文摘
To increase transparency in financial reporting and to promote a better understanding of companies' off-balance sheet obligations, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued Final Rule No. 67 (FR-67) to mandate a tabular disclosure of all known on- and off-balance sheet contractual obligations in a single location within the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&;A) from 2003. Using a sample of S&;P 1500 companies, I examine whether the disclosures under Rule FR-67 influence the assessment of credit risk by credit rating agencies, public bond holders, and private loan lenders. I find that all four credit risk measures (i.e., credit ratings, negative credit watch, bond spreads, and the number of covenants in private loan contracts) significantly increase with off-balance sheet obligations when the firms report the tabular disclosures of contractual obligations for the first time. My results also suggest that the three major debt-market participants view purchase obligations at least as relevant as operating leases and other types of off-balance sheet obligations in explaining firms' credit risk. This evidence should be of interest to regulators, investors, and creditors in addressing the present debate about to what extent off-balance sheet items should be recognized on the balance sheet.