国际分工、利益集团与贸易摩擦
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摘要
随着世界贸易迅速发展,各国之间的贸易摩擦频繁发生、摩擦形式日益多样化,贸易摩擦涉及的产品范围覆盖了各种农产品、工业制造品甚至服务业。中国是遭受贸易摩擦最多的国家之一,对华发起贸易摩擦的国家既包括欧美等发达国家,也包括部分发展中国家,遭受贸易摩擦的产品领域也非常广泛。本文试图在现有贸易政策政治经济学的分析框架下,基于利益集团的视角,对不同分工形式下贸易摩擦的形成及特点进行分析,以便在国际分工演进下对贸易摩擦的特点进行比较,并对不同国家之间、针对不同产品所发生的贸易摩擦进行经验分析,为中国应对贸易摩擦提供有益的启示。
首先,本文就研究背景、目的和问题进行了阐述,并对贸易摩擦的现有研究进行了梳理,包括贸易摩擦的界定、类型、经济及政治成因,中国遭受贸易摩擦的具体原因,贸易摩擦的化解机制;国际分工贸易带来的福利效应、受损者与受益者的界定;各种分工形式下贸易政策的政治内生化及其特点。
其次,在对贸易摩擦相关概念进行界定的基础上,提出国际分工、利益集团与贸易摩擦的政治经济学分析框架。在横向维度上,各个分工形式下的贸易摩擦形成机制相同:一定分工形式下的贸易具有分配效应,并产生贸易的受益者和受损者,形成对贸易政策持有不同态度的利益集团;在国内层次上利益集团和政府之间展开非合作博弈而形成贸易政策(贸易摩擦的基础);在国际层次上受本国利益集团影响的两国基于其国内博弈结果展开博弈,两国的非合作博弈均衡(即贸易战)容易导致贸易摩擦产生或加剧。在纵向维度上,以国际分工演进为研究的暗线进行纵向比较。
第三,对产业间分工贸易摩擦进行分析。基于GH(1994)保护待售模型、GH(1995)贸易战模型分析得出产业间分工下贸易摩擦的特点,即进口国对利益集团福利关心程度提高、产出/进口比增强等政治经济参数发生变化时,容易引起贸易摩擦产生及摩擦加剧,而出口国相关的政治经济参数变化往往促进贸易摩擦的缓解。随后对纺织服装、食品等行业的贸易救济措施摩擦情况,从利益集团、政治经济学的角度进行经验分析。并选取美日纺织品贸易摩擦这一经典案例进行分析,分析结果与理论指出的摩擦形成及摩擦特点相符。
第四,对产业内分工贸易摩擦进行分析。基于Pao-Li Chang(2005)垄断竞争保护待售模型、吴韧强和刘海云(2009)垄断竞争贸易战模型分析,得出产业内分工下贸易摩擦的特点;一国产业是否在政治上组织起来,决定了该国政治因素变化引起的进口、出口市场上贸易摩擦的发展方向;当一国产业竞争力增强时,容易引起本国市场上的贸易摩擦加剧、出口市场上的贸易摩擦缓解;当产品差异性增大时,两国市场上的贸易摩擦加剧。随后对化工及其相关产品行业的贸易救济措施摩擦情况,从利益集团影响、政治经济学的角度来进行经验分析。并选取美日半导体贸易摩擦这一经典案例进行分析,分析结果与理论指出的摩擦形成及摩擦特点相符。
第五,对产品内分工贸易摩擦进行分析。基于刘海云和吴韧强(2007)中间产品保护待售模型得出,最终产品是否能获得支持性贸易政策不仅取决于自身的政治组织状况、生产状况(国内产量),同时还取决于中间产品生产者的政治组织状况。进一步扩展模型进行分析得出:在南北产品内分工下,两国中间产品、最终产品生产者利益集团组织程度、政治力量及产品内分工程度共同决定贸易摩擦的产生及发展方向。对最终产品贸易而言,产品内分工程度、北方国家最终产品利益集团的政治组织状况及其与中间产品利益集团的政治力量对比,决定了摩擦的产生与发展方向。对于中间产品而言,哪个国家的中间产品利益集团政治力量较强,其政治经济因素变化导致对中间产品支持程度提高,将引起中间产品贸易摩擦产生或加剧。随后,结合主要发达国家产品内分工程度与贸易救济措施摩擦情况进行分析,得出:产业内分工程度较低的行业贸易摩擦比较多,反之则反是。产业间分工下的贸易摩擦多于产业内、产品内分工形式下的贸易摩擦。对中美、中日之间的机电、交通运输、纺织服装行业分析也得到类似结果。
第六,总结与展望。先对各种分工形式下的贸易摩擦进行总结。然后对国际分工演进下的贸易摩擦特点进行比较分析。最后对中国应对贸易摩擦提供有益的启示,并指出未来研究方向。
As the international trade grows rapidly, the trade frictions between countries happen frequently, and the types of frictions become more diverse, the involved products include various agricultural products, manufactured goods, even services. China is one of the most suffered nations. The countries that initiate trade frictions to China are not only including developed countries, but also developing countries. This dissertation is based on the analytical framework of the political economy of trade policy and the perspective of interest groups. It analyzes the evolution and the characteristics of trade frictions in different specializations, so that the longitudinal comparison can be done. And then the dissertation does empirical analysis on various countries and different products, so that it could provide useful inspirations for China to cope with the trade frictions.
