农户贷款担保困境及破解机制研究
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摘要
论文是关于农户贷款担保困境及破解机制研究。许多农户生产经营渴望获得信贷支持,但由于农业本身的高风险性以及严重的信息不对称所带来的“逆向选择”和道德风险,致使农户贷款面临风险大、监管难、成本高等难题。现有农村金融机构在追求利润最大化、风险最小化的经营目的驱使下,要么采取“惜贷”、“慎贷”策略,将从农村地区吸收的大量资金转移到城市地区,要么对借款农户提出较高融资担保要求。根据现实状况,由于农户自身担保能力有限、农业信贷服务滞后以及相关配套机制和支撑条件的缺陷,农户贷款担保陷入困境,从而造成农户融资非常艰难。从一定意义上说,农户“贷款难”的实质是“担保难”问题。为改变农户融资不畅的被动局面,就必须着手解决农户贷款担保存在的问题。
一、主要研究内容
本文运用制度经济学、信息经济学、行为经济学相关理论以及历史归纳、比较分析、模型分析、机制构建等方法,建立农户贷款担保问题的理论分析框架,借鉴国外农户贷款担保经验,剖析和实证我国农户贷款担保困境的现状、成因、影响,构建我国农户贷款担保困境的破解机制并设计有效担保模式,力求为开辟农户贷款担保的有效路径并促进农村金融良性发展提供理论、实证与决策思路的支持。研究的主要内容有：(1)建立农户贷款担保问题的理论分析框架。(2)国外农户贷款担保的比较分析。(3)农户贷款担保现状及困境的调查分析。(4)农户贷款担保困境成因的实证研究。(5)农户贷款担保困境影响的实证研究。(6)农户贷款担保困境的破解机制设计。(7)农户贷款有效担保模式选择。
二、主要研究结论
1.在我国农村金融制度和体系建设滞后、农户生产经营层次和效益水平相对较低的整体环境下,农户贷款担保成为农户贷款的“试金石”.其运行特点表现为：较低的信用层次带来较高的担保要求,道德风险和经营风险成为担保重点,担保质量主要体现在债权实现难易程度上。农户贷款担保的有效性除了担保主体是否具备主体资格和经济担保能力、担保物的合法有效性等影响要素外,信誉担保机制的有效性、担保人风险控制的能力、担保的动机和意愿以及利益平衡机制、担保合约能充分有效实施也是重要的决定因素。
2.借鉴国外农户贷款担保的经验得出,结合农户实际提供有效的信贷担保至关重要。要根据农户需求设计贷款担保方式是重要准则,完善风险控制机制是降低农户贷款担保要求有效路径,优化信用环境是农户贷款担保健康运行的保障,完善配套措施是农户贷款担保顺利实施的支撑条件,政府支持是农户贷款担保良性发展的坚强后盾；对我国的启示是：加快农户担保创新,实现农户贷款担保方式多元化。改进农户贷款供给水平和质量,缓解农户实物担保的困难。发展农业保险和融资保险,健全农户贷款风险的分担机制。优化农村信用环境,促进农户贷款担保健康运行。加快完善配套条件和法律制度,保障农户贷款担保的有效实施。加大政府扶持力度,推动农户贷款担保良性发展。
3.农户贷款担保现实困境的主要表现是缺乏有效担保物、有效担保人以及有效担保机制.重庆市近3年农户贷款总额中抵押贷款比例最高,其次是第三方保证、信誉担保。样本农户中获得银行贷款的比例仅为28%,担保条件不足是多数农户不能获得贷款的主要原因,传统小而全农户贷款获得比率最低,采用抵押担保方式的农户贷款满足度最高。大型银行对农户贷款供给整体呈现担保门槛较高的特点,新型农村金融机构的担保要求有所降低,但仍以保证、抵押担保为主。农户抵质押动产数量少、价值低、难变现,家庭金融资产相对缺乏,不动产抵押品主要为城镇住房,农林土地承包权抵押较少,第三方担保以亲属朋友担保为主,财产权利、生物资产、互助担保等创新担保方式缺乏,担保模式总体较为单一
4.农户贷款担保困境的根源在于农户自身担保能力存在先天不足,内生优势资源未有效利用,金融机构、社会、政府宽容和支持力度不够,外生力量和多方促成机制存在缺陷.模型检验表明,农户贷款担保困境形成因素主要有三个方面,在农户自身方面,农户家庭收入、有形资产积累、财产性权利利用、声誉担保机制作用发挥是其重要影响因素；在金融机构方面,农户信贷供给水平、信贷担保认知、信贷管理技术对农户贷款担保困境形成影响较为显著。在配套支持条件和外部环境方面,担保实施条件、第三方担保机制、农业保险对农业产业风险的保障作用、信用评级体系、法律规制是其重要影响因素。不同类型农户具备担保条件的概率存在显著差异,创业型农户具备贷款担保条件的平均概率最高,其次依次为从事现代农业农户和传统小而全农户。5.担保困境影响农户贷款可得性,并带来农户生产发展条件及收入福利水平的分化。担保困境制约农户贷款获得额度,其对农户正规贷款渠道的影响更大,也增加了长期贷款和经营性贷款的可得难度,造成农户贷款利率提高,也带来担保实施成本、中介费用、隐性费用等交易成本；在影响农户贷款满足程度的变量中,农户受教育程度、家庭收入、金融资产、是否加入合作社、农业保险、专业评估机构具有显著正向影响,而土地承包经营权和动产现值仅在抵押贷款模型中通过了显著性检验,农户任职只在信誉担保中影响显著,银行数目变量则整体不显著；担保条件较好的农户在生产规模扩张、生产性资产增加、经营项目增加以及家庭收入增加、生活性资产增加、消费增加方面具有明显优势。6.农户贷款担保困境的破解应按照创新性、贴近性、系统性、协调性的原则要求,全方位建立或完善农户贷款担保的有效机制.一是农户自我担保能力提升机制。强化有形资产的担保作用,完善声誉担保机制,充分发挥财产性权利的担保潜能。二是第三方保证人扩展机制。推行农产品采购企业担保和新型农村经济组织担保,建立健全专业担保机构担保机制。三是金融机构信贷管理改进机制。积极推动农户信贷模式改革,强化信贷过程管理,提升信贷服务水平。四是强化信用环境促进机制。建立农户信用征信体系,构建道德诚信激励约束机制和村社组织监督约束机制。五是健全保险分担机制。进一步扩大农业保险品种,加快完善农业保险体系,建立农业重大灾害救助机制。六是政府扶持机制。加大财税支持力度,优化扶持方式,实施差异化监管模式,加快农户贷款担保配套体系建设。
