特定应计项的盈余管理研究
|
摘要
本文以澄清资产公允计量的判断尺度,并明晰特定应计项的盈余管理度量开篇,在新制度经济学的系统理论框架下,从盈余管理的内部动因和外部诱因两条线索展开分析,考察坏账信息中的盈余管理证据。企业的委托-代理契约性质是盈余管理的内部动因,决定了盈余被操控的幅度；信息不对称的产品市场、借贷市场、股票市场、以及控制权市场中广泛存在的私人控制权利益,是盈余管理的外部诱因,决定了盈余被调节的方向。坏账信息这一特定应计项上的盈余管理证据,使本文得以在新制度经济学的框架之下,搭建起一个连通企业、市场与政府的盈余管理研究完整结构。
追溯盈余管理计量研究的发展历程,研究者所考察应计项的演变,启示本文对关键变量的设计与筛选,以及检验程序的安排,奉行将偏误降至最低的主旨。本文参考McNichols和Wilson (1988)对坏账准备计提的研究(以下简称MW1988),提出一个刻画特定应计项操控性部分的代理变量(Resprov),该代理变量的无偏性藉由总体计量得以佐证,从而增加了动因检验和诱因检验的信心。拆解国内经验证据进行统计分析,本文初略描绘了近十年来本土盈余管理实证研究的全景,海外与本土经验证据的差异说明,不考虑治理环境差异而移植海外研究的代理变量表征主题,将造成检验结果的水土不服。此外,本土研究中的传统减值变量忽略了盈余的期间特性,因而在表征盈余管理方面可能存在偏误。
实证结果显示：对中国上市公司样本期间(2002-2005年)坏账准备计提的综合评价为“少提减值”,或者说,“计提不足”。除了巨亏公司大幅超额计提进行清洗和高盈利公司小幅超额计提进行平滑以外,大部分公司倾向于少提或转回坏账以调高盈余。(1)在特定应计项的操控幅度方面,有可能发挥制约作用的公司内部治理机制包括：集中的股权结构,机构投资者参与公司治理,董事会中审计委员会的设立,以及地区治理环境中更高的市场化水平；而国有产权属性、股权制衡、以及独立董事制度,没有取得制约特定应计项操控幅度的证据,转型经济体的制度背景对此做出了最好的注解,在内部人转移或侵占上市公司资源的“掏空”行为,制衡股权引发的控制权利益激烈争夺,以及独立董事“独力”“懂事”的无奈选择背后,是产权界分根深蒂固的一股独大现状,政府的角色错位,内部人控制的同仇敌忾,法律监督和投资者保护机制的缺失,以及上市公司信息披露的不透明,这就注定了某些企业制度对于解决代理问题的无能为力。(2)在特定应计项的调节方向方面,股票市场牟利的检验结果比产品市场、借贷市场、和控制权市场都更为理想。综合股票市场牟利来看,在特定应计项上管理盈余的两类中国上市公司,其一是高盈利区间的绩优公司,其二是处于被ST边缘的微利公司和清洗公司,相反,注定难逃ST命运的公司,反而没有表现出明显的对特定应计项的操控。产品市场牟利证明了政治成本在解释特定应计项的调节方向上依然适用,而借贷市场中以会计信息为契约基础的牟利,也依然可以应用债务契约来解释,与其他三个市场相比,控制权市场并非基于经营业绩的薪酬契约与职位任免,导致牟利与会计信息的联系自行断裂,缺乏特定应计项盈余管理的证据,因而最可能在本土经验证据上遭遇滑铁卢的,就是分红计划。
廓清新制度经济学的整体框架,是希望能够为盈余管理的治理提供理论指导,以确定企业制度与市场制度安排的偏向和优先次序。产权明晰的企业制度与信息充分披露的市场制度是治理的终极目标,二者都可以降低交易费用,然而盈余管理问题超出了企业制度的解决范围,无论最终控制人的性质是国有、民营还是外资,无论股权集中还是分散,无论股权制衡程度如何,无论董事会的作用如何,只要市场牟利的诱因存在,管理者都可能采取管理盈余、操纵盈余、甚至会计舞弊的机会主义行为,其后果都会影响资源配置的效率和误导投资者而造成社会财富损失,带来不确定的、可能是巨额的交易费用,这就是科斯(1960)在《社会成本问题》中所言的“当交易费用巨大时,即使明晰的产权也无济于事”,正如市场牟利诱因是盈余管理的根源,市场制度也是解决盈余管理问题的根本,为了减少内部人“说谎”的机会主义行为,政府的职责是辅助(而不是取代)市场建立传递或甄别信号的激励机制和约束机制,只有提高市场识别“谎言”的能力,才能使盈余管理的私人牟利动机失效,这就是法制、或者法制缺乏下政府监管的重心和方向。
The paper started with the judgement yardstick to measure assets'fair value and earnings management on specific accruals without bias. Under New Institutional Economics theories'framework, the paper inspects the earnings management evidence on bad debts information along two clues, one is internal motivation and the other is external causality. The agent contract characteristic of modern corporations is the internal motivation, affecting the extent of discretionary reported earnings, while the private controlling benefits in markets of products, credits, stocks, and managers, are the attractive causality, determining the derection of adjustments towards target income. The evidence on bad debts helped to construct an integrated structure connecting corporations, markets and governments together and make explaination for the behavior of managers.
Tracing back to the history of earnings management measuring, the developments of total accruals studied by researchers inspired us to pursue the substance of minimized bias in designing and selecting key variables, and arranging test process as well. Following McNichols & Wilson (1988) model on bad debts provision, we developed a proxy named Resprov for discretionary part of specific accruals, and verified its unbias through overall test by modified Jones Model (1995), thus increased our confidence in this proxy during the following motivation test and causality test. Breaking the test results in domestic top journals into different topics for statistics and analysis, the paper tentatively sketched a whole scene portrait of local earnings management studies for recent ten years. The differenc between oversea and local evidence illustrated that ignoring the eviorment disparity, and transplant west proxy to capture research subjects without considering institutions background, will lead to the failure of tests and unexplainable results. The paper also found that traditional proxy in local writedown studies neglected the period characteristcs of earnings and has the suspicion of bias.
The paper shows, the synthetical appraisal for bad debts information provided by Chinese listed companies is insufficient provision. Except for large loss companies overfulfilled to take big bath, and large profit companies slightly exceeded to smooth, most companies have the tendency of providing less allowance for bad debts. (1) Under the clue of motivation, the coporate mechanisms which might restrict the extend of earnings management, are concentrated stock equity structure, institutional investors participation, audit committee establishment in board, and developed market process in region enviorment, while state-owned property, confrontationed equity structure, and outside directors failed to get evidence of restraining earnings manangement on specific accruals. The coporate governance enviorment in a transformed economic entity has made best annotation for this result. (2) Under the clue of causality, stock markets has get more idealed testing results than other markets. Using specific accruals to mange reported earings is more common in large profit companies to smoothing income into future periods, and companies in the edge of ST range, both above and beneath the scope, no matter in what period does their target income lies, the insufficient provision or exceeded provision reflected their desire to avoid the destiny of being ST by regulartors. In the opposite, large loss companies which doomed to be ST didn't express apparent manipulation on specific accruals. Because accounting information's role as contract foundamental basis is different in China markets, thus connection between private controlling benefits in certain markets and earnings management has voluntarily break up, such as managers' compensation of Positive Accounting Hypothesis in controlers market.
Clarifing the framework of New Instituional Economic theories as guidance in earnings management studies, the paper expects to provide direction in governing earnings management before it lead to great damage of society's wheath. The regulators' responsibility is to help (but not replace) the markets to build up information delivering and examining machanisms, thus increase markets'ability to distinguish the "lies".
追溯盈余管理计量研究的发展历程,研究者所考察应计项的演变,启示本文对关键变量的设计与筛选,以及检验程序的安排,奉行将偏误降至最低的主旨。本文参考McNichols和Wilson (1988)对坏账准备计提的研究(以下简称MW1988),提出一个刻画特定应计项操控性部分的代理变量(Resprov),该代理变量的无偏性藉由总体计量得以佐证,从而增加了动因检验和诱因检验的信心。拆解国内经验证据进行统计分析,本文初略描绘了近十年来本土盈余管理实证研究的全景,海外与本土经验证据的差异说明,不考虑治理环境差异而移植海外研究的代理变量表征主题,将造成检验结果的水土不服。此外,本土研究中的传统减值变量忽略了盈余的期间特性,因而在表征盈余管理方面可能存在偏误。
实证结果显示：对中国上市公司样本期间(2002-2005年)坏账准备计提的综合评价为“少提减值”,或者说,“计提不足”。除了巨亏公司大幅超额计提进行清洗和高盈利公司小幅超额计提进行平滑以外,大部分公司倾向于少提或转回坏账以调高盈余。(1)在特定应计项的操控幅度方面,有可能发挥制约作用的公司内部治理机制包括：集中的股权结构,机构投资者参与公司治理,董事会中审计委员会的设立,以及地区治理环境中更高的市场化水平；而国有产权属性、股权制衡、以及独立董事制度,没有取得制约特定应计项操控幅度的证据,转型经济体的制度背景对此做出了最好的注解,在内部人转移或侵占上市公司资源的“掏空”行为,制衡股权引发的控制权利益激烈争夺,以及独立董事“独力”“懂事”的无奈选择背后,是产权界分根深蒂固的一股独大现状,政府的角色错位,内部人控制的同仇敌忾,法律监督和投资者保护机制的缺失,以及上市公司信息披露的不透明,这就注定了某些企业制度对于解决代理问题的无能为力。(2)在特定应计项的调节方向方面,股票市场牟利的检验结果比产品市场、借贷市场、和控制权市场都更为理想。综合股票市场牟利来看,在特定应计项上管理盈余的两类中国上市公司,其一是高盈利区间的绩优公司,其二是处于被ST边缘的微利公司和清洗公司,相反,注定难逃ST命运的公司,反而没有表现出明显的对特定应计项的操控。产品市场牟利证明了政治成本在解释特定应计项的调节方向上依然适用,而借贷市场中以会计信息为契约基础的牟利,也依然可以应用债务契约来解释,与其他三个市场相比,控制权市场并非基于经营业绩的薪酬契约与职位任免,导致牟利与会计信息的联系自行断裂,缺乏特定应计项盈余管理的证据,因而最可能在本土经验证据上遭遇滑铁卢的,就是分红计划。
廓清新制度经济学的整体框架,是希望能够为盈余管理的治理提供理论指导,以确定企业制度与市场制度安排的偏向和优先次序。产权明晰的企业制度与信息充分披露的市场制度是治理的终极目标,二者都可以降低交易费用,然而盈余管理问题超出了企业制度的解决范围,无论最终控制人的性质是国有、民营还是外资,无论股权集中还是分散,无论股权制衡程度如何,无论董事会的作用如何,只要市场牟利的诱因存在,管理者都可能采取管理盈余、操纵盈余、甚至会计舞弊的机会主义行为,其后果都会影响资源配置的效率和误导投资者而造成社会财富损失,带来不确定的、可能是巨额的交易费用,这就是科斯(1960)在《社会成本问题》中所言的“当交易费用巨大时,即使明晰的产权也无济于事”,正如市场牟利诱因是盈余管理的根源,市场制度也是解决盈余管理问题的根本,为了减少内部人“说谎”的机会主义行为,政府的职责是辅助(而不是取代)市场建立传递或甄别信号的激励机制和约束机制,只有提高市场识别“谎言”的能力,才能使盈余管理的私人牟利动机失效,这就是法制、或者法制缺乏下政府监管的重心和方向。
The paper started with the judgement yardstick to measure assets'fair value and earnings management on specific accruals without bias. Under New Institutional Economics theories'framework, the paper inspects the earnings management evidence on bad debts information along two clues, one is internal motivation and the other is external causality. The agent contract characteristic of modern corporations is the internal motivation, affecting the extent of discretionary reported earnings, while the private controlling benefits in markets of products, credits, stocks, and managers, are the attractive causality, determining the derection of adjustments towards target income. The evidence on bad debts helped to construct an integrated structure connecting corporations, markets and governments together and make explaination for the behavior of managers.