First, the dissertation describes the research background, objectives, issues, and the previous studies on trade frictions, including the definition, type, economic and political causes of trade frictions, the specific reasons why Chinese suffered trade frictions, the resolving mechanism for trade frictions; the trade effect of welfare distribution, the definition of sufferer and beneficiaries, the political endogenization of trade policy and its characteristics in different specializations.
Second, based on the definition of related notion, the dissertation formulates the political economy analytical framework of specialization, interest groups and trade frictions. In the horizontal dimension, each trade friction mechanism under different specializations is the same: the distributional effects of trade produce winners and losers, and it promotes the formation of different interest groups that hold different attitudes for the trade policy. At the domestic level, there's a non-cooperative game between the interest groups and the government which forms the trade policy (the basis of trade frictions). At the international level, the two governments that affected by interest groups game based on the results of its internal game, and the non-cooperative game equilibrium (i.e., a trade war) of the two governments may easily lead to the creation of trade frictions or exacerbated trade frictions. In the longitudinal dimension, the evolution of the international specialization is the dark lines of longitudinally comparative analysis.
Third, this dissertation analyzes trade frictions under inter-industry trade. Based on "Protection for Sale" in GH (1994) and the trade war model in GH (1995), it obtains the characteristics of trade frictions under the inter-industry specialization, and concludes: in the importing country, as the weights giving to the interest groups is greater, the ratio of output/imports increases, or other political and economic parameters change, it easily leads to trade frictions or the friction intensifies. But in the exporting country, the changes of political and economic parameters often ease trade frictions. Then it does the empirical analysis of textiles and garments, food and other industries in trade remedy measures, and then it analyzes the classic case of US-Japan textile trade frictions, which the formation and characteristics of the friction is in accord with the theory suggests.
Fourth, this dissertation analyzes trade frictions under intra-industry trade. Based on Pao-Li Chang (2005), Wu Renqiang and Liu Haiyun(2009), it obtains the characteristics of trade frictions under the intra-industry specialization, and concludes : Whether a country's industries are organized politically decides the developing direction of trade frictions which caused by the change of the country's political environment in import market and export market. As a country's industrial competitiveness enhances, it is easy to intensify trade frictions on the domestic market and ease trade frictions on the export market. As the product differentiation increases, the trade frictions on both markets intensify. Then it does the empirical analysis of chemical and related products industry in trade remedy measures, and then it analyzes the classic case of the US-Japan semiconductor trade frictions, which the formation and characteristics of the friction is in accord with the theory suggests.
Fifth, this dissertation analyzes trade frictions under intra-product trade. Based on Liu Haiyun and Wu Renqiang (2007), it obtains the characteristics of trade policy under the intra-product specialization, and then it makes a further extension to the North-South intra-product specialization, and concludes: the respectively organized situation of intermediate-product interest groups and final-product interest groups jointly determined the emergence and developing direction of trade frictions. For the final-product trade, the degree of intra-product specialization, the final product status of interest groups and the political power comparing between the final-product and intermediate-product interest groups in Northern countries, jointly determined the emergence and developing direction of trade frictions. For the intermediate product trade, in country which intermediate-product interest groups is powerful, its political and economic circumstance change lead to the increasing support for intermediate-product, and this will bring about the intermediate-product trade frictions or frictions increase. Subsequently, based on the degree of intra-product specialization in the major developed countries and trade remedy measures, it concludes that the sectors with a lower level of specialization will have more trade frictions, on the contrary the anti-yes. The trade frictions under the inter-industry specialization are much more than that of intra-industry and intra-product specialization. The empirical analysis of the electrical and mechanical, transportation, textile and garment industries of United States, China and Japan has also been similar results.
