存款保险制度能否防范银行的系统性风险——基于Panel-Logit模型的实证检验
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摘要
以全球76个样本国家的数据为基础,通过构建Panel-Logit模型研究存款保险制度与银行系统性风险之间的关系。研究结果显示:利率的市场化改革会加剧银行系统的不稳定,此时建立存款保险制度可以降低银行系统性风险的发生概率,但整体效果不够显著,而且利率市场化完成后,存款保险制度的金融稳定效果还将下降;银行监管制度的强化有助于防范系统性风险的发生,同时与存款保险制度配套使用时,能够一起构成现代金融安全网,显著提升存款保险制度的金融稳定效果;在存款保险制度的具体内容设计中,存款保险机构较强的独立性与监管职能、存款人共同参与保险以及风险调整费率等有助于降低银行系统性风险的发生概率。
Based on the data of 76 sample countries around the world, this paper studies the relationship between the deposit insurance system and the bank systemic risk of the bank by constructing the Panel-Logit model. The result shows that: the market-oriented reform of interest rates will aggravate the instability of the banking system. Then the establishment of deposit insurance system can reduce the probability of bank systemic risk, but the effect is not significant enough. After the completion of interest rate marketization, the financial stability effect of the deposit insurance system will also decline. The strengthening of banking supervision helps to prevent the occurrence of systemic risks. At the same time, when combined with the deposit insurance system, it can form a modern financial safety net and significantly improve the financial stability of the deposit insurance system. In the designing of the deposit insurance system, the stronger independence and regulatory functions of deposit insurance institutions, the depositors' participation in insurance, and the risk-adjusted rates will help to reduce the probability of bank systemic risk.
Based on the data of 76 sample countries around the world, this paper studies the relationship between the deposit insurance system and the bank systemic risk of the bank by constructing the Panel-Logit model. The result shows that: the market-oriented reform of interest rates will aggravate the instability of the banking system. Then the establishment of deposit insurance system can reduce the probability of bank systemic risk, but the effect is not significant enough. After the completion of interest rate marketization, the financial stability effect of the deposit insurance system will also decline. The strengthening of banking supervision helps to prevent the occurrence of systemic risks. At the same time, when combined with the deposit insurance system, it can form a modern financial safety net and significantly improve the financial stability of the deposit insurance system. In the designing of the deposit insurance system, the stronger independence and regulatory functions of deposit insurance institutions, the depositors' participation in insurance, and the risk-adjusted rates will help to reduce the probability of bank systemic risk.
引文
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[3]周小川.全面深化金融业改革开放、加快完善金融市场体系 [J].理论导刊,2013(12):5-7.
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[16]韩永辉,赵越,陈晓亮.利率市场化背景下银行系统性危机的实证研究 [J].财经理论与实践,2016,37(2):2-8.
[17]Anginer.D,Demirguc-Kunt.A and Zhu.M.How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk?Evidence from the Recent Crisis [J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2014,48:312-321.
[18]田国强,赵禹朴,等.利率市场化、存款保险制度与银行挤兑 [J].经济研究,2016(3):96-109.
[19]Demirguc-Kunt.A and Detragiache.E.The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and Developed Countries [J].Imf Working Papers,1998,45(1):81-109.
[20]王道平.利率市场化、存款保险制度与系统性银行危机防范 [J].金融研究,2016(1):50-65.
[21]Beck.T,Demirguc-Kunt.A and Levine.R.Bank Concentration,Competition,and Crises First Results [J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2006,30(5):1581-1603.
[22]Chernykh.L and Cole.R.Does Deposit Insurance Improve Financial Intermediation?Evidence from the Russian experiment [J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2011,35(2):388-402.
[23]Laeven.L and Valencia.F.Systemic Banking Crises Database [J].IMF Economic Review,2013,61(2):225-270.
[24]Demirguc-Kunt.A,Kane.E and Laeven.L.Deposit Insurance Around the World:A Comprehensive Analysis and Database [J].Journal of Financial Stability,2015,20:155-183.
[25]Demirguc-Kunt.A,Kane.E and Laeven.L.Determinants of Deposit--insurance Adoption and Design[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2008,17(3):407-438.
[26]Abiad.A,Detragiache.E and Tressel.T.A New Database of Financial Reforms[J].IMF Staff Papers,2010,57(2):281-302.
[27]Barth.J,Capiro.G and Levine.R.Bank Regulation and Ssupervisionin 180 Countries from1999 to 2011 [J].Journal of Financial Economic Policy,2013,2(5):111-219.