7.农户贷款担保实施模式选择应遵循信贷风险管理的基本要求.从农村实际出发,大力推行与第一还款来源关联的农户财产担保,包括：在产品、产品抵押担保模式,订单、应收账款质押担保模式,农业项目经营权、收益权质押模式；扬长避短,克服农户家庭高价值实物担保资产相对缺乏的困难,强化以农户声誉约束为基础的保证担保模式,包括：农户个人信誉保证贷款模式、农户联保贷款模式、互助担保贷款模式；结合低附加值种植业、高附加值种植业、畜牧水产业、农产品加工业等不同类型农户的生产经营和贷款需求特点,建立健全多元性和差异化的农户贷款担保模式；着眼长远,在不断完善农村产权制度及其配套体系的基础上,积极探索农户土地用益物权担保。
三、主要创新点
1.探索构建了一个相对完整的分析农户贷款担保问题的理论视觉.本文基于制度经济学、信息经济学、行为经济学的分析框架,在理论层面上分析农户经济行为和贷款需求特征、农户贷款供给条件以及担保功效的基础上,厘清农户贷款担保的方式和有效性决定因素,剖析农户贷款与担保的依存关系以及农户担保条件对贷款需求和供给的牵制作用。
2.本文从农户角度并以一手的统计资料,对农户贷款担保困境的现状、成因和影响进行系统性和深入性的研究。探究农户贷款担保困境成因时,本文在农户财产性权利利用、金融机构的认知偏差和信贷技术、政府扶持方式等方面的分析较以前研究更为深化。此外,运用Logit模型,检验了农户自身、金融机构、外部配套条件和环境等因素对农户贷款担保的影响程度,并采用Order Logit模型检验了担保困境对农户贷款可得性的实际影响。
3.论证并提出了农户贷款担保困境破解机制的设计依据和设计原则,全面系统的构建了农户贷款担保困境破解的六个方面的具体机制.结合实际,确立了农户贷款担保模式选择的基本原则和总体思路,设计了四个方面的农户贷款有效担保模式。
This dissertation studies the difficulties of farmer loan guarantee and the mechanism to solve it. Many farmers in the countryside long for the credit support to produce and manage. But because of the adverse selection and moral hazard brought by the high risk of agriculture and the seriously asymmetric information, many fanners are confronted with numerous problems such as high risk, difficult supervision and high cost. Under the drive of management objectives which maximize the profits and minimize the risk, current financial institutions in the countryside either transfer the abundant capital from the rural area to the urban area or provide the high financing guarantee requirements for famers. According to the actual situation, owing to the relatively limited guarantee ability of farmers, lagged service of agriculture credit and the lack of relevant supporting mechanism and conditions, farmer loan guarantee may get into troubles, which will lead to the extreme difficulty of farmer financing. To some degree, the essence of loan difficulty is the guarantee difficulty. In order to change the passive situation of poor financing for farmers, the existing problems in farmer loan guarantee need to be solved.
