英国与柏林空运(1948-1949)
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摘要
为了迫使英美等国中止建立西德国家的计划,苏联在1948年6月切断了柏林与德国西占区间的陆路交通,从而引发了第一次柏林危机。柏林封锁开始后,英国领导层迅速决策,于较短的时间内出台了利用空运打破封锁、并配合外交和谈的政策。在政策实施过程中,英国一方面通过积极地沟通和协调,引导美国在空运问题上的决策;另一方面,游说美国持续提升运输力度,削弱了苏联以封锁为武器阻止德国分裂的策略效果。柏林空运在推动第一次柏林危机的解决和西德国家的筹建进程方面,发挥了重要作用。然而,其成果在一定程度上被夸大了,学者们对英国在空运中所扮演的角色的评价褒贬不一,需要重新进行客观地评判。
In order to compel Britain and the United States and other western countries to suspend their plans of establishing West Germany, the Soviet Union severed the land traffic between Berlin and the Western Zones of Germany in June 1948, and triggered the First Berlin Crisis. After the Berlin Blockade started, British leadership made decisions quickly and developed policies that broke the blockade by Airlift and coordinated with the diplomatic negotiations. In the process of implementing the policy, the UK actively guided the decisions of the United States on airlift through communication and coordination. On the other hand, in order to weaken the Soviet Union's strategy effect of blockade to prevent the division of Germany, Britain had been lobbied to assist the USA continue to enhance transport capacity. The Berlin Airlift played an important role in the solution of the First Berlin Crisis; it also advanced the Western Germany Program. However, the achievements of the Berlin Airlift have been exaggerated to some extent, and the role of Britain in Berlin Airlift has received mixed comments, calling for an objective reappraisal.
In order to compel Britain and the United States and other western countries to suspend their plans of establishing West Germany, the Soviet Union severed the land traffic between Berlin and the Western Zones of Germany in June 1948, and triggered the First Berlin Crisis. After the Berlin Blockade started, British leadership made decisions quickly and developed policies that broke the blockade by Airlift and coordinated with the diplomatic negotiations. In the process of implementing the policy, the UK actively guided the decisions of the United States on airlift through communication and coordination. On the other hand, in order to weaken the Soviet Union's strategy effect of blockade to prevent the division of Germany, Britain had been lobbied to assist the USA continue to enhance transport capacity. The Berlin Airlift played an important role in the solution of the First Berlin Crisis; it also advanced the Western Germany Program. However, the achievements of the Berlin Airlift have been exaggerated to some extent, and the role of Britain in Berlin Airlift has received mixed comments, calling for an objective reappraisal.
引文
① Michael D.Haydock,City under Siege:The Berlin Blockade and Airlift,1948-1949,Washington,D.C.:Brasseys,2000,pp.2-3.
(1)关于柏林空运的研究主要有以下成果:Richard Collier,Bridge across the Sky:the Berlin Blockade and Airlift,1948-1949,London:Macmillan,1978;Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,TX:Texas A&M University Press,2000;Thomas D.Parrish,Berlin in the Balance,1945-1949:The Berlin Blockade,the Airlift,the First Major Battle of the Cold War,Reading:Addison-Wesley,1998;D.M.Giangreco and Robert E.Griffin,Airbridge to Berlin:The Berlin Crisis of 1948,Its Origin and Aftermath,Calif.:Presidio Press,1988;Avi Shlaim,The United States and the Berlin Blockade 1948-1949:A Study in Crisis Decision-making,Berkeley:University of California Press,1983;Daniel F.Harrington,“The Air Force Can Deliver Anything!”:A History of the Berlin Airlift,Ramstein AB,Ger.:USAFE History Office,1998;Wolfgang J.Huschke,The Candy Bombers:The Berlin Airlift 1948-49:A History of the People and Planes,Berlin:Metropol Verlag,1999;Robert Jackson,The Berlin Airlift,Wellingborough,Eng.:Patrick Stephens,1988;Roger D.Launius,“Berlin Airlift:Constructive Air Power”,Air Power History,spring,1989,pp.9-22;J.B.McLaughlin,“Berlin Airlift:Plus Fifty”,IFR:The Magazine for the Accomplished Pilot,June,1998,pp.6-9;Roger G.Miller,“Tunner and the Luftwaffe Connection with the Berlin Airlift”,Air Power History,Winter 2009,Vol.56 Issue 4,pp.28-35;杨捷:《美国应对第一次柏林危机的空运行动:决策动因与政治效应》,《南昌大学学报(人文社会科学版)》,2011年第1期;张凤艳:《美国应对柏林封锁空运政策的讨论及决策》,《首都师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,2006年第S2期;尚慧霞:《1948-1949柏林空运的影响初探》,《重庆科技学院学报(社会科学版)》,2013年第11期,等等。
(2)例如艾维·施莱姆在《英国,柏林封锁与冷战》(Avi Shlaim,“Britain,The Berlin Blockade and the Cold War”,International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),Vol.60,No.1(Winter,1983-1984),pp.1-14.)一文中认为,英国在空运行动中发挥了决定性的作用,并且比美国更具进取心。而艾玛·佩普洛的《英国在柏林空运中的作用》(Emma Peplow,“The Role of Britain in the Berlin Airlift”,History,Apr.2010,Vol.95 Issue 318,pp.207-224.),则认为柏林空运的成功,掩盖了英国领导人对该行动缺乏信心的事实,自始至终美国都可以随心所欲地操控空运,英国时常服从美国的决定,致使它在柏林空运中发挥的作用十分有限。
(3)本文所使用的档案文件可分为两类:第一类,缩微胶卷,包括英国外交部(Foreign Office,简称FO)、国防部(Ministry of Defence,DEFE)、陆军部(War Office,WO)、空军部(Air Ministry,AIR)和首相办公厅(Prime Minister’s Office,PREM)的档案,以及英国内阁文件(Cabinet Papers,简称CAB)和财政部文件(Treasury Papers,T),来源为首都师范大学历史学院世界史资料中心;第二类,已刊档案,主要有《英国外交事务档案集》和《美国对外关系文件集》。
(4)CAB 129/23/7,CP(48)7,Review of Soviet Policy,January 5th,1948.
