中国转型经济下公司治理规制政策研究
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摘要
近二十年,世界范围内公司治理规制改革日益受到关注。对公司治理问题进行有针对性的、有系统的规制最早起源于英国的《凯德伯瑞报告》(Cadbury Report,1992)。随后,1997年亚洲金融危机爆发,引起世界范围内对公司治理规制问题的广泛关注。世界经济合作与发展组织(Organization for Economic Cooperation&Development,以下简称OECD)呼吁OECD与各国政府、有关的国际组织及私人部门共同制定一套公司治理的标准和指导方针,并成立了公司治理专门筹划小组,于1999年出台了《OECD公司治理原则》。2001年前后,美国等发达国家爆发一系列公司丑闻,促进美国全国性法律《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(Sarbanes-Oxley Act,2002)迅速出台,这使得一向强调市场机制的美国也开始从信息披露监管涉足到对公司治理机制、公司内部政策的监管。2007年,由美国次贷危机引发的金融危机席卷全球,世界各国进一步加强对公司治理的规制,美国又一部全国性法律《多德一弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案》(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act)要求企业披露更多关于组织结构的信息,并直接涉及到高管薪酬等公司内部治理问题。那么,处于转型经济时期的中国,该如何应对这场公司治理的革命呢?
本研究认为,公司治理改革不仅仅需要依靠市场自发机制形成良好的公司治理结构,更需要对公司治理进行规制和引导以形成良好的投资者利益保护机制。但是中国作为发展中国家,并处于转型经济的特殊时期,对于国际公司治理实践和监管应该采取积极借鉴和谨慎采用的态度。理论研究也表明,即使是在文化、政治、经济、法律背景相似的、同样采用盎格鲁-撒克逊模式公司治理的英国和美国,公司治理具体实践也不相同,而且相同的规制政策也有不同的效果。因而,对中国转型经济的特征进行分析,并在制定中国公司治理规制政策时充分考虑转型经济的特征成为公司治理规制能够有效的必须要考虑的因素。
尽管监管者日益将对公司治理的规制纳入监管视野,但对于公司治理规制的研究,仍是一个前沿性的新兴领域。拉·波塔等人(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,1997)首先提出“好的公司治理机制应该是把对大投资者和小投资者权利的法律保护结合起来”,随后,他们又详细研究了证券市场规制的普遍机制(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,1998),格莱泽和施莱弗(Glaeser and Shleifer,2001,2002)在研究中阐明,当国家利益与多数人的公众利益相背离以及规则容易被破坏时,就无法建立起有效的规制制度。他们的一系列研究引发了大批财务领域和法与经济学领域的研究人员对规制政策和公司治理相互关系的研究兴趣(Gillan,2006)。
可是,现有的研究存在着以下一些问题：第一,大多数研究主要是针对某一具体规制政策的评价和检验,对整体规制政策进行有系统、有逻辑的分析和评价的文章在作者所见范围内还未曾出现；第二,对于一国公司治理进行规制尚缺乏有力的、统一的理论分析框架,公司治理政策也多散见于不同的规章制度,缺乏一定的理论支撑；第三,转型经济国家的公司治理规制问题关注不足,而事实上转型经济国家由于相关监管机制不健全,规制问题的研究更具有理论和实践意义。
正是基于以上理论和实践的背景,本研究在对公司治理基本理论进行分析的基础上,着眼于中国转型经济的背景特征,分析、比较和借鉴国际公司治理规制政策的实践与新发展,构建了公司治理规制政策体系的分析框架,并具体分析了中国公司治理规制政策的实践以及规制政策体系中存在的问题,继而提出了相关的政策建议。
本研究主要内容安排如下：
第一章,绪论。提出中国转型经济背景下公司治理规制问题,并介绍国内外研究现状及本选题的研究意义和结构安排。
第二章,公司治理的理论分析。主要包含两部分：公司治理的理论基础和公司治理的理论框架。公司治理的理论基础部分主要对代理理论进行分析,指出应用代理理论解决公司治理问题时应注意的问题；公司治理的理论框架。对公司治理的基本概念进行界定,区分公司治理内部机制与外部机制,并提出公司治理的规制框架。
第三章,中国转型经济下公司治理外部环境。对中国公司治理的环境进行分析,以期为分析中国转型经济下公司治理内部机制特征提供背景信息。
第四章,中国转型经济下公司治理内部机制特征。依托于公司治理内部机制,从大股东机制、债权人保护机制、经理人市场机制、机构投资者机制和董事会制度五个方面上分析了中国转型经济下的公司治理特征。
第五章,国际公司治理规则比较与借鉴。分析比较世界范围内的主要公司治理准则,并提出国际公司治理准则比较对中国公司治理规制政策建设的借鉴意义。
第六章,中国转型经济下公司治理规制政策一般分析。对中国转型经济下的公司治理规制政策进行总体的分析评价,并对中国上市公司治理现状进行分析。
第七章,中国转型经济下公司治理规制政策具体分析。依托于公司治理内部机制,对中国公司治理双层董事会模式、管理层规制、股东保护、债权人及会计、审计、内部控制方面的规制政策进行具体分析。
第八章,中国转型经济下公司治理规制体系构建。提出公司治理规制体系框架,并指出中国转型经济下公司治理规制体系构建中存在的问题及改进建议。
第九章,总结。对全文进行概括总结,并指出本研究存在的不足之处。
本研究的主要研究方法为规范分析、比较分析和多学科交叉研究。本研究的结论对于理论研究、公司治理实践以及政府监管者的政策制定都具有重要意义。