I. Main research content
Within this dissertation, the relevant scientific theories including institutional economics, information economics and behavior economics will be used. With scientific methods such as historical induction, comparative analysis and model analysis, in order to develop the effective channel in farmer loan guarantee and offer support on theories, examples and thoughts to promote the sound development of rural finance, this dissertation builds the framework of theoretical analysis in farmer loan guarantee, draws lessons from the foreign experience in farmer loan guarantee, analyses the situations, reasons and effects of the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee, creates a kind of mechanism to solve the difficulties in fanner loan guarantee and moreover designs an effective guarantee mode. The main research contents include:(1)building the framework of theoretical analysis in farmer loan guarantee;(2) comparing and analyzing the foreign farmer loan guarantee;(3)investigating and analyzing the current situations and difficulties in farmer loan guarantee;(4) the empirical research of reasons in difficulties of farmer loan guarantee;(5)the empirical research of results of the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee;(6)designing the mechanism to solve the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee;(7)selecting the effective guarantee mode in farmer loan.
Ⅱ Main research conclusion
1. Under the overall environment of lagged construction in rural financial system, comparatively low levels in production and operation of farmers and the low effect levels, farmer loan guarantee has become the touchstone of farmer loan. The farmer loan guarantee is featured by the higher guarantee requirements caused by lower credit level. Moreover, moral hazard and operation risk become the focus in guarantee process and then the guarantee quality is mainly reflected in the degree to achieve the obligation rights. Except the fact that whether the guarantee body has the right and the economic assurance ability and whether the guarantee is legal or valid, in the process of fanner loan guarantee there are many important decisive factors such as the validity of credit guarantee mechanism, guarantor's ability to control the risk, the motive and willingness to guarantee, interest balance mechanism and the effective implementation of guarantee contract.
2. By learning from the foreign experience in farmer loan guarantee, we can know that considering the real situation of farmers in providing effective credit guarantee is vital. Designing the methods of farmer loan guarantee according to the farmer's needs is the important principle; improving the mechanism of risk control is the effective way to reduce the farmer loan guarantee; optimizing the credit environment is the safeguard in running the fanner loan guarantee; perfecting the supporting measures is the condition to ensure the successful implementation of farmer loan guarantee and getting the support from government is the strong supporter in developing the farmer loan guarantee. We are inspired to accelerate the innovation in farmer loan and diversify the methods of farmer loan guarantee. Moreover, we have to improve the level and quality of supply in farmer loan to ease the difficulties in farmer real guarantees, develop the agricultural insurance and financing insurance to perfect the sharing system in farmer loan risk, optimize the rural credit environment to improve the sound running of farmer loan guarantee, speed up to improve the supporting conditions and legal systems in order to ensure the effective implementation of farmer loan guarantee and promote government support or legislative guarantee to develop farmer loan guarantee.
3. The difficulties in farmer loan guarantee are featured by lacking the effective guarantee, guarantor and system. In Chongqing, among the farmer loan guarantee in recent years, the mortgage loan accounted for the highest proportion which is followed by the third-party loan and credit guarantee. Within the samples, the farmers receiving the loan can account for28%and inadequate guarantee conditions lead to failing to get the loan. The farmers using the traditional method will have the lowest satisfaction and those using the mortgage will have the highest satisfaction. The credit supply in large banks is featured by the higher guarantee standards, so the new rural financial institutions will lower their requirements but still choose mortgage guarantee. The farmers usually have the limited amount and cheap value in personal properties, but comparatively lack the household financial assets. Their real estate guarantees are mainly their houses, they seldom use contract rights of forest and land to mortgage and the third-party guarantees are often their relatives or friends. The creative guarantee methods such as the guarantee of property rights, biological assets and mutual help are lacking. In a word, the guarantee mode is too simple and single.
4. Difficulties of farmer loan guarantee are rooted in the fact that farmer's guarantee ability is inadequate; the internal advantages and resources fail to use effectively; financial institutions, society and government don't give the enough support and furthermore the outside forces and many mechanisms of farmer have the shortcomings. The model tests show that there are mainly three factors resulting in the difficulties of farmer loan guarantee: the first is about the farmer. The insufficient household income and tangible assets, the poor use of proprietary rights, and the ineffective reputation guarantee mechanism are the important factors; the second is about financial institutions. The service level of farmer credit, cognition of credit guarantee and the management of credit technology have shown the effects; the third is about supporting conditions and the outside environment. The accompanying conditions of credit implementation, guarantee mechanism of the third party, the protection function of agricultural insurance on agricultural risk, social credit environment, legal systems are their important factors. The probability of meeting the requirements for guarantee in different kinds of farmers has the obvious differences. The entrepreneurial farmers have the highest probability, and the small comprehensive farmers engaging in modern agriculture follow them.