(5)CAB 129/25/12,CP(48)72,The Threat to Western Civilisation,March 3rd,1948.
(6)CAB 129/23/6,CP(48)6,The First Aim of British Foreign Policy,January 4th,1948.
(7)纳粹德国被击败后,美国、苏联、英国和法国对德国领土及其首都柏林实施分区占领并进行管制。由于苏联同西方三国在德国统一后的政治模式、战争赔偿,以及社会改造等问题上分歧严重,致使《对德和约》和德国的统一问题长期未得到落实,由此形成了“战后德国问题”。参见:Daniel J.Nelson,Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma,University AL:The University of Alabama Press,1978;William R.Smyser,From Yalta to Berlin,New York:St.Martin’s Press,1999.
(8)CAB 129/23/5,CP(48)5,Policy in Germany,January 5th,1948.
(9)由于英美法三国的占领区位于德国西部,故而被统称为西占区。同样地,三国所占领的柏林市西部也被称作西柏林。
(10)CAB 129/27/18,CP(48)138,Talks on Germany;Resumed Session,June 4th,1948;U.S.Department of State,Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited as FRUS),1948,vol.2.Germany and Austria,Washington,D.C.:United States Government Printing Office,1973,p.313.
(11)CAB 128/13/2,CM(48)42,Cabinet Conclusions,June 24th,1948.
(12)FO 371/70495,C4921/3/18/G,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1162,June 24th,1948.
(13)FO 371/70497,C5037/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1207,June 28th,1948.
(14)FO 371/70490,C2539/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.513,April 2nd,1948.
(15)FO 371/70688,C4799/4794/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office(Military Governor),No.1118,June 19th,1948.
(16)FO 371/70502,C5745/3/18,From Lubbecke to Foreign Office(German Section),No.677 Basic,July 16th,1948.
(17)CAB 195/6/39,CM(48)43,Cabinet Notebook,June 25th,1948.
(18)DEFE 7/2051,C.O.S.(48)87th meeting,Chiefs of Staff Committee,Minutes of Meeting held on Monday,28th June,1948,at 11.30 a.m.
(19)CAB 128/13/4,CM(48) 44,Cabinet Conclusions,June 28th,1948.
(20)Alan Bullock,Ernest Bevin:Foreign Secretary,1945-1951,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1985,p.576.
(21)FO 371/70490,C2539/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.513,April 2nd,1948.
(22)Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,p.34.
(23)FO 371/70498,C5176/3/18/G,Minutes:From Strang to Bevin,June 26th,1948.
(24)CAB 195/6/39,CM(48)43,Cabinet Notebook,June 25th,1948.
(25)FO 371/70498,C5176/3/18/G,Minutes:From Strang to Bevin,June 26th,1948.
(26)FO 371/70496,C5015/3/18,Letter from Kirkpatrick to Hollis,June 26th,1948.
(27)FO 371/70498,C5176/3/18/G,Minutes:From Strang to Bevin,June 26th,1948.
(28)DEFE 7/2051,C.O.S.(48)87th meeting,Chiefs of Staff Committee,Minutes of Meeting held on Monday,28th June,1948,at 11.30 a.m.
(29)FO 800/467,Ger/48/31,Informal note of meeting in the Foreign Secretary’s room at the Foreign Office on Monday 28th June,1948.
(30)CAB 128/13/4,CM(48) 44,Cabinet Conclusions,June 28th,1948.
(31)该委员会是第一次柏林危机爆发后由首相艾德礼下令成立的,负责制定具体的危机应对政策。其组成人员多为内阁大臣,主要负责人为外交大臣贝文。
(32)FO 371/70498,C5136/3/18,Cabinet Committee of Ministers on Germany,GEN 241/ 1st meeting,Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street,S.W.L.,on Monday,28th June,1948 at 5.0 p.m.
(33)CAB 21/1885,Cabinet Committee of Ministers on Germany,GEN 241/ 2nd meeting,Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street,S.W.L.,on Tuesday,29th June,1948 at 4.45 p.m.
(34)John Kent,British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-49,Leicester:Leicester University Press,1993,p.165.
(35)FO 371/70497,C5094/3/18,Minute:Germany,June 25th,1948.
(36)FO 371/70498,C5136/3/18,Cabinet Committee of Ministers on Germany,GEN 241/ 1st meeting,Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street,S.W.L.,on Monday,28th June,1948 at 5.0 p.m.
(37)FO 371/70503,C5868/3/18,Minute:R.A.F.Supply Operation to the British Sector of Berlin,July 21st,1948.
(38)FO 371/70497,C5043/3/18,From Lubeecke to Ministry of Defence,No.CCG 21510,June 28th,1948.
(39)DEFE 11/321,Minutes:from Hollis to Murrie,June 29th,1948.
(40)DEFE 11/321,Letter from Ministry of Defence to Bevin,June 29th,1948.
(41)FO 371/70496,C5010/3/18,From Foreign Office to Berlin (Military Governor),No.1359,June 27th,1948;FO 371/70496,C5010/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1199,June 27th,1948.
