A revenue-sharing option contract toward coordination of supply chains

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• 作者：Hamed Vafa Arani ^{h.vafa@ut.ac.ir" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Masoud Rabbani ; ^{mrabani@ut.ac.ir" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Hamed Rafiei ^{hrafiei@ut.ac.ir" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：Option contract ; Revenue-sharing contract ; Mixed revenue-sharing option contract ; Game theory ; Supply chain coordination ; Double marginalization
• 刊名：International Journal of Production Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：August 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：178
• 期：Complete
• 页码：42-56
• 全文大小：1156 K

文摘

In this paper, a novel mixed revenue-sharing option contract is introduced to coordinate a retailer–manufacturer supply chain. A European call option mechanism and a revenue-sharing mechanism are combined to cover drawbacks of the classic contracts. The option can increase the profit of the chain and the revenue-sharing can reduce double marginalization effects. In addition, an instantaneous purchase and a shortage penalty mechanism are introduced. The proposed mixed contract is modeled through a game theoretic approach to examine several possible situations in order to obtain the order quantity of the retailer and the production quantity of the manufacturer in the Nash equilibrium. Also, both the retailer and the manufacturer are considered as the leader of the chain to recommend an appropriate contract conditions for various types of industries and markets. Finally, the best conditions for achieving the supply chain coordination are provided in different situations. Results also demonstrate that the mixed contract dominates a wholesale and a basic option contract. The proposed coordination mechanism is applied in a real fashion apparel supply chain in Iran and a comprehensive sensitivity analysis is implemented on some parameters of the contract to provide some managerial insights for the supply chain members.