Tracing back to the history of earnings management measuring, the developments of total accruals studied by researchers inspired us to pursue the substance of minimized bias in designing and selecting key variables, and arranging test process as well. Following McNichols & Wilson (1988) model on bad debts provision, we developed a proxy named Resprov for discretionary part of specific accruals, and verified its unbias through overall test by modified Jones Model (1995), thus increased our confidence in this proxy during the following motivation test and causality test. Breaking the test results in domestic top journals into different topics for statistics and analysis, the paper tentatively sketched a whole scene portrait of local earnings management studies for recent ten years. The differenc between oversea and local evidence illustrated that ignoring the eviorment disparity, and transplant west proxy to capture research subjects without considering institutions background, will lead to the failure of tests and unexplainable results. The paper also found that traditional proxy in local writedown studies neglected the period characteristcs of earnings and has the suspicion of bias.
The paper shows, the synthetical appraisal for bad debts information provided by Chinese listed companies is insufficient provision. Except for large loss companies overfulfilled to take big bath, and large profit companies slightly exceeded to smooth, most companies have the tendency of providing less allowance for bad debts. (1) Under the clue of motivation, the coporate mechanisms which might restrict the extend of earnings management, are concentrated stock equity structure, institutional investors participation, audit committee establishment in board, and developed market process in region enviorment, while state-owned property, confrontationed equity structure, and outside directors failed to get evidence of restraining earnings manangement on specific accruals. The coporate governance enviorment in a transformed economic entity has made best annotation for this result. (2) Under the clue of causality, stock markets has get more idealed testing results than other markets. Using specific accruals to mange reported earings is more common in large profit companies to smoothing income into future periods, and companies in the edge of ST range, both above and beneath the scope, no matter in what period does their target income lies, the insufficient provision or exceeded provision reflected their desire to avoid the destiny of being ST by regulartors. In the opposite, large loss companies which doomed to be ST didn't express apparent manipulation on specific accruals. Because accounting information's role as contract foundamental basis is different in China markets, thus connection between private controlling benefits in certain markets and earnings management has voluntarily break up, such as managers' compensation of Positive Accounting Hypothesis in controlers market.
Clarifing the framework of New Instituional Economic theories as guidance in earnings management studies, the paper expects to provide direction in governing earnings management before it lead to great damage of society's wheath. The regulators' responsibility is to help (but not replace) the markets to build up information delivering and examining machanisms, thus increase markets'ability to distinguish the "lies".
引文
[1]Paul M. Healy, James M. Wahlen撰,王学军,肖华译,曲晓辉校,盈余管理研究回顾及其对会计准则建设的启示[J].会计研究,2000(11)：52-60.
[2]Ross L. Watts, Jerold L. Zimmerman著,陈少华,黄世忠译.实证会计理论[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社.1999.
[3]William R. Scott著,陈汉文译.财务会计理论[M].北京：机械工业出版社.2000.
[4]白云霞,王亚军,吴联生.业绩低于阈值公司的盈余管理——来自控制权转移公司后续资产处置的证据[J].管理世界,2005,(5)：135-143.
[5]白云霞,吴联生.信息披露与国有股权私有化中的盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(10)：37-48.
[6]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,宋敏,张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,(2)：81-91.
[7]蔡吉甫.会计盈余管理与公司治理[J].当代财经,2007,(6)：109-114.
[8]蔡吉甫.盈余管理及其治理的博弈分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2008,(1)：51-55.
[9]蔡吉甫.大股东控制与上市公司盈余管理隧道效应研究[J].当代财经,2008,(11)：77-83.
[10]蔡祥,李志文,张为国.中国证券市场中的财务问题：实证研究述评[J].中国会计评论2003,(7)：1-23.
[11]蔡祥,张海燕.资产减值准备的计提、追溯与市场效应[J].中国会计与财务研究,2004,(12)：31-56.
[12]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与补贴收入——来自我国证券市场的经验证据[J].财经研究,2003,(9)：51-59.
[13]陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约[J].经济研究,2008,(3)：60-72.
[14]陈国欣,祝继高.我国上市公司的盈余管理行为实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2004,(7)：12-18.
[15]陈武朝,王可昕.中国上市公司资产减值政策的实证研究[C].中国会计实证研讨会：2005.
[16]陈小悦,肖星,过晓燕.配股权与上市公司利润操纵[J].经济研究,2000,(1)：30-36.
[17]陈晓,戴翠玉.A股亏损公司的盈余管理行为与手段研究[J].中国会计评论,2004,(12)：299-301.
[18]陈晓,江东.股权多元化,公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000,(8)：28-35.
[19]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001,(12)：20-28.
[20]陈信元,朱红军主编.转型经济中的公司治理——基于中国上市公司的案例[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2007.
[21]陈旭东,黄登仕.公司治理与会计稳健性——基于上市公司的实证研究[J].证券市场导报2007,(3)：10-17.
[22]陈政.大股东资金占用与盈余管理：问题掩饰还是揭露?[J].证券市场导报, 2008,(12)：51-58.
[23]代冰彬,陆正飞,张然.资产减值：稳健性还是盈余管理[J].会计研究,2007,(12)：35-42.
[24]戴德明,毛新述,邓蟠.中国亏损上市公司资产减值准备计提行为研究[J].财经研究,2005,(7)：71-82.
[25]戴捷敏,孔玉生.配股公司盈余管理行为分析——来自2001年-2005年沪深两市的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究,2008,(1)：71-75.
[26]邓川.新四项减值准备、审计任期与独立审计意见[J].财经论丛,2004,(11)：62-67.
[27]杜滨,李若山,俞乔.我国上市公司盈余管理程度研究[J].中国金融学,2003,(1)：99-118.
[28]杜滨,李若山.中国证券市场上市公司关联交易的实证研究[C].中国会计与财务问题国际研讨会论文集.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002：253-264.
[29]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007,(1)：58-65.
[30]杜兴强,温日光.公司治理与会计信息质量：一项经验研究[J].财经研究,2007,(1)：122-133.
[31]杜莹,刘立国.股权结构与公司治理效率：中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,2002,(11)：124-133.
[32]樊纲,王小鲁.消费条件模型和各地区消费条件指数[J].经济研究，2004,(5)：13-21.
[33]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006.
[34]富兰克·H·奈特著,王宇、王文玉译.风险、不确定性和利润[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：212-226页.
[35]干胜道,钟朝宏,田艳.微利上市公司盈余管理实证研究[J].财经论丛,2006,(6)：59-64.
[36]高雷,宋顺林.关联交易线下项目与盈余管理[J].中国会计评论,2008,(3)：61-78.
[37]高雷,张杰.公司治理、机构投资者与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(9)：46-56.
[38]高明华,马守莉.独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析[J].南开经济研究,2002,(2)：64-68.
[39]谷祺,于东智.公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J].财经问题研究,2001,(1)：58-65.
[40]顾振伟,秦默,欧阳令南.改进后扩展琼斯模型与其他盈余管理计量模型的比较研究[J].财经论丛,2008,(5)：78-83.
[41]郭荟,张辉军.盈余管理对地方政府资源配置的影响研究[J].财会通讯,2006,(8)：65-68.
[42]郭强,蒋东生.不完全契约与独立董事作用的本质及有效性分析——从传统法人治理结构的缺陷论起[J].管理世界,2003,(2)：78-90.
[43]郭旭芬.利用资产减值进行盈余管理的成因分析[J].财会通讯,2006,(6)：10-11.
[44]何问陶,倪全宏.中国上市公司MBO前一年盈余管理实证研究[J].会计研究,2005,(6)：58-65.
[45]胡勤勤,沈艺峰.独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩[J].世界经济,2002,(7)：51-62.
[46]胡奕明,林文雄,王玮璐.证券分析师的信息来源,关注域与分析工具[J].金融研究,2003,(12)：52-63.
[47]黄世忠.资产减值准则差异比较及政策建议[J].会计研究,2005,(1)：38-45.
[48]黄中生.论资产计量[J].会计研究,2005,(4)：15-19。
[49]计小青,曹啸.资本市场财务呈报管制：理论及其对中国实践的解释[J].管理世界,2003,(2)：4-14.
[50]姜国华.关于证券分析师对中国上市公司会计收益预测的实证研究[J].经济科学,2004,(6)：72-79.
[51]蒋义宏,魏刚.净资产收益率与配股条件[J／G].证券市场会计问题实证研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,1998.
[52]井尻雄士发言,陆建桥,隋春平译.美国会计准则及其环境：75年发展历史的二元研究(上、下)[J].财会通讯,2005,(10)：16-19：(11)：14-17.
[53]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界,2006,(1)：129-136.
[54]雷光勇,刘慧龙.控股股东性质、利益输送与盈余管理幅度——来自中国A股公司首次亏损年度的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2007,(8)：93-101.
[55]李东平,黄德华,王振林.“不清洁”审计意见、盈余管理与会计师事务所变更[J].会计研究,2001,(6)：51-57.
[56]李东平.大股东控制、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡[M].上海财经大学博士学位论文.北京：中国财政经济出版社.2005.
[57]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007,(1)：102-113.
[58]李维安,王新汉,王威.盈余管理与审计意见关系的实证研究——基于非经营性收益的分析[J].财经研究,2004,(11)：126-135.
[59]李享.会计操纵与交易规划的配合使用——来自长期资产减值的经验证据[J].财经研究,2009,(2)：99-101.
[60]李歆.减值准备、盈余管理和审计委员会效率[J].当代财经,2008,(5)：120-125.
[61]李延喜,包世泽,高锐,孔宪京.薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理[J].南开经济评论,2007,(6)：55-61.
[62]李勇.对“内部人”交易信息披露制度的经济分析[J].预测,2004,(6)：59-61.
[63]李远鹏,牛建军,姜国华.证券市场“应计异象”研究——回顾与展望[J].会计研究,2008,(1)：79-84.
[64]李越冬,倪婕.基于盈余管理视角的上市公司审计质量研究——来自沪市制造业审计意见的实证分析[J].财会通讯,2008,(3)：80-89.
[65]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排：来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,(12)：3-13.
[66]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组[J].经济研究,2005,(1)：95-105.
[67]李增泉.中国上市公司资产减值政策的实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2001,(12)：70-113。
[68]李志文,宋衍蘅.中国上市公司的变脸现象[C].中国会计与财务问题国际研讨会论文集.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002：292-316.
[69]李志文,宋衍蘅.影响中国上市公司配股决策的因素分析[J].经济科学,2003a,(3)：61-69.
[70]廖秀梅,会计信息的信贷决策有用性：基于所有权制度制约的研究[J].会计研究,2007,(5)：31-38.
[71]林舒,魏明海.中国A股发行公司首次公开募股过程中的盈利管理[J].中国会计与财务研究,2000,(12)：87-107.
[72]林翔,陈汉文.增长、盈余管理和应计持续性[J].中国会计评论,2005,(6)：117-142.
[73]林毅夫,李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004,(2)：17-27.
[74]林钟高,徐正刚.公司治理结构下的盈余管理[J].财经科学,2002,(4)：57-62
[75]刘斌,孙回回,李嘉明.自愿性会计政策变更与非标审计意见的相关性研究——来自1998-2002年深沪上市公司的经验证据[J].财贸研究,2004,(3)：101-107.
[76]刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择-中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究[J].中国会计评论,2004,(6)：141-158.
[77]刘凤委,汪辉,孙铮.股权性质与公司业绩——基于盈余管理基础上的经验分析[J].财经研究,2005,31(6)：69-79.
[78]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007,(9)：76-84.
[79]刘建民,刘星.上市公司关联交易与盈余管理实证研究[J].当代财经,2005,(9)：112-115.
[80]刘立国,杜莹.公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究[J].会计研究，2003,(2)：28-36.
[81]刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003,(4)：51-62.
[82]刘炜松,周焯华,张宗益.盈余管理动机与审计研究[J].经济问题探索,2005,(3)：73-75.
[83]刘小玄.国有企业与非国有企业的产权结构及其对效率的影响[J].经济研究,1995,(7)：11-20.
[84]刘星,安灵.基于盈余管理视角的中国上市公司资产出售实证研究[J].当代财经,2007,(1)：113-119.
[85]刘玉廷,戴德明,夏大慰主持,财政部会计准则委员会编.资产减值会计[M].大连：大连出版社,2005.
[86]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[D].上海财经大学博士学位论文,1998.
[87]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[J].会计研究,1999,(9)：25-35.
[88]陆宇建.上市公司盈余管理行为对配股政策反应的实证研究[J].中国软科学,2003,(6)：47-51.
[89]陆正飞,祝继高,孙便霞.盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约[J].管理世界,2008,(3)：152-158.
[90]罗炜,王永,吴联生.债务重组准则变更的经济后果[J].中国会计评论,2008,(2)：193-206.
