Judicial Discretion and the Problem of Dirty Hands

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• 作者：Daniel Tigard
• 关键词：Discretion ; Dirty hands ; Moral emotions ; H.L.A. Hart ; Michael Walzer
• 刊名：Ethical Theory & Moral Practice
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：February 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：19
• 期：1
• 页码：177-192
• 全文大小：255 KB
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• 作者单位：Daniel Tigard (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, USA
  
• 刊物主题：Ethics; Political Philosophy; Ontology;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8447

文摘

H.L.A. Hart’s lost and found essay ‘Discretion’ has provided new insight into the issue of how legal systems can cope with indeterminacy in the law. The so-called ‘open texture’ of law calls for the exercise of judicial discretion, which, I argue, renders judges susceptible to the problem of dirty hands. To show this, I frame the problem as being open to an array of appropriate emotional responses, namely, various senses of guilt. With these responses in mind, I revise an example from Michael Walzer’s original analysis in a way that highlights purely personal sacrifices in solutions to dirty hands situations. I then turn to an account of moral emotions in legal decision-making and show how judges—in failing to advance all interests—might be left with a unique sense of guilt. With an application of this account to Hart’s legal positivism, it can be seen that a judge’s hands are often dirtied in resolving borderline cases. If discretion leaves judges in situations where they must do wrong in order to do right, Hart’s endorsement of a closure view of wrongdoing will lead to difficulties in how he can explain the presence of moral remainders in jurisprudence.