(42)FRUS,1948,Vol.2,pp.918-919.
(43)Alan Bullock,Ernest Bevin:Foreign Secretary,1945-1951,p.576.
(44)Deborah Welch Larson,“The Origins of Commitment Truman and West Berlin,” Journal of Cold War Studies,Volume 13,Number 1,Winter 2011,p.188.
(45)[美]哈里·杜鲁门:《杜鲁门回忆录》(第二卷),李石译,北京:三联书店,1974年版,第140页。
(46)DEFE 11/321,From Ministry of Defence,London to B.J.S.M.Washington,Dotel 926,June 26th,1948.
(47)FO 371/70497,C5031/3/18,From Foreign Office to Washington,No.6962,June 28th,1948;Paul Preston and Michael Partridge (ed.),British Documents on Foreign Affairs:Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print,Part Ⅳ,Series F,1948,Vol.13,p.143.
(48)Alan Bullock,Ernest Bevin:Foreign Secretary,1945-1951,pp.576-577.
(49)CAB 53/3,C.O.S.(48)88,Chiefs of Staff Committee,Minutes of Meeting held on Monday,28th June,1948.
(50)FO 371/70501,C5448/3/18,Note by Strang,June 29th,1948.
(51)FO 371/70499,C5217/3/18/G,From Ministry of Defence to J.S.M.,June 30th,1948.
(52)FO 371/70503,C5873/3/18,From Foreign Office to H.M.Representatives at Athens,No.306 Intel,July 24th,1948.
(53)FO 371/70501,C5514/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1353,July 11th,1948.
(54)FO 371/70503,C5985/3/18,From Washington to Foreign Office,July 23rd,1948;[美]哈里·杜鲁门:《杜鲁门回忆录》(第二卷),第141-144页。
(55)FO 371/70503,C5985/3/18,From Washington to Foreign Office,July 23rd,1948.
(56)WO 32/12671,0154/7695(Sc.1),Time and Motion study of Air Supply (Operation Plainfare),pp.1-7.
(57)FO 371/70503,C5868/3/18,Minute:R.A.F.Supply Operation to the British Sector of Berlin,July 21st,1948.
(58)FO 371/70499,C5216/3/18,Note by Dean,June 30th,1948.
(59)FO 371/70509,C6752/3/18,Minute by Strang,August 11th,1948.
(60)FO 371/70503,C5873/3/18,From Foreign Office to H.M.Representatives at Athens,No.306 Intel,July 24th,1948.
(61)AIR 2/10573,C38998,Civil Airlift Operation Plainfare,Final Report of The Manager,Civil Airlift Division to the AIR Officer Commanding No.46 Group,pp.5-15.
(62)AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949).
(63)FO 371/70503,C5873/3/18,From Foreign Office to H.M.Representatives at Athens,No.306 Intel,July 24th,1948.
(64)FO 371/70501,C5485/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (German Section),No.154 Basic,July 9th,1948.
(65)FO 371/70502,C5633/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (German Section) and Ministry of Defence,No.1371,July 13th,1948.
(66)FO 371/70502,C5667/3/18/G,Record of an Informal Meeting with the Secretary of State held on July 12th,1948.
(67)FO 943/777,CO 520/131/1,Minutes by Stevens,August 3rd,1948.
(68)FO 371/70506,C6558/3/18/G,Situation in Berlin:Possible Increase in Air Lift,August 10th,1948.
(69)FO 371/70507,C6625/3/18/G,Operations of United States Aircraft in United Kingdom and Germany,August 12th,1948.
(70)AIR 20/7804,AL/575/SEC,From Waite to G.O.C.,British Troops Berlin,September 26th,1948.
(71)AIR 20/7804,AL/575/SEC,From Control Commission for Germany (British Element) to Foreign Office,No.1819 Basic,October 11th,1948.
(72)DEFE 7/2051,Minutes:Operation Plainfare,September 28th,1948;Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,p.100.
(73)AIR 20/7810,AL/592/SEC,From Francomb Frankfurt to AHQ BAFO,No.FGCC 54527,September 30th,1948.
(74)AIR 20/7810,AL/592/SEC,From Francomb Frankfurt to H.Q.BAFO,No.FGCC 54528,September 30th,1948;FO 371/70517,C8192/3/18,From Foreign Office to Paris,No.3272,October 4th,1948.
(75)AIR 20/7810,AL/592/SEC,From AHQ BAFO to Foreign Office,No.AX 469,October 5th,1948.
(76)AIR 20/7810,AL/592/SEC,From Air Headquarters (British Air Forces of Occupation) to H.Q.No.46 Group,October 29th,1948.
(77)AIR 2/10063,C38903/49/1A,Directive for Combined USAF/RAF Airlift Task Force,October 29th,1948.
(78)AIR 2/10063,C38903/49/1A,Directive for Combined USAF/RAF Airlift Task Force,October 29th,1948.
(79)AIR 38/299,From B.A.F.O.to Air Commander J.W.F.Merer,October 19th,1948.
(80)AIR 38/299,Headquarters Combined Airlift Task Force,General Order No.1,October 28th,1948.
(81)AIR 38/299,Headquarters Combined Airlift Task Force,TF Operations,MEMO 7E,November 6th,1948.
(82)AIR 2/10064,C38903/49/1A,Loan of C.54s to the R.A.F.for ‘Plainfare’,March 4th,1949.
(83)AIR 2/10063,C38903/49/47A,Minutes by Commanding General,United States Air Forces in Europe & Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief,British Air Forces of Occupation,1948.