Finally, this dissertation summarizes different trade frictions under different specialization, and then it does comparative analysis of characteristics in different stage of specialization. Then it provides some inspirations for China to cope with trade frictions and points out the direction for future research.
首先,本文就研究背景、目的和问题进行了阐述,并对贸易摩擦的现有研究进行了梳理,包括贸易摩擦的界定、类型、经济及政治成因,中国遭受贸易摩擦的具体原因,贸易摩擦的化解机制;国际分工贸易带来的福利效应、受损者与受益者的界定;各种分工形式下贸易政策的政治内生化及其特点。
其次,在对贸易摩擦相关概念进行界定的基础上,提出国际分工、利益集团与贸易摩擦的政治经济学分析框架。在横向维度上,各个分工形式下的贸易摩擦形成机制相同:一定分工形式下的贸易具有分配效应,并产生贸易的受益者和受损者,形成对贸易政策持有不同态度的利益集团;在国内层次上利益集团和政府之间展开非合作博弈而形成贸易政策(贸易摩擦的基础);在国际层次上受本国利益集团影响的两国基于其国内博弈结果展开博弈,两国的非合作博弈均衡(即贸易战)容易导致贸易摩擦产生或加剧。在纵向维度上,以国际分工演进为研究的暗线进行纵向比较。
第三,对产业间分工贸易摩擦进行分析。基于GH(1994)保护待售模型、GH(1995)贸易战模型分析得出产业间分工下贸易摩擦的特点,即进口国对利益集团福利关心程度提高、产出/进口比增强等政治经济参数发生变化时,容易引起贸易摩擦产生及摩擦加剧,而出口国相关的政治经济参数变化往往促进贸易摩擦的缓解。随后对纺织服装、食品等行业的贸易救济措施摩擦情况,从利益集团、政治经济学的角度进行经验分析。并选取美日纺织品贸易摩擦这一经典案例进行分析,分析结果与理论指出的摩擦形成及摩擦特点相符。
第四,对产业内分工贸易摩擦进行分析。基于Pao-Li Chang(2005)垄断竞争保护待售模型、吴韧强和刘海云(2009)垄断竞争贸易战模型分析,得出产业内分工下贸易摩擦的特点;一国产业是否在政治上组织起来,决定了该国政治因素变化引起的进口、出口市场上贸易摩擦的发展方向;当一国产业竞争力增强时,容易引起本国市场上的贸易摩擦加剧、出口市场上的贸易摩擦缓解;当产品差异性增大时,两国市场上的贸易摩擦加剧。随后对化工及其相关产品行业的贸易救济措施摩擦情况,从利益集团影响、政治经济学的角度来进行经验分析。并选取美日半导体贸易摩擦这一经典案例进行分析,分析结果与理论指出的摩擦形成及摩擦特点相符。
第五,对产品内分工贸易摩擦进行分析。基于刘海云和吴韧强(2007)中间产品保护待售模型得出,最终产品是否能获得支持性贸易政策不仅取决于自身的政治组织状况、生产状况(国内产量),同时还取决于中间产品生产者的政治组织状况。进一步扩展模型进行分析得出:在南北产品内分工下,两国中间产品、最终产品生产者利益集团组织程度、政治力量及产品内分工程度共同决定贸易摩擦的产生及发展方向。对最终产品贸易而言,产品内分工程度、北方国家最终产品利益集团的政治组织状况及其与中间产品利益集团的政治力量对比,决定了摩擦的产生与发展方向。对于中间产品而言,哪个国家的中间产品利益集团政治力量较强,其政治经济因素变化导致对中间产品支持程度提高,将引起中间产品贸易摩擦产生或加剧。随后,结合主要发达国家产品内分工程度与贸易救济措施摩擦情况进行分析,得出:产业内分工程度较低的行业贸易摩擦比较多,反之则反是。产业间分工下的贸易摩擦多于产业内、产品内分工形式下的贸易摩擦。对中美、中日之间的机电、交通运输、纺织服装行业分析也得到类似结果。
第六,总结与展望。先对各种分工形式下的贸易摩擦进行总结。然后对国际分工演进下的贸易摩擦特点进行比较分析。最后对中国应对贸易摩擦提供有益的启示,并指出未来研究方向。
As the international trade grows rapidly, the trade frictions between countries happen frequently, and the types of frictions become more diverse, the involved products include various agricultural products, manufactured goods, even services. China is one of the most suffered nations. The countries that initiate trade frictions to China are not only including developed countries, but also developing countries. This dissertation is based on the analytical framework of the political economy of trade policy and the perspective of interest groups. It analyzes the evolution and the characteristics of trade frictions in different specializations, so that the longitudinal comparison can be done. And then the dissertation does empirical analysis on various countries and different products, so that it could provide useful inspirations for China to cope with the trade frictions.
