长效激励机制间存在替代效应吗——基于高管股权与企业年金决策视角的实证分析
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摘要
由于企业年金可以视为管理补贴,从而可以减少未来可能的债务融资风险,因此没有持有本公司股份的高管将产生建立企业年金的动机以维持财务宽松。企业年金决策可以增加单一的人力资本价值,以应对股东权益最大化对高管利益带来的损害。随着高管持股增加,高管与股东的利益更加一致,因而建立企业年金的动机将会降低。研究中呈现的实证结果有力地支持了高管股权和企业年金间存在替代效应这一命题。企业可以通过高管股权和企业年金的混合均衡策略实现对人力资本的有效激励。
Because enterprise annuity can be seen as a kind of managerial subsidy, which can therefore reduce the future possible debt financing risks, those top executives with no shares of their companies will consequently have incentives to establish enterprise annuity in order to maintain financial slack. The enterprise annuity decision may increase the value of single human capital, so as to deal with the harm to the top executives ' interests caused by the maximized shareholders equity. Along with the increase of managerial share holdings, the incentives to establish such enterprise annuity will decrease since the interests of the top executives and the shareholders become more consistent.The results presented in this study can strongly support the proposition that substitution effect exists between the top executive stock rights and enterprise annuity. Enterprises can achieve effective incentives to human capital through the mixed equilibrium strategy between top executive stock rights and enterprise annuity.
Because enterprise annuity can be seen as a kind of managerial subsidy, which can therefore reduce the future possible debt financing risks, those top executives with no shares of their companies will consequently have incentives to establish enterprise annuity in order to maintain financial slack. The enterprise annuity decision may increase the value of single human capital, so as to deal with the harm to the top executives ' interests caused by the maximized shareholders equity. Along with the increase of managerial share holdings, the incentives to establish such enterprise annuity will decrease since the interests of the top executives and the shareholders become more consistent.The results presented in this study can strongly support the proposition that substitution effect exists between the top executive stock rights and enterprise annuity. Enterprises can achieve effective incentives to human capital through the mixed equilibrium strategy between top executive stock rights and enterprise annuity.
引文
[1]张小宁.经营者报酬、员工持股与上市公司绩效分析[J].世界经济,2002,10:57-64.
[2]李军,胡愈.基于专用性人力资本的人力资源管理研究[J].浙江工商大学学报,2007,(2):71-75.
[3]Black F..The Tax Consequences of Long Run Pension Policy[J].Financial Analysts,1980,(36):21-28.
[4]Sharpe W.F..Corporate Pension Fund Policy[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,(3):183-194.
[5]Bicksler J.L.,Chen A.H..The Integration of Insurance and Taxes in Corporate Pension Strategy[J].The Journal of Finance,1985,(40):943-955.
[6]Bodie Z.,Jay O.L.,Randall M.,Robert A.T..Corporate Pension Policy:An Empirical Investigation[J].Financial Analysts Journal,1985,41:10-16.
[7]Myers S.C.,Nicholas S.M..Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have In formation that Investors Do Not Have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984,(13):187-221.
[8]Agrawal A.,Gershon N.M..Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions[J].The Journal of Finance,1987,(42):823-838.
[9]Saunders A.,Strock E.,Travlos N.G..Ownership Structure,Deregulation,and Bank Risk Taking[J].The Journal of Finance,1990,45(2):643-654.
[10]Papaioannou G.J.,Elizabeth S.,Nicholaos G.T..Ownership Structure and Corporate Liquidity Policy[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,1992,(13):315-322.
[11]Gilson S.C..Management Turnover and Financial Distress[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989,(25):241-262.
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[13]Black F.,Myron S.The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities[J].Journal of Political Economy,1973,81:637-654.
[14]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(11):88-100.
[15]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励,董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006,(9):101-116.
[16]黄桂田,张悦.企业改革30年:管理层激励效应———基于上市公司的样本分析[J].金融研究,2008,(12):101-112.
[17]魏凤春,于红鑫.企业年金税收政策的分析框架[J].财经研究,2007,(4):64-73.
[18]郑秉文.中国企业年金发展滞后的政策因素分析——兼论“部分TEE”税优模式的选择[J].中国人口科学,2010,(2):2-23.
[19]陈秉正,郑婉仪.中国企业年金的发展预测分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究.2004,(1):20-29.
[20]朱铭来,于新亮,程远.企业年金决策影响因素研究[J].保险研究,2015,(1):8-21.
[21]Jensen M.,William M..Theory of the Firm:Management Behavior,Agency Costs and Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,(3):305-360.
[22]Jensen M..Agency Costs of Free Cash flows,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76:323-329.
[23]Mitchell M.L.,Mulherin J.H..The Stock Price Response to Pension Terminations and The Relation of Terminations with Corporate Takeovers[J].Financial Management,1989,18(3):41-56.