5. The difficulties in guarantee will influence the availability of farmer loan and may result in the disparity of production and development conditions of farmers and the income and welfare of farmers. These difficulties may restrict the obtaining amount of loan, exert the great influence on formal credit channel of farmers and increase the difficulties in getting the long-term loan and operating loans, thus raising the interest rates of farmers and bringing many transaction costs such as guarantee implementation costs, broker fees and intangible fees. Among the variables which may affect the satisfaction degree of farmer loan, education level of farmer, household incomes, financial assets, the question whether joining in the cooperative community, agricultural insurance and the institutions of professional assessment have the obvious positive effects, while the contract and management rights in soil and the present value of movable property have passed the salient test in mortgage model. The farmer's post only has the obvious influence on credit guarantee and the number variables in the bank haven't shown the obvious effect. As for the affluent farmers, they have the obvious advantages in expanding the production scale, increasing the productive assets, management items, household income, living assets and the consumption.
6. By principles of creativity, approaching, systematization and compatibility, effective system should be built and strengthened comprehensively in order to solve the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee. The first is the improvement mechanism in farmer's ability to guarantee themselves. We have to intensify the guarantee role in physical assets, strengthen the guarantee system in reputation and give full play to guarantee potential in proprietary rights. The second is extension mechanism in the third party. We should promote the guarantee mode of companies purchasing the agriculture products and new rural economic organization to build the guarantee system of professional security organizations. The third is improvement mechanism of the loan management in financial institutions. We'd better drive the revolution in farmer loan mode, strengthen the management in loan process and improve the service level in credit. The forth is to intensify the promotion mechanism in credit environment. We need to build the farmer's credit system and also build the commitment mechanism in moral and integrity incentive and that of organization supervision. The fifth is to perfect the system of insurance shares. We should expand the varieties of agricultural insurance, strengthen the system of agricultural insurance and build the relief mechanism of major disasters in agriculture. The sixth is the assistance system of government which should increase the financial support, optimize the financial assistance mode, carry out the supervision mode of differentiation and accelerate the construction of accompanying system of farmer loan guarantee.
7. The choice of implementation mode in farmer loan guarantee should obey the management rules of credit risk. Proceed from the reality of countryside, farmer property guarantee closely related to the first source of payment needs to be promoted, such as:guarantee mode of product collateral, guarantee mode of orders and accounts receivable, guarantee mode of management right and income right in agriculture project. Based on farmer reputation constraints, we need to promote the guarantee mode to make use of advantages, bypass the disadvantages and overcome the difficulties in relatively lacking the high-value physical assets within farmer's house, for example:loan mode of personal credit guarantee for farmers; loan mode of group guarantee; credit mode of mutual guarantee. Combined with various production management and demands for loan like crop production with low added value, high added value, animal and sea production and farming industry, farmer loan guarantee with diversification and differentiation should be built and strengthened. Based on the continuous improvement of property right system in rural area and its accompanying systems, we should energetically explore the farmer's land usufructuary right guarantee with the longer view.
Ⅲ Main innovation point1. This dissertation explores a comparatively sound vision theory in analyzing the difficulties of farmer loan guarantee. Based on the institutional economics, information economics and behavioral economics, it analyzes the farmer economical behavior, features of loan demands, supply conditions of farmer loan and the guarantee functions in theory, so it clarifies the way and effective determining factors of farmer loan guarantee and further dissects the dependency between farmer loan and guarantee and the constraints on loan demands and supplies from guarantee conditions.
2. From the perspective of farmers, based on the statistical data, this dissertation systematically and profoundly research the situation, causes and the effects of farmer loan guarantee. When exploring the causes of the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee, it has the deeper research in the use of proprietary rights of farmers, cognitive bias of financial institutions, credit technologies and the methods of government support compared with former research. Moreover, with mode of Logit, this dissertation examines the effect of farmers, financial institutions, external supporting conditions and environment on farmer loan guarantee and uses the mode of Order Logit to examine the actual effect of difficulties in farmer loan guarantee on satisfaction degree of farmer loan guarantee.
3. This dissertation demonstrates and offers the design considerations and principles in solving the difficulties on farmer loan guarantee, on whose basis it comprehensively builds the specific mechanism to solve the difficulties on farmer loan guarantee from six aspects, compared with former research. Combined with reality, it determines the basic principles and overall thought in selecting the mode of farmer loan guarantee and designs innovatively the effective guarantee mode of farmer loan in four aspects.
