Capacity withholding in wholesale electricity markets: The experience in England and Wales.

详细信息   

• 作者：Quinn ; James Arnold.
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：2005
• 导师：Holmes, Thomas Joseph
• 毕业院校：University of Minnesota
• 专业：Economics, General.;Energy.
• ISBN：9780542036132
• CBH：3167707
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：27142312
• Pages：139

文摘

This thesis examines the incentives wholesale electricity generators face to withhold generating capacity from centralized electricity spot markets.;The first chapter includes a brief history of electricity industry regulation in England and Wales and in the United States, including a description of key institutional features of England and Wales' restructured electricity market. The first chapter also includes a review of the literature on both bid price manipulation and capacity bid manipulation in centralized electricity markets.;The second chapter details a theoretical model of wholesale generator behavior in a single price electricity market. A duopoly model is specified under the assumption that demand is non-stochastic. This model assumes that duopoly generators offer to sell electricity at their marginal cost, but can withhold a continuous segment of their capacity from the market. The Nash equilibrium withholding strategy of this model involves each duopoly generator withholding so that it produces the Cournot equilibrium output. A monopoly model along the lines of the duopoly model is specified and simulated under the assumption that demand is stochastic. The optimal strategy depends on the degree of demand uncertainty. When there is a moderate degree of demand uncertainty, the optimal withholding strategy involves production inefficiencies. When there is a high degree of demand uncertainty, the optimal monopoly quantity is greater than the optimal output level when demand is non-stochastic.;The third chapter contains an empirical examination of the behavior of generators in the wholesale electricity market in England and Wales in the early 1990's. The wholesale market in England and Wales is analyzed because the industry structure in the early 1990's created a natural experiment, which is described in this chapter, whereby one of the two dominant generators had no incentive to behave non-competitively. This chapter develops a classification methodology consistent with the equilibrium identified in the second chapter. The availability of generating units owned by the two dominant generators is analyzed based on this classification system. This analysis includes the use of sample statistics as well as estimates from a dynamic random effects probit model. The analysis suggests a minimal degree of capacity withholding.