A New Semantics for Vagueness

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• 作者：Joshua D. K. Brown ; James W. Garson
• 刊名：Erkenntnis
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：82
• 期：1
• 页码：65-85
• 全文大小：
• 刊物主题：Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Ontology; Ethics; Logic;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8420
• 卷排序：82

文摘

Intuitively, vagueness involves some sort of indeterminacy: if Plato is a borderline case of baldness, then there is no fact of the matter about whether or not he’s bald—he’s neither bald nor not bald. The leading formal treatments of such indeterminacy—three valued logic, supervaluationism, etc.—either fail to validate the classical theorems, or require that various classically valid inference rules be restricted. Here we show how a fully classical, yet indeterminist account of vagueness can be given within natural semantics, an alternative semantics for classical proof theory. The key features of the account are: there is a single notion of truth—definite truth—and a single notion of validity; sentences can be true, false, or undetermined; all classical theorems and all classical inference rule are valid; the sorites argument is unsound; ‘definitely’ is treated as a meta-language predicate; higher-order vagueness is handled via semantic ascent.