可用冗余与研发投入:股权激励与破产距离的联合调节
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摘要
如何挖掘冗余资源价值、打破创新资源束缚在经济转型阶段备受关注。以我国2011-2015年间沪深两市A股企业为样本剖析股权激励如何影响高管利用可用冗余进行研发投入,以及破产距离对可用冗余与研发投入关系的调节作用,并进一步考察了股权激励与破产距离的联合调节作用。结果表明,可用冗余与研发投入正相关;高管股权激励会正向调节可用冗余与研发投入的关系;破产距离会正向调节可用冗余与研发投入的关系;当企业破产距离较远时,高管股权激励对可用冗余与研发投入关系所起的正向调节效应更加显著。在区分企业产权性质后,发现以上结论均在非国企中更为明显。
How to tap the value of available slack and break the constraint of innovative resources has attracted much attention in the economic transformation stage.Based on the data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2011 to 2015,this paper analyzes how equity incentives affects executives' use of available slack for R&D investment,and the effect of bankruptcy distance on the relationship between available slack and R&D investment,and further examines the joint moderation effects of the equity incentives and the bankruptcy distance.The results are shown below.Available slack is positively related to R&D investment.We also find that executive equity incentives will enhance the positive relationship between available slack and R&D investment.And this regulatory effect is more significant in companies with a long bankruptcy distance.In addition,the bankruptcy distance will enhance the positive relationship between available slack and R&D investment.After distinguishing the nature of the ultimate controller,it is found that the above conclusions are all more pronounced in non-SOEs.This paper enriches the research on the related governance factors in the field of the relationship between available slack and R&D investment,and provides a theoretical reference for how to motivate executives to increase innovation activities.
How to tap the value of available slack and break the constraint of innovative resources has attracted much attention in the economic transformation stage.Based on the data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2011 to 2015,this paper analyzes how equity incentives affects executives' use of available slack for R&D investment,and the effect of bankruptcy distance on the relationship between available slack and R&D investment,and further examines the joint moderation effects of the equity incentives and the bankruptcy distance.The results are shown below.Available slack is positively related to R&D investment.We also find that executive equity incentives will enhance the positive relationship between available slack and R&D investment.And this regulatory effect is more significant in companies with a long bankruptcy distance.In addition,the bankruptcy distance will enhance the positive relationship between available slack and R&D investment.After distinguishing the nature of the ultimate controller,it is found that the above conclusions are all more pronounced in non-SOEs.This paper enriches the research on the related governance factors in the field of the relationship between available slack and R&D investment,and provides a theoretical reference for how to motivate executives to increase innovation activities.
引文
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[25]任天龙,马鹏程,李一鸣,等.国企高管激励方式协同配置:薪酬、股权与政治晋升[J].山东社会科学,2017(8):150-155.
[26]吕长江,徐丽莉,周琳.上市公司财务困境与财务破产的比较分析[J].经济研究,2004(8):64-73.
[2]Mellahi K,Wilkinson A.A Study of the Association between Level of Slack Reduction Following Downsizing and Innovation Output[J].Journal of Management Studies,2010,47(3):483-508.
[3]Hughes M,Eggers F,Kraus S,et al.The Relevance of Slack Resource Availability and Networking Effectiveness for Entrepreneurial Orientation[J].International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business,2015,16(1):116-138.
[4]Herold D M,Jayaraman N,Narayanaswamy C R.What is the Relationship between Organizational Slack and Innovation?[J].Journal of Managerial Issues,2006,18(3):372-392.
[5]解维敏,魏化倩.市场竞争、组织冗余与企业研发投入[J].中国软科学,2016(8):102-111.
[6]陈晓红,王艳,关勇军.财务冗余、制度环境与中小企业研发投资[J].科学学研究,2012,30(10):1537-1545.
[7]Kim H,Kim H,Lee P M.Ownership Structure and the Relationship Between Financial Slack and R&DInvestments:Evidence from Korean Firms[J].Organization Science,2008,19(3):404-418.
[8]毕晓方,李海英,宋雪如.高管过度自信对企业创新的影响:财务冗余的中介作用与调节作用[J].科技进步与对策,2016,33(7):108-114.
[9]Adler P S,Benner M,Brunner D J,et al.Perspectives on the Productivity Dilemma[J].Journal of Operations Management,2009,27(2):99-113.
[10]Zhang Yilei,Christie W G.Are Debt and Incentive Compensation Substitutes in Controlling the Free Cash Flow Agency Problem?[J].Financial Management,2009,38(3):507-541.
[11]Bourgeois L J.On the Measurement of Organizational Slack[J].Academy of Management Review,1981,6(1):29-39.
[12]Geiger S W,Cashen L H.A Multidimensional Examination of Slack and Its Impact on Innovation[J].Journal of Managerial Issues,2002,14(1):68-84.
[13]Su Ming,Hildreth W B.Does Financial Slack Reduce Municipal Short-Term Borrowing?[J].Public Budgeting&Finance,2018,38(1):95-113.
[14]Frank M,Goyal V K.Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2005,1:135-202.
[15]Tan J,Peng M W.Organizational Slack and Firm Performance during Economic Transitions:Two Studies from an Emerging Economy[J].Strategic Management Journal,2003,24(13):1249-1263.
[16]蒋卫平,刘黛蒂.研发投入、冗余资源与企业绩效的关系研究[J].财经理论与实践,2016,37(5):57-62.
[17]舒谦,陈治亚.治理结构、研发投入与公司绩效---基于中国制造型上市公司数据的研究[J].预测,2014(3):45-50.
[18]邵剑兵,朱芳芳.晋升效应还是财富效应:CTO激励机制影响企业研发投入分析[J].商业研究,2015,61(11):140-148.
[19]李晓翔,刘春林.冗余资源与企业绩效关系的情境研究---兼谈冗余资源的数量变化[J].南开管理评论,2011,14(3):4-14.
[20]Wan W P,Yiu D W.From Crisis to Opportunity:Environmental Jolt,Corporate Acquisitions,and Firm Performance[J].Strategic Management Journal,2009,30(7):791-801.
[21]Lant T K.Aspiration Level Adaptation:An Empirical Exploration[J].Management Science,1992,38(5):623-644.
[22]Staw B M,Sandelands L E,Dutton J E.Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior:A Multilevel Analysis[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1981,26(4):501-524.
[23]连燕玲,刘俊良,陈琼.破产威胁与战略变革---基于组织资源与市场丰腴性的调节效应研究[J].外国经济与管理,2016,38(10):20-34.
[24]Chen W R,Miller K D.Situational and Institutional Determinants of Firms'R&D Search Intensity[J].Strategic Management Journal,2007,28(4):369-381.
[25]任天龙,马鹏程,李一鸣,等.国企高管激励方式协同配置:薪酬、股权与政治晋升[J].山东社会科学,2017(8):150-155.
[26]吕长江,徐丽莉,周琳.上市公司财务困境与财务破产的比较分析[J].经济研究,2004(8):64-73.