On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Daisuke Hirata ; ^{d.hirata@r.hit-u.ac.jp} ; Yusuke Kasuya ^{yusuke.asia@gmail.com}
• 关键词：C78 ; D47
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：March 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：168
• 期：Complete
• 页码：27-43
• 全文大小：350 K
• 卷排序：168

文摘

This paper studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. Not assuming any kind of substitutes condition or the law of aggregate demand, we obtain the following results. First, the number of stable and strategy-proof rules is at most one. Second, the doctor-optimal stable rule, whenever it exists, is the unique candidate for a stable and strategy-proof rule. Third, a stable and strategy-proof rule, whenever it exists, is second-best optimal for doctor welfare, in that no individually rational and strategy-proof rule can dominate it. This last result is further generalized to non-wasteful and strategy-proof rules. Due to the weak assumptions, our analysis covers a broad range of markets, including cases where a (unique) stable and strategy-proof rule is not equal to the one induced by the cumulative offer process or the deferred acceptance algorithm.