Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust Law and Economics
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- 作者：Pinar Akman ; D. Daniel Sokol
- 关键词：Antitrust ; Competition law ; Economics ; Most favored nation ; MFN ; Resale price maintenance ; RPM
- 刊名：Review of Industrial Organization
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：March 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：50
- 期：2
- 页码：133-151
- 全文大小：
- 刊物类别：Business and Economics
- 刊物主题：Industrial Organization; Microeconomics;
- 出版者：Springer US
- ISSN：1573-7160
- 卷排序：50
文摘
The legal framing of a firm’s pricing strategy can determine whether it constitutes online resale price maintenance (RPM) or online most favored nation (MFN). Together, cases that involve online RPM and MFN can be viewed as a natural experiment of how antitrust economics and law may adapt to an online world. Thus far, legal theories that have been inconsistent with economic theories have dictated enforcement across jurisdictions, which has led to confusion that thwarts potentially efficient business practices. This paper distinguishes issues of online RPM from traditional RPM and online RPM from online MFN. We apply the economics learning to RPM and analyze the antitrust cases of online RPM and MFN to date in the United States, Europe, and Australia. Finally, we offer policy recommendations that reduce the confusion in current legal doctrine.