一、主要研究内容
本文运用制度经济学、信息经济学、行为经济学相关理论以及历史归纳、比较分析、模型分析、机制构建等方法,建立农户贷款担保问题的理论分析框架,借鉴国外农户贷款担保经验,剖析和实证我国农户贷款担保困境的现状、成因、影响,构建我国农户贷款担保困境的破解机制并设计有效担保模式,力求为开辟农户贷款担保的有效路径并促进农村金融良性发展提供理论、实证与决策思路的支持。研究的主要内容有：(1)建立农户贷款担保问题的理论分析框架。(2)国外农户贷款担保的比较分析。(3)农户贷款担保现状及困境的调查分析。(4)农户贷款担保困境成因的实证研究。(5)农户贷款担保困境影响的实证研究。(6)农户贷款担保困境的破解机制设计。(7)农户贷款有效担保模式选择。
二、主要研究结论
1.在我国农村金融制度和体系建设滞后、农户生产经营层次和效益水平相对较低的整体环境下,农户贷款担保成为农户贷款的“试金石”.其运行特点表现为：较低的信用层次带来较高的担保要求,道德风险和经营风险成为担保重点,担保质量主要体现在债权实现难易程度上。农户贷款担保的有效性除了担保主体是否具备主体资格和经济担保能力、担保物的合法有效性等影响要素外,信誉担保机制的有效性、担保人风险控制的能力、担保的动机和意愿以及利益平衡机制、担保合约能充分有效实施也是重要的决定因素。
2.借鉴国外农户贷款担保的经验得出,结合农户实际提供有效的信贷担保至关重要。要根据农户需求设计贷款担保方式是重要准则,完善风险控制机制是降低农户贷款担保要求有效路径,优化信用环境是农户贷款担保健康运行的保障,完善配套措施是农户贷款担保顺利实施的支撑条件,政府支持是农户贷款担保良性发展的坚强后盾；对我国的启示是：加快农户担保创新,实现农户贷款担保方式多元化。改进农户贷款供给水平和质量,缓解农户实物担保的困难。发展农业保险和融资保险,健全农户贷款风险的分担机制。优化农村信用环境,促进农户贷款担保健康运行。加快完善配套条件和法律制度,保障农户贷款担保的有效实施。加大政府扶持力度,推动农户贷款担保良性发展。
3.农户贷款担保现实困境的主要表现是缺乏有效担保物、有效担保人以及有效担保机制.重庆市近3年农户贷款总额中抵押贷款比例最高,其次是第三方保证、信誉担保。样本农户中获得银行贷款的比例仅为28%,担保条件不足是多数农户不能获得贷款的主要原因,传统小而全农户贷款获得比率最低,采用抵押担保方式的农户贷款满足度最高。大型银行对农户贷款供给整体呈现担保门槛较高的特点,新型农村金融机构的担保要求有所降低,但仍以保证、抵押担保为主。农户抵质押动产数量少、价值低、难变现,家庭金融资产相对缺乏,不动产抵押品主要为城镇住房,农林土地承包权抵押较少,第三方担保以亲属朋友担保为主,财产权利、生物资产、互助担保等创新担保方式缺乏,担保模式总体较为单一
4.农户贷款担保困境的根源在于农户自身担保能力存在先天不足,内生优势资源未有效利用,金融机构、社会、政府宽容和支持力度不够,外生力量和多方促成机制存在缺陷.模型检验表明,农户贷款担保困境形成因素主要有三个方面,在农户自身方面,农户家庭收入、有形资产积累、财产性权利利用、声誉担保机制作用发挥是其重要影响因素；在金融机构方面,农户信贷供给水平、信贷担保认知、信贷管理技术对农户贷款担保困境形成影响较为显著。在配套支持条件和外部环境方面,担保实施条件、第三方担保机制、农业保险对农业产业风险的保障作用、信用评级体系、法律规制是其重要影响因素。不同类型农户具备担保条件的概率存在显著差异,创业型农户具备贷款担保条件的平均概率最高,其次依次为从事现代农业农户和传统小而全农户。5.担保困境影响农户贷款可得性,并带来农户生产发展条件及收入福利水平的分化。担保困境制约农户贷款获得额度,其对农户正规贷款渠道的影响更大,也增加了长期贷款和经营性贷款的可得难度,造成农户贷款利率提高,也带来担保实施成本、中介费用、隐性费用等交易成本；在影响农户贷款满足程度的变量中,农户受教育程度、家庭收入、金融资产、是否加入合作社、农业保险、专业评估机构具有显著正向影响,而土地承包经营权和动产现值仅在抵押贷款模型中通过了显著性检验,农户任职只在信誉担保中影响显著,银行数目变量则整体不显著；担保条件较好的农户在生产规模扩张、生产性资产增加、经营项目增加以及家庭收入增加、生活性资产增加、消费增加方面具有明显优势。6.农户贷款担保困境的破解应按照创新性、贴近性、系统性、协调性的原则要求,全方位建立或完善农户贷款担保的有效机制.一是农户自我担保能力提升机制。强化有形资产的担保作用,完善声誉担保机制,充分发挥财产性权利的担保潜能。二是第三方保证人扩展机制。推行农产品采购企业担保和新型农村经济组织担保,建立健全专业担保机构担保机制。三是金融机构信贷管理改进机制。积极推动农户信贷模式改革,强化信贷过程管理,提升信贷服务水平。四是强化信用环境促进机制。建立农户信用征信体系,构建道德诚信激励约束机制和村社组织监督约束机制。五是健全保险分担机制。进一步扩大农业保险品种,加快完善农业保险体系,建立农业重大灾害救助机制。六是政府扶持机制。加大财税支持力度,优化扶持方式,实施差异化监管模式,加快农户贷款担保配套体系建设。
7.农户贷款担保实施模式选择应遵循信贷风险管理的基本要求.从农村实际出发,大力推行与第一还款来源关联的农户财产担保,包括：在产品、产品抵押担保模式,订单、应收账款质押担保模式,农业项目经营权、收益权质押模式；扬长避短,克服农户家庭高价值实物担保资产相对缺乏的困难,强化以农户声誉约束为基础的保证担保模式,包括：农户个人信誉保证贷款模式、农户联保贷款模式、互助担保贷款模式；结合低附加值种植业、高附加值种植业、畜牧水产业、农产品加工业等不同类型农户的生产经营和贷款需求特点,建立健全多元性和差异化的农户贷款担保模式；着眼长远,在不断完善农村产权制度及其配套体系的基础上,积极探索农户土地用益物权担保。
三、主要创新点
1.探索构建了一个相对完整的分析农户贷款担保问题的理论视觉.本文基于制度经济学、信息经济学、行为经济学的分析框架,在理论层面上分析农户经济行为和贷款需求特征、农户贷款供给条件以及担保功效的基础上,厘清农户贷款担保的方式和有效性决定因素,剖析农户贷款与担保的依存关系以及农户担保条件对贷款需求和供给的牵制作用。
2.本文从农户角度并以一手的统计资料,对农户贷款担保困境的现状、成因和影响进行系统性和深入性的研究。探究农户贷款担保困境成因时,本文在农户财产性权利利用、金融机构的认知偏差和信贷技术、政府扶持方式等方面的分析较以前研究更为深化。此外,运用Logit模型,检验了农户自身、金融机构、外部配套条件和环境等因素对农户贷款担保的影响程度,并采用Order Logit模型检验了担保困境对农户贷款可得性的实际影响。
