Inside or outside control of banks? Evidence from the composition of supervisory boards

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• 作者：Kathrin Johansen ; Saskia Laser ; Doris Neuberger&#8230
• 关键词：Corporate governance ; Dual board system ; Principal agent theory ; Stakeholder theory ; Banks
• 刊名：European Journal of Law and Economics
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：43
• 期：1
• 页码：31-58
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Law and Economics; European Integration; Public Finance; Commercial Law;
• 出版者：Springer US
• ISSN：1572-9990
• 卷排序：43

文摘

This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of 41 large German banks in 1999–2010. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by major shareholders and inside control by other stakeholders. The largest group among non-employee board members is made up of bank managers. The high proportion of former executives and German board representation indicates significant inside control. The chairpersons of banks controlled by banks are less likely to be former executives of the same bank than are the chairpersons of banks controlled by non-banks. Over time, representation of industrial and insurance companies on banks’ supervisory boards has decreased and the representation of banks and foreign shareholders has increased.