(84)PREM 8/990,Minutes:From Hollis to Ministry of Defence,January 20th,1949.
(85)PREM 8/990,D.O.(49)6,Cabinet Defence Committee,Berlin Air Lift,January 28th,1949.
(86)PREM 8/989,GEN241/9,Committee of Ministers on Germany,Minutes of a Meeting held at 10,Downing Street,S.W.l,on Monday,7th February 1949,at 11.30 a.m.
(87)FO 371/76550,C3793/14/18,From New York to Foreign Office,No.1130,May 4th,1949.
(88)CAB 128/16/3,CM(49)46,Cabinet Conclusion,July 18th,1949.
(89)AIR 55/98,General Reviews of Activities – Operation ‘Plainfare’(Reports and Memoranda,August 1948- September 1949).
(90)数据来源为:AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949),p.1.
(91)短吨为英美单位制中的质量单位,1短吨约合0.907公吨。在英国的档案中,短吨和公吨经常被混用,导致统计数据较为混乱,也造成已有论著中关于英国的运输数据记载不一。
(92)张盛发:《斯大林与冷战》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2000年版,第308页。
(93)PREM 8/989,GEN241/4,Committee of Ministers on Germany,Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 4th February 1949.
(94)T 236/1026,46/6/7,From Foreign Office (German Section) to Berlin,No.1352 Basic,March 23rd,1949.
(95)CAB 129/34/9,CP(49)79,Germany Occupation Statute and Tripartite Control Agreement,‘Annex’,April 7th,1949.
(96)W.R.Smyser,From Yalta to Berlin:The Cold War struggle over Germany,pp.85-86.
(97)苏联在谈判中没有再坚持“英美法三国须中止筹建西德政府的计划”的立场,而是同意召开四国外长会议商谈德国的各项问题。参见:FO 371/76549,C2417/14/18,From New York to Foreign Office (From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations),No.634,March 21st,1949;FO 371/76550,C3793/14/18,From New York to Foreign Office,No.1130,May 4th,1949.
(98)Kohler to SecState,telegram No.1154,May 6th,1949,Box 16,RG 335,NA,quoted in Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,p.180.
(99)Thomas D.Parrish,Berlin in the Balance,1945-1949:The Berlin Blockade,the Airlift,the First Major Battle of the Cold War,p.329;Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,pp.168-173;Richard Collier,Bridge Across The Sky:The Berlin Blockade and Airlift,1948-1949,pp.162-165.
(100)PREM 8/989,From Foreign Office to Berlin (To Military Governor),No.139,January 24th,1949.
(101)AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949),p.2.
(102)Timothy Moss,“Divided City,Divided Infrastructures:Securing Energy and Water Services in Postwar Berlin,” Journal of Urban History,2009,p.926.
(103)该指令同时也由外交部下发到英国通讯社和英国广播公司(BBC),作为其宣传工作的指导文件。
(104)FO 1030/61,CCG 215/2513,From Control Commission for Germany (British Element) to Hanreg,No.BGCC 5112,July 2nd,1948.
(105)AIR 20/7825,From Information Services Branch,Press Section to H.Q.Airlift,February 4th,1949.
(106)AIR 20/7825,From Foreign Office to BERCOMB,No.3809 Basic,December 1st,1948;AIR 20/7825,From Control Commission for Germany (British Element)Foreign Office to BERCOMB,No.2565 Basic,December 3rd,1948;AIR 20/7825,From Information Services Branch,Press Section to Headquarters Military Government,February 8th,1949.
(107)FO 944/659,CO 707/339,Food Situation in Berlin after nine months of Airlift,April 22nd,1949.
(108)FO 1030/61,CCG 215/2513,From Moscow to Foreign Office,No.851,July 20th,1948;FO 371/70503,C5893/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (From Military Governor),July 21st,1948.
(109)参见:FO 371/70502,C5597/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (From Office of Military Governor),No.1363,July 12th,1948;FO 371/70504,C6094/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1476,July 27th,1948;FO 371/70506,C6534/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1597,August 10th,1948;FO 371/76678,C801/222/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office,No.5 Saving,January 25th,1949;等等。
(110)William Stivers,“The incomplete blockade:Soviet zone supply of West Berlin,1948-49,” Diplomatic History,Fall 97,Vol.21 Issue 4,p585;FO 371/70488C,C9394/2/18,Military Government Liaison Section Weekly Report No.53,November 13th,1948;FO 1012/575,Minutes of Berlin Blockade Economy Committee Meeting held at HQ British Troops Berlin on 18 January 1949;FO 1012/575,Minutes of Berlin Blockade Economy Committee Meeting held at HQ British Troops Berlin on 25 February 1949.
(111)苏联对柏林空运为数不多的几次干扰发生在外交谈判进行得较为艰难之时,但没有直接封锁飞行走廊,而是采取在走廊附近举行空军演习,或要求运输机在飞临苏占区时提高飞行高度等措施,以此向西方三国施压。参见:FO 371/70503,C5942/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (From Military Governor),No.1448,July 22nd,1948;FO 371/70503,C6002/3/18,From Military Governor Berlin to Foreign Office,No.1458,July 23rd,1948;FO 371/70512,C7304/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1799,September 4th,1948;FO 371/76543,C1011/14/18,From Foreign Office to Washington,No.1409,February 4th,1949.
(112)参见:Richard Collier,Bridge Across The Sky:The Berlin Blockade and Airlift,1948-1949,p.158;Robert Jackson,The Berlin Airlift,pp.151-152;Avi Shlaim,“Britain,The Berlin Blockade and the Cold War,” p.14;Emma Peplow,“The Role of Britain in the Berlin Airlift,” p.224;Roger D.Launius,“Berlin Airlift:Constructive Air Power,” p.19.