3.论证并提出了农户贷款担保困境破解机制的设计依据和设计原则,全面系统的构建了农户贷款担保困境破解的六个方面的具体机制.结合实际,确立了农户贷款担保模式选择的基本原则和总体思路,设计了四个方面的农户贷款有效担保模式。
This dissertation studies the difficulties of farmer loan guarantee and the mechanism to solve it. Many farmers in the countryside long for the credit support to produce and manage. But because of the adverse selection and moral hazard brought by the high risk of agriculture and the seriously asymmetric information, many fanners are confronted with numerous problems such as high risk, difficult supervision and high cost. Under the drive of management objectives which maximize the profits and minimize the risk, current financial institutions in the countryside either transfer the abundant capital from the rural area to the urban area or provide the high financing guarantee requirements for famers. According to the actual situation, owing to the relatively limited guarantee ability of farmers, lagged service of agriculture credit and the lack of relevant supporting mechanism and conditions, farmer loan guarantee may get into troubles, which will lead to the extreme difficulty of farmer financing. To some degree, the essence of loan difficulty is the guarantee difficulty. In order to change the passive situation of poor financing for farmers, the existing problems in farmer loan guarantee need to be solved.
I. Main research content
Within this dissertation, the relevant scientific theories including institutional economics, information economics and behavior economics will be used. With scientific methods such as historical induction, comparative analysis and model analysis, in order to develop the effective channel in farmer loan guarantee and offer support on theories, examples and thoughts to promote the sound development of rural finance, this dissertation builds the framework of theoretical analysis in farmer loan guarantee, draws lessons from the foreign experience in farmer loan guarantee, analyses the situations, reasons and effects of the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee, creates a kind of mechanism to solve the difficulties in fanner loan guarantee and moreover designs an effective guarantee mode. The main research contents include:(1)building the framework of theoretical analysis in farmer loan guarantee;(2) comparing and analyzing the foreign farmer loan guarantee;(3)investigating and analyzing the current situations and difficulties in farmer loan guarantee;(4) the empirical research of reasons in difficulties of farmer loan guarantee;(5)the empirical research of results of the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee;(6)designing the mechanism to solve the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee;(7)selecting the effective guarantee mode in farmer loan.