[91]马光,孙黎.内部人交易与预售公告制度研究[J].证券市场导报,2008,(9)：4-9.
[92]马连福,胡艳,陈德球.大股东制衡、投资者关系管理与盈余管理[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,(12)：73-79.
[93]毛新述,戴德明,姚淑瑜.资产减值会计计量问题研究[j].会计研究,2005,(10)：35-41.
[94]孟焰,张秀梅.上市公司关联方交易盈余管理与关联方利益转移关系研究[J].会计研 究,2006,(4)：37-43.
[95]秦江萍,王怀栋.中国上市公司现金分红实实证分析[J].财会研究,2004,(8)：45-48.
[96]青木昌彦,奥野正宽著,魏加宁等译.经济体制的比较制度分析.[M].北京：中国发展出版社.1999.
[97]饶艳超,胡奕明.银行信贷中会计信息的使用情况调查与分析[J].会计研究,2005,(4)：36-41.
[98]邵军,边泓.A股亏损公司利用线下项目进行盈余管理的实证研究[J].财经论坛,2005(2)：101-103.
[99]沈振宇,王金圣,薛爽.坏账准备与上市公司利润操纵：来自中国上市公司的证据[J].中国会计与财务研究,2004,(6)：93-111.
[100]宋衍蘅,何玉润.监管压力与审计市场竞争压力：注册会计师的权衡——以长期资产减值准备为例[J].管理世界,2008,(5)：144-150.
[101]苏丹宁.资产减值：会计稳健性还是盈余管理[J].财会通讯,2007,(11)：16-19.
[102]孙亮,刘春.什么决定了盈余管理程度的差异：公司治理还是经营绩效?[J].中国会计评论,2008,(3)：79-92.
[103]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2006,(10)：100-107.
[104]孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5)：52-63.
[105]孙铮,王跃堂.资源配置与盈余操纵之实证研究[J].财经研究,1999,(4)：3-9.
[106]汤云为,钱逢胜.会计理论[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,1997：219.
[107]唐清泉,罗党论.设立独立董事的效果分析——来自中国上市公司独立董事的问卷调查[J].中国工业经济,2006,(1)：120-127.
[108]王建新.会计国际化环境制约、策略选择及其效果研究——来自《非货币性交易》准则的经验证据[J].管理世界,2005,(3)：15-22.
[109]王建新.绩效目标、公司治理与长期资产减值转回——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007,(3)：42-53。
[110]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理-基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007,(7)：111-120.
[111]王琨,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(2)：27-33.
[112]王生年.减值准备与盈余管理：来自中国上市公司的证据[J].当代财经,2008,(10)：121-125.
[113]王小军.2008年深市主板公司资产减值及非经常性损益分析[J].证券市场导报,2009,(7)：29-33.
[114]王小鲁,樊纲.中国地区差距的变动趋势和影响因素[J].经济研究,2004,(1)：33-44.
[115]王亚平,吴联生,白云霞.中国上市公司盈余管理的频率与幅度[J].经济研究,2005,(12)：102-112.
[116]王彦超,林斌,辛清泉.市场环境、民事诉讼与盈余管理[J].中国会计评论,2008(1)：21-40.
[117]王永海,王铁林,李青原.机构投资者参与公司治理积极性的分析[J].南开管理评论.2007(1)：4-7.
[118]王跃堂.会计政策选择的经济动机：基于沪深股市的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000,(12)：31-40.
[119]王跃堂,倪慧萍.资本市场信息沟通面临的挑战与应对策略——西方会计信息理论评述及其对我国的启示[J].外国经济与管理2001,(6)：44-49.
[120]王跃堂,孙铮,陈世敏.会计改革与会计信息质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2001,(7)：16-26.
[121]王跃堂,孙铮,陈世敏.股份有限公司会计制度经济后果的实证分析[J].中国会计与财务研究,2001,(12)：35-52.
[122]王跃堂,张祖国.财务报告质量评价观及信息披露监管[J].会计研究,2001,(10)：11-18.
[123]王跃堂,赵子夜.会计专业判断：基于盈余信息治理的思考[J].会计研究,2003,(7)：20-23.
[124]王跃堂,周雪,张莉.长期资产减值：公允价值的体现还是盈余管理行为[J].会计研究,2005,(8)：30-36.
[125]王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁.董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效?[J].经济研究,2006,(5)：62-73.
[126]魏明海.盈余管理基本理论及其研究述评[J].会计研究,2000,(9)：37-42.
[127]魏明海,刘峰,施鲲翔.论会计透明度[J].会计研究,2001,(9)：16-20.
[128]魏明海.会计信息质量经验研究的完善与运用[J].会计研究,2005,(3)：28-34.
[129]魏涛,陆正飞,单宏伟.非经常性损益盈余管理的动机、手段和作用研究-来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007,(1)：113-122.
[130]魏明海,陈胜蓝,黎文靖.投资者保护研究综述财务会计信息的作用[J].中国会计评论,2007,(3)：131-150.
[131]乌家培.谈信息经济学及其内容[J].网络与信息,1997,(9)：3-5.
[132]吴东辉.中国上市公司应计项目选择的实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2001,(9)：48-81.
[133]吴联生,利益相关者对会计规则制定的参与特征——基于调查数据的实证分析[J].经济研究,2004,(3)：88-97.
[134]吴联生,薄仙慧,王亚平.避免亏损的盈余管理程度：上市公司与非上市公司的比较[J].会计研究,2007a,(2)：44-52.
[135]吴联生,薄仙慧,王亚平.现金流量在多大程度上被管理了呢?——来自我国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2007b,(3)：162-174。
[136]吴联生,王亚平.盈余管理程度的估计模型与经验证据：一个综述[J].经济研究,2008,(8)：143-152.
[137]吴晓求.当前中国资本市场必须解决的三大问题[N].载上海证券报,2004-07-28.
[138]伍利娜,李蕙伶.投资者理解公司会计利润和应税利润的差异信息吗?[J].管理世界,2007,(10)：114-138.
[139]奚俊芳,于培友.我国上市公司控制权转移绩效研究——基于经营业绩的分析[J].南开管理评论,2006,(4)：42-48.
[140]夏冬林,李刚.机构投资者持股和会计盈余质量[J].当代财经,2008,(2)：111-118.
[141]夏立军.盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2003,Vol.5(2)：94-154.
[142]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5)：40-51.
[143]夏文贤.上市公司审计委员会设立与效率研究[D].厦门大学博士学位论文,2007.
[144]向凯.我国配股上市公司盈余操纵的实证研究——来自沪深股市的经验证据[J].财会通讯,2004,(10)：3-9.
[145]向凯.盈余管理实证研究：文献述评与未来研究方向[J].财会通讯,2006,(10)：60-65.
[146]向凯,陈胜蓝.财务会计信息、公司治理与投资者保护[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.
[147]肖洪广,肖小勇.国有商业银行信贷产品创新研究[J].求索,2006,(5)：37-39.
[148]肖星,申睿.配股前的盈余管理、配股后的资金流向与后续业绩[J／OL].工作底稿,清华大学,香港科技大学,2004.
[149]熊正德,李胜男.上市公司SEO后业绩变化及其影响因素实证研究[J].当代财经,2009,(2)：120-124.
[150]徐浩萍.二元股权结构下股权再融资的价值效应-对流通股价值的研究[J].中国会计评论,2005,(12)：329-342.
[151]徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006,(1)：90-100.
[152]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003,(2)：64-74.
[153]许小年. 以法人机构为主体建立公司治理机制和资本市场[J]. 改革,1997,(5)：28-34.
[154]许云.美国资产减值会计研究的历史回顾及启示[J].财经理论与实践,2004,(3)：72-76.
[155]薛爽,田立新,任帅.八项计提与公司盈余管理的实证研究[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2006,(3)：14-19.
[156]颜敏,王平心,张永国.强制性会计变更、证券市场监管与自发性会计变更[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2006,(1)：112-118.
[157]杨瑞龙,杨其静,企业理论：现代观点[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005,(12).
[158]杨旭东,莫小鹏.新配股政策出台后上市公司盈余管理现象的实证研究[J].会计研究,2006，(8)：44-52.
[159]杨有红,赵佳佳.试论资产减值内控制度的完善[J].会计研究,2005,(2)：18-23.
[160]姚树洁,冯根福,姜春霞.中国银行业效率的实证分析[J].经济研究,2004,(8)：4-15.
[161]姚颐,刘志远,王健.股权分置改革、机构投资者与投资者保护[J].金融研究,2007,(11)：48-56.
[162]于东智.转轨经济中的上市公司治理[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2002.
[163]于李胜.盈余管理动机、信息质量与政府监管[J].会计研究,2007,(9)：42-49.
[164]于永生.美国公允价值计量准则评介[J].会计研究，2007,(10)：11-15.
[165]于永生.IASB与FASB公允价值计量准则趋同的困难和挑战[J].财经论丛,2008,(5)：68-72.
[166]张国清,赵景文.资产负债项目可靠性、盈余持续性及其市场反应[J].会计研究,2008,(3)：51-57.
[167]张菊香.基于动机视角的盈余管理文献综述[J].审计与经济研究,2007,(11)：60-65.
[168]张俊瑞,李彬.企业生命周期与盈余管理关系研究——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据,预测,2009,(2)：16-20.
[169]张然.中国上市公司现金流管理研究-兼对新兴市场和成熟市场现金流管理行为比较研究[J].中国会计评论,2007,(10)：381-400.
[170]张荣武,刘文秀.管理者过度自信与盈余管理的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2008,(1)：72-77.
[171]张胜芳.资产净值的价值相关性和可靠性研究[D].厦门大学博士学位论文,2006.
[172]张为国,王霞.中国上市公司会计差错的动因分析[J].会计研究,2004,(4)：24-29.
[173]张维迎.所有制-治理结构及委托-代理关系-兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点[J].经济研究,1996,(6)：3-16.
[174]张晓东.政治成本、盈余管理及其经济后果——来自中国资本市场的证据[J].中国工业经济,2008,(8)：109-119.
[175]张昕,任明.关于上市公司盈余管理动机的比较研究[J].财经问题研究,2007,(11)：83-86.
[176]张听,杨再惠.中国上市公司利用盈余管理避免亏损的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007,(9)：166-167。
[177]张昕.中国亏损上市公司第四季度盈余管理的实证研究[J].会计研究,2008,(4)：25-32.
[178]张样建,徐晋.盈余管理的原因、动机及测度方法前沿研究综述[J].南开经济研究2006,(6)：123-141.
[179]张翼,Law, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Scandal in an Emerging Economy: Insights from China [J/OL]. Peking University, Working Paper,2004.
[180]章永奎,刘峰.盈余管理与审计意见相关性实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2002,Vol.4(1)：1-13.
[181]赵春光.减值与盈余管理——论《资产减值》准则的政策涵义[J].会计研究,2006,(3)：11-17.
[182]赵敏,甄颖.长期资产减值转回与盈余管理[J].财经论丛,2008,(1)：71-77.
[183]赵兴楣.基于审计契约安排的独立性互动机制研究[D].暨南大学博士学位论文,2008.
[184]郑吉昌,余克艰,黄玉英.激励报酬模型的局限性与制度失效——从盈余管理分析家族企业制走向两权分离的障碍[J].数量技术经济研究,2004,(6)：64-69.
[185]支晓强,童盼.盈余管理、控制权转移与独立董事变更——兼论独立董事治理作用的发挥[J].管理世界,2005,(11)：137-144。
[186]周勤业,夏立军,李莫愁.大股东侵害与上市公司资产评估偏差[J].统计研究,2003,(10)：39-44.
[187]朱星文,蔡吉甫,谢盛纹.公司治理、盈余质量与经理报酬研究——来自中国上市公司数据的检验[J].南开管理评论,2008,(2)：28-33.
[188]祝焰,赵红梅,杨梅.长期资产减值转回的政策效应[J].管理学报,2009,(3)：390-395.
[189]Abarbanell J. and R. Lehavy, Can Stock Recommendations Predict Earnings Management and Analysts'Earnings Forecast Errors? [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2003,41 (3):1-31.
[190]Abarbanell J.S., and B.J. Bushee, Fundamental analysis, Future earnings, and stock prices [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1997, Spring:1-24.
[191]Aboody, D., Kasznik, R., CEO stock options awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000,29,73-100.
[192]Agrawal Anup, and Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals [C]. AFA San Diego Meetings,2004.
[193]Aharony J., Lee C.W., Wong T.J. Financial packaging of IPO firms in China [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2000,38:103-126.
