连锁董事网络与权益资本成本:影响效应及路径检验
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摘要
作为一种长期稳定嵌入于企业中的非正式制度安排,连锁董事网络能否通过资源获取和信息传递功能降低权益资本成本有待深入探讨。本文利用2009-2016年中国沪深A股上市公司相关数据,通过社会网络分析方法考察连锁董事网络对权益资本成本的影响效应和作用路径。结果表明,较高的连锁董事网络位置能够显著降低权益资本成本;在内生性检验和一系列稳健性测试后,上述结论依然成立。中介效应检验表明,经营风险和信息风险在连锁董事网络影响权益资本成本中均发挥了显著的中介作用,即较高的连锁董事网络位置可以通过缓解经营风险和信息风险来降低权益资本成本。结论为深入理解连锁董事网络影响权益资本成本的内在机制提供了经验证据。
As an informal institutional arrangement that is embedded in the enterprise for a long time, whether the interlocking director network can reduce the cost of equity capital through resource acquisition and information transfer needs to be further studied. The specific effect and impact path of the interlocking directors′ network on the cost of equity capital are examined by the social network analysis method through the data of A-Share listed companies in 2009-2016 years. The results show that the higher network location of the interlocking directors can significantly reduce the cost of equity capital of the enterprise;after the endogeneity test and a series of robustness tests, the above conclusions are still established. Further impact mechanism analysis and intermediary effect test show that operating risk and information risk play a significant intermediary role in the impact of the cost of equity capital on the interlocking director network, that is, the higher network location of the chain directors can reduce the cost of equity capital by reducing operating risk and information risk. The conclusion provides empirical evidence for in-depth understanding of the internal mechanism of interlocking director network affecting the cost of equity capital.
As an informal institutional arrangement that is embedded in the enterprise for a long time, whether the interlocking director network can reduce the cost of equity capital through resource acquisition and information transfer needs to be further studied. The specific effect and impact path of the interlocking directors′ network on the cost of equity capital are examined by the social network analysis method through the data of A-Share listed companies in 2009-2016 years. The results show that the higher network location of the interlocking directors can significantly reduce the cost of equity capital of the enterprise;after the endogeneity test and a series of robustness tests, the above conclusions are still established. Further impact mechanism analysis and intermediary effect test show that operating risk and information risk play a significant intermediary role in the impact of the cost of equity capital on the interlocking director network, that is, the higher network location of the chain directors can reduce the cost of equity capital by reducing operating risk and information risk. The conclusion provides empirical evidence for in-depth understanding of the internal mechanism of interlocking director network affecting the cost of equity capital.
引文
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[3] 严若森,华小丽. 环境不确定性、连锁董事网络位置与企业创新投入[J].管理学报,2017(3):373-381.
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[9] 马连福,张琦,王丽丽. 董事会网络位置与企业技术创新投入——基于技术密集型上市公司的研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2016(4):126-136.
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[13] 陆贤伟,王建琼,董大勇. 董事网络、信息传递与债务融资成本[J].管理科学,2013(3):55-64.
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[16] Lambert R, Leuz C, Verrecchia R. E. Accounting Information, Disclosure, and Cost of Capital[J].Journal of Accounting Research, 2007,45(2): 385-420.
[17] 张祥建,郭岚. 国外连锁董事网络研究述评与未来展望[J].外国经济与管理,2014(5):69-80.
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[22] 钟军委,张祥建,钱有飞. 连锁董事网络、社会资本与企业投资效率——来自A股上市公司的经验证据[J].产业经济研究,2017(4):56-66.
[23] Hackbarth D,Mauer D C. Optimal Priority Structure,Capital Structure,and Investment[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,25(3):747-796.
[24] Freeman L C. Centrality in social networks[J].Social Networks,1979,1:215-239.
[25] 谢德仁,陈运森.董事网络:定义、特征和计量[J].金融研究,2012(3)44-51.
[26] Johnsom J L,Daily C M,Ellstrand A E. Boards of directors: a review and research agenda[J].Journal of Management,1996,22(3):409-438.
[27] 周军,刘晓彤,杨茗. 董事网络影响股价崩盘风险吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2018(1):61-74.
[28] Burris V. Interlocking directorates and political cohesion among corporate elites[J].American Journal of Sociology,2005,111(1): 2-249.
[29] 陈运森,谢德仁. 网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011(7):113-127.
[30] 万良勇,胡璟. 网络位置、独立董事治理与公司并购——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014(2):64-73.