本研究对于理论文献的贡献主要在于：第一,丰富了规制与公司治理的文献,并为公司治理规制研究提供了一个完善的理论分析框架。尽管关于公司治理的研究已经取得了很大进步,但规制框架与公司治理行为的关系仅得到了有限的关注,本研究提供的公司治理规制政策分析框架将有助于为目前的研究提供更好的分析视角；第二,公司治理问题的研究从最初的仅限于内部机制研究,即董事会、股东、管理层的研究,发展到除内部机制还有外部机制的研究,如控制权市场(兼并、重组等)、经理人市场以及文化等,公司治理规制问题是近些年来对外部机制研究的新领域,属于前沿性研究：而系统的研究外部机制(尽管只涉及到外部机制中的监管问题)具有一定的前瞻性；第三,本研究构建了中国转型经济下公司治理规制体系的分析框架,在相关领域属于首创性研究；第四,发达国家的公司治理实践和标准也在不断的发展和完善中,以转型经济为背景可以丰富公司治理领域的相关概念范畴和理论体系,因此具有重要的理论意义与学术价值。
本研究对于政府规制的政策参考主要在于：第一,本研究比较分析了国际公司治理规制政策发展,并分析了中国转型经济的特征,为公司治理规制政策的制定提供了一个全面、系统的视角；第二,本研究提供对规制政策体系的一般分析和具体分析,为检验综合的公司治理规制体系能否强化对中国转型经济下的监管提供决策依据；第三,本研究构建了公司治理规制体系的框架、分析了中国当前公司治理规制政策体系存在的问题及建议,为下一步公司治理改革与实践提供参考。
同时,本研究所做的公司治理实践分析和公司治理环境特征分析对于中国企业的公司治理实践是一个有益的参考,为现代公司构建合理、均衡的公司治理结构提供有益的参考视角。
当然,本文的研究也存在着一定的不足之处。首先,对现有规制政策的分析上未能提供经验数据的效果检验。这主要是因为如果对规制政策进行效果检验,则适当的研究方法应当为事件研究,而由于我国经济转型与发展迅速,公司治理规制政策变革非常快,使得事件研究中的内生性和噪声几乎无法控制,因而本文不得不采用详细的理论和规范性分析方法。其次,本研究对中国的综合治理准则的分析可能存在一定的滞后。《上市公司治理准则》颁布于2002年,由于随后的公司法、证券法等环境发生了很大变化,而使得这一准则失去了时效性,但新的《上市公司监督管理条例》正处于征求意见稿阶段(颁布于2007年),虽然有望近期出台,但相关条款在经历全球金融危机后是否会发生较大变化并未见更新的信息披露,故而对现有规制政策的分析可能存在一定的滞后性。最后,公司治理和规制问题都是非常复杂的系统,试图在一篇博士论文中涵盖这两个复杂的领域,有可能会存在一定的遗漏及观点的偏颇。例如《证券法》、《国有资产法》、除中国证监会以外的其他金融监管机构制定的监管条例等中也有相当数量的关于公司治理的法律规定,但鉴于研究能力所限,本文不能一一涵盖。
In recent two decades, regulators have raised revolution on corporate governance regulation on a world-wide scale. The earlist systematic national corporate governance code,'Cadbury Report'was implemented by the UK in2002. After that, Asian financial crisis of1997trigered extensive attention to the regulation on corporate governance across nations. Correspondingly, Organization for Economic Cooperation&Development (OECD) issued'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. At the beginning of21st century, a series of corporations in the US, such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco bursted out into scandles, which aoused a national act, i.e.'Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act'(also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) enforced in2002. This act actually somewhat turned the American regulators'attention from the mechanism of market-based regulation on information disclosure to the regulation on firms'internal policies and internal corporate governance structure. Further, the world-wide financial crisis aroused by the U.S. subprime crisis has swept the global economies. Hence, another federal act in the U.S.'Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act'has been enforced in2010. The Act creates rules on severeal specific internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as executive compensation and corporate governance structure. How should China, a transitional country, response to this wave of the revolution?
