权利管制、租金耗散与农业绩效——人民公社的经验分析及对未来变革的启示
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摘要
本文通过权利管制下租金耗散的逻辑框架分析人民公社体制下的经济绩效,并以湖北省人民公社的面板数据为例进行实证检验。结果表明,人民公社体制下国家对农地剩余索取权与退社权实施严密的管制,导致租金耗散。在人民公社工分制固定收入契约下,最低固定收入在长期内不会发生改变,这必然导致社员为最大化自身利益产生偷懒和卸责行为。尽管公社内部已经大量使用机械与技术设备等投入以促进生产率提高,但也无法避免权利管制所导致的租金耗散对人民公社经济绩效的冲击。因此,我国40年农地制度改革的伟大成就恰恰就是通过采用以放松产权管制为制度特征的家庭承包制来替代人民公社体制,从而减少了租金耗散,农业经济绩效因而显著提高。40年变革隐含的制度启示是:在农村土地集体所有制下,保持农地承包权稳定不变、放松对农地经营权的管制将依然是改革与完善农地制度的基本线索。
This paper analyzes economic performance of commune system by logical framework of rent dissipation under rights regulation,and takes the panel data of the people 's commune system of Hubei Province as an example for empirical test. It shows that under the people's commune system,the state strictly controls the residual claim and the right of retreating agricultural land,resulting in rent dissipation.. Under the fixed income contract of the people's commune system,the minimum fixed income does not change in the long run,which inevitably lead to commune members being lazy and dismissed to maximize their own interests. Although the machinery and technical equipment has been extensively used within the commune to promote productivity,the impact of rent dissipation caused by rights regulation on the economic performance of commune cannot be avoided.. Therefore,the great achievement of China's 40-year reform of agricultural land system is precisely the adoption of a household contract system characterized by deregulation of property rights,which replaced the people's commune system,thereby reducing rent dissipation and significantly improving agricultural economic performance. By reviewing this history,we obtain a simple policy implication that under community ownership of farmland,maintaining the stability of farmland contracting rights and further relaxing the control of farmland management rights will remain the basic rule for the reform and improvement of the farmland system.
This paper analyzes economic performance of commune system by logical framework of rent dissipation under rights regulation,and takes the panel data of the people 's commune system of Hubei Province as an example for empirical test. It shows that under the people's commune system,the state strictly controls the residual claim and the right of retreating agricultural land,resulting in rent dissipation.. Under the fixed income contract of the people's commune system,the minimum fixed income does not change in the long run,which inevitably lead to commune members being lazy and dismissed to maximize their own interests. Although the machinery and technical equipment has been extensively used within the commune to promote productivity,the impact of rent dissipation caused by rights regulation on the economic performance of commune cannot be avoided.. Therefore,the great achievement of China's 40-year reform of agricultural land system is precisely the adoption of a household contract system characterized by deregulation of property rights,which replaced the people's commune system,thereby reducing rent dissipation and significantly improving agricultural economic performance. By reviewing this history,we obtain a simple policy implication that under community ownership of farmland,maintaining the stability of farmland contracting rights and further relaxing the control of farmland management rights will remain the basic rule for the reform and improvement of the farmland system.
