Colluding with a conscience

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• 作者：Rudy Santore (1)
  Youping Li (2)
  Stephen J. Cotten (3)
  
  1. Department of Economics ; University of Tennessee ; Knoxville ; TN聽 ; 37996 ; USA
  2. School of Business ; East China University of Science and Technology ; 130 Meilong Road ; Shanghai聽 ; 200237 ; China
  3. Department of Economics and Finance ; University of Houston ; Clear Lake ; Houston ; TX聽 ; 77058 ; USA
  
• 关键词：Collusion ; Antitrust policy ; Behavioral economics ; Incentive compensation ; D43 ; K21 ; L13
• 刊名：Journal of Economics
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：April 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：114
• 期：3
• 页码：255-269
• 全文大小：245 KB
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• 刊物主题：Economics general; Economic Theory; International Economics; Microeconomics; R & D/Technology Policy;
• 出版者：Springer Vienna
• ISSN：1617-7134

文摘

Other-regarding preferences have been documented in many strategic settings. We provide a model in which the managers of firms in an oligopoly have preferences for both consumer welfare and own income. We find that profit sharing can function as a facilitating practice. Managers must receive a sufficiently large share of profits for collusion to be sustained, and the optimal collusive price increases with the degree of profit sharing. Thus, restrictions on performance-based compensation may be consistent with the objectives of antitrust policy. We also find that an increase in industry concentration can harm consumers even if the firms were already successfully colluding.