工期不确定下的外包项目激励机制设计
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摘要
对于科技研发等具有明显时间价值的项目以及水电站建设等大型项目而言,提前完工能够带来显著的经济效益,基于资源、进度和成本因素的考虑,外包成为此类项目的战略选择。当前对项目收益激励及工期优化问题的研究较多基于确定性工期或非合作视角,在实际施工中由于外生变量的影响工期往往不确定,因此分析工期不确定情况下,考虑参与各方的风险偏好,设计基于合作的激励机制对项目外包实践有重要的意义。基于此,从合作博弈的角度,分别制定了工期确定、工期不确定情况下的激励合同;通过模型对比,分析外界因素、承包商、分包商各自对激励机制设计的影响;并进一步提出基于收益最大化的联盟合作在工期确定时可以达到,在工期不确定时可以通过基于信任的Partnering项目管理模式达到。最后提出了对于外包项目激励机制设计的一些建议。
For projects with obvious time value, such as scientific research and development and large-scale projects like hydropower construction, early completion can bring significant economic benefits. Considering resources, schedule and cost, outsourcing has become a strategic choice for such projects. At present, the research on project income incentives and duration optimization is mostly based on deterministic duration or noncooperative perspective. In actual construction, the duration is often uncertain due to the influence of exogenous variables. Therefore, in the uncertainty of the duration, considering the risk preferences of all parties involved,designing a cooperative incentive mechanism is of great significance to the project outsourcing practice. From the perspective of cooperative game, this article makes cooperative incentive contracts with certain and uncertain duration respectively, to enlarge the project output, so both contractor and subcontractor can earn more. Finally, it provides several meaningful suggestions for the outsourcing project incentive problem in practice through model analysis.
For projects with obvious time value, such as scientific research and development and large-scale projects like hydropower construction, early completion can bring significant economic benefits. Considering resources, schedule and cost, outsourcing has become a strategic choice for such projects. At present, the research on project income incentives and duration optimization is mostly based on deterministic duration or noncooperative perspective. In actual construction, the duration is often uncertain due to the influence of exogenous variables. Therefore, in the uncertainty of the duration, considering the risk preferences of all parties involved,designing a cooperative incentive mechanism is of great significance to the project outsourcing practice. From the perspective of cooperative game, this article makes cooperative incentive contracts with certain and uncertain duration respectively, to enlarge the project output, so both contractor and subcontractor can earn more. Finally, it provides several meaningful suggestions for the outsourcing project incentive problem in practice through model analysis.
引文
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[16]MOHAMMAD S.How do contract types and incentives matter to project performance?[J].International Journal of Project Management,2016(34):1071-1087.
[2]汪应洛.多合同的激励优化与最优工期确定[J].预测,2005,24(2):60-63.
[3]兰定筠.对代建合同工期成本激励系数的研究[J].土木工程学报,2008,41(6):91-97.
[4]向寿生.单分包合同下的承包商工期激励强度模型研究[J].统计与决策,2013(6):44-47.
[5]帕特里克·博尔顿,马赛厄斯·德瓦特里庞.合同理论[M].费方瑜,译.上海:格致出版社,2015:231-260.
[6]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社.2011:245
[7]TANG C S.Incentive Contracts for Managing a Project with Uncertain Completion Time[J].Product and Operation,2015(12):1945-1954.
[8]王榴.基于委托代理模型的建筑工程激励合同机制研究[J].工程管理学报,2014,28(1):99-105.
[9]BERENDS T C.Cost plus incentive fee contracting experienced structuring[J].International Journal of Project Management,2000,18(3):165-173.
[10]吴孝灵.基于总包商施工效率的BOT项目工期激励合同研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(13):75-80.
[11]YANG Kai,ZHAO Rui-qing.Incentive contract design in project management with serial tasks and uncertain completion times[J].Engineering Optimization,2016(4):629-651.
[12]施锡铨.合作博弈引论[M].北京:北京大学出版社.2012.
[13]ESTéVEZ-FERNáNDEZ A.A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,216:647-657.
[14]CASTRO J.A project game for PERT networks[J].Science Direct Operations Research Letters,2007,35:791-798.
[15]陈菊红.虚拟企业收益分配问题博弈研究[J].运筹与管理,2002,11(1):11-17.
[16]MOHAMMAD S.How do contract types and incentives matter to project performance?[J].International Journal of Project Management,2016(34):1071-1087.