Belief Systems and Partial Spaces

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• 作者：Otávio Bueno
• 关键词：Problem space ; Conceptual space ; State ; space ; Partial space ; Belief system
• 刊名：Foundations of Science
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：March 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：21
• 期：1
• 页码：225-236
• 全文大小：406 KB
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• 作者单位：Otávio Bueno (1)
  
  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33124, USA
  
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy
  Philosophy of Science
  Methodology of the Social Sciences
  Mathematical Logic and Foundations
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-8471

文摘

One important role of belief systems is to allow us to represent information about a certain domain of inquiry. This paper presents a formal framework to accommodate such information representation. Three cognitive models to represent information are discussed: conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors in Conceptual spaces: the geometry of thought. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000), state-spaces (van Fraassen in Quantum mechanics: an empiricist view. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), and the problem spaces familiar from artificial intelligence. After indicating their weakness to deal with partial information, it is argued that an alternative, formulated in terms of partial structures (da Costa and French in Science and partial truth. Oxford University Press, New York, 2003), can be provided which not only captures the positive features of these models, but also accommodates the partiality of information ubiquitous in science and mathematics.