Social elites on the board and executive pay in developing countries: Evidence from Africa

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• 作者：Bruce Hearn^a ; ^{b.a.hearn@sussex.ac.uk} ; Roger Strange^a ; Jenifer Piesse^b ; ^c
• 关键词：Salary ; IPO ; Political economy ; Social elites ; Emerging economies ; Africa
• 刊名：Journal of World Business
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：52
• 期：2
• 页码：230-243
• 全文大小：788 K
• 卷排序：52

文摘

This study applies a new multi-focal actor-centered institution-theoretic approach to examine the association between executive pay and the recruitment of social elites to the board of directors in developing countries. We use a sample of 119 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 17 African stock markets to model this relationship. The results suggest that a higher proportion of elites on the board is associated with lower executive pay. This is moderated by institutional quality; that is, lower institutional quality is associated with more directors drawn from social elites and with higher pay, while the opposite is true in higher-institutional-quality environments. Our findings confirm the importance of the social environment within which governance is embedded.