Security Games with Ambiguous Information about Attacker Types

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• 作者：Youzhi Zhang (21)
  Xudong Luo (21)
  Wenjun Ma (22)
  
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：8272
• 期：1
• 页码：26-31
• 全文大小：271KB
• 作者单位：Youzhi Zhang (21)
  Xudong Luo (21)
  Wenjun Ma (22)
  
  21. Institute of Logic and Cognition, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
  22. School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK
  
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

There has been significant recent interest in security games, which are used to solve the problems of limited security resource allocation. In particular, the research focus is on the Bayesian Stackelberg game model with incomplete information about players’ types. However, in real life, the information in such a game is often not only incomplete but also ambiguous for lack of sufficient evidence, i.e., the defender could not precisely have the probability of each type of the attacker. To address this issue, we define a new kind of security games with ambiguous information about the attacker’s types. In this paper, we also propose an algorithm to find the optimal mixed strategy for the defender and analyse the computational complexity of the algorithm. Finally, we do lots of experiments to evaluate that our model.