策略性专利申请行为会影响专利权稳定性吗?
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摘要
已授权专利(范围、新创性等)与专利法规定的授权标准之间的"模糊空间"是导致专利权不稳定的根源。由于专利制度内在的"不确定性",使得专利申请人有动机通过采取策略性的专利申请行为影响专利审查过程,从而制造或者扩大这种"模糊空间"。本文选取我国经历过无效审查的发明专利作为研究对象,分别提取专利公开延迟、实质审查请求延迟、审查时间、权利要求撰写方式及技术复杂度作为策略性专利申请行为的代理变量,无效审查的结果作为专利权稳定性的代理变量,实证检验策略性专利申请行为与专利权稳定性的关系。实证研究表明,策略性专利申请行为普遍存在,并与专利权的稳定性存在显著相关性。策略性的延迟行为与专利权稳定性显著负相关,专利撰写方式(权利要求数)与专利权稳定性显著正相关。该研究为识别专利申请及审查过程中的"模糊空间",优化审查过程及提高审查质量提供一定的实证借鉴。
Patent examination progress is a game between patent applicants and patent examiners relates to the extent to which a grant patent should satisfy the statutory standard of patent law. "obscure space" between an actual granted patent and statutory standard of patent law is a prime source for patent instability. For the intrinsic "uncertainty" of patent system, patent applicants have motivations to affect patent examination process by taking kinds of strategic applicant behavior and thereby create and expand such "obscure space". This paper selects china invent patents which experienced invalidation procedure as research objects and make publication delay, examination request delay and examination delay as proxy variable for strategic application behavior, while invalidation procedure outcomes as proxy variable for patent stability to empirically test the relationship between strategic patent behavior and patent stability. Empirical results show that, publication delay, examination request delay and examination delay have negative correlation with the patent stability; patent claims size have positive correlation with the patent stability. This research provides empirical evidence to the identification of "obscure space" in the patent examination and provides guidance to the optimization of patent examination quality.
Patent examination progress is a game between patent applicants and patent examiners relates to the extent to which a grant patent should satisfy the statutory standard of patent law. "obscure space" between an actual granted patent and statutory standard of patent law is a prime source for patent instability. For the intrinsic "uncertainty" of patent system, patent applicants have motivations to affect patent examination process by taking kinds of strategic applicant behavior and thereby create and expand such "obscure space". This paper selects china invent patents which experienced invalidation procedure as research objects and make publication delay, examination request delay and examination delay as proxy variable for strategic application behavior, while invalidation procedure outcomes as proxy variable for patent stability to empirically test the relationship between strategic patent behavior and patent stability. Empirical results show that, publication delay, examination request delay and examination delay have negative correlation with the patent stability; patent claims size have positive correlation with the patent stability. This research provides empirical evidence to the identification of "obscure space" in the patent examination and provides guidance to the optimization of patent examination quality.
引文
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[12] 肖冰.基于法定保护期的专利维持时间影响因素研究[J].科学学研究,2017,35(11):1652-1658.
[13] 乔永忠.有效专利数量增长下的专利维持年费制度研究[J].科学学研究,2018,36(2):272-278.
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[16] Harhoff D,Reitzig M.Determinants of opposition against EPO patent grants—the case of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2004,22(4):443-480.
[17] Mejer M.Patent backlogs at USPTO and EPO:Systemic failure vs deliberate delays[J].World Patent Information,2011,33(2):122-127.
[18] Sterlacchini A.Patent oppositions and opposition outcomes:Evidence from domestic appliance companies[J].European Journal of Law & Economics,2016,41(1):1-21.
[19] 万小丽.专利质量指标研究[D].华中科技大学,2009.
[20] Giles D E.A survival analysis of the approval of US patent applications[J].Applied Economics,2011,43(11):1375-1384.
[21] Palangkaraya A,Jensen P H,Webster E.Applicant behaviour in patent examination request lags[J].Economics Letters,2008,101(3):243-245.
[22] Zeebroeck N V.Patents only live twice:A patent survival analysis in Europe[Z].2007.
[23] Harhoff D,Wagner S.The Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent Office[M].DUV,2006:1969-1984.