[28]Khundadze.S.The Problem of Moral Hazard and Effects of Deposit Insurance Project [J].IBSU Scientific Journal,2009(2):89-114.
[2]Daniel.B.C and Jones.J.Financial Liberalization and Banking Crises in Emerging Economies [J].Journal of International Economics,2007,5(72):202-221.
[3]周小川.全面深化金融业改革开放、加快完善金融市场体系 [J].理论导刊,2013(12):5-7.
[4]李扬.完善金融的资源配置功能——十八届三中全会中的金融改革议题 [J].经济研究,2014(1):8-11.
[5]Mckay.P and Seale.C.FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) [J].Journal of Business & Finance Librarianship,2000,5(3):63-73.
[6]张正平,何广文.存款保险制度在全球的最新发展,运行绩效及其启示 [J].国际金融研究,2005(6):33-39.
[7]Cull.R,Senbet.L and Sorge.M.Deposit Insurance and Financial Development [J].Journal of Money Credit & Banking,2005 ,37(1):43-82.
[8]Angkinand.A and Wihlborg.C.Deposit Insurance Coverage,Ownership,and Banks' Risk-taking in Emerging Markets [J].Journal of International Money & Finance,2010,29(2):252-274.
[9]Chernykh.L and Cole.R.Does Deposit Insurance Improve Financial Intermediation?Evidence from the Russian Experiment [J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2011,35(2):388-402.
[10]尹雷,卞志村.利率市场化、存款保险制度与银行危机——基于跨国数据的实证研究 [J].国际金融研究,2016,345(1):49-59.
[11]Laeven.L.Bank Risk and Deposite Insurance [J].The World Bank Economic Review,2002,16(1):109-137.
[12]Demirguc-Kunt.A and Detragiache.E.Does Deposite Insunrance Increase Banking System Stability?An Empiricial Investigation [J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2002(48):1373-1406.
[13]Demirguc-Kunt.A and Huizinga.H.Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2004,51(2):375-399.
[14]Khan.A and Dewan.H.Deposit Insurance Scheme and Banking Crises:A Special Focus on Less-developed Countries[J],Empirical Economics,2011,41(1):155-182.
[15]Bijlsma.M and Wiel.K.Consumer Perception of Deposit Insurance:Little Awareness,Limited Effectiveness?[J].Applied Economics,2015,47(32):3439-3461.
[16]韩永辉,赵越,陈晓亮.利率市场化背景下银行系统性危机的实证研究 [J].财经理论与实践,2016,37(2):2-8.
[17]Anginer.D,Demirguc-Kunt.A and Zhu.M.How Does Deposit Insurance Affect Bank Risk?Evidence from the Recent Crisis [J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2014,48:312-321.
[18]田国强,赵禹朴,等.利率市场化、存款保险制度与银行挤兑 [J].经济研究,2016(3):96-109.
[19]Demirguc-Kunt.A and Detragiache.E.The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and Developed Countries [J].Imf Working Papers,1998,45(1):81-109.
[20]王道平.利率市场化、存款保险制度与系统性银行危机防范 [J].金融研究,2016(1):50-65.
[21]Beck.T,Demirguc-Kunt.A and Levine.R.Bank Concentration,Competition,and Crises First Results [J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2006,30(5):1581-1603.
[22]Chernykh.L and Cole.R.Does Deposit Insurance Improve Financial Intermediation?Evidence from the Russian experiment [J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2011,35(2):388-402.
[23]Laeven.L and Valencia.F.Systemic Banking Crises Database [J].IMF Economic Review,2013,61(2):225-270.
[24]Demirguc-Kunt.A,Kane.E and Laeven.L.Deposit Insurance Around the World:A Comprehensive Analysis and Database [J].Journal of Financial Stability,2015,20:155-183.
[25]Demirguc-Kunt.A,Kane.E and Laeven.L.Determinants of Deposit--insurance Adoption and Design[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2008,17(3):407-438.
[26]Abiad.A,Detragiache.E and Tressel.T.A New Database of Financial Reforms[J].IMF Staff Papers,2010,57(2):281-302.
[27]Barth.J,Capiro.G and Levine.R.Bank Regulation and Ssupervisionin 180 Countries from1999 to 2011 [J].Journal of Financial Economic Policy,2013,2(5):111-219.
[28]Khundadze.S.The Problem of Moral Hazard and Effects of Deposit Insurance Project [J].IBSU Scientific Journal,2009(2):89-114.
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