Appointments of outsiders as CEOs, state-owned enterprises, and firm performance: Evidence from China

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• 作者：Fuxiu Jiang ; ^{jfx@ruc.edu.cn} ; Jicheng Huang ^{huangjicheng008@163.com} ; Kenneth A. Kim ; ^{kennethakim@gmail.com}
• 关键词：G30
• 刊名：Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：June, 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：23
• 期：Complete
• 页码：49-64
• 全文大小：269 K

文摘

We study CEO successions in China and focus on the decision to appoint outsiders as CEOs. In doing so, we also differentiate our sample into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and non-SOEs. We find that firm-specific factors can predict external successions for SOEs, but not for non-SOEs. Further, for those SOEs that choose outsiders as CEOs for firm-specific reasons, their subsequent firm performance improves.