Resolute majority rules

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• 作者：Hyewon Jeong ; Biung-Ghi Ju
• 关键词：Majority rule ; Majority rule with a quorum ; Resoluteness ; Neutrality ; Monotonicity ; Positive responsiveness
• 刊名：Theory and Decision
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：82
• 期：1
• 页码：31-39
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Operation Research/Decision Theory; Behavioral/Experimental Economics; Statistics for B
• 出版者：Springer US
• ISSN：1573-7187
• 卷排序：82

文摘

We investigate resolute voting rules that always rank two alternatives strictly and avoid social indecision. Resolute majority rules differ from the standard majority rule in that whenever both alternatives win the same number of votes, a tie-breaking function is used to determine the outcome. We provide axiomatic characterizations of resolute majority rules or resolute majority rules with a quorum. Resoluteness axiom is used in all these results. The other axioms are weaker than those considered in the characterization of the majority rule by May (1952 Econometrica, 20:680–684). In particular, instead of May’s positive responsiveness, we consider a much weaker monotonicity axiom.