First, the dissertation describes the research background, objectives, issues, and the previous studies on trade frictions, including the definition, type, economic and political causes of trade frictions, the specific reasons why Chinese suffered trade frictions, the resolving mechanism for trade frictions; the trade effect of welfare distribution, the definition of sufferer and beneficiaries, the political endogenization of trade policy and its characteristics in different specializations.
Second, based on the definition of related notion, the dissertation formulates the political economy analytical framework of specialization, interest groups and trade frictions. In the horizontal dimension, each trade friction mechanism under different specializations is the same: the distributional effects of trade produce winners and losers, and it promotes the formation of different interest groups that hold different attitudes for the trade policy. At the domestic level, there's a non-cooperative game between the interest groups and the government which forms the trade policy (the basis of trade frictions). At the international level, the two governments that affected by interest groups game based on the results of its internal game, and the non-cooperative game equilibrium (i.e., a trade war) of the two governments may easily lead to the creation of trade frictions or exacerbated trade frictions. In the longitudinal dimension, the evolution of the international specialization is the dark lines of longitudinally comparative analysis.
Third, this dissertation analyzes trade frictions under inter-industry trade. Based on "Protection for Sale" in GH (1994) and the trade war model in GH (1995), it obtains the characteristics of trade frictions under the inter-industry specialization, and concludes: in the importing country, as the weights giving to the interest groups is greater, the ratio of output/imports increases, or other political and economic parameters change, it easily leads to trade frictions or the friction intensifies. But in the exporting country, the changes of political and economic parameters often ease trade frictions. Then it does the empirical analysis of textiles and garments, food and other industries in trade remedy measures, and then it analyzes the classic case of US-Japan textile trade frictions, which the formation and characteristics of the friction is in accord with the theory suggests.
Fourth, this dissertation analyzes trade frictions under intra-industry trade. Based on Pao-Li Chang (2005), Wu Renqiang and Liu Haiyun(2009), it obtains the characteristics of trade frictions under the intra-industry specialization, and concludes : Whether a country's industries are organized politically decides the developing direction of trade frictions which caused by the change of the country's political environment in import market and export market. As a country's industrial competitiveness enhances, it is easy to intensify trade frictions on the domestic market and ease trade frictions on the export market. As the product differentiation increases, the trade frictions on both markets intensify. Then it does the empirical analysis of chemical and related products industry in trade remedy measures, and then it analyzes the classic case of the US-Japan semiconductor trade frictions, which the formation and characteristics of the friction is in accord with the theory suggests.
Fifth, this dissertation analyzes trade frictions under intra-product trade. Based on Liu Haiyun and Wu Renqiang (2007), it obtains the characteristics of trade policy under the intra-product specialization, and then it makes a further extension to the North-South intra-product specialization, and concludes: the respectively organized situation of intermediate-product interest groups and final-product interest groups jointly determined the emergence and developing direction of trade frictions. For the final-product trade, the degree of intra-product specialization, the final product status of interest groups and the political power comparing between the final-product and intermediate-product interest groups in Northern countries, jointly determined the emergence and developing direction of trade frictions. For the intermediate product trade, in country which intermediate-product interest groups is powerful, its political and economic circumstance change lead to the increasing support for intermediate-product, and this will bring about the intermediate-product trade frictions or frictions increase. Subsequently, based on the degree of intra-product specialization in the major developed countries and trade remedy measures, it concludes that the sectors with a lower level of specialization will have more trade frictions, on the contrary the anti-yes. The trade frictions under the inter-industry specialization are much more than that of intra-industry and intra-product specialization. The empirical analysis of the electrical and mechanical, transportation, textile and garment industries of United States, China and Japan has also been similar results.
Finally, this dissertation summarizes different trade frictions under different specialization, and then it does comparative analysis of characteristics in different stage of specialization. Then it provides some inspirations for China to cope with trade frictions and points out the direction for future research.
引文
[1]数据来源:根据WTO网站的反倾销、反补贴、保障措施数据整理得出,http://www.wto.org.