My study argues that not only market mechanism but also government should take responsibilities for corporate governance revolution so that investors can be protected better. However, as a developing country, China has its specific institutional background which shouldn't lead to the same regulations as what the developed coutried have. Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that even if the Anglo-Saxon Model which embedded in similar culture, law, politics and economics in the UK and the U.S. has different practices. Therefore, it is necessary to analysis the characteristics of China's transitional economics so that the regulation on corporate governance could be efficiently and effectively enforced.
Although practically, regulators tend to pay more attention to corporate governance recently, the research on this issue has not yet been well developed. Comparing to the hot-debated practive, this field remains relatively unexplored in academic. The pioneering paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems. Their research opens a door to research on regulation and corporate governance, and consequently, quite a few papers investigate this issue (Gillan,2006)
However, extant research has limitations as follows. First, the majority of literature focuses mainly on a specific policy rather than a systematic mechanism of corporate governance. There is no literature analyzing and discussing national regulation on corporate governance as a whole. Second, there is no logical theoretical framework supporting analyzing corporate governance regulation. Third, there is less concern on transitional economics about corporate governance regulation, despite the fact that the research on regulation in transitional countries might contribute to corporate governance research more due to their incomplete mornitoring mechanisms.
Based on this theoretical and practical background, my study interprets corporate governance theory first, and then focuses on explaining the characteristics of China's transitional background. Sequentially, I conduct a comparative study on international corporate governance code and propose their enlightments on China's corporate governance regulation. I also build up a theoretical framework for analyzing corporate governance regulation. By use of that framework, I discuss corporate governance regulation in China in details. Finally, I point out the problem existing in China's regulating system and provide several improvements in the future policies making.
The study contains nine chapters. Chapter1is the introduction. Chapter2discusses the classical theores for analysing corporate governance issues. In Chapater3,I propose a conceptual framework of corporate governance mechanisms. Chapter4analyses the general institutional background of corporate governan in China. The characteristics of corporate governance under China's transitional economics are reported in Chapter5. Chapter6compares international corporate governance codes and sheds lights on their reference to China's revolution. Chapter7and Chapter8provide the general analysis and detailed discussion of/on China's regulation on corporate governance, respectively. Finally, a framework for supporting a systematic regulation system is constructed in Chapter9.
The main research methods in this paper are qualative method, comparative analysis and interdisciplinary study. My study contributes to the literature, policy making and corporate governance practice in several ways. Regarding the contributions to literature, my research:first increases the literature on the relation between regulation and corporate governance and provides an integrate framework for this stream of research. Second, this is one of the pioneering works on external corporate governance mechanisms. Third, this work is initiative in terms of constructing a framework for regulatory system of corportate governance under China's transitional economics. Fourth, even developed countries are struggling with corporate governance regulation; the research based on transitional background will enrich the literature relevant to this.
As far as the contribution to policy making into concern, my study:first compares international corporate governance codes, analyses the characteristics of China's transitional economics, and provides a comprehensive perspective on understanding regulatory policies on corporate governance. Second, it reports the general and detailde analysis of corporate governance policies in China, providing supports for the empirical examination on regulatory power. Third, my study constructs a framework for regulatory system of corporate governance in China, suggests improvement of current regulatory system, and provides reference for the proceeding revolution on corporate governance either in practice or in regulation.