引文
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8.G.Driscoll,Hoskins.L.Property Rights:The Key to Economic Development.Cato Journal,2003,48(2)
9.E.Anderson,Bandiera.O.Private Enforcement and Social Efficiency.Journal of Development Economics,2005,77(2):341~366
10.P.Stoett.The International Regulation of Trade in Wildlife:Institutional and Normative Considerations.International Environmental A-greements:Politics,Law and Economics,2002,2(2):193~208
11.Estache A,Martimort D.Politics,Transaction Costs,and the Design of Regulatory Institutions.Social Science Electronic Publishing,1999,volume 16(1):85~108(24)
12.S.Rassenti,V.Smith,B.Wilson.Using Experiments to Inform The Privatization/Deregulation Movement In Electericity.Cato Journal,2002,21(3):133~146
13.Press U O P.Collective Action and Property Rights for PovertyReduction.Development Policy Review,2012,27(3):307-331
14.Libecap G D.State Regulation of Open-Access,Common-Pool Resources.Icer Working Papers,2005:545~572
15.G.Tullock.The Origin Rent-Seeking Concept.International Journal of Business and Economics,2003,2(1):1~8
16.J.Lin.Exit Rights,Exit Costs,and Shirking in Agricultural Cooperatives:AReply.Journal of Comparative Economics,1993,17(2):504~520
17.X.Dong and L.Dow.Does Free Exit Reduce Shirking in Production Team?.Journal of Comparative Economics,1993,17(2):504~520
18.K.Kung.Transaction Costs and Peasants Choice of Institutions:Did the Right to Exit Really Solve the Free Rider Problem in Chinese Collective Agriculture?.Journal of Comparative Economics,1993,17(2):485~503
19.K.Sen.Poverty and Famine.Oxford,U.K.:Clarendon Press,1981
20.X.Houser,Y.Sands,O.Barbara and Q.Xiao,Three parts natural,seven parts man-made:Bayesian analysis of China’s Great Leap Forward demographic disaster.Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2009,69(2):148~159
21.Xin Meng,N.Qian,and P.Yared.The Institutional Causes of China’s Great Famine1959-61[J/OL].http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pyared/papers/famines.pdf,2010-09-01
22.J.Lin.Collectivization and Chinas’agricultural crisis in 1959-1961.Journal of Political Economy,1993,17(6):1228~1252
23.R.Solow.A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1956,70(1):65~94
24.曹啸,计小青.管制经济学的演进:从传统理论到比较制度分析.财经研究,2006(10):71~79
25.郭艳茹.管制的产权分析:一种方法论上的探讨.学术月刊,2005(12):52~57
26.郭艳茹.交易费用、权力控制与明代管制型制度体系的演变.南开经济研究,2008(2):3~21
27.张辉,张丽.价格管制与租值消散:以劳动合同法为例.西安财经学院学报,2009,22(3):93~97
28.郭锐欣,张鹏飞.进入管制与黑车现象.世界经济,2009(3):59~71
29.许德风.住房租赁合同的社会控制.中国社会科学,2009(3):125~139+206~207
30.陶然,刘明兴,章奇.农民负担、政府管制与财政体制改革.经济研究,2003(4):3~12+91
31.章奇,刘明兴,单伟.政府管制、法律软约束与农村基层民主.经济研究,2004(6):59~68
32.陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约.经济研究,2008(3):60~72
33.白让让,郁义鸿.价格与进入管制下的边缘性进入:一个理论模型分析.经济研究,2004(9):70~81
34.陈钊.转型经济中的放松管制和企业重构的最优路径.经济学(季刊),2004(1):259~280
35.何一鸣,罗必良.产权管制放松与中国经济转轨绩效.经济理论与经济管理,2009(9):10~15
