Assessing bankruptcy reform in a model with temptation and equilibrium default

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• 作者：Makoto Nakajima ^{makoto.nakajima@phil.frb.org}
• 关键词：Consumer bankruptcy ; Debt ; Default ; Borrowing constraint ; Temptation and self-control ; Hyperbolic discounting ; Heterogeneous agents ; Incomplete markets
• 刊名：Journal of Public Economics
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：145
• 期：Complete
• 页码：42-64
• 全文大小：1573 K
• 卷排序：145

文摘

I construct a novel model with equilibrium default and temptation. Agents with and without temptation coexist in the model. The 2005 bankruptcy law reform and other reforms are evaluated using the model. The 2005 reform reduces bankruptcy filings, and generates a welfare gain. Temptation plays a role when evaluating the optimal income garnishment rate.