知识论析取主义与强怀疑论
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摘要
在知觉知识研究领域,强怀疑论一直以来都是难以解决的问题,诸多理论都试图对这一问题给出解答,却都差强人意。近年来,知识论析取主义作为一种新的知觉知识研究进路方兴未艾,其代表人物麦克道尔通过对强怀疑论论证做出一个合理的"诊断",澄清了一个长久以来对于知觉经验的误解,从而消解了提出这一问题的合理性基础,为强怀疑论的解决给出了新的可能。但他的解决方案也遭受了一些反驳,如赖特就认为他并没有"真正认真对待怀疑论",并不比摩尔的回应做的更好。笔者将试图为麦克道尔做出某种辩护,指出赖特的指责是建立在对麦克道尔的误解之上,忽视了麦克道尔论证的先验面向。在笔者看来,知识论析取主义的确为强怀疑论问题的解决提供了一个更好的方案。
In the field of perceptual knowledge research,radical scepticism has always been a difficult problem. A lot of theories failed to give a satisfied solution to this problem. Within recent years,the epistemological disjunctivism represented by Mc Dowell provides a new approach to this problem. They try to clarify a long-term misunderstanding of the conception of perceptual experience via giving a reasonable‘diagnosis' to the radical sceptism argument,and then the reasonable basis of radical scepticism will be dissolved. However,they also receive a strong objection from Wright,who claims that Mc Dowell has never taken the sceptism serious. I try to defend Mc Dowell's position,and point out that Wright has misunderstood Mc Dowell's argument,especially missing the transcendental dimension. I would agree that epistemological disjunctivism has indeed provided a better solution to the sceptical prioblem.
In the field of perceptual knowledge research,radical scepticism has always been a difficult problem. A lot of theories failed to give a satisfied solution to this problem. Within recent years,the epistemological disjunctivism represented by Mc Dowell provides a new approach to this problem. They try to clarify a long-term misunderstanding of the conception of perceptual experience via giving a reasonable‘diagnosis' to the radical sceptism argument,and then the reasonable basis of radical scepticism will be dissolved. However,they also receive a strong objection from Wright,who claims that Mc Dowell has never taken the sceptism serious. I try to defend Mc Dowell's position,and point out that Wright has misunderstood Mc Dowell's argument,especially missing the transcendental dimension. I would agree that epistemological disjunctivism has indeed provided a better solution to the sceptical prioblem.
引文
[1]Pritchard D.Epistemological Disjunctivism[M].Oxford:Oxford U-niversity Press,2012.
[2]Moore G E.Proof of an External World[J].Proceedings of the British Academy,1939,25:273-300.
[3]Wright C.(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle:G.E.Moore and John Mc Dowell[J].Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,2002,Vol.65:331-49.
[4]Pritchard D.Epistemic Angst:Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,2015.
[5]Mc Dowell J.The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument[C]//Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson(eds.).Disjunctivism:Perception,Action,Knowledge,Oxford:Oxfprd University Press,2008:376-389.
[6]Mc Dowell J.Criteria,Defeasibilty,and Knowledge[J].Proceedings of the British Academy,1982,68:455-79.
[7]Mc Dowell J.Knowledge and the Internal[J].Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,1995,55:877-93.
[8]Wright C.Comment on John Mc Dowell’s“The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”[C]//Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson(eds.).Disjunctivism:Perception,Action,Knowledge,Oxford:Oxfprd University Press,2008:390-404.
[9]Wittgenstein L.On Certainty[M].G.E.M.Anscombe and G.H.von Wright(eds.)and Translated by D.Paul and G.E.M.Anscombe.Oxford:Blackwell,1969.
(1)笔者这里的重构和赖特的原表述略有不同,赖特并没有将L2闭合原则表述出来,原表述见[3]331-349。
(1)这里是笔者自己对维特根斯坦“On Certainty”一书的341节的翻译,见[9]341-343。
(1)这一形式化的重构是笔者对麦克道尔想法的总结提炼,详见[5]第3、4节。
[2]Moore G E.Proof of an External World[J].Proceedings of the British Academy,1939,25:273-300.
[3]Wright C.(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle:G.E.Moore and John Mc Dowell[J].Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,2002,Vol.65:331-49.
[4]Pritchard D.Epistemic Angst:Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,2015.
[5]Mc Dowell J.The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument[C]//Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson(eds.).Disjunctivism:Perception,Action,Knowledge,Oxford:Oxfprd University Press,2008:376-389.
[6]Mc Dowell J.Criteria,Defeasibilty,and Knowledge[J].Proceedings of the British Academy,1982,68:455-79.
[7]Mc Dowell J.Knowledge and the Internal[J].Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,1995,55:877-93.
[8]Wright C.Comment on John Mc Dowell’s“The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”[C]//Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson(eds.).Disjunctivism:Perception,Action,Knowledge,Oxford:Oxfprd University Press,2008:390-404.
[9]Wittgenstein L.On Certainty[M].G.E.M.Anscombe and G.H.von Wright(eds.)and Translated by D.Paul and G.E.M.Anscombe.Oxford:Blackwell,1969.
(1)笔者这里的重构和赖特的原表述略有不同,赖特并没有将L2闭合原则表述出来,原表述见[3]331-349。
(1)这里是笔者自己对维特根斯坦“On Certainty”一书的341节的翻译,见[9]341-343。
(1)这一形式化的重构是笔者对麦克道尔想法的总结提炼,详见[5]第3、4节。