文摘
Fiscal decentralization has generated enormous interest in the past two decades. Despite some remaining skepticism regarding fiscal decentralization, many countries have adopted various forms in an effort to improve public service quality. The primary objectives of this dissertation are to understand fiscal decentralization in unitary countries, to gain information about the role of the equalization program in local finances, and to investigate local financial accountability issues in a unitary country. Three independent but linked studies were conducted to achieve the above objectives. They employ case studies on Taiwans equalization transfer program, the Centrally-Allotted Tax Revenue CATR) program, and local financial accountability---since a transformation of the CATR program in 2000 from a discretionary to a formula-driven program was referred to as a reform toward fiscal decentralization. The first study concerns the equalization function of the CATR program. It reviews the current CATR distribution regulations and identifies contemporary issues in it. Findings indicate that the current distribution approach is not transparent or objective enough, the equalization function does not improve by using the current formula-based distribution approach, and the distribution results have low correlations with inter-regions relative poverty and demand. The second study focuses on the expenditure impacts of the CATR program. An approach claimed by Nagamine 1995), which considers institutionalized difference between Japans and western countries local governments is adopted to detect the flypaper effect. An interrupted times-series approach is applied to address the transformation of the program in 2000. Results lend no support to the existence of the flypaper effect, and the use of formula to allocate CATR funds does not change CATRs expenditure effect. The third study provides an evaluation on the current local financial mechanism in Taiwan. Findings suggest that local financial accountability has improved significantly in recent years, yet more efforts are needed to enhance it. Bottom-up accountability is insufficient; the central government is involved in the use of general grants, but may hurt the responsive accountability of local governments; the integrity of internal oversight is not assured; and the quality of external accountability needs to be improved.