(113)三国在谈判中,多次拒绝苏联提出的暂缓建立西德国家的计划,令苏联外长莫洛托夫十分恼怒,以致他对三国谈判代表说:“告诉我,你们究竟愿不愿意推迟成立西德政府?”参见:FO 371/70506,C6423/3/18,From Moscow to Foreign Office,No.966,August 6th,1948;FO 371/70507,C6608/3/18,From Moscow to Foreign Office,No.1009,August 12th,1948;FO 371/70515,C7701/3/18,From Moscow to Foreign Office,No.1253,September 18th,1948.
(114)AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949),pp.5-10.
(115)T 236/1025,OF46/6/7/A,From Wharton to Smith,July 28th,1948.
(116)Richard Collier,Bridge Across The Sky:The Berlin Blockade and Airlift,1948-1949,p.165.
(117)AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949),pp.13-19.
(118)CAB 129/37/8,CP(49)208,Memorandum:European Policy,October 18th,1949.
(119)CAB 131/9,D.O.(50)45,Defence Policy and Global Strategy,June 5th,1950.
(1)关于柏林空运的研究主要有以下成果:Richard Collier,Bridge across the Sky:the Berlin Blockade and Airlift,1948-1949,London:Macmillan,1978;Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,TX:Texas A&M University Press,2000;Thomas D.Parrish,Berlin in the Balance,1945-1949:The Berlin Blockade,the Airlift,the First Major Battle of the Cold War,Reading:Addison-Wesley,1998;D.M.Giangreco and Robert E.Griffin,Airbridge to Berlin:The Berlin Crisis of 1948,Its Origin and Aftermath,Calif.:Presidio Press,1988;Avi Shlaim,The United States and the Berlin Blockade 1948-1949:A Study in Crisis Decision-making,Berkeley:University of California Press,1983;Daniel F.Harrington,“The Air Force Can Deliver Anything!”:A History of the Berlin Airlift,Ramstein AB,Ger.:USAFE History Office,1998;Wolfgang J.Huschke,The Candy Bombers:The Berlin Airlift 1948-49:A History of the People and Planes,Berlin:Metropol Verlag,1999;Robert Jackson,The Berlin Airlift,Wellingborough,Eng.:Patrick Stephens,1988;Roger D.Launius,“Berlin Airlift:Constructive Air Power”,Air Power History,spring,1989,pp.9-22;J.B.McLaughlin,“Berlin Airlift:Plus Fifty”,IFR:The Magazine for the Accomplished Pilot,June,1998,pp.6-9;Roger G.Miller,“Tunner and the Luftwaffe Connection with the Berlin Airlift”,Air Power History,Winter 2009,Vol.56 Issue 4,pp.28-35;杨捷:《美国应对第一次柏林危机的空运行动:决策动因与政治效应》,《南昌大学学报(人文社会科学版)》,2011年第1期;张凤艳:《美国应对柏林封锁空运政策的讨论及决策》,《首都师范大学学报(社会科学版)》,2006年第S2期;尚慧霞:《1948-1949柏林空运的影响初探》,《重庆科技学院学报(社会科学版)》,2013年第11期,等等。
(2)例如艾维·施莱姆在《英国,柏林封锁与冷战》(Avi Shlaim,“Britain,The Berlin Blockade and the Cold War”,International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),Vol.60,No.1(Winter,1983-1984),pp.1-14.)一文中认为,英国在空运行动中发挥了决定性的作用,并且比美国更具进取心。而艾玛·佩普洛的《英国在柏林空运中的作用》(Emma Peplow,“The Role of Britain in the Berlin Airlift”,History,Apr.2010,Vol.95 Issue 318,pp.207-224.),则认为柏林空运的成功,掩盖了英国领导人对该行动缺乏信心的事实,自始至终美国都可以随心所欲地操控空运,英国时常服从美国的决定,致使它在柏林空运中发挥的作用十分有限。
(3)本文所使用的档案文件可分为两类:第一类,缩微胶卷,包括英国外交部(Foreign Office,简称FO)、国防部(Ministry of Defence,DEFE)、陆军部(War Office,WO)、空军部(Air Ministry,AIR)和首相办公厅(Prime Minister’s Office,PREM)的档案,以及英国内阁文件(Cabinet Papers,简称CAB)和财政部文件(Treasury Papers,T),来源为首都师范大学历史学院世界史资料中心;第二类,已刊档案,主要有《英国外交事务档案集》和《美国对外关系文件集》。
(4)CAB 129/23/7,CP(48)7,Review of Soviet Policy,January 5th,1948.
(5)CAB 129/25/12,CP(48)72,The Threat to Western Civilisation,March 3rd,1948.
(6)CAB 129/23/6,CP(48)6,The First Aim of British Foreign Policy,January 4th,1948.
(7)纳粹德国被击败后,美国、苏联、英国和法国对德国领土及其首都柏林实施分区占领并进行管制。由于苏联同西方三国在德国统一后的政治模式、战争赔偿,以及社会改造等问题上分歧严重,致使《对德和约》和德国的统一问题长期未得到落实,由此形成了“战后德国问题”。参见:Daniel J.Nelson,Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma,University AL:The University of Alabama Press,1978;William R.Smyser,From Yalta to Berlin,New York:St.Martin’s Press,1999.
(8)CAB 129/23/5,CP(48)5,Policy in Germany,January 5th,1948.