[2]数据来源:中国商务部公平贸易局网站,http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/mymcyd/subjectdd/200908/20090806465340.html.
[1]格罗斯曼G.M.,赫尔普曼E..利益集团与贸易政策.北京:中国人民大学出版社.2005.
[2]S.P.Magee,W.A.Brock and Young.Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy formation.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1989.
[1]参考:J.Michael Finger,Ann Harrison.Import Protection for U.S.Textiles and Apparel:Viewed from the Domestic Perspective.In The Political Economy of American Trade Policy,Anne O.Krueger(ed).University of Chicago Press,1996:44-45.
[2]数据来源:侯俊军,王耀中.中美、日关纷织品贸易摩揍比较及其启示.国际贸易问题,2006(4):35.
[1]参考郑春荣.欧盟多层级治理体系中的德国利益集团.德国研究.2008(02):11-16.
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[2]数据来源:中国商务部公平贸易局网站,http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/mymcyd/subjectdd/200908/20090806465340.html.
[1]格罗斯曼G.M.,赫尔普曼E..利益集团与贸易政策.北京:中国人民大学出版社.2005.
[2]S.P.Magee,W.A.Brock and Young.Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy formation.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1989.
[1]参考:J.Michael Finger,Ann Harrison.Import Protection for U.S.Textiles and Apparel:Viewed from the Domestic Perspective.In The Political Economy of American Trade Policy,Anne O.Krueger(ed).University of Chicago Press,1996:44-45.
[2]数据来源:侯俊军,王耀中.中美、日关纷织品贸易摩揍比较及其启示.国际贸易问题,2006(4):35.
[1]参考郑春荣.欧盟多层级治理体系中的德国利益集团.德国研究.2008(02):11-16.
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[33] Kohler, Wilhelm. Aspects of International Fragmentation. Economics Working Papers 2002—08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, 2002.
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[35] Lee, Kyung-Ho and Mah, Jai S. Institutional Changes and Antidumping Decisions in the United States. Journal of Policy Modeling, 2003(25): 555-565.
[36] Markusen, J. R. Trade in Producers Services and Other Specialised Intermediate Inputs. American Economic Review, 1989(79): 85-95.
[37] Michael J. Gilligan. Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-industry Trade. International Studies Quarterly, 1997, 41: 455-474.
[38] Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1965.
[39] Pao-Li Chang, Myoung-Jae Lee. Protection for Sale under Monopolistic Competition: An Empirical Investigation. Singapore Management University, Singapore 259756, 2005(4): 1-28.
[40] Pao-Li Chang. Protection for sale under Monopolistic Competition. Journal of International Economics, 2005(66): 509-526.
[41] Paul R. Krugman. Import Protection as Export Promotion: International Competition in the Presence of Oligopoly and Economics of Scale. In: H. Kierzkowski(ed. ). Monopolistic Competition and International Trade, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984b.
[42] Paul R. Krugman. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986.
[43] Paul R. Krugman. The New Theories of International Trade and the Multinational Corporation,in D. Audretsch and C. Kindleberger(eds. ). The Multinational Corporation in the 1980', Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982.
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[49] Paul R. Krugman. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics. International Organization, 1990,44(1): 107-135.
[50] Paul R. Krugman. Growth, Trade, and Income Distribution under Increasing Returns. Mimeo, 1984a.
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[53]Reynolds,Kara M.Subsidizing Rent-seeking:Antidumping Protection and the Byrd Amendment.Journal of International Economics,2006,70(2):490-502.
[54]S.P.Magee,W.A.Brock and Young.Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Formation.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1989.
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[56]Schattschneider E.E.Politics,Pressure and the Tariff:A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics,as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tariff.New York:Prentice Hall,1935.
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[63]北京大学中国经济研究中心课题组.垂直专门化、产业内贸易与中美贸易关系.北京大学中国经济研究中心讨论稿NO.C2005005,2005
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[65]丁黎.从贸易角度探讨中国的贸易摩擦与对策.国际贸易问题,2005(11):29-34
[66]付娟.贸易摩擦日益频繁的原因及对策分析.东北财经大学学报,2003(7):91-92
[67]格罗斯曼G.M.,赫尔普曼E.利益集团与贸易政策.北京:中国人民大学出版社.2005
[68]韩燕.产业内贸易研究综述,首都经济贸易大学学报,2005(06):11-16
[69]侯俊军,王耀中.中美、日美纺织品贸易摩擦比较及其启示.国际贸易问题.2006(4):34-38
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