36.江曙霞,谢杰斌.产权保护:公共物品?私有物品?.南开经济研究,2008(2):79~92+104
37.杜明义,赵曦.农地租值耗散与农民土地权益保护.贵州社会科学,2009(1):89~94
38.张卫东,童睿.租值消散理论述评.江西师范大学学报,2005(3):44~48
39.李月,贾绍凤.水权制度选择理论:基于交易成本、租值消散的研究.自然资源学报,2007(5):692~700
40.杨骞.行政垄断租值耗散的理论与实证研究.中南财经政法大学学报,2009(3):49~54+143
41.叶航,王弟海.公有产权经济效率的再认识.浙江社会科学,2001(4):62~64
42.孟昌.租金的竞争性寻求及其耗散:基于经典文献的术语考证与概念界定.教学与研究,2011(12):53~58
43.范子英,孟令杰,石慧.为何1959-1961年大饥荒终结于1962年.经济学(季刊),2009,8(1):289~306
44.陈硕.1959-1961年中国饥荒的回顾及启示.世界经济,2011,34(4):80~103
45.文贯中,刘愿.从退堂权的失而复得看“大跃进”饥荒的成因和教训.经济学(季刊)2010,9(3):1083~1118
46.孙圣民.工农业关系与经济发展:计划经济时代的历史计量学再考察——兼与姚洋、郑东雅商榷.经济研究,2009,44(8):135~147
47.张威,吴能全.财政交易、意识形态约束与激进公有化:中国1950年代的政治经济学.经济研究,2010,45(2):137~151
48.曹树基.1959-1961年中国人口的死亡及其成因.中国人口科学,2005(1):16~30+97
49.刘愿.中国“大跃进”饥荒成因再辩:政治权利的视角.经济学(季刊),2010,9(3):1177~1188
50.杨涛.探讨大饥荒的成因:集权、计划失误与政治行为的影响.经济学(季刊),2010,9(3):1143~1150
51.陈剑波.人民公社的产权制度——对排它性受到严格限制的产权体系所进行的制度分析.经济研究,1994(7):47~53
52.周其仁.产权与制度变迁——中国改革的经验研究.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2002
53.何一鸣,罗必良.产权管制范式.制度经济学研究,2012(2):111~125
54.何一鸣,罗必良.新中国农地制度变迁的经验证据研究.河南社会科学,2009,17(4):16~19
2.E.Jansson.Deregulation,Property Rights,and Legal System.European Journal of Law Economics,2008,26(2):187~211
3.S.Cheung.A Theory of PriceControl.Journal of Law and Economics,1974,17(1):53~71
4.J.Umbeck.Might Makes Rights:A Theory of The Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights.Economic Inquiry,1981,19(1):38~59
5.Y.Barzel.Economic Analysis of Property Rights.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1989
6.E.Ostrom.Private and Common Property Rights[A],In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics[C].,B.Bouckaert,G.D.Geest,eds.Aldershot:Edward Elgar Publishing,2000
7.V.Mukhija.Collective Action and Property Rights:A Planner’s Critical Look at the Dogma of Private Property.International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,2005,29(4):972-983
8.G.Driscoll,Hoskins.L.Property Rights:The Key to Economic Development.Cato Journal,2003,48(2)
9.E.Anderson,Bandiera.O.Private Enforcement and Social Efficiency.Journal of Development Economics,2005,77(2):341~366
10.P.Stoett.The International Regulation of Trade in Wildlife:Institutional and Normative Considerations.International Environmental A-greements:Politics,Law and Economics,2002,2(2):193~208
11.Estache A,Martimort D.Politics,Transaction Costs,and the Design of Regulatory Institutions.Social Science Electronic Publishing,1999,volume 16(1):85~108(24)
12.S.Rassenti,V.Smith,B.Wilson.Using Experiments to Inform The Privatization/Deregulation Movement In Electericity.Cato Journal,2002,21(3):133~146
13.Press U O P.Collective Action and Property Rights for PovertyReduction.Development Policy Review,2012,27(3):307-331
14.Libecap G D.State Regulation of Open-Access,Common-Pool Resources.Icer Working Papers,2005:545~572
15.G.Tullock.The Origin Rent-Seeking Concept.International Journal of Business and Economics,2003,2(1):1~8