There are also some limitations of my study. First, I haven't provided empirical evidence on the analysis of regulatory policies. This shortcome is coming from China's specific institutional background. Because event study should be the proper method for understanding regulatory efficiency, however, the institutional environment has kept changing in the last decade; therefore, it seems like impossible to control the problems from event study, i.e. endogeinity and noises. That is also why I have to accept the detailed qualative research method. Second, there might be lagged information on the analysis of China's comprehensive corporate governance principles. The first corporate governance code in China,'Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China'was implemented in2002; however, after its implementation, Chinese institutional background has been dramatically changed especially after the new amended'Security Act'and 'Corporate Act'in2005. Due to the new acts, several items of Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China'became stale. Meanwhile, China Securities Regulatory Commission issued'Provision on the Supervision and Administration of Listed Companies'in2007, which is still in the process of seeking for advice. It is unclear if the original stated items will be changed or not when it is finally implemented one day.
本研究认为,公司治理改革不仅仅需要依靠市场自发机制形成良好的公司治理结构,更需要对公司治理进行规制和引导以形成良好的投资者利益保护机制。但是中国作为发展中国家,并处于转型经济的特殊时期,对于国际公司治理实践和监管应该采取积极借鉴和谨慎采用的态度。理论研究也表明,即使是在文化、政治、经济、法律背景相似的、同样采用盎格鲁-撒克逊模式公司治理的英国和美国,公司治理具体实践也不相同,而且相同的规制政策也有不同的效果。因而,对中国转型经济的特征进行分析,并在制定中国公司治理规制政策时充分考虑转型经济的特征成为公司治理规制能够有效的必须要考虑的因素。
尽管监管者日益将对公司治理的规制纳入监管视野,但对于公司治理规制的研究,仍是一个前沿性的新兴领域。拉·波塔等人(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,1997)首先提出“好的公司治理机制应该是把对大投资者和小投资者权利的法律保护结合起来”,随后,他们又详细研究了证券市场规制的普遍机制(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,1998),格莱泽和施莱弗(Glaeser and Shleifer,2001,2002)在研究中阐明,当国家利益与多数人的公众利益相背离以及规则容易被破坏时,就无法建立起有效的规制制度。他们的一系列研究引发了大批财务领域和法与经济学领域的研究人员对规制政策和公司治理相互关系的研究兴趣(Gillan,2006)。
可是,现有的研究存在着以下一些问题：第一,大多数研究主要是针对某一具体规制政策的评价和检验,对整体规制政策进行有系统、有逻辑的分析和评价的文章在作者所见范围内还未曾出现；第二,对于一国公司治理进行规制尚缺乏有力的、统一的理论分析框架,公司治理政策也多散见于不同的规章制度,缺乏一定的理论支撑；第三,转型经济国家的公司治理规制问题关注不足,而事实上转型经济国家由于相关监管机制不健全,规制问题的研究更具有理论和实践意义。
正是基于以上理论和实践的背景,本研究在对公司治理基本理论进行分析的基础上,着眼于中国转型经济的背景特征,分析、比较和借鉴国际公司治理规制政策的实践与新发展,构建了公司治理规制政策体系的分析框架,并具体分析了中国公司治理规制政策的实践以及规制政策体系中存在的问题,继而提出了相关的政策建议。
本研究主要内容安排如下：
第一章,绪论。提出中国转型经济背景下公司治理规制问题,并介绍国内外研究现状及本选题的研究意义和结构安排。
第二章,公司治理的理论分析。主要包含两部分：公司治理的理论基础和公司治理的理论框架。公司治理的理论基础部分主要对代理理论进行分析,指出应用代理理论解决公司治理问题时应注意的问题；公司治理的理论框架。对公司治理的基本概念进行界定,区分公司治理内部机制与外部机制,并提出公司治理的规制框架。
第三章,中国转型经济下公司治理外部环境。对中国公司治理的环境进行分析,以期为分析中国转型经济下公司治理内部机制特征提供背景信息。
第四章,中国转型经济下公司治理内部机制特征。依托于公司治理内部机制,从大股东机制、债权人保护机制、经理人市场机制、机构投资者机制和董事会制度五个方面上分析了中国转型经济下的公司治理特征。
第五章,国际公司治理规则比较与借鉴。分析比较世界范围内的主要公司治理准则,并提出国际公司治理准则比较对中国公司治理规制政策建设的借鉴意义。
第六章,中国转型经济下公司治理规制政策一般分析。对中国转型经济下的公司治理规制政策进行总体的分析评价,并对中国上市公司治理现状进行分析。
