Addressing the valuation problem in multi-round combinatorial auctions

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• 作者：Soumyakanti Chakraborty ; Anup K. Sen ; Amitava Bagchi
• 关键词：Multi ; round combinatorial auction ; Information feedback ; Package valuation ; Valuation problem
• 刊名：Information Systems Frontiers
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：October 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：17
• 期：5
• 页码：1145-1160
• 全文大小：1,871 KB
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• 作者单位：Soumyakanti Chakraborty (1)
  Anup K. Sen (2)
  Amitava Bagchi (3)
  
  1. XLRI Xavier School of Management, C.H.Area(E), Jamshedpur, Jharkhand, 831001, India
  2. Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Joka, Diamond Harbour Road, Kolkata, 700104, India
  3. Heritage Institute of Technology, East Kolkata Township, Anandapur, Kolkata, 700107, India
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Business Information Systems
  Management of Computing and Information Systems
  Systems Theory and Control
  Operation Research and Decision Theory
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-9419

文摘

Multi-round combinatorial auctions have been infrequently employed for essentially two reasons, the computational complexity of the Winner Determination Problem, and the need to provide information feedback to bidders to enable them to bid meaningfully. Here we take a fresh look at the second issue. In business environments, a bidder’s valuation of a package can change in response to signals from other bidders. In the absence of feedback, bidders are forced to expend time and resources to determine these package valuations as accurately as possible. We propose a multi-round combinatorial auction scheme with inter-round feedback called RevalSlot that helps a bidder to converge to an appropriate valuation for a package. This is likely to prove attractive to bidders and thereby increase bidder participation. We also propose a simplified version of the scheme called RevalBundle that requires fewer solutions of the Winner Determination Problem. Keywords Multi-round combinatorial auction Information feedback Package valuation Valuation problem