Research on the Loss Sharing Contract in Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information
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摘要
In this study, the coordination contract of internal and external losses of supply chain under asymmetric information is studied. Firstly, the profit functions of supplier and manufacturer are established respectively. Secondly, the contract under unilateral and bilateral moral hazard is designed.Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze the coordination contract. It is proved that the overall coordination of supply chain can be achieved through loss sharing contract, and the quality level and overall profit can be improved.
In this study, the coordination contract of internal and external losses of supply chain under asymmetric information is studied. Firstly, the profit functions of supplier and manufacturer are established respectively. Secondly, the contract under unilateral and bilateral moral hazard is designed.Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze the coordination contract. It is proved that the overall coordination of supply chain can be achieved through loss sharing contract, and the quality level and overall profit can be improved.
In this study, the coordination contract of internal and external losses of supply chain under asymmetric information is studied. Firstly, the profit functions of supplier and manufacturer are established respectively. Secondly, the contract under unilateral and bilateral moral hazard is designed.Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze the coordination contract. It is proved that the overall coordination of supply chain can be achieved through loss sharing contract, and the quality level and overall profit can be improved.
引文
[1] Cachon G P. Stock wars:Inventory competition in a two-echelon supply chain with multiple retailers.Operations Research, 2001, 49(5):658–674.
[2] Baiman S, Fischer P E, Rajan M V. Performance measurement and design in supply chains. Management Science, 2001, 47(1):173–188.
[3] Balachandran K R, Radhakrishnan S. Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain. Management Science, 2005, 51(8):1266–1277.
[4] Hu B, Meng C, Xu D, et al. Three-echelon supply chain coordination with a loss-averse retailer and revenue sharing contracts. International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, 179:192–202.
[5] Cachon G P, Lariviere M A. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:Strengths and limitations. Management science, 2005, 51(1):30–44.
[6] Hu B, Feng Y. Optimization and coordination of supply chain with revenue sharing contracts and service requirement under supply and demand uncertainty. International Journal of Production Economics, 2017,183:185–193.
[7] Song H, Gao X. Green supply chain game model and analysis under revenue-sharing contract. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2018, 170:183–192.
[8] Ghosh D, Shah J. Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract.International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 164:319–329.
[9] Bai Q, Chen M, Xu L. Revenue and promotional cost-sharing contract versus two-part tariff contract in coordinating sustainable supply chain systems with deteriorating items. International Journal of Production Economics, 2017, 187:85–101.
[10] Gunasekaran A, Papadopoulos T, Dubey R, et al. Big data and predictive analytics for supply chain and organizational performance. Journal of Business Research, 2017, 70:308–317.
[11] Kim M, Chai S. The impact of supplier innovativeness, information sharing and strategic sourcing on improving supply chain agility:Global supply chain perspective. International Journal of Production Economics, 2017, 187:42–52.
[12] Zhou M, Dan B, Ma S, et al. Supply chain coordination with information sharing:The informational advantage of GPOs. European Journal of Operational Research, 2017, 256(3):785–802.
[13] Hult G T M, Ketchen Jr D J, Slater S F. Information processing, knowledge development, and strategic supply chain performance. Academy of Management Journal, 2004, 47(2):241–253.
[14] Shih S C, Hsu S H Y, Zhu Z, et al. Knowledge sharing key role in the downstream supply chain. Information&Management, 2012, 49(2):70–80.
[15] Blome C, Schoenherr T, Eckstein D. The impact of knowledge transfer and complexity on supply chain flexibility:A knowledge-based view. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 147:307–316.
[16] Harland C M. Supply chain management:Relationships, chains and networks. British Journal of management, 1996, 7:S63–S80.
[17] Protopappa-Sieke M, Seifert R W. Benefits of working capital sharing in supply chains. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2017, 68(5):521–532.
[18] Balachandran K R, Radhakrishnan S. Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain. Management Science, 2005, 51(8):1266–1277.
[2] Baiman S, Fischer P E, Rajan M V. Performance measurement and design in supply chains. Management Science, 2001, 47(1):173–188.
[3] Balachandran K R, Radhakrishnan S. Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain. Management Science, 2005, 51(8):1266–1277.
[4] Hu B, Meng C, Xu D, et al. Three-echelon supply chain coordination with a loss-averse retailer and revenue sharing contracts. International Journal of Production Economics, 2016, 179:192–202.
[5] Cachon G P, Lariviere M A. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:Strengths and limitations. Management science, 2005, 51(1):30–44.
[6] Hu B, Feng Y. Optimization and coordination of supply chain with revenue sharing contracts and service requirement under supply and demand uncertainty. International Journal of Production Economics, 2017,183:185–193.
[7] Song H, Gao X. Green supply chain game model and analysis under revenue-sharing contract. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2018, 170:183–192.
[8] Ghosh D, Shah J. Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract.International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 164:319–329.
[9] Bai Q, Chen M, Xu L. Revenue and promotional cost-sharing contract versus two-part tariff contract in coordinating sustainable supply chain systems with deteriorating items. International Journal of Production Economics, 2017, 187:85–101.
[10] Gunasekaran A, Papadopoulos T, Dubey R, et al. Big data and predictive analytics for supply chain and organizational performance. Journal of Business Research, 2017, 70:308–317.
[11] Kim M, Chai S. The impact of supplier innovativeness, information sharing and strategic sourcing on improving supply chain agility:Global supply chain perspective. International Journal of Production Economics, 2017, 187:42–52.
[12] Zhou M, Dan B, Ma S, et al. Supply chain coordination with information sharing:The informational advantage of GPOs. European Journal of Operational Research, 2017, 256(3):785–802.
[13] Hult G T M, Ketchen Jr D J, Slater S F. Information processing, knowledge development, and strategic supply chain performance. Academy of Management Journal, 2004, 47(2):241–253.
[14] Shih S C, Hsu S H Y, Zhu Z, et al. Knowledge sharing key role in the downstream supply chain. Information&Management, 2012, 49(2):70–80.
[15] Blome C, Schoenherr T, Eckstein D. The impact of knowledge transfer and complexity on supply chain flexibility:A knowledge-based view. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 147:307–316.
[16] Harland C M. Supply chain management:Relationships, chains and networks. British Journal of management, 1996, 7:S63–S80.
[17] Protopappa-Sieke M, Seifert R W. Benefits of working capital sharing in supply chains. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2017, 68(5):521–532.
[18] Balachandran K R, Radhakrishnan S. Quality implications of warranties in a supply chain. Management Science, 2005, 51(8):1266–1277.