Ⅱ Main research conclusion
1. Under the overall environment of lagged construction in rural financial system, comparatively low levels in production and operation of farmers and the low effect levels, farmer loan guarantee has become the touchstone of farmer loan. The farmer loan guarantee is featured by the higher guarantee requirements caused by lower credit level. Moreover, moral hazard and operation risk become the focus in guarantee process and then the guarantee quality is mainly reflected in the degree to achieve the obligation rights. Except the fact that whether the guarantee body has the right and the economic assurance ability and whether the guarantee is legal or valid, in the process of fanner loan guarantee there are many important decisive factors such as the validity of credit guarantee mechanism, guarantor's ability to control the risk, the motive and willingness to guarantee, interest balance mechanism and the effective implementation of guarantee contract.
2. By learning from the foreign experience in farmer loan guarantee, we can know that considering the real situation of farmers in providing effective credit guarantee is vital. Designing the methods of farmer loan guarantee according to the farmer's needs is the important principle; improving the mechanism of risk control is the effective way to reduce the farmer loan guarantee; optimizing the credit environment is the safeguard in running the fanner loan guarantee; perfecting the supporting measures is the condition to ensure the successful implementation of farmer loan guarantee and getting the support from government is the strong supporter in developing the farmer loan guarantee. We are inspired to accelerate the innovation in farmer loan and diversify the methods of farmer loan guarantee. Moreover, we have to improve the level and quality of supply in farmer loan to ease the difficulties in farmer real guarantees, develop the agricultural insurance and financing insurance to perfect the sharing system in farmer loan risk, optimize the rural credit environment to improve the sound running of farmer loan guarantee, speed up to improve the supporting conditions and legal systems in order to ensure the effective implementation of farmer loan guarantee and promote government support or legislative guarantee to develop farmer loan guarantee.
3. The difficulties in farmer loan guarantee are featured by lacking the effective guarantee, guarantor and system. In Chongqing, among the farmer loan guarantee in recent years, the mortgage loan accounted for the highest proportion which is followed by the third-party loan and credit guarantee. Within the samples, the farmers receiving the loan can account for28%and inadequate guarantee conditions lead to failing to get the loan. The farmers using the traditional method will have the lowest satisfaction and those using the mortgage will have the highest satisfaction. The credit supply in large banks is featured by the higher guarantee standards, so the new rural financial institutions will lower their requirements but still choose mortgage guarantee. The farmers usually have the limited amount and cheap value in personal properties, but comparatively lack the household financial assets. Their real estate guarantees are mainly their houses, they seldom use contract rights of forest and land to mortgage and the third-party guarantees are often their relatives or friends. The creative guarantee methods such as the guarantee of property rights, biological assets and mutual help are lacking. In a word, the guarantee mode is too simple and single.
4. Difficulties of farmer loan guarantee are rooted in the fact that farmer's guarantee ability is inadequate; the internal advantages and resources fail to use effectively; financial institutions, society and government don't give the enough support and furthermore the outside forces and many mechanisms of farmer have the shortcomings. The model tests show that there are mainly three factors resulting in the difficulties of farmer loan guarantee: the first is about the farmer. The insufficient household income and tangible assets, the poor use of proprietary rights, and the ineffective reputation guarantee mechanism are the important factors; the second is about financial institutions. The service level of farmer credit, cognition of credit guarantee and the management of credit technology have shown the effects; the third is about supporting conditions and the outside environment. The accompanying conditions of credit implementation, guarantee mechanism of the third party, the protection function of agricultural insurance on agricultural risk, social credit environment, legal systems are their important factors. The probability of meeting the requirements for guarantee in different kinds of farmers has the obvious differences. The entrepreneurial farmers have the highest probability, and the small comprehensive farmers engaging in modern agriculture follow them.
5. The difficulties in guarantee will influence the availability of farmer loan and may result in the disparity of production and development conditions of farmers and the income and welfare of farmers. These difficulties may restrict the obtaining amount of loan, exert the great influence on formal credit channel of farmers and increase the difficulties in getting the long-term loan and operating loans, thus raising the interest rates of farmers and bringing many transaction costs such as guarantee implementation costs, broker fees and intangible fees. Among the variables which may affect the satisfaction degree of farmer loan, education level of farmer, household incomes, financial assets, the question whether joining in the cooperative community, agricultural insurance and the institutions of professional assessment have the obvious positive effects, while the contract and management rights in soil and the present value of movable property have passed the salient test in mortgage model. The farmer's post only has the obvious influence on credit guarantee and the number variables in the bank haven't shown the obvious effect. As for the affluent farmers, they have the obvious advantages in expanding the production scale, increasing the productive assets, management items, household income, living assets and the consumption.