[24] Frakes M,Wasserman M F.Is the time allocated to review patent applications inducing examiners to grant invalid patents?Evidence from micro-level application data[J].Nber Working Papers,2014,92(1):8-19.
[25] 文家春,卢娣.专利倾向与专利审查的互动效应及其政策含义[J].科学学研究,2018,36(6):961-966.
[26] 张米尔,国伟,曲宁.面向专利预警的专利申请关键特征研究[J].科研管理,2018,39(1):135-142.
[27] 张古鹏,陈向东.基于发明专利的专利制度变动效应研究[J].科研管理,2012,33(6):110-119.
[28] Popp D,Juhl T,Johnson D K N.Time in purgatory:Examining the grant lag for U.S.patent applications[J].Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy,2004,4(1):29.
[2] Eckert A,Langinier C.A survey of the economics of patent systems and procedures[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,2014,28(5):996-1015.
[3] 张米尔,胡素雅,国伟.低质量专利的识别方法及应用研究[J].科研管理,2013,34(3):122-127.
[4] Bessen J,Meurer M J.Patent Failure[M].Princeton University Press,2009:352.
[5] Sternitzke C.Reducing uncertainty in the patent application procedure-insights from invalidating prior art in European patent applications[J].World Patent Information,2009,31(1):48-53.
[6] Oh J B,Kim Y K.Examination workloads,grant decision bias and examination quality of patent office[Z].2017:46.
[7] Carrara P,Russo D.Patent searches opinion:How to minimize the risk when reviewing patent applications[J].World Patent Information,2017,49:43-51.
[8] Cockburn I,Kortun S,Stern S.Are All Patent Examiners Equal[M].National Academies press,2003.
[9] Schuett F.Patent quality and incentives at the patent office[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2013,44(2):313-336.
[10] Mann R J,Allison J R.Disputed Quality of Software Patents[M].Washington University Law Review,2007.
[11] 刘立春,漆苏.专利特征对药品专利法律质量评估的实证研究[J].科研管理,2015,36(6):119-127.
[12] 肖冰.基于法定保护期的专利维持时间影响因素研究[J].科学学研究,2017,35(11):1652-1658.
[13] 乔永忠.有效专利数量增长下的专利维持年费制度研究[J].科学学研究,2018,36(2):272-278.
[14] Schneider C.The battle for patent rights in plant biotechnology:Evidence from opposition fillings[J].Journal of Technology Transfer,2011,36(5):565-579.
[15] Potterie B V P D.The quality factor in patent systems[J].Working Papers,2010,20(7921):1755-1793.
[16] Harhoff D,Reitzig M.Determinants of opposition against EPO patent grants—the case of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2004,22(4):443-480.
[17] Mejer M.Patent backlogs at USPTO and EPO:Systemic failure vs deliberate delays[J].World Patent Information,2011,33(2):122-127.
[18] Sterlacchini A.Patent oppositions and opposition outcomes:Evidence from domestic appliance companies[J].European Journal of Law & Economics,2016,41(1):1-21.
[19] 万小丽.专利质量指标研究[D].华中科技大学,2009.
[20] Giles D E.A survival analysis of the approval of US patent applications[J].Applied Economics,2011,43(11):1375-1384.
[21] Palangkaraya A,Jensen P H,Webster E.Applicant behaviour in patent examination request lags[J].Economics Letters,2008,101(3):243-245.
[22] Zeebroeck N V.Patents only live twice:A patent survival analysis in Europe[Z].2007.
[23] Harhoff D,Wagner S.The Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent Office[M].DUV,2006:1969-1984.
[24] Frakes M,Wasserman M F.Is the time allocated to review patent applications inducing examiners to grant invalid patents?Evidence from micro-level application data[J].Nber Working Papers,2014,92(1):8-19.
[25] 文家春,卢娣.专利倾向与专利审查的互动效应及其政策含义[J].科学学研究,2018,36(6):961-966.
[26] 张米尔,国伟,曲宁.面向专利预警的专利申请关键特征研究[J].科研管理,2018,39(1):135-142.
[27] 张古鹏,陈向东.基于发明专利的专利制度变动效应研究[J].科研管理,2012,33(6):110-119.
[28] Popp D,Juhl T,Johnson D K N.Time in purgatory:Examining the grant lag for U.S.patent applications[J].Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy,2004,4(1):29.
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