Structures and dynamics of social networks: Selection,influence,and self-organization.
详细信息
- 作者：Go ; Myong-Hyun.
- 学历：Ph.D.
- 年：2010
- 毕业院校：The Pardee RAND Graduate School
- ISBN：9781109759594
- CBH：3407317
- Country：USA
- 语种：English
- FileSize：1369023
- Pages：128
文摘
The unifying theme of my dissertation is the study of social structures and dynamics of human networks: how peers at the micro level and physical environments at the macro level interact with the individual preferences and attributes and shape social dynamics. The dissertation is composed of three parts. The first essay, "Friendship Choices and Group Effects in Adolescent Smoking" explores the Add Health network data for modelling of peer effects. I analyze the association between group effects and individual behavior, as well as how the composition of friendship choices is affected by the change of an individuals attribute. This paper acts as exploratory analysis and theory building piece for the second paper. The second essay, "Social Distance and Homophily in Adolescent Smoking," addresses the issue of peer selection vs. peer influence. Human social networks are characterized by high levels of homogeneity and clustering, and the question I seek to answer with the study of adolescent networks is which of the two dynamics is most responsible for the problem of adolescent smoking. I employ the concept of social distance to parse out the effects of selection and influence: the key insight is that influence and selection, while seemingly confounded, are differentiable with the use of social distance. Friendship between two peers socially distant implies strong selection effect: the effect of influence becomes weaker as distance grows. I also address the concern for selection on observables by adjusting the findings with the propensity score weights model with three treatment indicators. In the third essay, "Collective Location for Collective Action," I discuss collective action and collective location problems as complex social dynamics that are shaped by physical factors. Collective action can be seen as an example of multiple prisoners dilemma game, in which the Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium is to always defect. Mass protests are collective actions taking place in a single location. The provision of collective action then depends on the solution to the collective location problem. I show that by solving the n-person location problem, the solution of which is the center of mass of any convex surface, mutual cooperation becomes the Nash equilibrium solution to the collective action problem.