First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

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• 作者：Dirk Bergemann ; Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
• 刊名：Econometrica
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：85
• 期：1.x
• 页码：107-143
• 全文大小：334K
• ISSN：1468-0262

文摘

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values. We also report further characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from data on winning bids and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative auction mechanisms.