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The People's Republic of China,1949-2012: A Political Economy Perspective.
详细信息   
  • 作者:Li ; Mark Z.
  • 学历:Doctor
  • 年:2013
  • 导师:Rowley,Charles K.,eadvisorPaden,John N.ecommittee memberWilliams,Walter E.ecommittee member
  • 毕业院校:George Mason University
  • Department:Economics.
  • ISBN:9781267912466
  • CBH:3552663
  • Country:USA
  • 语种:English
  • FileSize:5546607
  • Pages:330
文摘
This dissertation explores the evolution of China from a socialist economy to an authoritarian market economy from a political economy perspective. Chapter 1 presents an analytical history of China from the Xia Dynasty to the Early Chinese Republic 2070 BC – 1949). I trace the history back to the beginning of Chinese civilization,and evaluate its progression over a span of more than 4,000 years in terms of social,political,economic,and philosophical developments. Chapter 2 introduces a public choice evaluation of two key dictators,Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping,who shaped modern China. The first stage analyzes the ideologies of these two dictators and their initial choice of economic institutions. I find that the ideological formations of both dictators are path dependent due to the unique Chinese culture stretched over a span of more than 4,000 years. I also find that the initial economic institutions utilized by both leaders are influenced by their upbringing. The second stage of the evaluation uses a model of dictatorship developed by Ronald Wintrobe 1998) to analyze Mao and Deng as dictators. Chapter 3 provides a timeline of Chinas political and economic transition between 1949 and 2012. Starting with Mao,his failed socialist economy ended in the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. After Mao,Deng established a blueprint for Chinas market oriented growth model,which created the incentive for local government officials and self-interested individuals to engage in profit-seeking exchanges. After Deng,Jiang followed Dengs footstep by promoting economic privatization which transformed China into an authoritarian market economy. After Jiang,Hu slowed down Chinas market process by focusing on strengthening the existing state-owned enterprises,and increasing media censorship and repression. Xi will be the next leader of China; based on what is known of him,Xis pro-Mao political ideology is unlikely to be compatible with greater economic freedom in China. Chapter 4 applies empirical analysis to case studies on the evaluation of economic freedom in China,from 1978 to 2000. First,using the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 as a tipping point to the advancement of economic freedom in China,I empirically test economic factors driving Chinese citizens increased awareness of freedom,which led to these protests. I find that domestic investment of the collective and the private sectors,FDI,and the level of education at the provincial level are highly correlated with the number of protestors in major cities. Second,I empirically test the impact of major reforms of state-owned enterprises SOEs) on the productivity increase of SOEs. Chapter 5 develops case studies on the impact of Chinas WTO accession to Chinas sustained economic growth,from 2001 to 2012. First,I empirically test the effect of government size at the provincial level to foreign investment inflow,and then repeat the process to test the impact of foreign investment inflow in promoting the growth of non-state enterprises. I find that smaller provincial government size attracted greater foreign investment,while foreign investment inflow are highly correlated with provincial economic growth driven by non-state enterprises. Second,I analyze the impact of Chinas rapid economic growth,driven by both domestic market-oriented reforms and foreign investment,on the demand for rural migrant workers in the urban areas. Chapter 6 tests the theory of political survival developed by Bruce Beuno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith 2011) on Chinas dictatorship. This theory predicts that the behavior of dictators depends on the relative size of the minimum winning coalition and the selectorate. Consistent with the theory,a smaller minimum winning coalition leads to greater private goods and less public goods in China. In addition to their theory,I find that the relative size of the different factions within the winning coalition matters just as much if not more in shaping the behavior of Chinas dictators. Then,I use Xis presidential transition and Bo Xilais political downfall as a case study. Finally,I evaluate Chinas four alternative shifts from the status quo over the coming decade and the conditions that will determine which of them will most likely take place. Chapter 7 assesses the past and future trend of economic and political freedom in China under the past leader Hu Jintao and the new leader Xi Jinping. First,using various economic and political indexes produced by the Fraser Institute,The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal,and the Freedom House,I find that Chinas rapid growth in the past decade had both positive and negative impact on Chinas economic freedom ranking,but this rapid growth had little or negative impact on Chinas progress toward a more politically free state. Second,I evaluate Chinas future economic and political freedom,based on the composition of the 18<super>th</super> PSC. Abstract shortened by UMI.).

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