Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences

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• 作者：John Duffy ; Félix Mu?oz-García
• 关键词：Prisoner’s dilemma ; Social preferences ; Inequity aversion ; Incomplete information ; Signaling ; Information transmission ; C72 ; C73 ; D82
• 刊名：Theory and Decision
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：January 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：78
• 期：1
• 页码：45-75
• 全文大小：392 KB
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• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Economic Theory
  Game Theory and Mathematical Methods
  Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behavioral Sciences
  Methodology of the Social Sciences
  Operation Research and Decision Theory
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-7187

文摘

This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players-concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding “inequity aversion.-In this environment, we show that only a pooling equilibrium can be sustained, in which a player type who is unconcerned about fairness initially cooperates in order to disguise himself as a player type who is concerned about fairness. This disguising strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate in all periods of the repeated game, including the final period, at which point the player type who is unconcerned about fairness takes the opportunity to defect, i.e., he “backstabs-the uninformed player. Despite such last-minute defection, our results show that the introduction of incomplete information can actually result in a Pareto improvement under certain conditions. We connect the predictions of this “backstabbing-equilibrium with the frequently observed decline in cooperative behavior in the final period of finitely repeated experimental games.