From Emergence Theory to Panpsychism—A Philosophical Evaluation of Nancey Murphy’s Non-reductive Physicalism

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• 作者：Mikael Leidenhag
• 关键词：Emergence theory ; Nancey Murphy ; Panpsychism ; Causal powers
• 刊名：Sophia
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：55
• 期：3
• 页码：381-394
• 全文大小：343 KB
• 刊物主题：Philosophy of Religion; Religious Studies; Philosophy; Non-Western Philosophy; Humanities, general;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1873-930X
• 卷排序：55

文摘

In this article, I offer a critical evaluation of non-reductive physicalism as articulated and defended by Nancey Murphy. I argue that (A) the examples given by Murphy do not illustrate robust emergence and the philosophical idea of downward causation. (B) The thesis of multiple realizability is ontologically neutral, and so cannot support the idea of the causal efficacy of higher-level properties. (C) Supervenience is incompatible with strong emergence. I also argue for the fruitful relationship between emergence theory and panpsychism pertaining to the metaphysical issue of the origin and nature of mind.