Conforming coalitions in Markov Stackelberg security games: Setting max cooperative defenders vs. non-cooperative attackers
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- 作者：Julio B. Clempnera ; julio@clempner.name" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Alexander S. Poznyakb ; apoznyak@ctrl.cinvestav.mx" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Security games ; Stackelberg ; Strong equilibrium ; Lp-norm ; Coalition ; Multiple agents
- 刊名：Applied Soft Computing
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：October 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：47
- 期：Complete
- 页码：1-11
- 全文大小：1836 K
文摘
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A real security game is represented for cooperative Stackelberg games.
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The game describes a group of defenders that cooperate and a group attackers that do not.
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The coalition is reached by computing the Strong Lp-Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium.
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The extraproximal method is employed for converging to an equilibrium point.
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A game-theoretic formulation method is provided to generate randomized patrol schedules.