Strategic risk in supply chain contract design

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• 作者：Abdolkarim Sadrieh ; Guido Voigt
• 关键词：Behavioral operations management ; Contracting ; Asymmetric information ; Punishment
• 刊名：Journal of Business Economics
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：87
• 期：1
• 页码：125-153
• 全文大小：
• 刊物主题：Business and Management, general; Operations Management; Organization; Human Resource Management; Accounting/Auditing; Business Taxation/Tax Law;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1861-8928
• 卷排序：87

文摘

Supply chains facing asymmetric information can either operate in a cooperative mode with information and benefit sharing or can choose a non-cooperative form of interaction and align their incentives via screening contracts. In the cooperative mode, supply chain efficiency can be achieved, but high levels of trust and trustworthiness are required. In the non-cooperative mode, the contract mechanism guarantees a second best supply chain performance, but only if all parties choose their equilibrium strategies without trembles. Experimental evidence, however, shows that both operating modes often fail due to strategic risk. Cooperation is disrupted by deceptive signals and the lack of trust, whereas non-cooperative strategies suffer from persistent out-of-equilibrium behavior. We present two means to reduce strategic risk. First, a punishment mechanism leads to a better matching of trust and trustworthiness and supports the cooperative operating mode. Second, an enforcement of self-selection supports the non-cooperative equilibrium by increasing the attractiveness of screening contracts. We find that supply chain performance can benefit from reduced strategic risk in either operating mode.