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刊物类别:Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
刊物主题:Philosophy Philosophy Logic Epistemology Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion
出版者:Springer Netherlands
ISSN:1573-0883
文摘
In this paper I explore the points of similarity and difference that distinguish expressivists such as myself from the position known as Cornell realism. I argue that there are considerable overlaps of doctrine, although these doctrines are arrived at in very different ways. I urge that Cornell realism can only benefit by taking on some of the commitments of expressivism.