[24]Moore N.H.,Stephen W.P..A Comment on Excess Asset Reversions and Shareholder Wealth[J].The Journal of Finance,1990,(4):1709-1714.
[25]Ghilarducci T..Scale Economies in Union Pension Plan Administration:1981-1993[J].Industrial Re lations:A Journal of Economy and Society,1999,38(1):11-17.
[26]Tepper I..Taxation and Corporate Pension policy[J].The Journal of Finance,1981,36:1-14.
[27]Heckman J..Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error[J].Econometrica,1979,47(1):153-161.
1PBGC保险的价值可以概括为一个卖出期权定价框架,年金负债水平与行使价格类似,而年金基金与公司净资产代表了卖出期权的潜在资产。较少资金将提升保险保障价值。
2《企业年金试行办法》于2003年12月30日经劳动和社会保障部第7次部务会议通过,自2004年5月1日起施行。证监会于2005年12月31日发布《上市公司股权激励管理办法》(试行),自2006年1月1日起施行。
[2]李军,胡愈.基于专用性人力资本的人力资源管理研究[J].浙江工商大学学报,2007,(2):71-75.
[3]Black F..The Tax Consequences of Long Run Pension Policy[J].Financial Analysts,1980,(36):21-28.
[4]Sharpe W.F..Corporate Pension Fund Policy[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,(3):183-194.
[5]Bicksler J.L.,Chen A.H..The Integration of Insurance and Taxes in Corporate Pension Strategy[J].The Journal of Finance,1985,(40):943-955.
[6]Bodie Z.,Jay O.L.,Randall M.,Robert A.T..Corporate Pension Policy:An Empirical Investigation[J].Financial Analysts Journal,1985,41:10-16.
[7]Myers S.C.,Nicholas S.M..Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have In formation that Investors Do Not Have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984,(13):187-221.
[8]Agrawal A.,Gershon N.M..Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions[J].The Journal of Finance,1987,(42):823-838.
[9]Saunders A.,Strock E.,Travlos N.G..Ownership Structure,Deregulation,and Bank Risk Taking[J].The Journal of Finance,1990,45(2):643-654.
[10]Papaioannou G.J.,Elizabeth S.,Nicholaos G.T..Ownership Structure and Corporate Liquidity Policy[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,1992,(13):315-322.
[11]Gilson S.C..Management Turnover and Financial Distress[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1989,(25):241-262.
[12]Gilson S.C.,Vetsuypens M.R..CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms:An Empirical Analysis[J].The Journal of Finance,1993,48(2):425-458.
[13]Black F.,Myron S.The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities[J].Journal of Political Economy,1973,81:637-654.
[14]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(11):88-100.
[15]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励,董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006,(9):101-116.
[16]黄桂田,张悦.企业改革30年:管理层激励效应———基于上市公司的样本分析[J].金融研究,2008,(12):101-112.
[17]魏凤春,于红鑫.企业年金税收政策的分析框架[J].财经研究,2007,(4):64-73.
[18]郑秉文.中国企业年金发展滞后的政策因素分析——兼论“部分TEE”税优模式的选择[J].中国人口科学,2010,(2):2-23.
[19]陈秉正,郑婉仪.中国企业年金的发展预测分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究.2004,(1):20-29.
[20]朱铭来,于新亮,程远.企业年金决策影响因素研究[J].保险研究,2015,(1):8-21.
[21]Jensen M.,William M..Theory of the Firm:Management Behavior,Agency Costs and Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,(3):305-360.
[22]Jensen M..Agency Costs of Free Cash flows,Corporate Finance,and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76:323-329.
[23]Mitchell M.L.,Mulherin J.H..The Stock Price Response to Pension Terminations and The Relation of Terminations with Corporate Takeovers[J].Financial Management,1989,18(3):41-56.
[24]Moore N.H.,Stephen W.P..A Comment on Excess Asset Reversions and Shareholder Wealth[J].The Journal of Finance,1990,(4):1709-1714.
[25]Ghilarducci T..Scale Economies in Union Pension Plan Administration:1981-1993[J].Industrial Re lations:A Journal of Economy and Society,1999,38(1):11-17.
[26]Tepper I..Taxation and Corporate Pension policy[J].The Journal of Finance,1981,36:1-14.
[27]Heckman J..Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error[J].Econometrica,1979,47(1):153-161.
1PBGC保险的价值可以概括为一个卖出期权定价框架,年金负债水平与行使价格类似,而年金基金与公司净资产代表了卖出期权的潜在资产。较少资金将提升保险保障价值。
2《企业年金试行办法》于2003年12月30日经劳动和社会保障部第7次部务会议通过,自2004年5月1日起施行。证监会于2005年12月31日发布《上市公司股权激励管理办法》(试行),自2006年1月1日起施行。