6. By principles of creativity, approaching, systematization and compatibility, effective system should be built and strengthened comprehensively in order to solve the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee. The first is the improvement mechanism in farmer's ability to guarantee themselves. We have to intensify the guarantee role in physical assets, strengthen the guarantee system in reputation and give full play to guarantee potential in proprietary rights. The second is extension mechanism in the third party. We should promote the guarantee mode of companies purchasing the agriculture products and new rural economic organization to build the guarantee system of professional security organizations. The third is improvement mechanism of the loan management in financial institutions. We'd better drive the revolution in farmer loan mode, strengthen the management in loan process and improve the service level in credit. The forth is to intensify the promotion mechanism in credit environment. We need to build the farmer's credit system and also build the commitment mechanism in moral and integrity incentive and that of organization supervision. The fifth is to perfect the system of insurance shares. We should expand the varieties of agricultural insurance, strengthen the system of agricultural insurance and build the relief mechanism of major disasters in agriculture. The sixth is the assistance system of government which should increase the financial support, optimize the financial assistance mode, carry out the supervision mode of differentiation and accelerate the construction of accompanying system of farmer loan guarantee.
7. The choice of implementation mode in farmer loan guarantee should obey the management rules of credit risk. Proceed from the reality of countryside, farmer property guarantee closely related to the first source of payment needs to be promoted, such as:guarantee mode of product collateral, guarantee mode of orders and accounts receivable, guarantee mode of management right and income right in agriculture project. Based on farmer reputation constraints, we need to promote the guarantee mode to make use of advantages, bypass the disadvantages and overcome the difficulties in relatively lacking the high-value physical assets within farmer's house, for example:loan mode of personal credit guarantee for farmers; loan mode of group guarantee; credit mode of mutual guarantee. Combined with various production management and demands for loan like crop production with low added value, high added value, animal and sea production and farming industry, farmer loan guarantee with diversification and differentiation should be built and strengthened. Based on the continuous improvement of property right system in rural area and its accompanying systems, we should energetically explore the farmer's land usufructuary right guarantee with the longer view.
Ⅲ Main innovation point1. This dissertation explores a comparatively sound vision theory in analyzing the difficulties of farmer loan guarantee. Based on the institutional economics, information economics and behavioral economics, it analyzes the farmer economical behavior, features of loan demands, supply conditions of farmer loan and the guarantee functions in theory, so it clarifies the way and effective determining factors of farmer loan guarantee and further dissects the dependency between farmer loan and guarantee and the constraints on loan demands and supplies from guarantee conditions.
2. From the perspective of farmers, based on the statistical data, this dissertation systematically and profoundly research the situation, causes and the effects of farmer loan guarantee. When exploring the causes of the difficulties in farmer loan guarantee, it has the deeper research in the use of proprietary rights of farmers, cognitive bias of financial institutions, credit technologies and the methods of government support compared with former research. Moreover, with mode of Logit, this dissertation examines the effect of farmers, financial institutions, external supporting conditions and environment on farmer loan guarantee and uses the mode of Order Logit to examine the actual effect of difficulties in farmer loan guarantee on satisfaction degree of farmer loan guarantee.
3. This dissertation demonstrates and offers the design considerations and principles in solving the difficulties on farmer loan guarantee, on whose basis it comprehensively builds the specific mechanism to solve the difficulties on farmer loan guarantee from six aspects, compared with former research. Combined with reality, it determines the basic principles and overall thought in selecting the mode of farmer loan guarantee and designs innovatively the effective guarantee mode of farmer loan in four aspects.
引文
① 马克思,恩格斯：《马克思恩格斯全集》(第24卷),北京：人民出版社,1972年,第192和356页。
① 转引自：郎波.农村金融与担保机制研究——基于专业农牧担保的实证分析[D].西南财经大学,2013年.
① 转引自：温铁军：《农户信用与民间借贷研究：农户信用与民间借贷课题主报告》,2001年。
① 转引自：黄晓红：《基于信号传递的农户声誉对农户借贷结果影响的实证研究》,《经济经纬》,2009年。
① 钱克明：《成渝统筹城乡改革试验中的农村土地问题》,《人民政协报》,2010年8月16日。
① 数据来源：各省2012年《经济统计年鉴》。
② 参见：中国人民银行黎川县支行课题组(成员：涂进、任志勇)：《农村土地抵押制度及相关问题研究—以江西黎川县为例》,《金融参考》,2010年。
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① 转引自：郎波.农村金融与担保机制研究——基于专业农牧担保的实证分析[D].西南财经大学,2013年.
① 转引自：温铁军：《农户信用与民间借贷研究：农户信用与民间借贷课题主报告》,2001年。
① 转引自：黄晓红：《基于信号传递的农户声誉对农户借贷结果影响的实证研究》,《经济经纬》,2009年。
① 钱克明：《成渝统筹城乡改革试验中的农村土地问题》,《人民政协报》,2010年8月16日。
① 数据来源：各省2012年《经济统计年鉴》。
② 参见：中国人民银行黎川县支行课题组(成员：涂进、任志勇)：《农村土地抵押制度及相关问题研究—以江西黎川县为例》,《金融参考》,2010年。
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