On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
详细信息 查看全文
- 作者：Nizar Allouch ; Myrna Wooders
- 关键词：NTU games ; Core ; Approximate cores ; Small group effectiveness ; Coalition formation ; Payoff ; dependent balancedness
- 刊名：Economic Theory
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：January 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：63
- 期：1
- 页码：191-209
- 全文大小：506KB
- 刊物类别：Business and Economics
- 刊物主题：Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Microeconomics; Public Finance;
- 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- ISSN：1432-0479
- 卷排序：63
文摘
We provide a new proof of the nonemptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their “balanced cover games,” which are nonempty, can be approximated by equal-treatment \(\varepsilon \)-cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we develop a limiting payoff possibilities set and rely on a fixed point theorem.