Weak versus strong net neutrality: correction and clarification

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• 作者：Joshua S. Gans ; Michael L. Katz
• 刊名：Journal of Regulatory Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：August 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：50
• 期：1
• 页码：99-110
• 全文大小：409 KB
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Industrial Organization
  Public Finance and Economics
  Microeconomics
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0468
• 卷排序：50

文摘

We correct and clarify the results of Gans (J Regul Econ 47:183–200, 2015) regarding the effects of net neutrality regulation on equilibrium outcomes in settings where a content provider sells its services to consumers for a fee. We examine both pricing and investment effects. We extend the earlier paper’s result that weak forms of net neutrality are ineffective and also show that even a strong form of net neutrality may be ineffective. In addition, we demonstrate that, when strong net neutrality does affect the equilibrium outcome, it may harm efficiency by distorting both ISP and content provider investment and service-quality choices.KeywordsRegulationNet neutralityInternet service providersContent providersInfrastructure investment