(9)由于英美法三国的占领区位于德国西部,故而被统称为西占区。同样地,三国所占领的柏林市西部也被称作西柏林。
(10)CAB 129/27/18,CP(48)138,Talks on Germany;Resumed Session,June 4th,1948;U.S.Department of State,Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited as FRUS),1948,vol.2.Germany and Austria,Washington,D.C.:United States Government Printing Office,1973,p.313.
(11)CAB 128/13/2,CM(48)42,Cabinet Conclusions,June 24th,1948.
(12)FO 371/70495,C4921/3/18/G,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1162,June 24th,1948.
(13)FO 371/70497,C5037/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1207,June 28th,1948.
(14)FO 371/70490,C2539/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.513,April 2nd,1948.
(15)FO 371/70688,C4799/4794/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office(Military Governor),No.1118,June 19th,1948.
(16)FO 371/70502,C5745/3/18,From Lubbecke to Foreign Office(German Section),No.677 Basic,July 16th,1948.
(17)CAB 195/6/39,CM(48)43,Cabinet Notebook,June 25th,1948.
(18)DEFE 7/2051,C.O.S.(48)87th meeting,Chiefs of Staff Committee,Minutes of Meeting held on Monday,28th June,1948,at 11.30 a.m.
(19)CAB 128/13/4,CM(48) 44,Cabinet Conclusions,June 28th,1948.
(20)Alan Bullock,Ernest Bevin:Foreign Secretary,1945-1951,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1985,p.576.
(21)FO 371/70490,C2539/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.513,April 2nd,1948.
(22)Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,p.34.
(23)FO 371/70498,C5176/3/18/G,Minutes:From Strang to Bevin,June 26th,1948.
(24)CAB 195/6/39,CM(48)43,Cabinet Notebook,June 25th,1948.
(25)FO 371/70498,C5176/3/18/G,Minutes:From Strang to Bevin,June 26th,1948.
(26)FO 371/70496,C5015/3/18,Letter from Kirkpatrick to Hollis,June 26th,1948.
(27)FO 371/70498,C5176/3/18/G,Minutes:From Strang to Bevin,June 26th,1948.
(28)DEFE 7/2051,C.O.S.(48)87th meeting,Chiefs of Staff Committee,Minutes of Meeting held on Monday,28th June,1948,at 11.30 a.m.
(29)FO 800/467,Ger/48/31,Informal note of meeting in the Foreign Secretary’s room at the Foreign Office on Monday 28th June,1948.
(30)CAB 128/13/4,CM(48) 44,Cabinet Conclusions,June 28th,1948.
(31)该委员会是第一次柏林危机爆发后由首相艾德礼下令成立的,负责制定具体的危机应对政策。其组成人员多为内阁大臣,主要负责人为外交大臣贝文。
(32)FO 371/70498,C5136/3/18,Cabinet Committee of Ministers on Germany,GEN 241/ 1st meeting,Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street,S.W.L.,on Monday,28th June,1948 at 5.0 p.m.
(33)CAB 21/1885,Cabinet Committee of Ministers on Germany,GEN 241/ 2nd meeting,Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street,S.W.L.,on Tuesday,29th June,1948 at 4.45 p.m.
(34)John Kent,British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944-49,Leicester:Leicester University Press,1993,p.165.
(35)FO 371/70497,C5094/3/18,Minute:Germany,June 25th,1948.
(36)FO 371/70498,C5136/3/18,Cabinet Committee of Ministers on Germany,GEN 241/ 1st meeting,Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street,S.W.L.,on Monday,28th June,1948 at 5.0 p.m.
(37)FO 371/70503,C5868/3/18,Minute:R.A.F.Supply Operation to the British Sector of Berlin,July 21st,1948.
(38)FO 371/70497,C5043/3/18,From Lubeecke to Ministry of Defence,No.CCG 21510,June 28th,1948.
(39)DEFE 11/321,Minutes:from Hollis to Murrie,June 29th,1948.
(40)DEFE 11/321,Letter from Ministry of Defence to Bevin,June 29th,1948.
(41)FO 371/70496,C5010/3/18,From Foreign Office to Berlin (Military Governor),No.1359,June 27th,1948;FO 371/70496,C5010/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1199,June 27th,1948.
(42)FRUS,1948,Vol.2,pp.918-919.
(43)Alan Bullock,Ernest Bevin:Foreign Secretary,1945-1951,p.576.
(44)Deborah Welch Larson,“The Origins of Commitment Truman and West Berlin,” Journal of Cold War Studies,Volume 13,Number 1,Winter 2011,p.188.
(45)[美]哈里·杜鲁门:《杜鲁门回忆录》(第二卷),李石译,北京:三联书店,1974年版,第140页。
(46)DEFE 11/321,From Ministry of Defence,London to B.J.S.M.Washington,Dotel 926,June 26th,1948.
(47)FO 371/70497,C5031/3/18,From Foreign Office to Washington,No.6962,June 28th,1948;Paul Preston and Michael Partridge (ed.),British Documents on Foreign Affairs:Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print,Part Ⅳ,Series F,1948,Vol.13,p.143.
(48)Alan Bullock,Ernest Bevin:Foreign Secretary,1945-1951,pp.576-577.
(49)CAB 53/3,C.O.S.(48)88,Chiefs of Staff Committee,Minutes of Meeting held on Monday,28th June,1948.
(50)FO 371/70501,C5448/3/18,Note by Strang,June 29th,1948.
(51)FO 371/70499,C5217/3/18/G,From Ministry of Defence to J.S.M.,June 30th,1948.
(52)FO 371/70503,C5873/3/18,From Foreign Office to H.M.Representatives at Athens,No.306 Intel,July 24th,1948.
