Strategic bidding in an accumulating priority queue: equilibrium analysis

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• 作者：Moshe Haviv ; Liron Ravner
• 关键词：Queueing games ; Dynamic priority ; Strategic priority purchasing ; Queue priority pricing
• 刊名：Annals of Operations Research
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：244
• 期：2
• 页码：505-523
• 全文大小：715 KB
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Operation Research and Decision Theory
  Combinatorics
  Theory of Computation
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-9338
• 卷排序：244

文摘

We study the strategic purchasing of priorities in a time-dependent accumulating priority M/G/1 queue. We formulate a non-cooperative game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in exchange. The priority of each customer in the queue is a linear function of the individual waiting time, with the purchased coefficient being the slope. The unique pure Nash equilibrium is solved explicitly for the case with homogeneous customers. A general characterisation of the Nash equilibrium is provided for the heterogeneous case. It is shown that both avoid the crowd and follow the crowd behaviors are prevalent, within class types and between them. We further present a pricing mechanism that ensures the order of the accumulating priority rates in equilibrium follows a \(C\mu \) type rule and improves overall efficiency.