第七章,中国转型经济下公司治理规制政策具体分析。依托于公司治理内部机制,对中国公司治理双层董事会模式、管理层规制、股东保护、债权人及会计、审计、内部控制方面的规制政策进行具体分析。
第八章,中国转型经济下公司治理规制体系构建。提出公司治理规制体系框架,并指出中国转型经济下公司治理规制体系构建中存在的问题及改进建议。
第九章,总结。对全文进行概括总结,并指出本研究存在的不足之处。
本研究的主要研究方法为规范分析、比较分析和多学科交叉研究。本研究的结论对于理论研究、公司治理实践以及政府监管者的政策制定都具有重要意义。
本研究对于理论文献的贡献主要在于：第一,丰富了规制与公司治理的文献,并为公司治理规制研究提供了一个完善的理论分析框架。尽管关于公司治理的研究已经取得了很大进步,但规制框架与公司治理行为的关系仅得到了有限的关注,本研究提供的公司治理规制政策分析框架将有助于为目前的研究提供更好的分析视角；第二,公司治理问题的研究从最初的仅限于内部机制研究,即董事会、股东、管理层的研究,发展到除内部机制还有外部机制的研究,如控制权市场(兼并、重组等)、经理人市场以及文化等,公司治理规制问题是近些年来对外部机制研究的新领域,属于前沿性研究：而系统的研究外部机制(尽管只涉及到外部机制中的监管问题)具有一定的前瞻性；第三,本研究构建了中国转型经济下公司治理规制体系的分析框架,在相关领域属于首创性研究；第四,发达国家的公司治理实践和标准也在不断的发展和完善中,以转型经济为背景可以丰富公司治理领域的相关概念范畴和理论体系,因此具有重要的理论意义与学术价值。
本研究对于政府规制的政策参考主要在于：第一,本研究比较分析了国际公司治理规制政策发展,并分析了中国转型经济的特征,为公司治理规制政策的制定提供了一个全面、系统的视角；第二,本研究提供对规制政策体系的一般分析和具体分析,为检验综合的公司治理规制体系能否强化对中国转型经济下的监管提供决策依据；第三,本研究构建了公司治理规制体系的框架、分析了中国当前公司治理规制政策体系存在的问题及建议,为下一步公司治理改革与实践提供参考。
同时,本研究所做的公司治理实践分析和公司治理环境特征分析对于中国企业的公司治理实践是一个有益的参考,为现代公司构建合理、均衡的公司治理结构提供有益的参考视角。
当然,本文的研究也存在着一定的不足之处。首先,对现有规制政策的分析上未能提供经验数据的效果检验。这主要是因为如果对规制政策进行效果检验,则适当的研究方法应当为事件研究,而由于我国经济转型与发展迅速,公司治理规制政策变革非常快,使得事件研究中的内生性和噪声几乎无法控制,因而本文不得不采用详细的理论和规范性分析方法。其次,本研究对中国的综合治理准则的分析可能存在一定的滞后。《上市公司治理准则》颁布于2002年,由于随后的公司法、证券法等环境发生了很大变化,而使得这一准则失去了时效性,但新的《上市公司监督管理条例》正处于征求意见稿阶段(颁布于2007年),虽然有望近期出台,但相关条款在经历全球金融危机后是否会发生较大变化并未见更新的信息披露,故而对现有规制政策的分析可能存在一定的滞后性。最后,公司治理和规制问题都是非常复杂的系统,试图在一篇博士论文中涵盖这两个复杂的领域,有可能会存在一定的遗漏及观点的偏颇。例如《证券法》、《国有资产法》、除中国证监会以外的其他金融监管机构制定的监管条例等中也有相当数量的关于公司治理的法律规定,但鉴于研究能力所限,本文不能一一涵盖。
In recent two decades, regulators have raised revolution on corporate governance regulation on a world-wide scale. The earlist systematic national corporate governance code,'Cadbury Report'was implemented by the UK in2002. After that, Asian financial crisis of1997trigered extensive attention to the regulation on corporate governance across nations. Correspondingly, Organization for Economic Cooperation&Development (OECD) issued'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance'. At the beginning of21st century, a series of corporations in the US, such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco bursted out into scandles, which aoused a national act, i.e.'Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act'(also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) enforced in2002. This act actually somewhat turned the American regulators'attention from the mechanism of market-based regulation on information disclosure to the regulation on firms'internal policies and internal corporate governance structure. Further, the world-wide financial crisis aroused by the U.S. subprime crisis has swept the global economies. Hence, another federal act in the U.S.'Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act'has been enforced in2010. The Act creates rules on severeal specific internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as executive compensation and corporate governance structure. How should China, a transitional country, response to this wave of the revolution?
