Real Estate Agents, House Prices, and Liquidity

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• 作者：Henry J. Munneke (1)
  Joseph T. L. Ooi (2)
  C. F. Sirmans (3)
  Geoffrey K. Turnbull (4)
  
  1. Department of Ins/LS/RE ; University of Georgia ; Athens ; GA ; USA
  2. Department of Real Estate ; National University of Singapore ; Singapore ; Singapore
  3. Department of Risk Mgt/Insurance ; Real Estate ; and Business Law ; Florida State University ; Tallahassee ; FL ; USA
  4. Dr. P. Phillips School of Real Estate ; University of Central Florida ; Orlando ; FL ; USA
  
• 关键词：Real estate agents ; House prices ; Liquidity ; Moral hazard
• 刊名：The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：January 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：50
• 期：1
• 页码：1-33
• 全文大小：502 KB
• 参考文献：1. Brastow, R. T., Springer, T. M., & Waller, B. D. (2011). Efficiency and incentives in residential brokerage. / Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. doi:10.1007/s11146-011-9301-1 .
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  14. Rutherford, R. C., Springer, T., & Yavas, A. (2005). Conflicts between principals and agents: evidence from real estate brokerage. / Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 627鈥?65. CrossRef
  15. Simon, H. A. (1951). A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship. / Econometrica, 19, 293鈥?05. CrossRef
  16. Sirmans, C. F., & Turnbull, G. K. (1997). Brokerage pricing under competition. / Journal of Urban Economics, 41, 102鈥?17. CrossRef
  17. Sirmans, C. F., Turnbull, G. K., & Benjamin, J. D. (1991). The markets for housing and real estate broker services. / Journal of Housing Economics, 1, 207鈥?17. CrossRef
  18. Sirmans, C. F., Turnbull, G. K., & Dombrow, J. (1997). Residential development, risk, and land prices. / Journal of Regional Science, 37, 613鈥?28. CrossRef
  19. Sirmans, C. F., Sirmans, G. S., & Turnbull, G. K. (1999). Prices, incentives, and choice of management form. / Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29, 173鈥?97. CrossRef
  20. Tse, R. Y. C. (2002). Estimating Neighbourhood Effects in House Prices: Towards a New Hedonic Model Approach. / Urban Studies, 39(7), 1165鈥?180. CrossRef
  21. Turnbull, G. K. (1993). Incentive Compatibility and the Quantity-Setting Competitive Firm under Demand Uncertainty. / Journal of Economics, 58, 77鈥?9. CrossRef
  22. Turnbull, G. K., & Dombrow, J. (2006). Spatial Competition and Shopping Externalities: Evidence from the Housing Market. / Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 32, 391鈥?08. CrossRef
  23. Zahirovic-Herbert, V., & Turnbull, G. K. (2008). School Quality, House Prices, and Liquidity. / Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 37, 113鈥?30. CrossRef
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Regional Science
  Finance and Banking
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-045X

文摘

Comparing agent-owner with agent-represented home sales illustrates that commission contracts lead to external agent moral hazard. Real estate developers are sophisticated sellers who can either use external agents or hire internal agents. The theory shows that neither scheme eliminates agent moral hazard. The empirical study of how the seller-agent relationship affects both price and liquidity in a simultaneous system concludes that external agents enjoy superior selling ability that offset moral hazard effects.