[31] 万良勇,邓路,郑小玲. 网络位置、独立董事治理与公司违规——基于部分可观测Bivariate Probit模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014(12):3091-3102.
[32] Chuluun T,Prevost A K,Puthenpurackal J. Board networks and the cost of corporate debt[R]. NewYork: Social Science Research Network,2010:1-50.
[33] 曹廷求,张钰,刘舒. 董事网络、信息不对称和并购财富效应[J].经济管理,2013(8):41-52.
[34] 陈运森.独立董事网络中心度与公司信息披露质量[J].审计研究,2012(5):92-100.
[35] 傅代国,夏常源.网络位置、独立董事治理与盈余质量[J].审计与经济研究,2014(2):67-75.
[36] Jensen M C,Meckling W H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976(4): 305-360.
[37] Elton E J. Presidential address: Expected return,realized return,and asset pricing tests[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(4):1199-1220.
[38] Easton PD. PERatios,PEGRatios,and Estimating the Implied Expected Rate of Return on Equity Capital[J].Accounting Review,2004,79(1):73-95.
[39] 罗琦,王悦歌. 真实盈余管理与权益资本成本:基于公司成长性差异的分析[J].金融研究,2015(5):178-191.
[40] 李慧云,刘镝. 市场化进程、自愿性信息披露和权益资本成本[J].会计研究,2016(1):71- 78.
[41] Gebhardt W,Lee C,Swaminathan B. Towards an Implied Cost of Capital[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2001,39(1):135-176.
[42] Baron R M,Kenny D A. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual,strategic,and statistical considerations[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1986,51(6):1173-1182.
[43] 温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等. 中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004,36(5):614-620.
[44] 余明桂,李文贵,潘红波. 民营化、产权保护与企业风险承担[J].经济研究,2013(9):112-124.
[45] 翟胜宝,张胜,谢露,等. 银行关联与企业风险——基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2014(4):53-59.
[46] Francis J R,LaFond P,Olsson and Schipper K.The market pricing of accruals quality[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39 (2): 295-327.
[47] 于李胜,王艳艳. 信息风险与市场定价[J].管理世界,2007(2):76-85.
[48] 曾雪云,陆正飞. 盈余管理信息风险、业绩波动与审计意见——投资者如何逃离有重大盈余管理嫌疑的上市公司?[J].财经研究,2016(8):133-144.
[49] Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation [J].Journal of Accounting & Economics,2006,42(3):335-370.
[2] 陈运森,郑登津. 董事网络关系、信息桥与投资趋同[J].南开管理评论,2017(3):159-171.
[3] 严若森,华小丽. 环境不确定性、连锁董事网络位置与企业创新投入[J].管理学报,2017(3):373-381.
[4] Burt R S. Corporate Profits and Cooptation Networks of Market Constraints and Directorate Ties in the American Economy[M]. New York: Acadcmic Press, 1983.
[5] Shropshire C. The Role of the Interlocking Director and Board Receptivity in the Diffusion of Practices[J].Academy of Management Review, 2010,35(2):246-264.
[6] Campello M, Giambona E, Graham J R. Access to Liquidity and Corporate Investment in Europe during the Financial Crisis[J].Review of Finance, 2012,300(1):539-555.
[7] Hackbarth D, Mauer D C. Optimal Priority Structure, Capital Structure, and Investment[J].Review of Financial Studies, 2009, 25(3):747-796.
[8] 万良勇,郑小玲. 董事网络的结构洞特征与公司并购[J].会计研究,2014(5):67-72.
[9] 马连福,张琦,王丽丽. 董事会网络位置与企业技术创新投入——基于技术密集型上市公司的研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2016(4):126-136.
[10] Larcker D F, So E C, Wang C C Y. Boardroom Centrality and Stock Returns[C] Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, 2010.
[11] 曹廷求,王营,张蕾. 董事网络位置及其溢出效应:为关系支付薪酬?[J].财经研究,2012(10):15-25.
[12] 李敏娜,王铁男. 董事网络、高管薪酬激励与公司成长性[J].中国软科学,2014(4):138-148.
[13] 陆贤伟,王建琼,董大勇. 董事网络、信息传递与债务融资成本[J].管理科学,2013(3):55-64.
[14] Ghoul S E, Guedhami O, Kwok C Y. Does Corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital? [J].Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2011, 35(9):2388-2406.