[194]Aklerlof, G., The Market for'Lemons':Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1970,84(3):488-500.
[195]Alciatore M., P. Easton, and N. Spear, Asset write-downs:a decade of research [J]. Journal of Accounting Literature,1998,17:1-39.
[196]Ali, Ashiq and Hwang, Lee-Seok, Country-Specific Factors Related to Financial Reporting and the Value Relevance of Accounting Data [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2000,38, April:1-21.
[197]Armen A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, Production, information costs, and economic organization [J]. American Economic Review,1972.62, Dec.:777-795.
[198]Armen A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm [J]. Journal of Economic History,1973,33, Mar.:16-27.
[199]Armen A. Alchian, Corporate Management and Property Rights [M]. Chapter9 of Economic Forces at work, Liberty Press.1969.
[200]Bai, Chong-En, Qiao Liu, Joe Lu, Frank M. Song, Jun xi Zhang, Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32:599-616.
[201]Ball R., and P.Brown, An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers [J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1968, Autumn:159-178.
[202]Barth M.E., J.A. Elliott, and M.W. Finn, Market rewards associated with pattens of increasing earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1999, Autumn:387-413.
[203]Bartov E., Lindahl F.W. and Ricks W., Stock price behavior around announcements of write-offs [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,1998,3(4):327-346.
[204]Bartov, E., Gul, F. A., and Tsui, S.L., Discretionary-Accruals Models and Audit Qualifications [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,30:421-452.
[205]Beasley, M. S. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud [J].The Accounting Review,1996,71 (October): 443-465.
[206]Beasley, M. S., J. V. Carcello, D. R. Hermanson, and P. D Lapides. Fraudulent financial reporting:Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms [J]. Accounting Horizons,2000,14 (December):441-454.
[207]Beaver, W.H., McNichols, M.F. The Characteristics and Valuation of Loss Reserves of Property Casualty Insurers [J].Review of Accounting Studies 1998,3:73-95.
[208]Beneish, M. D. The Detection of Earnings Manipulation [J]. Financial Analysts Journal, 1999,24:24-36.
[209]Beneish, M.D. and M. Vargus, Insider Trading, Earnings Quality, and Accrual Mispricing [J]. The Accounting Review,2002,77, October:755-791.
[210]Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process [J]. Journal of Law and Economics.1978, 21:297-326.
[211]Berle Adolf A., and Gardiner C. Means, the Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York, the Macmillan Company,1932.
[212]Bernard V.L, Skinner D.J., What motivates managers' choice of discretionary accruals? [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1996,22:313-325.
[213]Bunsis H., A description and market analysis of write-off announcements [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,1997,24:1385-1400.
[214]Burgstahler, D., and I. Dichev. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1997,24 (December):99-127.
[215]Burgstahler D., J. Jiambalvo, and T. Shevlin, Do stock prices fully reflect the implications of special items for future earnings? [J].Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40 (3): 585-612.
[216]Burgstahler, D., Eames M., Earnings management to avoid losses and earnings decreases. Are analysis fooled [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2003,20 (2):253-294.
[217]Bushman R.M., and R.J. Indjejikian, Accounting income, stock price and managerial compensation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993,16:3-23.
[218]Bushman, R., Chen,Q., Engel, E.,and Smith A., Financial Accounting Information, Organizational Complexity and Corporate Governance Systems [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2004,37:167-201.
[219]Cahan, S. F., The Effect of Antitrust Investigations on Discretionary Accruals:A Refined Test of the Political-Cost Hypothesis [J]. The Accounting Review,1992,67(1):77-95.
[220]Cahan, S.F., B.M. Chavis, R.G. Elmendorf, Earnings Management of Chemical Firms in Response to Political Cost from Environmental Legislation [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,1997,12(1):37-65.
[221]Carcello, J.V., and T.L. Neal, Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor Dismissals following "New" Going-Concern Reports [J]. The Accounting Review,2003,65:131-156.
[222]Chen K, Yuan H., Earnings management and capital resource allocation:evidence from China's accounting-based regulation of rights issues [J]. The Accounting Review,2004, 79:645-665.
[223]Chen, S.K., B. Lin, Y. Wang, L. Wu, The Frequency and Magnitude of Earnings Management:Time Series and Multi-threshold Comparisons in the U. S. Market [J/OL]. Working Paper, University of Rhode Island and Peking University,2005.
[224]Chordia,T., and Shivakumar, L., Momentum, Business Cycle and Time. Varying Expected Returns [J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57:985-1019.
[225]Chtourou S, Bedard J, Courteau L Corporate governance and earnings management [J/OL]. Working Paper, University Laval, Canada,2001.
[226]Chung, R., Firth, M., Kim, J.-B. Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2002,8 (1):29-48.
[227]Claessens Stijn, Djankov Simeon, Lang Larry H.P., The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:1-2.
[228]Coase, R. H., The Nature of the Firm [J]. Economica,1937,4:386-405.
[229]Coase, R. H., The Problem of Social Cost [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1960,3, October:1-44.
[230]Collins J., Shackelford D., Wahlen J., Bank difference in the coordination of regulatory capital, earnings and taxes [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1995,33:263-291.
[231]Davidson, S., Clyde P. Stickney and Roman L. Weil, Accounting:The Language of Business [M]. Sun Lakes, Ariz:T. Horton,1987.
[232]DeAngelo, L. Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes:A study of management buyouts of public stockholders [J]. The Accounting Review.1986,61(3):400-420.
[233]DeAngelo L. E., Managerial competition, information costs and corporate governance:the use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1988,10:3-36.
[234]DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. Skinner. Accounting choices in troubled companies [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994.17(January):113-143.
[235]DeAngelo H., L. DeAngelo L., Ancient redwoods and the politics of finance:the hostile takeover of the Pacific Lumber Company [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998,47(1), Jan:3-53.
[236]Dechow, P.M., R.G. Sloan, Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem:An Empirical Investigation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1991,14(1):51-89.
[237]Dechow, P. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance:the role of accounting accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,18(1):3-42.
[238]Dechow, P., Sloan, R., and Sweeney., Detecting Earnings Management [J]. The Accounting Review,1995a.,70:193-225.
[239]Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney, Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation:An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,13(1):1-36.
[240]DeFond, M.L., and J. Jiambalvo. Incidence and circumstances of accounting errors [J]. The Accounting Review,1991,66 (3):643-655.
[241]Defond M.L., Jiambalvo J. Debt covenant effects and the manipulation of accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,17:145-176.
[242]Degeorge F., Patel J., Zeckhauser R., Earnings management to exceed thresholds [J]. Journal of Business,1999,72:1-33.
[243]Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser, Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds[J]. Journal of Business,1999,72(1):1-33.
[244]Demsetz H, Lehn K. The structure of corporate ownership:causes and consequence [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(6):1155-1177.
[245]Diamond Douglas W., Robert E. Verrecchia, Disclosure liquidity and the cost of capital [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1981,9(3):221-35.
[246]Dichev,I. and D. Skinner, Large Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40 (4):1091-1123.
[247]Douglass North, Institutional Change and Economic Growth [J]. Journal of Economic History,1971,31, Mar:118-125.
[248]Dyck A. and L. Zingales, Private Benefits of Control:An International Comparison [J]. Journal of Finance,2004,59(2):537-600.
[249]Elliott J.A. and Shaw W.H., Write-offs as accounting procedures to manage perceptions [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1988,26:91-119.
[250]Elliott J.A. and J.D. Hanna, Repeated accounting write-offs and the information content of earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1996,34:135-155.
[251]Erlend Kvaal.2005. Topics in accounting for impairment of fixed assets. A dissertation submitted to BI Norwegian School of Management for the Degree of Dr. Oecon.
[252]Fama E., and Jensen M., Separation of Ownership and Control [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:301-325.
[253]Feltham, G. A., and J. A. Ohlson, Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating and financial activities [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research 1995,11:689-732.
[254]Francis J., J.D. Hanna and L. Vincent, Causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offs [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1996,34:117-134.
[255]Friedlan, J., Accounting choices by issuers of initial public offerings [J].Contemporary Accounting Research,1994,11:1-31.
[256]Gaumnitz, J.E and D.R Emery, Asset Growth, Abandonment Value and the Replacement Decision of Like-for-Like Capital Assets[J]. Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1981,15:407-417.
[257]Graham J.R., C. R. Harvey, S. Rajgopal, The economic implications of corporate financial reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40:3-73.
[258]Gray, S.J, Towards a theory of cultural influence on the development of accounting of accounting systems internationally [J]. Abacus,1988,24:1-15.
[259]Grinstein, Yaniv and Michaely, Roni. Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy [J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60, June:1389-1426.
[260]Grossman S. and O. Hart, An Analysis of the Principle-Agent Problem [J]. Econometrica, 1983,51:7-45.
[261]Guay W, Kothari S., and Watt R. A Market Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accrual Models [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1996,34:85-105.
[262]Hall, Steven C. Political Scrutiny and Earnings Management in the Oil Refining Industry [J]. Journal of Accounting & Public Policy,1993,12(4):325-351.
[263]Hall, Steven C., Stammerjohan, William W. Damage Awards and Earnings Management in the Oil Industry [J]. Accounting Review,1997,72(1):47-65.
[264]Han, Jerry C. Y., Shiing-Wu Wang. Political Costs and Earnings Management of Oil Companies During the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis [J]. Accounting Review,1998,73 (1): 103-117.
[265]Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1964, Oct.:11-25.
[266]Hart O., B. Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts [J].. In Troman F.B. ed. Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress, Cambridge University Press,1987,73-79.
[267]Hart O., J. Moore, Property Rights and Nature of the Firm [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990,98:1119-1158.
[268]Hart O., J. Moore, Default and Renegotiation:A Dynamic Model of Debt [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113:1-42.
[269]Haw I.M, Daqing Qi, Woody Wu., Earnings management of listed firms in response to security regulations in China's emerging capital market [J/OL]. Working Paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong,1998.
[270]Haw I.M., B.Hu, L.S. Hwang, and W. Wu, Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42 (2): 423-462.
[271]Healy, P., The impact of bonus schemes on the selection of accounting principles. Journal of Accounting and Economics [J].1985, (7):85-107.
[272]Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu, Effectiveness of accounting-based dividend covenants [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1990,12:97-123.
[273]Healy P. and J. Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implications for Standard Setting [J]. Accounting Horizons,1999,13 (4):365-383.
[274]Heflin, F. and T. Warfield Managerial Discretion in Accounting for Asset Write-offs [J/OL]. Working Paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison,1997.
[275]Hendriksen, E.S., Breda, M.F., Accounting Theory,5th ed., Irwin,1992.
[276]Hofstede, G.H., Culture's Consequences:International Differences in Work Related Values [M]. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, London,1980.
[277]Holmstrom, Bengt, Moral Hazard in Teams [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn,1982, 13(2):324-40.
[278]Holthausen, D. M., A Risk Return Model with Risk and Return Measured from a Target Return [J]. American Economic Review,1981, (71):182-188.
[279]Holthausen R.W., Larcker D.F., Sloan R.G., Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economic,1995,19:29-74.
[280]Hope O.-K., Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy:An International Study [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2003,41(2): 235-272.
[281]Jaffe, J., Special information and insider trading [J]. Journal of Business,1974,47: 410-428.
[282]Jensen M. and W. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3, Oct.3:305-360.
[283]Jian, M. and T. J. Wong, Earning management and tunneling through related party transactions:evidence from Chinese corporate groups [J/OL]. Working Paper, HKUST, 2003.
[284]John B. Canning, The Economics of Accountancy,1929, P.22.
[285]Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling [J]. The American Economic Review,2000,90 (2):22-27.
[286]Jones J., Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29:193-228.
[287]Kang, S. H. and Sivaramakrishnan, K., Issues in Testing Earnings Management and an Instrumental Variable approach [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1995,33(2):353-367.
[288]Kasznik R., On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1999,37:276-302.
[289]Key, Kimberly Galligan. Political Cost Incentives for Earnings Management in the Cable Television Industry [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics,1997,23(3):309-337.
[290]Kim Sungsoo, Sung S. Kwon, SFAS 121 asset write-down:early vs. late firms [J/OL]. Working Paper, School of Business Rutgers University-Camden,2001.
[291]Klein, A., Audit committees, board of directors characteristics, and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33 (3):375-400.
[292]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny The Quality of Government [J]. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1999,15 (1):222-279.
[293]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silames, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World [J]. The Journal of Finance.2000b,55:1-33.
