Incomplete Contract Enforcement in International Trade
详细信息
- 作者：Olsen ; Morten Graugaard ; Ph.D.
- 学历：Ph.D.
- 年：2011
- 关键词：International trade ; Contract enforcement ; Banking
- 导师：Antras, Pol, Helpman, Elhanan, Hart, Oliver, Shleifer, Andrei
- 毕业院校：Harvard University
- 专业：Economics, Banking
- ISBN：9781124737683
- CBH：3462776
- Country：USA
- 语种：English
- FileSize：9186944
- Pages：249
文摘
This dissertation consists of three chapters on incomplete contract enforcement and international Trade .
The first chapter analyzes the role of banks in overcoming incomplete international contract enforcement. It argues that banks function as mechanisms for building reputation when firms themselves are incapable of doing so and that other large entities can serve a similar purpose.
The second chapter explores the role of repeated interaction in overcoming contract enforcement domestically and argues that although repeated interaction can overcome the short run incentive for dishonest behavior when contract enforcement is poor, it comes at the cost of creating rigid relationships which can stifle innovation and lead to dynamic costs.
The third chapter explores the role of accumulated sector-specific human capital in accounting for the observed sluggish adjustment to trade liberalization, but show that the existence of sector-specific human capital might be of a benefit to low-skilled workers, even - as we suggest is the case - the existence of sector-specific human capital is predominantly a feature of less educated workers.
The first chapter analyzes the role of banks in overcoming incomplete international contract enforcement. It argues that banks function as mechanisms for building reputation when firms themselves are incapable of doing so and that other large entities can serve a similar purpose.
The second chapter explores the role of repeated interaction in overcoming contract enforcement domestically and argues that although repeated interaction can overcome the short run incentive for dishonest behavior when contract enforcement is poor, it comes at the cost of creating rigid relationships which can stifle innovation and lead to dynamic costs.
The third chapter explores the role of accumulated sector-specific human capital in accounting for the observed sluggish adjustment to trade liberalization, but show that the existence of sector-specific human capital might be of a benefit to low-skilled workers, even - as we suggest is the case - the existence of sector-specific human capital is predominantly a feature of less educated workers.