My study argues that not only market mechanism but also government should take responsibilities for corporate governance revolution so that investors can be protected better. However, as a developing country, China has its specific institutional background which shouldn't lead to the same regulations as what the developed coutried have. Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that even if the Anglo-Saxon Model which embedded in similar culture, law, politics and economics in the UK and the U.S. has different practices. Therefore, it is necessary to analysis the characteristics of China's transitional economics so that the regulation on corporate governance could be efficiently and effectively enforced.
Although practically, regulators tend to pay more attention to corporate governance recently, the research on this issue has not yet been well developed. Comparing to the hot-debated practive, this field remains relatively unexplored in academic. The pioneering paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems. Their research opens a door to research on regulation and corporate governance, and consequently, quite a few papers investigate this issue (Gillan,2006)
However, extant research has limitations as follows. First, the majority of literature focuses mainly on a specific policy rather than a systematic mechanism of corporate governance. There is no literature analyzing and discussing national regulation on corporate governance as a whole. Second, there is no logical theoretical framework supporting analyzing corporate governance regulation. Third, there is less concern on transitional economics about corporate governance regulation, despite the fact that the research on regulation in transitional countries might contribute to corporate governance research more due to their incomplete mornitoring mechanisms.
Based on this theoretical and practical background, my study interprets corporate governance theory first, and then focuses on explaining the characteristics of China's transitional background. Sequentially, I conduct a comparative study on international corporate governance code and propose their enlightments on China's corporate governance regulation. I also build up a theoretical framework for analyzing corporate governance regulation. By use of that framework, I discuss corporate governance regulation in China in details. Finally, I point out the problem existing in China's regulating system and provide several improvements in the future policies making.
The study contains nine chapters. Chapter1is the introduction. Chapter2discusses the classical theores for analysing corporate governance issues. In Chapater3,I propose a conceptual framework of corporate governance mechanisms. Chapter4analyses the general institutional background of corporate governan in China. The characteristics of corporate governance under China's transitional economics are reported in Chapter5. Chapter6compares international corporate governance codes and sheds lights on their reference to China's revolution. Chapter7and Chapter8provide the general analysis and detailed discussion of/on China's regulation on corporate governance, respectively. Finally, a framework for supporting a systematic regulation system is constructed in Chapter9.
The main research methods in this paper are qualative method, comparative analysis and interdisciplinary study. My study contributes to the literature, policy making and corporate governance practice in several ways. Regarding the contributions to literature, my research:first increases the literature on the relation between regulation and corporate governance and provides an integrate framework for this stream of research. Second, this is one of the pioneering works on external corporate governance mechanisms. Third, this work is initiative in terms of constructing a framework for regulatory system of corportate governance under China's transitional economics. Fourth, even developed countries are struggling with corporate governance regulation; the research based on transitional background will enrich the literature relevant to this.
As far as the contribution to policy making into concern, my study:first compares international corporate governance codes, analyses the characteristics of China's transitional economics, and provides a comprehensive perspective on understanding regulatory policies on corporate governance. Second, it reports the general and detailde analysis of corporate governance policies in China, providing supports for the empirical examination on regulatory power. Third, my study constructs a framework for regulatory system of corporate governance in China, suggests improvement of current regulatory system, and provides reference for the proceeding revolution on corporate governance either in practice or in regulation.
There are also some limitations of my study. First, I haven't provided empirical evidence on the analysis of regulatory policies. This shortcome is coming from China's specific institutional background. Because event study should be the proper method for understanding regulatory efficiency, however, the institutional environment has kept changing in the last decade; therefore, it seems like impossible to control the problems from event study, i.e. endogeinity and noises. That is also why I have to accept the detailed qualative research method. Second, there might be lagged information on the analysis of China's comprehensive corporate governance principles. The first corporate governance code in China,'Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China'was implemented in2002; however, after its implementation, Chinese institutional background has been dramatically changed especially after the new amended'Security Act'and 'Corporate Act'in2005. Due to the new acts, several items of Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China'became stale. Meanwhile, China Securities Regulatory Commission issued'Provision on the Supervision and Administration of Listed Companies'in2007, which is still in the process of seeking for advice. It is unclear if the original stated items will be changed or not when it is finally implemented one day.
引文
①北京商报,2010年8月30日。
①引自经济合作与发展组织著,张政军译,张春霖校《OECD公司治理原则》,p.4.2004.
①转摘自中国公司治理网,《欧洲的公司治理、重组和职工持股》,作者,阿德瑞安·佩普。
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