[294]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silames,A. Shleifer, and R.Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,57:1147-70.
[295]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silames, and A. Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws? [J]. The Journal of Finance,2006,61:1-32.
[296]Lander, Gerald and Alan Reinstein, Implementing the Impairment of Assets Requirements of SFAS No.144:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Managerial Auditing Journal,2004,19(3): 400-411(12).
[297]Leuz, C., D.Nanda, and P. D.Wysocki, Earnings Management and Investor Protection:An International Comparison [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,69(3):505-527.
[298]Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J., A modest proposal for improved corporate governance [J]. The Business Lawyer.1992,48 (1):59-77.
[299]Liu. Michelle M., Accruals and Managerial Operating Decisions Over the Firm Life Cycle [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2006,27(Supplement):153-192.
[300]M. Erickson, S.W. Wang, Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock mergers [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,27:149-176.
[301]McNichols, M. and G.P. Wilson, Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1988,26:1-31.
[302]Mehran, H., Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1995,38, (2):163-184.
[303]Michael L. Moore, Management changes and discretionary accounting decisions [J]. Journal of accounting research,1973,11(1):100-107.
[304]Mirrlees, J.A., Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty [J]. in Balch, M., Mc Fadden, D., and Wu, S., (eds.) Essays in Equilibrium Behavior, Amsterdam:North Holland.1974.
[305]Mirrlees, J.A., The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior:Part Ⅰ [M]. Nuffield College, Oxford, mimeographed.1975.
[306]Mirrlees, J.A., The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization, [J]. Bell Journal of Economics 1976, (7):105-131.
[307]Morck, E., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W.. Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,293-315.
[308]Myers, S., The Capital Structure Puzzle [J]. Journal of Finance,1984,39(3),575-592.
[309]Myers, Stewart and Nicholal S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors Do Not Have [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1984, June,13(2):187-221.
[310]Nelson K.K., Rate Regulation, Competition, and Loss Reserve Discounting by Property-Casualty Insurers [J]. The Accounting Review,75(1):115-138.
[311]Nikos Vafeas, Board meeting frequency and firm performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics 1999,53:113-142.
[312]Park, S., J. Jang, and M. Loeb, Insider Trading Activity Surrounding Annual Earnings Announcements [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,1995,22 (4):587-614.
[313]Peasnell, K., Pope, P., and Yong, S., Board Monitoring and Earnings Management:Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2005,7:1311-1344.
[314]Penman, S. A Comparison of the Information Content of Insider Trading and Management Earnings Forecasts [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1985,20:1-17.
[315]Penman, S. Insider Trading and the Dissemination of Firms' Forecast Information [J]. Journal of Business,1982,55 (4):479-503.
[316]Perry S., T. Williams, Earnings Management Preceding Management Buyout Offers [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,18:157-179.
[317]Petroni K.R., Optimistic reporting in the property casualty insurance Industry [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1992,15:485-508.
[318]Pistor K., C. Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies:Lessons from China [J]. American Law & Economics Review,2005,7(1):184-210.
[319]Rees L., Gill S., and Gore R.,1996. An investigation of asset write-downs and concurrent abnormal accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,34:157-169.
[320]Richardson S., Teoh S.H., Wysocki P., Tracking analysts'forecasts over the annual earnings horizon:are analysts'forecasts optimistic or pessimistic? University of Michigan.1999.
[321]Richardson, S., S.H. Teoh and P.D. Wysocki, The Walk down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2004,21, pp.885-924.
[322]Riedl Edward, An Examination of Long-Lived Asset Impairments [J]. Accounting Review, 2004.79(3):823-852.
[323]Rogers, J., Disclosure quality and management trading incentives [J/OL]. Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania,2004.
[324]Ross L. Watts, Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positiv Accounting Theory, [M]. Prentice-Hall Inc., 1986.
[325]Schipper, Katherine, Commentary on earnings management, Accounting Horizons [J].1989, (3):91-102.
[326]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. Large shareholders and corporate control [J]. Journal of Political Economy 1986,94,461-488.
[327]Shleifer A. and R. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997,52:737-783.
[328]Skinner, D., Sloan, R., Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don't let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2002,7 (2-3): 289-312.
[329]Smith M., Shareholders activism by institutional investors:Evidence from Calpers [J]. Journal of Finance,1996,51:227-252.
[330]Spence, A.M., Job Market Signaling [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1973,87: 355-374.
[331]Steven N. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy [D]. Chicago:Univ. of Chicago.1969.
[332]Steven N. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm [J]. Journal of Law and Economic, 1983,26.
[333]Stigler, George J. The Economics of Information [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1961, 69 (3):213-225.
[334]Stiglitz, Joseph E., The Theory of'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income [J]. American Economic Review,1975,6:283-300.
[335]Strong J. S., and J.R. Meyer,1987. Asset Write-downs:Managerial incentives and security returns [J]. The Journal of Finance,42(3):643-661.
[336]Subramanyam, K.R., The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1996,22:249-282.
[337]Sweeney A.P., Debt covenant violations and managers'accounting responses [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994, (5):281-308.
[338]Teoh, S.H., I. Welch, and T.J. Wong. Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings [J]. Journal of Finance,1998a,53:1935-1974.
[339]Teoh, S.H., I. Welch, and T.J. Wong. Earnings Management and the Underperformance of Seasoned Equity Offerings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998b,50:63-99.
[340]Thomas A. Ratcliffe, Paul Munter, Practical Guidance in Implementing SFAS No.121 Noncurrent Asset Impairment [J]. National Public Accountant,1998 (7):43-.
[341]Vickrey, W., Auction and Bidding Games, in Recent Advances in Game Theory [J]. Proceedings of a Conference, Princeton:Princeton University Press.1962.
[342]Vickrey, W., Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders [J]. Journal of Finance.1961,16:8-37.
[343]Vickrey, W., Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics 1960,74:507-535.
[344]Wahlen, J., The Nature of Information in Commercial Bank Loan Loss Disclosures [J]. The Accounting Review,1994,69(3):455-478.
[345]Weisbach M.S., Outside Directors and CEO Turnover [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,20:192-203.
[346]Williams O., Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis of Antitrust Implications [M]. New York: Free Press.1975.
[347]Williams O., The Economic Institute of Capitalism [M]. New York, Free Press.1985.
[348]Wright, D. W., Evidence on the relation between corporate governance characteristics and the quality of financial reporting [D]. University of Michigan.1996.
[349]Xie, B., W. N. Davidson, and P. DaDalt. Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance.2003,9: 295-316.
[350]Young D. and D. A. Guenther, Financial Reporting Environments and International Capital Mobility [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,41(3):553-579.
[351]Young, S., Systematic measurement error in the estimation of discretionary accruals:An evaluation of alternative modeling procedures [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,1999,26:833-862.
[352]Yu, Qiao, Bin Du, and Qian Sun, Earnings Management at Rights Issues Thresholds: Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2006,30 (12):3453-3468.
[353]Zabihollah Rezaee, James A. Smith, and Rudolph S. Lindbeck, An Examination f Long-Lived Asset Impairments Under SFAS No.121 [J]. International Advances in Economic Research,1996, (2):86-.
[354]Zucca L. J. and D. R. Campbell,1992. A closer look at discretionary write-downs of impaired assets [J]. Accounting Horizon, (9):30-41.
[2]Ross L. Watts, Jerold L. Zimmerman著,陈少华,黄世忠译.实证会计理论[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社.1999.
[3]William R. Scott著,陈汉文译.财务会计理论[M].北京：机械工业出版社.2000.
[4]白云霞,王亚军,吴联生.业绩低于阈值公司的盈余管理——来自控制权转移公司后续资产处置的证据[J].管理世界,2005,(5)：135-143.
[5]白云霞,吴联生.信息披露与国有股权私有化中的盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(10)：37-48.
[6]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,宋敏,张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,(2)：81-91.
[7]蔡吉甫.会计盈余管理与公司治理[J].当代财经,2007,(6)：109-114.
[8]蔡吉甫.盈余管理及其治理的博弈分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2008,(1)：51-55.
[9]蔡吉甫.大股东控制与上市公司盈余管理隧道效应研究[J].当代财经,2008,(11)：77-83.
[10]蔡祥,李志文,张为国.中国证券市场中的财务问题：实证研究述评[J].中国会计评论2003,(7)：1-23.
[11]蔡祥,张海燕.资产减值准备的计提、追溯与市场效应[J].中国会计与财务研究,2004,(12)：31-56.
[12]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与补贴收入——来自我国证券市场的经验证据[J].财经研究,2003,(9)：51-59.
[13]陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约[J].经济研究,2008,(3)：60-72.
[14]陈国欣,祝继高.我国上市公司的盈余管理行为实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2004,(7)：12-18.
[15]陈武朝,王可昕.中国上市公司资产减值政策的实证研究[C].中国会计实证研讨会：2005.
[16]陈小悦,肖星,过晓燕.配股权与上市公司利润操纵[J].经济研究,2000,(1)：30-36.
[17]陈晓,戴翠玉.A股亏损公司的盈余管理行为与手段研究[J].中国会计评论,2004,(12)：299-301.
[18]陈晓,江东.股权多元化,公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000,(8)：28-35.
[19]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001,(12)：20-28.
[20]陈信元,朱红军主编.转型经济中的公司治理——基于中国上市公司的案例[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2007.
[21]陈旭东,黄登仕.公司治理与会计稳健性——基于上市公司的实证研究[J].证券市场导报2007,(3)：10-17.
[22]陈政.大股东资金占用与盈余管理：问题掩饰还是揭露?[J].证券市场导报, 2008,(12)：51-58.
[23]代冰彬,陆正飞,张然.资产减值：稳健性还是盈余管理[J].会计研究,2007,(12)：35-42.
[24]戴德明,毛新述,邓蟠.中国亏损上市公司资产减值准备计提行为研究[J].财经研究,2005,(7)：71-82.
[25]戴捷敏,孔玉生.配股公司盈余管理行为分析——来自2001年-2005年沪深两市的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究,2008,(1)：71-75.
[26]邓川.新四项减值准备、审计任期与独立审计意见[J].财经论丛,2004,(11)：62-67.
[27]杜滨,李若山,俞乔.我国上市公司盈余管理程度研究[J].中国金融学,2003,(1)：99-118.
[28]杜滨,李若山.中国证券市场上市公司关联交易的实证研究[C].中国会计与财务问题国际研讨会论文集.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002：253-264.
[29]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007,(1)：58-65.
[30]杜兴强,温日光.公司治理与会计信息质量：一项经验研究[J].财经研究,2007,(1)：122-133.
[31]杜莹,刘立国.股权结构与公司治理效率：中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,2002,(11)：124-133.
[32]樊纲,王小鲁.消费条件模型和各地区消费条件指数[J].经济研究，2004,(5)：13-21.
[33]樊纲,王小鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006.
[34]富兰克·H·奈特著,王宇、王文玉译.风险、不确定性和利润[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005：212-226页.
[35]干胜道,钟朝宏,田艳.微利上市公司盈余管理实证研究[J].财经论丛,2006,(6)：59-64.
[36]高雷,宋顺林.关联交易线下项目与盈余管理[J].中国会计评论,2008,(3)：61-78.
[37]高雷,张杰.公司治理、机构投资者与盈余管理[J].会计研究,2008,(9)：46-56.
[38]高明华,马守莉.独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析[J].南开经济研究,2002,(2)：64-68.
[39]谷祺,于东智.公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J].财经问题研究,2001,(1)：58-65.
[40]顾振伟,秦默,欧阳令南.改进后扩展琼斯模型与其他盈余管理计量模型的比较研究[J].财经论丛,2008,(5)：78-83.
[41]郭荟,张辉军.盈余管理对地方政府资源配置的影响研究[J].财会通讯,2006,(8)：65-68.
[42]郭强,蒋东生.不完全契约与独立董事作用的本质及有效性分析——从传统法人治理结构的缺陷论起[J].管理世界,2003,(2)：78-90.
[43]郭旭芬.利用资产减值进行盈余管理的成因分析[J].财会通讯,2006,(6)：10-11.
[44]何问陶,倪全宏.中国上市公司MBO前一年盈余管理实证研究[J].会计研究,2005,(6)：58-65.
[45]胡勤勤,沈艺峰.独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩[J].世界经济,2002,(7)：51-62.
[46]胡奕明,林文雄,王玮璐.证券分析师的信息来源,关注域与分析工具[J].金融研究,2003,(12)：52-63.