(53)FO 371/70501,C5514/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1353,July 11th,1948.
(54)FO 371/70503,C5985/3/18,From Washington to Foreign Office,July 23rd,1948;[美]哈里·杜鲁门:《杜鲁门回忆录》(第二卷),第141-144页。
(55)FO 371/70503,C5985/3/18,From Washington to Foreign Office,July 23rd,1948.
(56)WO 32/12671,0154/7695(Sc.1),Time and Motion study of Air Supply (Operation Plainfare),pp.1-7.
(57)FO 371/70503,C5868/3/18,Minute:R.A.F.Supply Operation to the British Sector of Berlin,July 21st,1948.
(58)FO 371/70499,C5216/3/18,Note by Dean,June 30th,1948.
(59)FO 371/70509,C6752/3/18,Minute by Strang,August 11th,1948.
(60)FO 371/70503,C5873/3/18,From Foreign Office to H.M.Representatives at Athens,No.306 Intel,July 24th,1948.
(61)AIR 2/10573,C38998,Civil Airlift Operation Plainfare,Final Report of The Manager,Civil Airlift Division to the AIR Officer Commanding No.46 Group,pp.5-15.
(62)AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949).
(63)FO 371/70503,C5873/3/18,From Foreign Office to H.M.Representatives at Athens,No.306 Intel,July 24th,1948.
(64)FO 371/70501,C5485/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (German Section),No.154 Basic,July 9th,1948.
(65)FO 371/70502,C5633/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (German Section) and Ministry of Defence,No.1371,July 13th,1948.
(66)FO 371/70502,C5667/3/18/G,Record of an Informal Meeting with the Secretary of State held on July 12th,1948.
(67)FO 943/777,CO 520/131/1,Minutes by Stevens,August 3rd,1948.
(68)FO 371/70506,C6558/3/18/G,Situation in Berlin:Possible Increase in Air Lift,August 10th,1948.
(69)FO 371/70507,C6625/3/18/G,Operations of United States Aircraft in United Kingdom and Germany,August 12th,1948.
(70)AIR 20/7804,AL/575/SEC,From Waite to G.O.C.,British Troops Berlin,September 26th,1948.
(71)AIR 20/7804,AL/575/SEC,From Control Commission for Germany (British Element) to Foreign Office,No.1819 Basic,October 11th,1948.
(72)DEFE 7/2051,Minutes:Operation Plainfare,September 28th,1948;Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,p.100.
(73)AIR 20/7810,AL/592/SEC,From Francomb Frankfurt to AHQ BAFO,No.FGCC 54527,September 30th,1948.
(74)AIR 20/7810,AL/592/SEC,From Francomb Frankfurt to H.Q.BAFO,No.FGCC 54528,September 30th,1948;FO 371/70517,C8192/3/18,From Foreign Office to Paris,No.3272,October 4th,1948.
(75)AIR 20/7810,AL/592/SEC,From AHQ BAFO to Foreign Office,No.AX 469,October 5th,1948.
(76)AIR 20/7810,AL/592/SEC,From Air Headquarters (British Air Forces of Occupation) to H.Q.No.46 Group,October 29th,1948.
(77)AIR 2/10063,C38903/49/1A,Directive for Combined USAF/RAF Airlift Task Force,October 29th,1948.
(78)AIR 2/10063,C38903/49/1A,Directive for Combined USAF/RAF Airlift Task Force,October 29th,1948.
(79)AIR 38/299,From B.A.F.O.to Air Commander J.W.F.Merer,October 19th,1948.
(80)AIR 38/299,Headquarters Combined Airlift Task Force,General Order No.1,October 28th,1948.
(81)AIR 38/299,Headquarters Combined Airlift Task Force,TF Operations,MEMO 7E,November 6th,1948.
(82)AIR 2/10064,C38903/49/1A,Loan of C.54s to the R.A.F.for ‘Plainfare’,March 4th,1949.
(83)AIR 2/10063,C38903/49/47A,Minutes by Commanding General,United States Air Forces in Europe & Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief,British Air Forces of Occupation,1948.
(84)PREM 8/990,Minutes:From Hollis to Ministry of Defence,January 20th,1949.
(85)PREM 8/990,D.O.(49)6,Cabinet Defence Committee,Berlin Air Lift,January 28th,1949.
(86)PREM 8/989,GEN241/9,Committee of Ministers on Germany,Minutes of a Meeting held at 10,Downing Street,S.W.l,on Monday,7th February 1949,at 11.30 a.m.
(87)FO 371/76550,C3793/14/18,From New York to Foreign Office,No.1130,May 4th,1949.
(88)CAB 128/16/3,CM(49)46,Cabinet Conclusion,July 18th,1949.
(89)AIR 55/98,General Reviews of Activities – Operation ‘Plainfare’(Reports and Memoranda,August 1948- September 1949).
(90)数据来源为:AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949),p.1.
(91)短吨为英美单位制中的质量单位,1短吨约合0.907公吨。在英国的档案中,短吨和公吨经常被混用,导致统计数据较为混乱,也造成已有论著中关于英国的运输数据记载不一。
(92)张盛发:《斯大林与冷战》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2000年版,第308页。
(93)PREM 8/989,GEN241/4,Committee of Ministers on Germany,Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 4th February 1949.
(94)T 236/1026,46/6/7,From Foreign Office (German Section) to Berlin,No.1352 Basic,March 23rd,1949.
(95)CAB 129/34/9,CP(49)79,Germany Occupation Statute and Tripartite Control Agreement,‘Annex’,April 7th,1949.
