Machines and the Moral Community
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- 作者：Erica L. Neely (1)
- 关键词：Moral patiency ; Moral community ; Artificial intelligence ; Intelligent machines ; Conscious machines ; Machine rights ; Robot ethics
- 刊名：Philosophy & Technology
- 出版年：2014
- 出版时间：March 2014
- 年：2014
- 卷：27
- 期：1
- 页码：97-111
- 全文大小：210 KB
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1. Department of Philosophy and Religion, Ohio Northern University, Ada, OH, 45810, USA - ISSN：2210-5441
文摘
A key distinction in ethics is between members and nonmembers of the moral community. Over time, our notion of this community has expanded as we have moved from a rationality criterion to a sentience criterion for membership. I argue that a sentience criterion is insufficient to accommodate all members of the moral community; the true underlying criterion can be understood in terms of whether a being has interests. This may be extended to conscious, self-aware machines, as well as to any autonomous intelligent machines. Such machines exhibit an ability to formulate desires for the course of their own existence; this gives them basic moral standing. While not all machines display autonomy, those which do must be treated as moral patients; to ignore their claims to moral recognition is to repeat past errors. I thus urge moral generosity with respect to the ethical claims of intelligent machines.