[15] Modigliani F, Miller M. The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment[J].American Economic Review, 1958, 48(3): 261-297.
[16] Lambert R, Leuz C, Verrecchia R. E. Accounting Information, Disclosure, and Cost of Capital[J].Journal of Accounting Research, 2007,45(2): 385-420.
[17] 张祥建,郭岚. 国外连锁董事网络研究述评与未来展望[J].外国经济与管理,2014(5):69-80.
[18] Granovetter M. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,1985,91(3):481-510.
[19] Alchian A,Demsetz H. Production,Information Costs,and Economic Organization[J].IEEE Engineering Management Review,2007,3(2):21-41.
[20] Deutsch Y,Keil T,Laamanen T. A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,32(2):212-227.
[21] Gulati R. Network location and learning: the influence of network resources and firm capabilities on alliance formation[J].Strategic Management Journal,2015,20(5):397-420.
[22] 钟军委,张祥建,钱有飞. 连锁董事网络、社会资本与企业投资效率——来自A股上市公司的经验证据[J].产业经济研究,2017(4):56-66.
[23] Hackbarth D,Mauer D C. Optimal Priority Structure,Capital Structure,and Investment[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,25(3):747-796.
[24] Freeman L C. Centrality in social networks[J].Social Networks,1979,1:215-239.
[25] 谢德仁,陈运森.董事网络:定义、特征和计量[J].金融研究,2012(3)44-51.
[26] Johnsom J L,Daily C M,Ellstrand A E. Boards of directors: a review and research agenda[J].Journal of Management,1996,22(3):409-438.
[27] 周军,刘晓彤,杨茗. 董事网络影响股价崩盘风险吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2018(1):61-74.
[28] Burris V. Interlocking directorates and political cohesion among corporate elites[J].American Journal of Sociology,2005,111(1): 2-249.
[29] 陈运森,谢德仁. 网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界,2011(7):113-127.
[30] 万良勇,胡璟. 网络位置、独立董事治理与公司并购——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014(2):64-73.
[31] 万良勇,邓路,郑小玲. 网络位置、独立董事治理与公司违规——基于部分可观测Bivariate Probit模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014(12):3091-3102.
[32] Chuluun T,Prevost A K,Puthenpurackal J. Board networks and the cost of corporate debt[R]. NewYork: Social Science Research Network,2010:1-50.
[33] 曹廷求,张钰,刘舒. 董事网络、信息不对称和并购财富效应[J].经济管理,2013(8):41-52.
[34] 陈运森.独立董事网络中心度与公司信息披露质量[J].审计研究,2012(5):92-100.
[35] 傅代国,夏常源.网络位置、独立董事治理与盈余质量[J].审计与经济研究,2014(2):67-75.
[36] Jensen M C,Meckling W H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976(4): 305-360.
[37] Elton E J. Presidential address: Expected return,realized return,and asset pricing tests[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(4):1199-1220.
[38] Easton PD. PERatios,PEGRatios,and Estimating the Implied Expected Rate of Return on Equity Capital[J].Accounting Review,2004,79(1):73-95.
[39] 罗琦,王悦歌. 真实盈余管理与权益资本成本:基于公司成长性差异的分析[J].金融研究,2015(5):178-191.
[40] 李慧云,刘镝. 市场化进程、自愿性信息披露和权益资本成本[J].会计研究,2016(1):71- 78.
[41] Gebhardt W,Lee C,Swaminathan B. Towards an Implied Cost of Capital[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2001,39(1):135-176.
[42] Baron R M,Kenny D A. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual,strategic,and statistical considerations[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1986,51(6):1173-1182.
[43] 温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等. 中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报,2004,36(5):614-620.
[44] 余明桂,李文贵,潘红波. 民营化、产权保护与企业风险承担[J].经济研究,2013(9):112-124.
[45] 翟胜宝,张胜,谢露,等. 银行关联与企业风险——基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2014(4):53-59.
[46] Francis J R,LaFond P,Olsson and Schipper K.The market pricing of accruals quality[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39 (2): 295-327.
[47] 于李胜,王艳艳. 信息风险与市场定价[J].管理世界,2007(2):76-85.
[48] 曾雪云,陆正飞. 盈余管理信息风险、业绩波动与审计意见——投资者如何逃离有重大盈余管理嫌疑的上市公司?[J].财经研究,2016(8):133-144.
[49] Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation [J].Journal of Accounting & Economics,2006,42(3):335-370.