[47]黄世忠.资产减值准则差异比较及政策建议[J].会计研究,2005,(1)：38-45.
[48]黄中生.论资产计量[J].会计研究,2005,(4)：15-19。
[49]计小青,曹啸.资本市场财务呈报管制：理论及其对中国实践的解释[J].管理世界,2003,(2)：4-14.
[50]姜国华.关于证券分析师对中国上市公司会计收益预测的实证研究[J].经济科学,2004,(6)：72-79.
[51]蒋义宏,魏刚.净资产收益率与配股条件[J／G].证券市场会计问题实证研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,1998.
[52]井尻雄士发言,陆建桥,隋春平译.美国会计准则及其环境：75年发展历史的二元研究(上、下)[J].财会通讯,2005,(10)：16-19：(11)：14-17.
[53]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界,2006,(1)：129-136.
[54]雷光勇,刘慧龙.控股股东性质、利益输送与盈余管理幅度——来自中国A股公司首次亏损年度的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2007,(8)：93-101.
[55]李东平,黄德华,王振林.“不清洁”审计意见、盈余管理与会计师事务所变更[J].会计研究,2001,(6)：51-57.
[56]李东平.大股东控制、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡[M].上海财经大学博士学位论文.北京：中国财政经济出版社.2005.
[57]李寿喜.产权、代理成本和代理效率[J].经济研究,2007,(1)：102-113.
[58]李维安,王新汉,王威.盈余管理与审计意见关系的实证研究——基于非经营性收益的分析[J].财经研究,2004,(11)：126-135.
[59]李享.会计操纵与交易规划的配合使用——来自长期资产减值的经验证据[J].财经研究,2009,(2)：99-101.
[60]李歆.减值准备、盈余管理和审计委员会效率[J].当代财经,2008,(5)：120-125.
[61]李延喜,包世泽,高锐,孔宪京.薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理[J].南开经济评论,2007,(6)：55-61.
[62]李勇.对“内部人”交易信息披露制度的经济分析[J].预测,2004,(6)：59-61.
[63]李远鹏,牛建军,姜国华.证券市场“应计异象”研究——回顾与展望[J].会计研究,2008,(1)：79-84.
[64]李越冬,倪婕.基于盈余管理视角的上市公司审计质量研究——来自沪市制造业审计意见的实证分析[J].财会通讯,2008,(3)：80-89.
[65]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排：来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,(12)：3-13.
[66]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组[J].经济研究,2005,(1)：95-105.
[67]李增泉.中国上市公司资产减值政策的实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2001,(12)：70-113。
[68]李志文,宋衍蘅.中国上市公司的变脸现象[C].中国会计与财务问题国际研讨会论文集.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002：292-316.
[69]李志文,宋衍蘅.影响中国上市公司配股决策的因素分析[J].经济科学,2003a,(3)：61-69.
[70]廖秀梅,会计信息的信贷决策有用性：基于所有权制度制约的研究[J].会计研究,2007,(5)：31-38.
[71]林舒,魏明海.中国A股发行公司首次公开募股过程中的盈利管理[J].中国会计与财务研究,2000,(12)：87-107.
[72]林翔,陈汉文.增长、盈余管理和应计持续性[J].中国会计评论,2005,(6)：117-142.
[73]林毅夫,李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004,(2)：17-27.
[74]林钟高,徐正刚.公司治理结构下的盈余管理[J].财经科学,2002,(4)：57-62
[75]刘斌,孙回回,李嘉明.自愿性会计政策变更与非标审计意见的相关性研究——来自1998-2002年深沪上市公司的经验证据[J].财贸研究,2004,(3)：101-107.
[76]刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择-中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究[J].中国会计评论,2004,(6)：141-158.
[77]刘凤委,汪辉,孙铮.股权性质与公司业绩——基于盈余管理基础上的经验分析[J].财经研究,2005,31(6)：69-79.
[78]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007,(9)：76-84.
[79]刘建民,刘星.上市公司关联交易与盈余管理实证研究[J].当代财经,2005,(9)：112-115.
[80]刘立国,杜莹.公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究[J].会计研究，2003,(2)：28-36.
[81]刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003,(4)：51-62.
[82]刘炜松,周焯华,张宗益.盈余管理动机与审计研究[J].经济问题探索,2005,(3)：73-75.
[83]刘小玄.国有企业与非国有企业的产权结构及其对效率的影响[J].经济研究,1995,(7)：11-20.
[84]刘星,安灵.基于盈余管理视角的中国上市公司资产出售实证研究[J].当代财经,2007,(1)：113-119.
[85]刘玉廷,戴德明,夏大慰主持,财政部会计准则委员会编.资产减值会计[M].大连：大连出版社,2005.
[86]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[D].上海财经大学博士学位论文,1998.
[87]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[J].会计研究,1999,(9)：25-35.
[88]陆宇建.上市公司盈余管理行为对配股政策反应的实证研究[J].中国软科学,2003,(6)：47-51.
[89]陆正飞,祝继高,孙便霞.盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约[J].管理世界,2008,(3)：152-158.
[90]罗炜,王永,吴联生.债务重组准则变更的经济后果[J].中国会计评论,2008,(2)：193-206.
[91]马光,孙黎.内部人交易与预售公告制度研究[J].证券市场导报,2008,(9)：4-9.
[92]马连福,胡艳,陈德球.大股东制衡、投资者关系管理与盈余管理[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,(12)：73-79.
[93]毛新述,戴德明,姚淑瑜.资产减值会计计量问题研究[j].会计研究,2005,(10)：35-41.
[94]孟焰,张秀梅.上市公司关联方交易盈余管理与关联方利益转移关系研究[J].会计研 究,2006,(4)：37-43.
[95]秦江萍,王怀栋.中国上市公司现金分红实实证分析[J].财会研究,2004,(8)：45-48.
[96]青木昌彦,奥野正宽著,魏加宁等译.经济体制的比较制度分析.[M].北京：中国发展出版社.1999.
[97]饶艳超,胡奕明.银行信贷中会计信息的使用情况调查与分析[J].会计研究,2005,(4)：36-41.
[98]邵军,边泓.A股亏损公司利用线下项目进行盈余管理的实证研究[J].财经论坛,2005(2)：101-103.
[99]沈振宇,王金圣,薛爽.坏账准备与上市公司利润操纵：来自中国上市公司的证据[J].中国会计与财务研究,2004,(6)：93-111.
[100]宋衍蘅,何玉润.监管压力与审计市场竞争压力：注册会计师的权衡——以长期资产减值准备为例[J].管理世界,2008,(5)：144-150.
[101]苏丹宁.资产减值：会计稳健性还是盈余管理[J].财会通讯,2007,(11)：16-19.
[102]孙亮,刘春.什么决定了盈余管理程度的差异：公司治理还是经营绩效?[J].中国会计评论,2008,(3)：79-92.
[103]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2006,(10)：100-107.
[104]孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5)：52-63.
[105]孙铮,王跃堂.资源配置与盈余操纵之实证研究[J].财经研究,1999,(4)：3-9.
[106]汤云为,钱逢胜.会计理论[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,1997：219.
[107]唐清泉,罗党论.设立独立董事的效果分析——来自中国上市公司独立董事的问卷调查[J].中国工业经济,2006,(1)：120-127.
[108]王建新.会计国际化环境制约、策略选择及其效果研究——来自《非货币性交易》准则的经验证据[J].管理世界,2005,(3)：15-22.
[109]王建新.绩效目标、公司治理与长期资产减值转回——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007,(3)：42-53。
[110]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理-基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007,(7)：111-120.
[111]王琨,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,8(2)：27-33.
[112]王生年.减值准备与盈余管理：来自中国上市公司的证据[J].当代财经,2008,(10)：121-125.
[113]王小军.2008年深市主板公司资产减值及非经常性损益分析[J].证券市场导报,2009,(7)：29-33.
[114]王小鲁,樊纲.中国地区差距的变动趋势和影响因素[J].经济研究,2004,(1)：33-44.
[115]王亚平,吴联生,白云霞.中国上市公司盈余管理的频率与幅度[J].经济研究,2005,(12)：102-112.
[116]王彦超,林斌,辛清泉.市场环境、民事诉讼与盈余管理[J].中国会计评论,2008(1)：21-40.
[117]王永海,王铁林,李青原.机构投资者参与公司治理积极性的分析[J].南开管理评论.2007(1)：4-7.
[118]王跃堂.会计政策选择的经济动机：基于沪深股市的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000,(12)：31-40.
[119]王跃堂,倪慧萍.资本市场信息沟通面临的挑战与应对策略——西方会计信息理论评述及其对我国的启示[J].外国经济与管理2001,(6)：44-49.
[120]王跃堂,孙铮,陈世敏.会计改革与会计信息质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2001,(7)：16-26.
[121]王跃堂,孙铮,陈世敏.股份有限公司会计制度经济后果的实证分析[J].中国会计与财务研究,2001,(12)：35-52.
[122]王跃堂,张祖国.财务报告质量评价观及信息披露监管[J].会计研究,2001,(10)：11-18.
[123]王跃堂,赵子夜.会计专业判断：基于盈余信息治理的思考[J].会计研究,2003,(7)：20-23.
[124]王跃堂,周雪,张莉.长期资产减值：公允价值的体现还是盈余管理行为[J].会计研究,2005,(8)：30-36.
[125]王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁.董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效?[J].经济研究,2006,(5)：62-73.
[126]魏明海.盈余管理基本理论及其研究述评[J].会计研究,2000,(9)：37-42.
[127]魏明海,刘峰,施鲲翔.论会计透明度[J].会计研究,2001,(9)：16-20.
[128]魏明海.会计信息质量经验研究的完善与运用[J].会计研究,2005,(3)：28-34.
[129]魏涛,陆正飞,单宏伟.非经常性损益盈余管理的动机、手段和作用研究-来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2007,(1)：113-122.
[130]魏明海,陈胜蓝,黎文靖.投资者保护研究综述财务会计信息的作用[J].中国会计评论,2007,(3)：131-150.
[131]乌家培.谈信息经济学及其内容[J].网络与信息,1997,(9)：3-5.
[132]吴东辉.中国上市公司应计项目选择的实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2001,(9)：48-81.
[133]吴联生,利益相关者对会计规则制定的参与特征——基于调查数据的实证分析[J].经济研究,2004,(3)：88-97.
[134]吴联生,薄仙慧,王亚平.避免亏损的盈余管理程度：上市公司与非上市公司的比较[J].会计研究,2007a,(2)：44-52.
[135]吴联生,薄仙慧,王亚平.现金流量在多大程度上被管理了呢?——来自我国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2007b,(3)：162-174。
[136]吴联生,王亚平.盈余管理程度的估计模型与经验证据：一个综述[J].经济研究,2008,(8)：143-152.
[137]吴晓求.当前中国资本市场必须解决的三大问题[N].载上海证券报,2004-07-28.
[138]伍利娜,李蕙伶.投资者理解公司会计利润和应税利润的差异信息吗?[J].管理世界,2007,(10)：114-138.
[139]奚俊芳,于培友.我国上市公司控制权转移绩效研究——基于经营业绩的分析[J].南开管理评论,2006,(4)：42-48.
[140]夏冬林,李刚.机构投资者持股和会计盈余质量[J].当代财经,2008,(2)：111-118.
[141]夏立军.盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2003,Vol.5(2)：94-154.
[142]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5)：40-51.
[143]夏文贤.上市公司审计委员会设立与效率研究[D].厦门大学博士学位论文,2007.
[144]向凯.我国配股上市公司盈余操纵的实证研究——来自沪深股市的经验证据[J].财会通讯,2004,(10)：3-9.
[145]向凯.盈余管理实证研究：文献述评与未来研究方向[J].财会通讯,2006,(10)：60-65.
[146]向凯,陈胜蓝.财务会计信息、公司治理与投资者保护[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.
[147]肖洪广,肖小勇.国有商业银行信贷产品创新研究[J].求索,2006,(5)：37-39.
[148]肖星,申睿.配股前的盈余管理、配股后的资金流向与后续业绩[J／OL].工作底稿,清华大学,香港科技大学,2004.
[149]熊正德,李胜男.上市公司SEO后业绩变化及其影响因素实证研究[J].当代财经,2009,(2)：120-124.
[150]徐浩萍.二元股权结构下股权再融资的价值效应-对流通股价值的研究[J].中国会计评论,2005,(12)：329-342.
[151]徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006,(1)：90-100.
[152]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003,(2)：64-74.
