Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function

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• 关键词：Traffic flow ; BPR latency function ; Wardrop equilibrium ; Price of anarchy
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：9869
• 期：1
• 页码：37-49
• 全文大小：218 KB
• 参考文献：1.U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. Traffic Assignment Manual. U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C (1964)
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• 作者单位：Jaimie W. Lien (18)
  Vladimir V. Mazalov (19)
  Anna V. Melnik (20)
  Jie Zheng (21)
  
  18. Department of Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong, China
  19. Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center, Russian Academy of Sciences, 11, Pushkinskaya Street, Petrozavodsk, Russia, 185910
  20. Saint-Petersburg State University, Universitetskii Prospekt 35, Saint-petrsburg, Russia, 198504
  21. Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China
  
• 丛书名：Discrete Optimization and Operations Research
• ISBN：978-3-319-44914-2
• 刊物类别：Computer Science
• 刊物主题：Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
  Computer Communication Networks
  Software Engineering
  Data Encryption
  Database Management
  Computation by Abstract Devices
  Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
  
• 出版者：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
• ISSN：1611-3349
• 卷排序：9869

文摘

This paper considers a network comprised of parallel routes with the Bureau of Public Road (BPR) latency function and suggests an optimal distribution method for incoming traffic flow. The authors analytically derive a system of equations defining the optimal distribution of the incoming flow with minimum social costs, as well as a corresponding system of equations for the Wardrop equilibrium in this network. In particular, the Wardrop equilibrium is applied to the competition model with rational consumers who use the carriers with minimal cost, where cost is equal to the price for service plus the waiting time for the service. Finally, the social costs under the equilibrium and under the optimal distribution are compared. It is shown that the price of anarchy can be infinitely large in the model with strategic pricing.