16.J.Lin.Exit Rights,Exit Costs,and Shirking in Agricultural Cooperatives:AReply.Journal of Comparative Economics,1993,17(2):504~520
17.X.Dong and L.Dow.Does Free Exit Reduce Shirking in Production Team?.Journal of Comparative Economics,1993,17(2):504~520
18.K.Kung.Transaction Costs and Peasants Choice of Institutions:Did the Right to Exit Really Solve the Free Rider Problem in Chinese Collective Agriculture?.Journal of Comparative Economics,1993,17(2):485~503
19.K.Sen.Poverty and Famine.Oxford,U.K.:Clarendon Press,1981
20.X.Houser,Y.Sands,O.Barbara and Q.Xiao,Three parts natural,seven parts man-made:Bayesian analysis of China’s Great Leap Forward demographic disaster.Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,2009,69(2):148~159
21.Xin Meng,N.Qian,and P.Yared.The Institutional Causes of China’s Great Famine1959-61[J/OL].http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pyared/papers/famines.pdf,2010-09-01
22.J.Lin.Collectivization and Chinas’agricultural crisis in 1959-1961.Journal of Political Economy,1993,17(6):1228~1252
23.R.Solow.A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1956,70(1):65~94
24.曹啸,计小青.管制经济学的演进:从传统理论到比较制度分析.财经研究,2006(10):71~79
25.郭艳茹.管制的产权分析:一种方法论上的探讨.学术月刊,2005(12):52~57
26.郭艳茹.交易费用、权力控制与明代管制型制度体系的演变.南开经济研究,2008(2):3~21
27.张辉,张丽.价格管制与租值消散:以劳动合同法为例.西安财经学院学报,2009,22(3):93~97
28.郭锐欣,张鹏飞.进入管制与黑车现象.世界经济,2009(3):59~71
29.许德风.住房租赁合同的社会控制.中国社会科学,2009(3):125~139+206~207
30.陶然,刘明兴,章奇.农民负担、政府管制与财政体制改革.经济研究,2003(4):3~12+91
31.章奇,刘明兴,单伟.政府管制、法律软约束与农村基层民主.经济研究,2004(6):59~68
32.陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约.经济研究,2008(3):60~72
33.白让让,郁义鸿.价格与进入管制下的边缘性进入:一个理论模型分析.经济研究,2004(9):70~81
34.陈钊.转型经济中的放松管制和企业重构的最优路径.经济学(季刊),2004(1):259~280
35.何一鸣,罗必良.产权管制放松与中国经济转轨绩效.经济理论与经济管理,2009(9):10~15
36.江曙霞,谢杰斌.产权保护:公共物品?私有物品?.南开经济研究,2008(2):79~92+104
37.杜明义,赵曦.农地租值耗散与农民土地权益保护.贵州社会科学,2009(1):89~94
38.张卫东,童睿.租值消散理论述评.江西师范大学学报,2005(3):44~48
39.李月,贾绍凤.水权制度选择理论:基于交易成本、租值消散的研究.自然资源学报,2007(5):692~700
40.杨骞.行政垄断租值耗散的理论与实证研究.中南财经政法大学学报,2009(3):49~54+143
41.叶航,王弟海.公有产权经济效率的再认识.浙江社会科学,2001(4):62~64
42.孟昌.租金的竞争性寻求及其耗散:基于经典文献的术语考证与概念界定.教学与研究,2011(12):53~58
43.范子英,孟令杰,石慧.为何1959-1961年大饥荒终结于1962年.经济学(季刊),2009,8(1):289~306
44.陈硕.1959-1961年中国饥荒的回顾及启示.世界经济,2011,34(4):80~103
45.文贯中,刘愿.从退堂权的失而复得看“大跃进”饥荒的成因和教训.经济学(季刊)2010,9(3):1083~1118
46.孙圣民.工农业关系与经济发展:计划经济时代的历史计量学再考察——兼与姚洋、郑东雅商榷.经济研究,2009,44(8):135~147
47.张威,吴能全.财政交易、意识形态约束与激进公有化:中国1950年代的政治经济学.经济研究,2010,45(2):137~151
48.曹树基.1959-1961年中国人口的死亡及其成因.中国人口科学,2005(1):16~30+97
49.刘愿.中国“大跃进”饥荒成因再辩:政治权利的视角.经济学(季刊),2010,9(3):1177~1188
50.杨涛.探讨大饥荒的成因:集权、计划失误与政治行为的影响.经济学(季刊),2010,9(3):1143~1150
51.陈剑波.人民公社的产权制度——对排它性受到严格限制的产权体系所进行的制度分析.经济研究,1994(7):47~53
52.周其仁.产权与制度变迁——中国改革的经验研究.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2002
53.何一鸣,罗必良.产权管制范式.制度经济学研究,2012(2):111~125
54.何一鸣,罗必良.新中国农地制度变迁的经验证据研究.河南社会科学,2009,17(4):16~19