[153]许小年. 以法人机构为主体建立公司治理机制和资本市场[J]. 改革,1997,(5)：28-34.
[154]许云.美国资产减值会计研究的历史回顾及启示[J].财经理论与实践,2004,(3)：72-76.
[155]薛爽,田立新,任帅.八项计提与公司盈余管理的实证研究[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2006,(3)：14-19.
[156]颜敏,王平心,张永国.强制性会计变更、证券市场监管与自发性会计变更[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2006,(1)：112-118.
[157]杨瑞龙,杨其静,企业理论：现代观点[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005,(12).
[158]杨旭东,莫小鹏.新配股政策出台后上市公司盈余管理现象的实证研究[J].会计研究,2006，(8)：44-52.
[159]杨有红,赵佳佳.试论资产减值内控制度的完善[J].会计研究,2005,(2)：18-23.
[160]姚树洁,冯根福,姜春霞.中国银行业效率的实证分析[J].经济研究,2004,(8)：4-15.
[161]姚颐,刘志远,王健.股权分置改革、机构投资者与投资者保护[J].金融研究,2007,(11)：48-56.
[162]于东智.转轨经济中的上市公司治理[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2002.
[163]于李胜.盈余管理动机、信息质量与政府监管[J].会计研究,2007,(9)：42-49.
[164]于永生.美国公允价值计量准则评介[J].会计研究，2007,(10)：11-15.
[165]于永生.IASB与FASB公允价值计量准则趋同的困难和挑战[J].财经论丛,2008,(5)：68-72.
[166]张国清,赵景文.资产负债项目可靠性、盈余持续性及其市场反应[J].会计研究,2008,(3)：51-57.
[167]张菊香.基于动机视角的盈余管理文献综述[J].审计与经济研究,2007,(11)：60-65.
[168]张俊瑞,李彬.企业生命周期与盈余管理关系研究——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据,预测,2009,(2)：16-20.
[169]张然.中国上市公司现金流管理研究-兼对新兴市场和成熟市场现金流管理行为比较研究[J].中国会计评论,2007,(10)：381-400.
[170]张荣武,刘文秀.管理者过度自信与盈余管理的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2008,(1)：72-77.
[171]张胜芳.资产净值的价值相关性和可靠性研究[D].厦门大学博士学位论文,2006.
[172]张为国,王霞.中国上市公司会计差错的动因分析[J].会计研究,2004,(4)：24-29.
[173]张维迎.所有制-治理结构及委托-代理关系-兼评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点[J].经济研究,1996,(6)：3-16.
[174]张晓东.政治成本、盈余管理及其经济后果——来自中国资本市场的证据[J].中国工业经济,2008,(8)：109-119.
[175]张昕,任明.关于上市公司盈余管理动机的比较研究[J].财经问题研究,2007,(11)：83-86.
[176]张听,杨再惠.中国上市公司利用盈余管理避免亏损的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007,(9)：166-167。
[177]张昕.中国亏损上市公司第四季度盈余管理的实证研究[J].会计研究,2008,(4)：25-32.
[178]张样建,徐晋.盈余管理的原因、动机及测度方法前沿研究综述[J].南开经济研究2006,(6)：123-141.
[179]张翼,Law, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Scandal in an Emerging Economy: Insights from China [J/OL]. Peking University, Working Paper,2004.
[180]章永奎,刘峰.盈余管理与审计意见相关性实证研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2002,Vol.4(1)：1-13.
[181]赵春光.减值与盈余管理——论《资产减值》准则的政策涵义[J].会计研究,2006,(3)：11-17.
[182]赵敏,甄颖.长期资产减值转回与盈余管理[J].财经论丛,2008,(1)：71-77.
[183]赵兴楣.基于审计契约安排的独立性互动机制研究[D].暨南大学博士学位论文,2008.
[184]郑吉昌,余克艰,黄玉英.激励报酬模型的局限性与制度失效——从盈余管理分析家族企业制走向两权分离的障碍[J].数量技术经济研究,2004,(6)：64-69.
[185]支晓强,童盼.盈余管理、控制权转移与独立董事变更——兼论独立董事治理作用的发挥[J].管理世界,2005,(11)：137-144。
[186]周勤业,夏立军,李莫愁.大股东侵害与上市公司资产评估偏差[J].统计研究,2003,(10)：39-44.
[187]朱星文,蔡吉甫,谢盛纹.公司治理、盈余质量与经理报酬研究——来自中国上市公司数据的检验[J].南开管理评论,2008,(2)：28-33.
[188]祝焰,赵红梅,杨梅.长期资产减值转回的政策效应[J].管理学报,2009,(3)：390-395.
[189]Abarbanell J. and R. Lehavy, Can Stock Recommendations Predict Earnings Management and Analysts'Earnings Forecast Errors? [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2003,41 (3):1-31.
[190]Abarbanell J.S., and B.J. Bushee, Fundamental analysis, Future earnings, and stock prices [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1997, Spring:1-24.
[191]Aboody, D., Kasznik, R., CEO stock options awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2000,29,73-100.
[192]Agrawal Anup, and Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals [C]. AFA San Diego Meetings,2004.
[193]Aharony J., Lee C.W., Wong T.J. Financial packaging of IPO firms in China [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2000,38:103-126.
[194]Aklerlof, G., The Market for'Lemons':Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1970,84(3):488-500.
[195]Alciatore M., P. Easton, and N. Spear, Asset write-downs:a decade of research [J]. Journal of Accounting Literature,1998,17:1-39.
[196]Ali, Ashiq and Hwang, Lee-Seok, Country-Specific Factors Related to Financial Reporting and the Value Relevance of Accounting Data [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2000,38, April:1-21.
[197]Armen A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, Production, information costs, and economic organization [J]. American Economic Review,1972.62, Dec.:777-795.
[198]Armen A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm [J]. Journal of Economic History,1973,33, Mar.:16-27.
[199]Armen A. Alchian, Corporate Management and Property Rights [M]. Chapter9 of Economic Forces at work, Liberty Press.1969.
[200]Bai, Chong-En, Qiao Liu, Joe Lu, Frank M. Song, Jun xi Zhang, Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2004,32:599-616.
[201]Ball R., and P.Brown, An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers [J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1968, Autumn:159-178.
[202]Barth M.E., J.A. Elliott, and M.W. Finn, Market rewards associated with pattens of increasing earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1999, Autumn:387-413.
[203]Bartov E., Lindahl F.W. and Ricks W., Stock price behavior around announcements of write-offs [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,1998,3(4):327-346.
[204]Bartov, E., Gul, F. A., and Tsui, S.L., Discretionary-Accruals Models and Audit Qualifications [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,30:421-452.
[205]Beasley, M. S. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud [J].The Accounting Review,1996,71 (October): 443-465.
[206]Beasley, M. S., J. V. Carcello, D. R. Hermanson, and P. D Lapides. Fraudulent financial reporting:Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms [J]. Accounting Horizons,2000,14 (December):441-454.
[207]Beaver, W.H., McNichols, M.F. The Characteristics and Valuation of Loss Reserves of Property Casualty Insurers [J].Review of Accounting Studies 1998,3:73-95.
[208]Beneish, M. D. The Detection of Earnings Manipulation [J]. Financial Analysts Journal, 1999,24:24-36.
[209]Beneish, M.D. and M. Vargus, Insider Trading, Earnings Quality, and Accrual Mispricing [J]. The Accounting Review,2002,77, October:755-791.
[210]Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process [J]. Journal of Law and Economics.1978, 21:297-326.
[211]Berle Adolf A., and Gardiner C. Means, the Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York, the Macmillan Company,1932.
[212]Bernard V.L, Skinner D.J., What motivates managers' choice of discretionary accruals? [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1996,22:313-325.
[213]Bunsis H., A description and market analysis of write-off announcements [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,1997,24:1385-1400.
[214]Burgstahler, D., and I. Dichev. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1997,24 (December):99-127.
[215]Burgstahler D., J. Jiambalvo, and T. Shevlin, Do stock prices fully reflect the implications of special items for future earnings? [J].Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40 (3): 585-612.
[216]Burgstahler, D., Eames M., Earnings management to avoid losses and earnings decreases. Are analysis fooled [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2003,20 (2):253-294.
[217]Bushman R.M., and R.J. Indjejikian, Accounting income, stock price and managerial compensation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993,16:3-23.
[218]Bushman, R., Chen,Q., Engel, E.,and Smith A., Financial Accounting Information, Organizational Complexity and Corporate Governance Systems [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2004,37:167-201.
[219]Cahan, S. F., The Effect of Antitrust Investigations on Discretionary Accruals:A Refined Test of the Political-Cost Hypothesis [J]. The Accounting Review,1992,67(1):77-95.
[220]Cahan, S.F., B.M. Chavis, R.G. Elmendorf, Earnings Management of Chemical Firms in Response to Political Cost from Environmental Legislation [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,1997,12(1):37-65.
[221]Carcello, J.V., and T.L. Neal, Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor Dismissals following "New" Going-Concern Reports [J]. The Accounting Review,2003,65:131-156.
[222]Chen K, Yuan H., Earnings management and capital resource allocation:evidence from China's accounting-based regulation of rights issues [J]. The Accounting Review,2004, 79:645-665.
[223]Chen, S.K., B. Lin, Y. Wang, L. Wu, The Frequency and Magnitude of Earnings Management:Time Series and Multi-threshold Comparisons in the U. S. Market [J/OL]. Working Paper, University of Rhode Island and Peking University,2005.
[224]Chordia,T., and Shivakumar, L., Momentum, Business Cycle and Time. Varying Expected Returns [J]. Journal of Finance,2002,57:985-1019.
[225]Chtourou S, Bedard J, Courteau L Corporate governance and earnings management [J/OL]. Working Paper, University Laval, Canada,2001.
[226]Chung, R., Firth, M., Kim, J.-B. Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2002,8 (1):29-48.
[227]Claessens Stijn, Djankov Simeon, Lang Larry H.P., The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:1-2.
[228]Coase, R. H., The Nature of the Firm [J]. Economica,1937,4:386-405.
[229]Coase, R. H., The Problem of Social Cost [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1960,3, October:1-44.
[230]Collins J., Shackelford D., Wahlen J., Bank difference in the coordination of regulatory capital, earnings and taxes [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1995,33:263-291.
[231]Davidson, S., Clyde P. Stickney and Roman L. Weil, Accounting:The Language of Business [M]. Sun Lakes, Ariz:T. Horton,1987.
[232]DeAngelo, L. Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes:A study of management buyouts of public stockholders [J]. The Accounting Review.1986,61(3):400-420.
[233]DeAngelo L. E., Managerial competition, information costs and corporate governance:the use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1988,10:3-36.
[234]DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. Skinner. Accounting choices in troubled companies [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994.17(January):113-143.
[235]DeAngelo H., L. DeAngelo L., Ancient redwoods and the politics of finance:the hostile takeover of the Pacific Lumber Company [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998,47(1), Jan:3-53.
[236]Dechow, P.M., R.G. Sloan, Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem:An Empirical Investigation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1991,14(1):51-89.
[237]Dechow, P. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance:the role of accounting accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,18(1):3-42.
[238]Dechow, P., Sloan, R., and Sweeney., Detecting Earnings Management [J]. The Accounting Review,1995a.,70:193-225.
[239]Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney, Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation:An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,1996,13(1):1-36.
[240]DeFond, M.L., and J. Jiambalvo. Incidence and circumstances of accounting errors [J]. The Accounting Review,1991,66 (3):643-655.
[241]Defond M.L., Jiambalvo J. Debt covenant effects and the manipulation of accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,17:145-176.
[242]Degeorge F., Patel J., Zeckhauser R., Earnings management to exceed thresholds [J]. Journal of Business,1999,72:1-33.
[243]Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser, Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds[J]. Journal of Business,1999,72(1):1-33.
[244]Demsetz H, Lehn K. The structure of corporate ownership:causes and consequence [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(6):1155-1177.
[245]Diamond Douglas W., Robert E. Verrecchia, Disclosure liquidity and the cost of capital [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1981,9(3):221-35.
[246]Dichev,I. and D. Skinner, Large Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40 (4):1091-1123.
[247]Douglass North, Institutional Change and Economic Growth [J]. Journal of Economic History,1971,31, Mar:118-125.
[248]Dyck A. and L. Zingales, Private Benefits of Control:An International Comparison [J]. Journal of Finance,2004,59(2):537-600.
[249]Elliott J.A. and Shaw W.H., Write-offs as accounting procedures to manage perceptions [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1988,26:91-119.