(96)W.R.Smyser,From Yalta to Berlin:The Cold War struggle over Germany,pp.85-86.
(97)苏联在谈判中没有再坚持“英美法三国须中止筹建西德政府的计划”的立场,而是同意召开四国外长会议商谈德国的各项问题。参见:FO 371/76549,C2417/14/18,From New York to Foreign Office (From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations),No.634,March 21st,1949;FO 371/76550,C3793/14/18,From New York to Foreign Office,No.1130,May 4th,1949.
(98)Kohler to SecState,telegram No.1154,May 6th,1949,Box 16,RG 335,NA,quoted in Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,p.180.
(99)Thomas D.Parrish,Berlin in the Balance,1945-1949:The Berlin Blockade,the Airlift,the First Major Battle of the Cold War,p.329;Roger G.Miller,To Save a City:The Berlin Airlift,1948-1949,pp.168-173;Richard Collier,Bridge Across The Sky:The Berlin Blockade and Airlift,1948-1949,pp.162-165.
(100)PREM 8/989,From Foreign Office to Berlin (To Military Governor),No.139,January 24th,1949.
(101)AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949),p.2.
(102)Timothy Moss,“Divided City,Divided Infrastructures:Securing Energy and Water Services in Postwar Berlin,” Journal of Urban History,2009,p.926.
(103)该指令同时也由外交部下发到英国通讯社和英国广播公司(BBC),作为其宣传工作的指导文件。
(104)FO 1030/61,CCG 215/2513,From Control Commission for Germany (British Element) to Hanreg,No.BGCC 5112,July 2nd,1948.
(105)AIR 20/7825,From Information Services Branch,Press Section to H.Q.Airlift,February 4th,1949.
(106)AIR 20/7825,From Foreign Office to BERCOMB,No.3809 Basic,December 1st,1948;AIR 20/7825,From Control Commission for Germany (British Element)Foreign Office to BERCOMB,No.2565 Basic,December 3rd,1948;AIR 20/7825,From Information Services Branch,Press Section to Headquarters Military Government,February 8th,1949.
(107)FO 944/659,CO 707/339,Food Situation in Berlin after nine months of Airlift,April 22nd,1949.
(108)FO 1030/61,CCG 215/2513,From Moscow to Foreign Office,No.851,July 20th,1948;FO 371/70503,C5893/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (From Military Governor),July 21st,1948.
(109)参见:FO 371/70502,C5597/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (From Office of Military Governor),No.1363,July 12th,1948;FO 371/70504,C6094/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1476,July 27th,1948;FO 371/70506,C6534/3/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1597,August 10th,1948;FO 371/76678,C801/222/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office,No.5 Saving,January 25th,1949;等等。
(110)William Stivers,“The incomplete blockade:Soviet zone supply of West Berlin,1948-49,” Diplomatic History,Fall 97,Vol.21 Issue 4,p585;FO 371/70488C,C9394/2/18,Military Government Liaison Section Weekly Report No.53,November 13th,1948;FO 1012/575,Minutes of Berlin Blockade Economy Committee Meeting held at HQ British Troops Berlin on 18 January 1949;FO 1012/575,Minutes of Berlin Blockade Economy Committee Meeting held at HQ British Troops Berlin on 25 February 1949.
(111)苏联对柏林空运为数不多的几次干扰发生在外交谈判进行得较为艰难之时,但没有直接封锁飞行走廊,而是采取在走廊附近举行空军演习,或要求运输机在飞临苏占区时提高飞行高度等措施,以此向西方三国施压。参见:FO 371/70503,C5942/3/18,From Berlin to Foreign Office (From Military Governor),No.1448,July 22nd,1948;FO 371/70503,C6002/3/18,From Military Governor Berlin to Foreign Office,No.1458,July 23rd,1948;FO 371/70512,C7304/18,From Berlin (Military Governor) to Foreign Office,No.1799,September 4th,1948;FO 371/76543,C1011/14/18,From Foreign Office to Washington,No.1409,February 4th,1949.
(112)参见:Richard Collier,Bridge Across The Sky:The Berlin Blockade and Airlift,1948-1949,p.158;Robert Jackson,The Berlin Airlift,pp.151-152;Avi Shlaim,“Britain,The Berlin Blockade and the Cold War,” p.14;Emma Peplow,“The Role of Britain in the Berlin Airlift,” p.224;Roger D.Launius,“Berlin Airlift:Constructive Air Power,” p.19.
(113)三国在谈判中,多次拒绝苏联提出的暂缓建立西德国家的计划,令苏联外长莫洛托夫十分恼怒,以致他对三国谈判代表说:“告诉我,你们究竟愿不愿意推迟成立西德政府?”参见:FO 371/70506,C6423/3/18,From Moscow to Foreign Office,No.966,August 6th,1948;FO 371/70507,C6608/3/18,From Moscow to Foreign Office,No.1009,August 12th,1948;FO 371/70515,C7701/3/18,From Moscow to Foreign Office,No.1253,September 18th,1948.
(114)AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949),pp.5-10.
(115)T 236/1025,OF46/6/7/A,From Wharton to Smith,July 28th,1948.
(116)Richard Collier,Bridge Across The Sky:The Berlin Blockade and Airlift,1948-1949,p.165.
(117)AIR 55/106,Statistical summary of Operation ‘Plainfare’(28th June 1948-30th September 1949),pp.13-19.
(118)CAB 129/37/8,CP(49)208,Memorandum:European Policy,October 18th,1949.
(119)CAB 131/9,D.O.(50)45,Defence Policy and Global Strategy,June 5th,1950.