[250]Elliott J.A. and J.D. Hanna, Repeated accounting write-offs and the information content of earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1996,34:135-155.
[251]Erlend Kvaal.2005. Topics in accounting for impairment of fixed assets. A dissertation submitted to BI Norwegian School of Management for the Degree of Dr. Oecon.
[252]Fama E., and Jensen M., Separation of Ownership and Control [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:301-325.
[253]Feltham, G. A., and J. A. Ohlson, Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating and financial activities [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research 1995,11:689-732.
[254]Francis J., J.D. Hanna and L. Vincent, Causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offs [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1996,34:117-134.
[255]Friedlan, J., Accounting choices by issuers of initial public offerings [J].Contemporary Accounting Research,1994,11:1-31.
[256]Gaumnitz, J.E and D.R Emery, Asset Growth, Abandonment Value and the Replacement Decision of Like-for-Like Capital Assets[J]. Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1981,15:407-417.
[257]Graham J.R., C. R. Harvey, S. Rajgopal, The economic implications of corporate financial reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40:3-73.
[258]Gray, S.J, Towards a theory of cultural influence on the development of accounting of accounting systems internationally [J]. Abacus,1988,24:1-15.
[259]Grinstein, Yaniv and Michaely, Roni. Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy [J]. Journal of Finance,2005,60, June:1389-1426.
[260]Grossman S. and O. Hart, An Analysis of the Principle-Agent Problem [J]. Econometrica, 1983,51:7-45.
[261]Guay W, Kothari S., and Watt R. A Market Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accrual Models [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1996,34:85-105.
[262]Hall, Steven C. Political Scrutiny and Earnings Management in the Oil Refining Industry [J]. Journal of Accounting & Public Policy,1993,12(4):325-351.
[263]Hall, Steven C., Stammerjohan, William W. Damage Awards and Earnings Management in the Oil Industry [J]. Accounting Review,1997,72(1):47-65.
[264]Han, Jerry C. Y., Shiing-Wu Wang. Political Costs and Earnings Management of Oil Companies During the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis [J]. Accounting Review,1998,73 (1): 103-117.
[265]Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights [J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1964, Oct.:11-25.
[266]Hart O., B. Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts [J].. In Troman F.B. ed. Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress, Cambridge University Press,1987,73-79.
[267]Hart O., J. Moore, Property Rights and Nature of the Firm [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990,98:1119-1158.
[268]Hart O., J. Moore, Default and Renegotiation:A Dynamic Model of Debt [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113:1-42.
[269]Haw I.M, Daqing Qi, Woody Wu., Earnings management of listed firms in response to security regulations in China's emerging capital market [J/OL]. Working Paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong,1998.
[270]Haw I.M., B.Hu, L.S. Hwang, and W. Wu, Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42 (2): 423-462.
[271]Healy, P., The impact of bonus schemes on the selection of accounting principles. Journal of Accounting and Economics [J].1985, (7):85-107.
[272]Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu, Effectiveness of accounting-based dividend covenants [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1990,12:97-123.
[273]Healy P. and J. Wahlen, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implications for Standard Setting [J]. Accounting Horizons,1999,13 (4):365-383.
[274]Heflin, F. and T. Warfield Managerial Discretion in Accounting for Asset Write-offs [J/OL]. Working Paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison,1997.
[275]Hendriksen, E.S., Breda, M.F., Accounting Theory,5th ed., Irwin,1992.
[276]Hofstede, G.H., Culture's Consequences:International Differences in Work Related Values [M]. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, London,1980.
[277]Holmstrom, Bengt, Moral Hazard in Teams [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn,1982, 13(2):324-40.
[278]Holthausen, D. M., A Risk Return Model with Risk and Return Measured from a Target Return [J]. American Economic Review,1981, (71):182-188.
[279]Holthausen R.W., Larcker D.F., Sloan R.G., Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economic,1995,19:29-74.
[280]Hope O.-K., Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy:An International Study [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2003,41(2): 235-272.
[281]Jaffe, J., Special information and insider trading [J]. Journal of Business,1974,47: 410-428.
[282]Jensen M. and W. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3, Oct.3:305-360.
[283]Jian, M. and T. J. Wong, Earning management and tunneling through related party transactions:evidence from Chinese corporate groups [J/OL]. Working Paper, HKUST, 2003.
[284]John B. Canning, The Economics of Accountancy,1929, P.22.
[285]Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling [J]. The American Economic Review,2000,90 (2):22-27.
[286]Jones J., Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29:193-228.
[287]Kang, S. H. and Sivaramakrishnan, K., Issues in Testing Earnings Management and an Instrumental Variable approach [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1995,33(2):353-367.
[288]Kasznik R., On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1999,37:276-302.
[289]Key, Kimberly Galligan. Political Cost Incentives for Earnings Management in the Cable Television Industry [J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics,1997,23(3):309-337.
[290]Kim Sungsoo, Sung S. Kwon, SFAS 121 asset write-down:early vs. late firms [J/OL]. Working Paper, School of Business Rutgers University-Camden,2001.
[291]Klein, A., Audit committees, board of directors characteristics, and earnings management [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33 (3):375-400.
[292]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny The Quality of Government [J]. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1999,15 (1):222-279.
[293]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silames, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World [J]. The Journal of Finance.2000b,55:1-33.
[294]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silames,A. Shleifer, and R.Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,57:1147-70.
[295]La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silames, and A. Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws? [J]. The Journal of Finance,2006,61:1-32.
[296]Lander, Gerald and Alan Reinstein, Implementing the Impairment of Assets Requirements of SFAS No.144:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Managerial Auditing Journal,2004,19(3): 400-411(12).
[297]Leuz, C., D.Nanda, and P. D.Wysocki, Earnings Management and Investor Protection:An International Comparison [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,69(3):505-527.
[298]Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J., A modest proposal for improved corporate governance [J]. The Business Lawyer.1992,48 (1):59-77.
[299]Liu. Michelle M., Accruals and Managerial Operating Decisions Over the Firm Life Cycle [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2006,27(Supplement):153-192.
[300]M. Erickson, S.W. Wang, Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock mergers [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,27:149-176.
[301]McNichols, M. and G.P. Wilson, Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1988,26:1-31.
[302]Mehran, H., Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1995,38, (2):163-184.
[303]Michael L. Moore, Management changes and discretionary accounting decisions [J]. Journal of accounting research,1973,11(1):100-107.
[304]Mirrlees, J.A., Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty [J]. in Balch, M., Mc Fadden, D., and Wu, S., (eds.) Essays in Equilibrium Behavior, Amsterdam:North Holland.1974.
[305]Mirrlees, J.A., The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior:Part Ⅰ [M]. Nuffield College, Oxford, mimeographed.1975.
[306]Mirrlees, J.A., The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization, [J]. Bell Journal of Economics 1976, (7):105-131.
[307]Morck, E., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W.. Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,293-315.
[308]Myers, S., The Capital Structure Puzzle [J]. Journal of Finance,1984,39(3),575-592.
[309]Myers, Stewart and Nicholal S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors Do Not Have [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1984, June,13(2):187-221.
[310]Nelson K.K., Rate Regulation, Competition, and Loss Reserve Discounting by Property-Casualty Insurers [J]. The Accounting Review,75(1):115-138.
[311]Nikos Vafeas, Board meeting frequency and firm performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics 1999,53:113-142.
[312]Park, S., J. Jang, and M. Loeb, Insider Trading Activity Surrounding Annual Earnings Announcements [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,1995,22 (4):587-614.
[313]Peasnell, K., Pope, P., and Yong, S., Board Monitoring and Earnings Management:Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2005,7:1311-1344.
[314]Penman, S. A Comparison of the Information Content of Insider Trading and Management Earnings Forecasts [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1985,20:1-17.
[315]Penman, S. Insider Trading and the Dissemination of Firms' Forecast Information [J]. Journal of Business,1982,55 (4):479-503.
[316]Perry S., T. Williams, Earnings Management Preceding Management Buyout Offers [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,18:157-179.
[317]Petroni K.R., Optimistic reporting in the property casualty insurance Industry [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1992,15:485-508.
[318]Pistor K., C. Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies:Lessons from China [J]. American Law & Economics Review,2005,7(1):184-210.
[319]Rees L., Gill S., and Gore R.,1996. An investigation of asset write-downs and concurrent abnormal accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,34:157-169.
[320]Richardson S., Teoh S.H., Wysocki P., Tracking analysts'forecasts over the annual earnings horizon:are analysts'forecasts optimistic or pessimistic? University of Michigan.1999.
[321]Richardson, S., S.H. Teoh and P.D. Wysocki, The Walk down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2004,21, pp.885-924.
[322]Riedl Edward, An Examination of Long-Lived Asset Impairments [J]. Accounting Review, 2004.79(3):823-852.
[323]Rogers, J., Disclosure quality and management trading incentives [J/OL]. Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania,2004.
[324]Ross L. Watts, Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positiv Accounting Theory, [M]. Prentice-Hall Inc., 1986.
[325]Schipper, Katherine, Commentary on earnings management, Accounting Horizons [J].1989, (3):91-102.
[326]Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. Large shareholders and corporate control [J]. Journal of Political Economy 1986,94,461-488.
[327]Shleifer A. and R. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997,52:737-783.
[328]Skinner, D., Sloan, R., Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don't let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2002,7 (2-3): 289-312.
[329]Smith M., Shareholders activism by institutional investors:Evidence from Calpers [J]. Journal of Finance,1996,51:227-252.
[330]Spence, A.M., Job Market Signaling [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1973,87: 355-374.
[331]Steven N. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy [D]. Chicago:Univ. of Chicago.1969.
[332]Steven N. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm [J]. Journal of Law and Economic, 1983,26.
[333]Stigler, George J. The Economics of Information [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1961, 69 (3):213-225.
[334]Stiglitz, Joseph E., The Theory of'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income [J]. American Economic Review,1975,6:283-300.
[335]Strong J. S., and J.R. Meyer,1987. Asset Write-downs:Managerial incentives and security returns [J]. The Journal of Finance,42(3):643-661.
[336]Subramanyam, K.R., The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1996,22:249-282.
[337]Sweeney A.P., Debt covenant violations and managers'accounting responses [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994, (5):281-308.
[338]Teoh, S.H., I. Welch, and T.J. Wong. Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings [J]. Journal of Finance,1998a,53:1935-1974.
[339]Teoh, S.H., I. Welch, and T.J. Wong. Earnings Management and the Underperformance of Seasoned Equity Offerings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998b,50:63-99.
[340]Thomas A. Ratcliffe, Paul Munter, Practical Guidance in Implementing SFAS No.121 Noncurrent Asset Impairment [J]. National Public Accountant,1998 (7):43-.
[341]Vickrey, W., Auction and Bidding Games, in Recent Advances in Game Theory [J]. Proceedings of a Conference, Princeton:Princeton University Press.1962.
[342]Vickrey, W., Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders [J]. Journal of Finance.1961,16:8-37.
[343]Vickrey, W., Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics 1960,74:507-535.
[344]Wahlen, J., The Nature of Information in Commercial Bank Loan Loss Disclosures [J]. The Accounting Review,1994,69(3):455-478.
[345]Weisbach M.S., Outside Directors and CEO Turnover [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,20:192-203.
[346]Williams O., Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis of Antitrust Implications [M]. New York: Free Press.1975.
[347]Williams O., The Economic Institute of Capitalism [M]. New York, Free Press.1985.
[348]Wright, D. W., Evidence on the relation between corporate governance characteristics and the quality of financial reporting [D]. University of Michigan.1996.
[349]Xie, B., W. N. Davidson, and P. DaDalt. Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance.2003,9: 295-316.
[350]Young D. and D. A. Guenther, Financial Reporting Environments and International Capital Mobility [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2002,41(3):553-579.
[351]Young, S., Systematic measurement error in the estimation of discretionary accruals:An evaluation of alternative modeling procedures [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,1999,26:833-862.
[352]Yu, Qiao, Bin Du, and Qian Sun, Earnings Management at Rights Issues Thresholds: Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2006,30 (12):3453-3468.
[353]Zabihollah Rezaee, James A. Smith, and Rudolph S. Lindbeck, An Examination f Long-Lived Asset Impairments Under SFAS No.121 [J]. International Advances in Economic Research,1996, (2):86-.
[354]Zucca L. J. and D. R. Campbell,1992. A closer look at discretionary write-downs of impaired assets [J]. Accounting Horizon, (9):30-41.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |