高管薪酬契约有效性研究
|
摘要
自我国实行经济体制改革以来,收入分配制度经历了一系列的改革,从传统经济体制下的单一的分配制度造成的平均主义模式,到不断地探索寻求适合发展中社会主义市场经济条件下新的分配制度。因此,如何制定一套有效的适应我国经济转型机制的激励契约已经成为公司治理研究中的一个重要议题。
随着我国资本市场的快速发展,上市公司数量和规模的扩大,上市公司高管薪酬也在快速增长,而且高管薪酬的差距在加大,同时还出现了很多令人费解的现象:某些上市公司当年发生巨额亏损,但公司高管却依然可以拿到丰厚的薪酬;某些公司业绩名列前茅,高管薪酬却在薪酬排名榜上默默无闻;某些上市公司高管年薪的增长远高于公司业绩增长。
那么薪酬制定的依据到底是什么呢?委托代理理论认为,高管的报酬具有激励作用。在委托代理关系中,委托人与代理人的效用函数不一样,委托人追求的是股东财富最大化,而代理人追求自己的工资津贴收入、奢侈消费和闲暇时间最大化等等,这必然导致两者的利益冲突。为了避免两者的冲突,委托人必须设计最优契约来激励代理人。研究表明,出于保护股东和投资者利益的目的,把高管薪酬与公司绩效有效地结合起来的激励契约是有效的。
高管薪酬激励契约的制定依据的原则纷繁复杂,而且不具有透明性。虽然激励的最终目的是提高企业价值、提升公司业绩,但是高管薪酬激励契约的制定还会受到很多公司内在或外在因素的影响,这些影响有可能是可以提高激励有效性的正面影响,也有可能会对激励有效性产生负面的影响。
以往文献先后考察了公司规模、风险、成长性、行业和地区,以及公司治理结构方面的很多因素。但是很少有文献研究政府对高管薪酬激励契约的影响。本文从政府通过制定政策法规的政府管制角度和政府作为公司实际控制人的微观管理角度对上市公司高管薪酬契约的激励有效性的影响进行分析,可以对高管薪酬领域的研究增添一个崭新的视角,同时对于完善我国上市公司的激励机制有一些现实意义,也可以帮助我国各级政府更好地发挥政府职能。
本文将主要研究以下几个问题:
第一,考察高管薪酬契约是否有效地激励了公司管理者,进而达到提高公司业绩的目的,即高管薪酬激励契约是否有效?
第二,中央政府和地方政府作为市场化改革的推动者,在我国的不同地区产生的影响也不同,进而各个地区的市场化进展程度也各不相同。在部分省份,尤其是东部沿海地区,市场化改革已经取得了决定性的进展;而在另外一些省份,非市场因素还占有重要地位。那么在不同地区的上市公司高管薪酬水平是否有差距?不同地区的上市公司的高管薪酬契约的激励有效性是否有差别?即市场化改革进程的不同是否对高管薪酬契约的激励有效性存在影响?
第三,以往研究表明,政府干预会对公司治理产生影响,那么政府作为公司实际控制人对公司经营管理活动进行的干预是否会对高管薪酬水平产生影响?政府作为公司实际控制人对公司经营管理活动进行的干预是否会影响公司高管薪酬契约的激励有效性?中央政府控制企业与地方政府控制企业的高管薪酬水平是否有差别?中央政府作为公司实际控制人与地方政府作为公司实际控制人对高管薪酬契约的激励有效性的影响是否有差别?
第四,不同地区的市场化改革进程对政府控制公司高管薪酬契约的有效性的影响,与对非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约的有效性的影响是否有差别?
针对以上问题,本文构建了回归模型,并利用2001-2005年上市公司的数据进行了实证研究分析,得出如下结论:首先,在总体上得到了我国上市公司的高管薪酬契约具有激励有效性的证据,这个结果同以往的研究结论是一致的。其次,数据结果没有发现我国的市场化改革进展程度对上市公司高管薪酬契约的有效性产生影响,即检验结果没有支持“市场化改革进程会提高高管薪酬对业绩的敏感性”的假设。对此,本文把样本按照公司实际控制人性质分为政府控制公司和非政府控制公司两个分样本,进行了进一步的研究分析,结果显示:对于政府控制公司的数据样本,数据结果同前面的结论一样,没有发现市场化程度的提高影响到高管薪酬对于业绩的敏感性;对于非政府控制公司的数据样本,数据结果出现了相反的结论,市场化改革提高了高管薪酬对于业绩的敏感性。即相对于政府控制上市公司,市场化改革进程对非政府控制上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响更显著。
本文认为由于在全样本数据中非政府控制公司的样本数量只有880个,占全样本数据量(4728个)的比例不到20%,比例较小,而占全样本比例较大的政府控制公司,由于受到政策性负担以及公司的社会目标等因素的影响,致使高管薪酬契约难以真正地与公司业绩挂钩,进而使薪酬契约的激励效果难以发挥。由于受占全样本数量80%以上的政府控制公司的样本数据的影响,本文分析的全样本数据的回归结果才没有支持“市场化改革进程会提高高管薪酬对业绩的敏感性”的假设。
最后,本文关于公司实际控制人性质对于高管薪酬契约有效性的影响的研究结果显示,非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约对于业绩的敏感性要高于政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约对于业绩的敏感性,即非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约的激励有效性要好于政府控制公司;对于中央政府控制公司和地方政府控制公司高管薪酬契约有效性的检验结果则是:两类公司的高管薪酬契约的激励效果有差异,相对于地方政府作为实际控制人,中央政府作为实际控制人对于上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响更显著。
本文通过考察市场化改革和公司实际控制人性质对公司高管薪酬的影响,从外部环境因素和内部机制因素两个方面研究了高管薪酬契约的影响因素;同时,也从政府作为政策监管制定者和公司实际控制人两个角度说明了政府行为对公司治理结构的干预和影响。
最后,本文给出如下建议:公司治理结构要依据制度环境进行动态调整,只有适应制度环境的要求才能发挥作用;进一步改变政府经济职能,减少政府对于市场和企业的过多干预、更好地发挥市场的资源配置作用。
Since the restructuring of economic system in China, income distribution system has undergone series of reforms, from the egalitarianism resulting from the single distribution system under the traditional economy to the striving for exploring the new distribution system in keeping with the development of social market economy, therefore, It has been one of the important topics relating to the study of corporate governance how to establish an efficient incentive contract system suitable for the transformation of the national economy.
With the rapid development of china capital market, more and more companies are listed and increased in scale. The executive pay of listed companies also increased rapidly and the gap between executive`s pay have been widened. At the same time, people are puzzling by such facts as some companies made huge losses, but the management got well-paid, some companies performance ranked former position, but the executive pay don’t rank the compensation scorecard.(without attracting public attention);For some companies, the annual increase rate of compensation for the executive is far higher than the increase rate of its performance.
Therefore what is the benchmark for the determination of the executive pay? The principal-agent theory assumes that the executive pay has incentive function. In the principal-agent relationship, the utility function of principal and agent are different, the principal pursues for the maximization of shareholder wealth, the agent strives for the maximum of personal salary and bonus, position-related consumption, leisure time and so on. The difference will necessarily result in the conflict between them. In order to compromise the conflict, the principal must design an optimum contract to make incentive to the agent. The studies indicate that the incentive contract is efficient from the viewpoint of protecting the interest of shareholders and investors, linking between the executive pay and corporate performance.
Owing to the complexity and lack of transparency of the principles underlying the determination of the pay-performance incentive contracts, many factors, inside and outside the company will have influence, of which probably having positive effect on increasing the effectiveness, otherwise negative effect on decreasing the effectiveness, on the establishment of the pay-performance incentive contracts for the executives of which the final purpose is to increase corporate value, promote corporate performance.
The former essay studied respectively the influences of corporate scale, risk, growth, industry and region, and corporate governance on the executive pay incentive contracts in sequence, but made less study of the effect of the government. This paper analyzed the effects on the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contracts of the government from the macro viewpoint of regulating the law and legislations and from the micro viewpoint of real controller of company. This paper will not only add a new viewpoint to the study of the executive pay incentive, but also have some significance in perfecting incentive mechanism of listed company. This paper will also be helpful to better perform their role for the government at all level. This paper mainly study some questions as follows:
First, to study the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract by analyzing whether pay incentive contract stimulate the executive to achieving the purpose of improving corporate performance.
In China, the central and local government are acting as the advocator of the market-oriented reform. Owing to the influence from the governments above varied from different regions, thereby the progressiveness in market reform varies. In some provinces, in particular, east coastal regions, market reform has achieved decisive progress, but in other regions, non market factors still play an important parts. Therefore, this paper secondly study the effect of the progress of market-oriented reform in different regions on the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract by examining whether there are differences in the executive pay level and in the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract of listed companies in different regions.
Thirdly, the former studies indicated that government intervention has effect on the corporate governance. Therefore, whether there are influences on the executive pay level and on the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract by the government intervening the corporate management acting as the real controller of the company? whether there are differences in the executive pay level and in the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract between the listed companies controlled by central government and local government?
Fourthly, whether the progress of market-oriented reform in different regions influence the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract of private companies? whether the progress of market-oriented reform in different regions influence the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract of the companies controlled by the government?
After analyzing empirically by establishing a regression model the data on the listed companies over 2001-2005 relating to the questions mentioned above, this paper drew the following conclusions that the executive pay contracts of listed companies have incentive effectiveness as a whole firstly, consistent with the previous research findings; Secondly, the data analysis indicated that the degree of progress in market-oriented reform has no influence on the effectiveness of the executive pay contract of listed companies, i.e. data analysis don’t support the hypothesis that the process of market-oriented reform improve the sensitivity of executive pay to corporate performance.
In order to make further analysis, this paper classified the segment data according to the real controller of the companies into two sections: data of government-controlled listed companies and data of non-government-controlled listed companies. The further analysis indicated that for the government-controlled companies, a higher level of marketization don’t improve the sensitivity of the executive pay to corporate performance consistent with the conclusions mentioned above, but for the non-government-controlled companies, the process of market-oriented reform improve the sensitivity of the executive pay to corporate performance. i.e. relative to the government-controlled listed companies, market-oriented reform process of the non-government-controlled listed companies influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts more significantly.
In this paper, the sample size of non-government-controlled companies only amounted to 880, less than 20%of the full sample data companies(amounting to 4728), government-controlled companies accounted for a larger proportion of the total sample. For the government-controlled companies, as a result of the policy burden, and the company's social goals and other factors, executive compensation contracts can hardly be linked with corporate performance effectively, thereby enabling the incentive effects of compensation contracts is difficult to play. Resulting from the impact of government-controlled companies which accounted for more than 80% of the total number of samples, the regression results of the full sample of data in this paper do not support the "market-oriented affect the sensitivity of executive pay for corporate performance" hypothesis.
Finally, the study of the influence of the nature of real controller of companies on the effectiveness of the executive pay contract indicated that the sensitivity degree of the executive pay to corporate performance for the non-government-controlled companies is higher than that for the government-controlled companies, i.e. for the non-government controlled company, the effectiveness of the executive incentive compensation contract is better than the that of government-controlled companies. The test results of the incentive effects of executive compensation contracts for the companies controlled by the central government and local government are different , the central government acting as real controller influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts more significantly than that by local government.
This paper investigated the factors which affect the executive pay contract of listed companies from the external environment and internal mechanism respectively by examining the effect of market-oriented reform and the nature of real controller on the executive pay. At the same time, this paper analyzed the effect of government behavior and its intervention on the corporate governance structure acting as legislation regulator and real controller of the company respectively.
Finally, several suggestions were given base on the former analysis in the end of this paper. On one hand, in order to play the role, the structure of corporate governance should adjusted dynamically to meet the requirements of the environment; On the other hand, we should further change the role of the government, lessen government intervention to market and company, let the market play an increasingly important role in resource allocation.
随着我国资本市场的快速发展,上市公司数量和规模的扩大,上市公司高管薪酬也在快速增长,而且高管薪酬的差距在加大,同时还出现了很多令人费解的现象:某些上市公司当年发生巨额亏损,但公司高管却依然可以拿到丰厚的薪酬;某些公司业绩名列前茅,高管薪酬却在薪酬排名榜上默默无闻;某些上市公司高管年薪的增长远高于公司业绩增长。
那么薪酬制定的依据到底是什么呢?委托代理理论认为,高管的报酬具有激励作用。在委托代理关系中,委托人与代理人的效用函数不一样,委托人追求的是股东财富最大化,而代理人追求自己的工资津贴收入、奢侈消费和闲暇时间最大化等等,这必然导致两者的利益冲突。为了避免两者的冲突,委托人必须设计最优契约来激励代理人。研究表明,出于保护股东和投资者利益的目的,把高管薪酬与公司绩效有效地结合起来的激励契约是有效的。
高管薪酬激励契约的制定依据的原则纷繁复杂,而且不具有透明性。虽然激励的最终目的是提高企业价值、提升公司业绩,但是高管薪酬激励契约的制定还会受到很多公司内在或外在因素的影响,这些影响有可能是可以提高激励有效性的正面影响,也有可能会对激励有效性产生负面的影响。
以往文献先后考察了公司规模、风险、成长性、行业和地区,以及公司治理结构方面的很多因素。但是很少有文献研究政府对高管薪酬激励契约的影响。本文从政府通过制定政策法规的政府管制角度和政府作为公司实际控制人的微观管理角度对上市公司高管薪酬契约的激励有效性的影响进行分析,可以对高管薪酬领域的研究增添一个崭新的视角,同时对于完善我国上市公司的激励机制有一些现实意义,也可以帮助我国各级政府更好地发挥政府职能。
本文将主要研究以下几个问题:
第一,考察高管薪酬契约是否有效地激励了公司管理者,进而达到提高公司业绩的目的,即高管薪酬激励契约是否有效?
第二,中央政府和地方政府作为市场化改革的推动者,在我国的不同地区产生的影响也不同,进而各个地区的市场化进展程度也各不相同。在部分省份,尤其是东部沿海地区,市场化改革已经取得了决定性的进展;而在另外一些省份,非市场因素还占有重要地位。那么在不同地区的上市公司高管薪酬水平是否有差距?不同地区的上市公司的高管薪酬契约的激励有效性是否有差别?即市场化改革进程的不同是否对高管薪酬契约的激励有效性存在影响?
第三,以往研究表明,政府干预会对公司治理产生影响,那么政府作为公司实际控制人对公司经营管理活动进行的干预是否会对高管薪酬水平产生影响?政府作为公司实际控制人对公司经营管理活动进行的干预是否会影响公司高管薪酬契约的激励有效性?中央政府控制企业与地方政府控制企业的高管薪酬水平是否有差别?中央政府作为公司实际控制人与地方政府作为公司实际控制人对高管薪酬契约的激励有效性的影响是否有差别?
第四,不同地区的市场化改革进程对政府控制公司高管薪酬契约的有效性的影响,与对非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约的有效性的影响是否有差别?
针对以上问题,本文构建了回归模型,并利用2001-2005年上市公司的数据进行了实证研究分析,得出如下结论:首先,在总体上得到了我国上市公司的高管薪酬契约具有激励有效性的证据,这个结果同以往的研究结论是一致的。其次,数据结果没有发现我国的市场化改革进展程度对上市公司高管薪酬契约的有效性产生影响,即检验结果没有支持“市场化改革进程会提高高管薪酬对业绩的敏感性”的假设。对此,本文把样本按照公司实际控制人性质分为政府控制公司和非政府控制公司两个分样本,进行了进一步的研究分析,结果显示:对于政府控制公司的数据样本,数据结果同前面的结论一样,没有发现市场化程度的提高影响到高管薪酬对于业绩的敏感性;对于非政府控制公司的数据样本,数据结果出现了相反的结论,市场化改革提高了高管薪酬对于业绩的敏感性。即相对于政府控制上市公司,市场化改革进程对非政府控制上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响更显著。
本文认为由于在全样本数据中非政府控制公司的样本数量只有880个,占全样本数据量(4728个)的比例不到20%,比例较小,而占全样本比例较大的政府控制公司,由于受到政策性负担以及公司的社会目标等因素的影响,致使高管薪酬契约难以真正地与公司业绩挂钩,进而使薪酬契约的激励效果难以发挥。由于受占全样本数量80%以上的政府控制公司的样本数据的影响,本文分析的全样本数据的回归结果才没有支持“市场化改革进程会提高高管薪酬对业绩的敏感性”的假设。
最后,本文关于公司实际控制人性质对于高管薪酬契约有效性的影响的研究结果显示,非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约对于业绩的敏感性要高于政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约对于业绩的敏感性,即非政府控制公司的高管薪酬契约的激励有效性要好于政府控制公司;对于中央政府控制公司和地方政府控制公司高管薪酬契约有效性的检验结果则是:两类公司的高管薪酬契约的激励效果有差异,相对于地方政府作为实际控制人,中央政府作为实际控制人对于上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响更显著。
本文通过考察市场化改革和公司实际控制人性质对公司高管薪酬的影响,从外部环境因素和内部机制因素两个方面研究了高管薪酬契约的影响因素;同时,也从政府作为政策监管制定者和公司实际控制人两个角度说明了政府行为对公司治理结构的干预和影响。
最后,本文给出如下建议:公司治理结构要依据制度环境进行动态调整,只有适应制度环境的要求才能发挥作用;进一步改变政府经济职能,减少政府对于市场和企业的过多干预、更好地发挥市场的资源配置作用。
Since the restructuring of economic system in China, income distribution system has undergone series of reforms, from the egalitarianism resulting from the single distribution system under the traditional economy to the striving for exploring the new distribution system in keeping with the development of social market economy, therefore, It has been one of the important topics relating to the study of corporate governance how to establish an efficient incentive contract system suitable for the transformation of the national economy.
With the rapid development of china capital market, more and more companies are listed and increased in scale. The executive pay of listed companies also increased rapidly and the gap between executive`s pay have been widened. At the same time, people are puzzling by such facts as some companies made huge losses, but the management got well-paid, some companies performance ranked former position, but the executive pay don’t rank the compensation scorecard.(without attracting public attention);For some companies, the annual increase rate of compensation for the executive is far higher than the increase rate of its performance.
Therefore what is the benchmark for the determination of the executive pay? The principal-agent theory assumes that the executive pay has incentive function. In the principal-agent relationship, the utility function of principal and agent are different, the principal pursues for the maximization of shareholder wealth, the agent strives for the maximum of personal salary and bonus, position-related consumption, leisure time and so on. The difference will necessarily result in the conflict between them. In order to compromise the conflict, the principal must design an optimum contract to make incentive to the agent. The studies indicate that the incentive contract is efficient from the viewpoint of protecting the interest of shareholders and investors, linking between the executive pay and corporate performance.
Owing to the complexity and lack of transparency of the principles underlying the determination of the pay-performance incentive contracts, many factors, inside and outside the company will have influence, of which probably having positive effect on increasing the effectiveness, otherwise negative effect on decreasing the effectiveness, on the establishment of the pay-performance incentive contracts for the executives of which the final purpose is to increase corporate value, promote corporate performance.
The former essay studied respectively the influences of corporate scale, risk, growth, industry and region, and corporate governance on the executive pay incentive contracts in sequence, but made less study of the effect of the government. This paper analyzed the effects on the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contracts of the government from the macro viewpoint of regulating the law and legislations and from the micro viewpoint of real controller of company. This paper will not only add a new viewpoint to the study of the executive pay incentive, but also have some significance in perfecting incentive mechanism of listed company. This paper will also be helpful to better perform their role for the government at all level. This paper mainly study some questions as follows:
First, to study the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract by analyzing whether pay incentive contract stimulate the executive to achieving the purpose of improving corporate performance.
In China, the central and local government are acting as the advocator of the market-oriented reform. Owing to the influence from the governments above varied from different regions, thereby the progressiveness in market reform varies. In some provinces, in particular, east coastal regions, market reform has achieved decisive progress, but in other regions, non market factors still play an important parts. Therefore, this paper secondly study the effect of the progress of market-oriented reform in different regions on the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract by examining whether there are differences in the executive pay level and in the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract of listed companies in different regions.
Thirdly, the former studies indicated that government intervention has effect on the corporate governance. Therefore, whether there are influences on the executive pay level and on the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract by the government intervening the corporate management acting as the real controller of the company? whether there are differences in the executive pay level and in the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract between the listed companies controlled by central government and local government?
Fourthly, whether the progress of market-oriented reform in different regions influence the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract of private companies? whether the progress of market-oriented reform in different regions influence the effectiveness of the executive pay incentive contract of the companies controlled by the government?
After analyzing empirically by establishing a regression model the data on the listed companies over 2001-2005 relating to the questions mentioned above, this paper drew the following conclusions that the executive pay contracts of listed companies have incentive effectiveness as a whole firstly, consistent with the previous research findings; Secondly, the data analysis indicated that the degree of progress in market-oriented reform has no influence on the effectiveness of the executive pay contract of listed companies, i.e. data analysis don’t support the hypothesis that the process of market-oriented reform improve the sensitivity of executive pay to corporate performance.
In order to make further analysis, this paper classified the segment data according to the real controller of the companies into two sections: data of government-controlled listed companies and data of non-government-controlled listed companies. The further analysis indicated that for the government-controlled companies, a higher level of marketization don’t improve the sensitivity of the executive pay to corporate performance consistent with the conclusions mentioned above, but for the non-government-controlled companies, the process of market-oriented reform improve the sensitivity of the executive pay to corporate performance. i.e. relative to the government-controlled listed companies, market-oriented reform process of the non-government-controlled listed companies influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts more significantly.
In this paper, the sample size of non-government-controlled companies only amounted to 880, less than 20%of the full sample data companies(amounting to 4728), government-controlled companies accounted for a larger proportion of the total sample. For the government-controlled companies, as a result of the policy burden, and the company's social goals and other factors, executive compensation contracts can hardly be linked with corporate performance effectively, thereby enabling the incentive effects of compensation contracts is difficult to play. Resulting from the impact of government-controlled companies which accounted for more than 80% of the total number of samples, the regression results of the full sample of data in this paper do not support the "market-oriented affect the sensitivity of executive pay for corporate performance" hypothesis.
Finally, the study of the influence of the nature of real controller of companies on the effectiveness of the executive pay contract indicated that the sensitivity degree of the executive pay to corporate performance for the non-government-controlled companies is higher than that for the government-controlled companies, i.e. for the non-government controlled company, the effectiveness of the executive incentive compensation contract is better than the that of government-controlled companies. The test results of the incentive effects of executive compensation contracts for the companies controlled by the central government and local government are different , the central government acting as real controller influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts more significantly than that by local government.
This paper investigated the factors which affect the executive pay contract of listed companies from the external environment and internal mechanism respectively by examining the effect of market-oriented reform and the nature of real controller on the executive pay. At the same time, this paper analyzed the effect of government behavior and its intervention on the corporate governance structure acting as legislation regulator and real controller of the company respectively.
Finally, several suggestions were given base on the former analysis in the end of this paper. On one hand, in order to play the role, the structure of corporate governance should adjusted dynamically to meet the requirements of the environment; On the other hand, we should further change the role of the government, lessen government intervention to market and company, let the market play an increasingly important role in resource allocation.
引文
[1]曹红辉、董军、王华.对差异化政策、地方政府行为与地区金融生态关系的考察[J].经济研究参考,2006(40):2-7.
[2]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与企业绩效[D].上海:上海财经大学,2002.
[3]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与补贴收入[J].财经研究,2003(9):15-21.
[4]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101
[5]陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约[J].经济研究,2008(3):60-72.
[6]陈爽英,唐小我.股权结构与高管人员薪酬的实证研究[J].软科学,2005(19):23-28.
[7]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001(12)
[8]陈小悦,肖星,过晓燕.配股权与上市公司盈利操纵[J].经济研究,2000(1).
[9]陈信元,叶鹏飞,陈冬华.机会主义资产重组与刚性管制[J].经济研究,2003(5)
[10]陈志广.高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2002(5)
[11]杜胜利,翟艳玲.总经理年度报酬决定因素的实证分析——以我国上市公司为例[J].管理世界,2005(8):115-120.
[12]杜兴强,王丽华.高层当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性研究[J].会计研究,2007(1):58-65.
[13]樊纲,王晓鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告(2006年)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006.
[14]高雷,宋顺林.高管报酬激励与企业绩效——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].财经科学,2007(4):35-46.
[15]胡铭.上市公司高层经理与经营绩效的实证分析[J].财贸经济,2003(4):59-62.
[16]堪新民,刘善敏.上市公司经营者报酬结构差异性的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(8):55-63.
[17]李东平.大股东控制、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡[D].上海财经大学,2001.
[18]李琦.上市公司高管薪酬影响因素分析[J].经济科学,2003(6):37-45.
[19]李亚静,朱宏泉,黄登仕,周应峰.董事会控制、经理报酬与公司经营绩效[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005(2).
[20]李增泉.国家控股与公司治理的有效性——一项基于中国证券市场的实证研究[D].上海:上海财经大学,2002.
[21]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(11)
[22]林毅夫,李志.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004(2):17-27.
[23]林毅夫,蔡昉,李周.中国的奇迹:发展战略与经济改革[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2002.
[24]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3)
[25]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约——来自国有上市公司的经验数据[J].管理世界,2007(9):76-84.
[26]刘国亮,王加胜.上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,2000(5):40-45.
[27]刘洪,赵曙明.企业家薪酬确定的原则、影响因素与方案[J].中华软科学,2006(6):8-13.
[28]茅铭晨.政府管制理论研究综述[J].管理世界,2007(2):137-150.
[29]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008(4):41-52.
[30]彭碧玉.经理薪酬的影响因素分析[J].现代管理科学,2004(10):23-25.
[31]邵平,刘林,孔爱国.高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感性因素分析[J].财经研究,2001(1):94-104.
[32]宋增基,张宗益.上市公司经营者报酬与公司绩效的实证研究[J].重庆大学学报,2002(11):90-93.
[33]孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5):52-63.
[34]田志龙,邓新明.企业市场行为、非市场行为与竞争互动[J].管理世界,2007(8):116-127.
[35]王北星,金淑华,周佰成.国有企业公司治理、业绩与高管报酬的关系研究[J].税务与经济,2007(1):45-48.
[36]王海波,韩素萍,杜兰英.湖北省上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效实证研究[J].当代经济,2006(6):53-54.
[37]王华,黄之俊.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006(9):101-115.
[38]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7):111-119.
[39]王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论———基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用[M].北京:商务印书馆,2001.
[40]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[41]夏立军.政府干预与市场失灵——上市公司之会计师事务所选择研究[D].上海:上海财经大学,2005.
[42]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值[J].经济研究,2005(5):40-51.
[43]肖继辉.有关经理报酬决定因素的实证研究[J].当代财经,2005(5):69-79.
[44]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究[M].郭大力、王亚南译.北京:商务印书馆,1972.
[45]燕志雄,费方域.企业融资中的控制权安排与企业家的激励[J].经济研究,2007(2):111-122.
[46]杨汉明.高管薪酬与上市公司绩效的实证研究[J].统计与决策,2004(12):93-95.
[47]杨惠馨,王胡峰.国有企业高层管理人员激励与企业绩效实证研究[J].南开经济研究,2006(4):82-97 .
[48]杨瑞龙,刘江.经理报酬、企业绩效与股权结构的实证研究[J].江苏行政学院学报,2002(1)
[49]姚正海.股权结构与公司经营业绩相关性的思考——基于江苏上市公司的实证分析[J].财会研究,2005 (10):46-47.
[50]余晖.论政府管制与行政改革[J].中国工业经济,1997(5).
[51]曾庆生.国家控股、超额雇员与公司价值——一向基于中国证券市场的实证研究[D].上海:上海财经大学,2004.
[52]张必武,石金涛.董事会特征、高管薪酬与业绩敏感性——中国上市公司的经验分析[J].管理科学,2005
[53]张恩众,张文斌.影响上市公司高管薪酬的因素分析[J].经济问题探索,2007(11):124-127.
[54]张晖明,陈志广.高级管理人员激励与企业绩效——以沪市上市公司为样本的实证研究[J].世界经济文汇,2002(6):29-37.
[55]张建红,J.Paul Elhorst,Arjen van Witteloostuijn.中国地区工资水平差异的影响因素分析[J].经济研究,2006(10):62-70.
[56]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9)
[57]张晓晶.中国市场化进程报告:现状分析与未来预测[J].管理世界,2004(3):5-13.
[58]张小宁.人力资源资本化的若干问题[J].中国工业经济,2001(5):63-69.
[59]张雪岷.基于EVA的中国上市公司高级管理人员薪酬激励研究[D].哈尔滨工程大学,2006.
[60]赵西萍,李有根,李怀祖.董事会构成与经理控制机制关系研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002(11):64-69.
[61]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励治理效应研究[J].经济研究,2003(5):96-105.
[62]周兆生.中国上市公司总经理激励的实证研究[J].企业改革,2003(3):50-57.
[63]Abowd, J. M.. Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance? [J]. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1990, 43(3): 32–73.
[64]Adward A.Dy1.Corporate control and management compensation:Evidence on the agency problem[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,1988(9):21-25.
[65]Aggrawal. Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: The case of anti-takeover charter amendents[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1990(25):143-161.
[66]Aleksandar Andjelkovic,Glean Boyle,Warren Mcnoe.Public disclosure of executive compensation: Do shares need to know[J]. pacific-basin Finance Journal,2001(10):91-117.
[67]Antle R. and A. Smith. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1986(24):1-39.
[68]Baker, George P., and Brian J. Hall. CEO incentives and firm size[J]. Journal of Labor Economics ,2004,22 (4): 767-798.
[69]Baker,Jensen and Murphy. Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs theory[J]. Journal of Finance,1988,43(3):593-616.
[70]Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(3): 901–932.
[71]Boyd B..Board control and CEO compensation[J].Strategic Management Journal,1994(15):335-344.
[72]Burgess, Jr. G. H.. The Economics of Regulation and Antitrust[M].New York, Harper Collins College Publishers,1995.
[73]Conyon, Martin J., and He Lerong. Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms[J]. Journal of Management Accounting Research,2004,16: 35-56.
[74]Conyon, Martin J., and Kevin J. Murphy. The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom[J]. The Economic Journal,2000,110(467): 640-671.
[75]Conyon, Martin J., and Simon I. Peck. Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1998,41(2): 146-157.
[76]Conyon, M. J., & Murphy, K. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom[J]. Economic Journal,2000, 110(467): 640–671. 2003,46(2): 151–158.
[77]Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Larcker, D. F. Executive compensation and incentives: A survey[J]. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,2003,9(1): 27–50.
[78]Core, John E., Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51 (3): 371-406.
[79]Coughlan Anne and Ronald Schmidt. Executive compensation,managementturnover , and firm performance: An emprical investigation[J]. Journal of accounting and Economics,,1985(7):43-65.
[80]Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn. The structure of corporate-ownership causes and consequences[J]. Journal of Political Economy ,1985,93 (6): 1155-1177.
[81]Denis and Sarin. Ownership and Board structure in public traded corporation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999(3):187-223.
[82]Falna, Jesen.CEO duality and firm performance : A contingence model[J].Strategic Management Journal,1983(16):301-312.
[83]Eric C. Chang,Sonia M. L. Wong Political control and performance in China’s listed firms[J].Journal Comparative Economics,2004(32):617-636.
[84]Firth, Michael, M. Tam, and M. Tang. The determinants of top management pay. Omega-International[J]. Journal of Management Science ,1999,27(6): 617-635.
[85]Gave J.J.and Gaver K.M..Compensation policy and the investment opportunity set[J]. Fianancial management,1995(6):125.
[86]Gibbons R. and Murphy K.J. Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers[J]. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1990,43(3).
[87]Guy,Frederick.CEO pay,shareholder returns and accounting profit international[J]. Journal of the economics of business,2000(7):263-274.
[88]Hall, B., & Murphy, K. Stock options for undiversified executives[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33(2): 3–21.
[89]Hall, Brian J., and Jeffrey B. Liebman. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113 (3): 653-691.
[90]Hall, P. A., & Gingerich, D. W. Varieties of capitalism andinstitutional complementarities in the macroeconomy: An empirical analysis[J]. Berlin Journal of Sociology,2004,14(1): 5–32.
[91]Hambrick D.C.,Finkestein S. The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: the case of CEO pay raises[J]. Journal of strategic management,1995(16):175-193.
[92]Havell and Holmstrom. The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation[J]. Journal of Economics,1979(10):118-125.
[93]Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael S. Weisbach. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO[J]. American Economic Review,1998,88(1):96-118.
[94]Holmstrom, Bengt. Moral hazard and observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economics ,1979,10(1): 74-91.
[95]Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. Performance pay and top management incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy ,1990,98(2):225–264.
[96]Jensen M. C. and K. J. Murphy. Performance pay and top management incentive[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990a(98):225-264.
[97]Jensen M. C. and K. J. Murphy. CEO incentives-It’s not how much you pay, but how[J]. Harvard Business Review,1990b(68):138-153.
[98]Jensen, Michael C., and J. B. Warner. The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics ,1988,20 (12): 3-24.
[99]Jensen Michael C. , William H. Meckling. Theory of the firm : Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Ecomics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[100]Jensen M.C..The modern industrial revolution,exit,and failure of internal control system[J].Journal of Finance,1993,84(3):831-880.
[101]Jingjing Xu and Changjiang Lu. Accounting conservatism: A studyof market-level and firm-level explanatory factors [J]. China Journal of Accounting Research,2008(1):11-20.
[102]Joscow Paul,Nancy Rose,and Shepard Andrea. Regulatory Constraints on CEO compensation[J]. Brookings Papers:Microeconomics,1993.
[103]Korr J. and Kron L. Effect of relative decision monitoring on chief executive compensation[J]. Industry and Labor Relations Review,1990,43(3).
[104]Kren J.and Kerr J..THe effect of outside directors and board shareholdings on the relation between CEO and firm performance[J]. Accounting and Business Research,1997(27):297-309.
[105]Lala-Belkaoui and Pavlik. The impact of risk on executive compensation[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1993.
[106]Lewellen and Huntsman. Managerial pay and corporate performance[J]. The American Economic Review,1970(4):710-720.
[107]Lipton M.,Lorsch J.W. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance[J]. Journal of Business Lawyer,1992(48):59-77.
[108]Mcguire, Chiu and Elbeing. Executive income, sales, and profits[J]. American Economics Review,,1962(51):753-761.
[109]Murdoch J..Executive compensation:The use of incentive contracts to attenuate and agency problem[D].University of Calofornaia,Los Angeles unpublished Ph.D.Dissertation,1991.
[110]Murphy K.J. Corporate performance and Managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis[J]. Journal of financial economics,1995(7):11-42.
[111]Murphy K. R. S. and Salter M. S.Should CEO pay be linked to results? [J]. Harvard Business Review,1975(53):66-73.
[112]P.Zre Land. Company law and the myth of shareholder ownership[J].Modern Law Review,1999(62):32-57.
[113]Rechner Dalton. CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1999.
[114]Rexford E.Santerre, Stephen P.Neun. Stock dispersion and executive compention[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1986(68):685-687.
[115]R.Lambert, D.F.Larcker. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1987(25):85-125.
[116]R.Sloan. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993(16):55-100.
[117]Rosen. The Conflict between managers and Shareholders[J] NBER working paper,1992(10):320-323.
[118]Rosen, Sherwin. Authority, control and distribution of earnings[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1982(2):311-323.
[119]Taussings F.W.and Baker W.S. American corporations and their executives: a statistical inquiry[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1925(3):1-51.
[120]Tosi H.L.,Werner S.,Katz J.. How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of executive compensation studies[J]. Journal of Management,2000(2):301-339.
[121]Yermack, David. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics ,1996,40 (2): 185-211.
[2]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与企业绩效[D].上海:上海财经大学,2002.
[3]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与补贴收入[J].财经研究,2003(9):15-21.
[4]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101
[5]陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约[J].经济研究,2008(3):60-72.
[6]陈爽英,唐小我.股权结构与高管人员薪酬的实证研究[J].软科学,2005(19):23-28.
[7]陈晓,李静.地方政府财政行为在提升上市公司业绩中的作用探析[J].会计研究,2001(12)
[8]陈小悦,肖星,过晓燕.配股权与上市公司盈利操纵[J].经济研究,2000(1).
[9]陈信元,叶鹏飞,陈冬华.机会主义资产重组与刚性管制[J].经济研究,2003(5)
[10]陈志广.高级管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2002(5)
[11]杜胜利,翟艳玲.总经理年度报酬决定因素的实证分析——以我国上市公司为例[J].管理世界,2005(8):115-120.
[12]杜兴强,王丽华.高层当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性研究[J].会计研究,2007(1):58-65.
[13]樊纲,王晓鲁,朱恒鹏.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告(2006年)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006.
[14]高雷,宋顺林.高管报酬激励与企业绩效——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].财经科学,2007(4):35-46.
[15]胡铭.上市公司高层经理与经营绩效的实证分析[J].财贸经济,2003(4):59-62.
[16]堪新民,刘善敏.上市公司经营者报酬结构差异性的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(8):55-63.
[17]李东平.大股东控制、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡[D].上海财经大学,2001.
[18]李琦.上市公司高管薪酬影响因素分析[J].经济科学,2003(6):37-45.
[19]李亚静,朱宏泉,黄登仕,周应峰.董事会控制、经理报酬与公司经营绩效[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005(2).
[20]李增泉.国家控股与公司治理的有效性——一项基于中国证券市场的实证研究[D].上海:上海财经大学,2002.
[21]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(11)
[22]林毅夫,李志.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004(2):17-27.
[23]林毅夫,蔡昉,李周.中国的奇迹:发展战略与经济改革[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2002.
[24]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3)
[25]刘凤委,孙铮,李增泉.政府干预、行业竞争与薪酬契约——来自国有上市公司的经验数据[J].管理世界,2007(9):76-84.
[26]刘国亮,王加胜.上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,2000(5):40-45.
[27]刘洪,赵曙明.企业家薪酬确定的原则、影响因素与方案[J].中华软科学,2006(6):8-13.
[28]茅铭晨.政府管制理论研究综述[J].管理世界,2007(2):137-150.
[29]潘红波,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008(4):41-52.
[30]彭碧玉.经理薪酬的影响因素分析[J].现代管理科学,2004(10):23-25.
[31]邵平,刘林,孔爱国.高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感性因素分析[J].财经研究,2001(1):94-104.
[32]宋增基,张宗益.上市公司经营者报酬与公司绩效的实证研究[J].重庆大学学报,2002(11):90-93.
[33]孙铮,刘凤委,李增泉.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5):52-63.
[34]田志龙,邓新明.企业市场行为、非市场行为与竞争互动[J].管理世界,2007(8):116-127.
[35]王北星,金淑华,周佰成.国有企业公司治理、业绩与高管报酬的关系研究[J].税务与经济,2007(1):45-48.
[36]王海波,韩素萍,杜兰英.湖北省上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效实证研究[J].当代经济,2006(6):53-54.
[37]王华,黄之俊.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006(9):101-115.
[38]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7):111-119.
[39]王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论———基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用[M].北京:商务印书馆,2001.
[40]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[41]夏立军.政府干预与市场失灵——上市公司之会计师事务所选择研究[D].上海:上海财经大学,2005.
[42]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值[J].经济研究,2005(5):40-51.
[43]肖继辉.有关经理报酬决定因素的实证研究[J].当代财经,2005(5):69-79.
[44]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因的研究[M].郭大力、王亚南译.北京:商务印书馆,1972.
[45]燕志雄,费方域.企业融资中的控制权安排与企业家的激励[J].经济研究,2007(2):111-122.
[46]杨汉明.高管薪酬与上市公司绩效的实证研究[J].统计与决策,2004(12):93-95.
[47]杨惠馨,王胡峰.国有企业高层管理人员激励与企业绩效实证研究[J].南开经济研究,2006(4):82-97 .
[48]杨瑞龙,刘江.经理报酬、企业绩效与股权结构的实证研究[J].江苏行政学院学报,2002(1)
[49]姚正海.股权结构与公司经营业绩相关性的思考——基于江苏上市公司的实证分析[J].财会研究,2005 (10):46-47.
[50]余晖.论政府管制与行政改革[J].中国工业经济,1997(5).
[51]曾庆生.国家控股、超额雇员与公司价值——一向基于中国证券市场的实证研究[D].上海:上海财经大学,2004.
[52]张必武,石金涛.董事会特征、高管薪酬与业绩敏感性——中国上市公司的经验分析[J].管理科学,2005
[53]张恩众,张文斌.影响上市公司高管薪酬的因素分析[J].经济问题探索,2007(11):124-127.
[54]张晖明,陈志广.高级管理人员激励与企业绩效——以沪市上市公司为样本的实证研究[J].世界经济文汇,2002(6):29-37.
[55]张建红,J.Paul Elhorst,Arjen van Witteloostuijn.中国地区工资水平差异的影响因素分析[J].经济研究,2006(10):62-70.
[56]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9)
[57]张晓晶.中国市场化进程报告:现状分析与未来预测[J].管理世界,2004(3):5-13.
[58]张小宁.人力资源资本化的若干问题[J].中国工业经济,2001(5):63-69.
[59]张雪岷.基于EVA的中国上市公司高级管理人员薪酬激励研究[D].哈尔滨工程大学,2006.
[60]赵西萍,李有根,李怀祖.董事会构成与经理控制机制关系研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002(11):64-69.
[61]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励治理效应研究[J].经济研究,2003(5):96-105.
[62]周兆生.中国上市公司总经理激励的实证研究[J].企业改革,2003(3):50-57.
[63]Abowd, J. M.. Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance? [J]. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1990, 43(3): 32–73.
[64]Adward A.Dy1.Corporate control and management compensation:Evidence on the agency problem[J].Managerial and Decision Economics,1988(9):21-25.
[65]Aggrawal. Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: The case of anti-takeover charter amendents[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1990(25):143-161.
[66]Aleksandar Andjelkovic,Glean Boyle,Warren Mcnoe.Public disclosure of executive compensation: Do shares need to know[J]. pacific-basin Finance Journal,2001(10):91-117.
[67]Antle R. and A. Smith. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1986(24):1-39.
[68]Baker, George P., and Brian J. Hall. CEO incentives and firm size[J]. Journal of Labor Economics ,2004,22 (4): 767-798.
[69]Baker,Jensen and Murphy. Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs theory[J]. Journal of Finance,1988,43(3):593-616.
[70]Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(3): 901–932.
[71]Boyd B..Board control and CEO compensation[J].Strategic Management Journal,1994(15):335-344.
[72]Burgess, Jr. G. H.. The Economics of Regulation and Antitrust[M].New York, Harper Collins College Publishers,1995.
[73]Conyon, Martin J., and He Lerong. Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms[J]. Journal of Management Accounting Research,2004,16: 35-56.
[74]Conyon, Martin J., and Kevin J. Murphy. The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom[J]. The Economic Journal,2000,110(467): 640-671.
[75]Conyon, Martin J., and Simon I. Peck. Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation[J]. Academy of Management Journal,1998,41(2): 146-157.
[76]Conyon, M. J., & Murphy, K. The prince and the pauper? CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom[J]. Economic Journal,2000, 110(467): 640–671. 2003,46(2): 151–158.
[77]Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Larcker, D. F. Executive compensation and incentives: A survey[J]. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,2003,9(1): 27–50.
[78]Core, John E., Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51 (3): 371-406.
[79]Coughlan Anne and Ronald Schmidt. Executive compensation,managementturnover , and firm performance: An emprical investigation[J]. Journal of accounting and Economics,,1985(7):43-65.
[80]Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn. The structure of corporate-ownership causes and consequences[J]. Journal of Political Economy ,1985,93 (6): 1155-1177.
[81]Denis and Sarin. Ownership and Board structure in public traded corporation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999(3):187-223.
[82]Falna, Jesen.CEO duality and firm performance : A contingence model[J].Strategic Management Journal,1983(16):301-312.
[83]Eric C. Chang,Sonia M. L. Wong Political control and performance in China’s listed firms[J].Journal Comparative Economics,2004(32):617-636.
[84]Firth, Michael, M. Tam, and M. Tang. The determinants of top management pay. Omega-International[J]. Journal of Management Science ,1999,27(6): 617-635.
[85]Gave J.J.and Gaver K.M..Compensation policy and the investment opportunity set[J]. Fianancial management,1995(6):125.
[86]Gibbons R. and Murphy K.J. Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers[J]. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1990,43(3).
[87]Guy,Frederick.CEO pay,shareholder returns and accounting profit international[J]. Journal of the economics of business,2000(7):263-274.
[88]Hall, B., & Murphy, K. Stock options for undiversified executives[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33(2): 3–21.
[89]Hall, Brian J., and Jeffrey B. Liebman. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113 (3): 653-691.
[90]Hall, P. A., & Gingerich, D. W. Varieties of capitalism andinstitutional complementarities in the macroeconomy: An empirical analysis[J]. Berlin Journal of Sociology,2004,14(1): 5–32.
[91]Hambrick D.C.,Finkestein S. The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: the case of CEO pay raises[J]. Journal of strategic management,1995(16):175-193.
[92]Havell and Holmstrom. The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation[J]. Journal of Economics,1979(10):118-125.
[93]Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael S. Weisbach. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO[J]. American Economic Review,1998,88(1):96-118.
[94]Holmstrom, Bengt. Moral hazard and observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economics ,1979,10(1): 74-91.
[95]Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. Performance pay and top management incentives[J]. Journal of Political Economy ,1990,98(2):225–264.
[96]Jensen M. C. and K. J. Murphy. Performance pay and top management incentive[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990a(98):225-264.
[97]Jensen M. C. and K. J. Murphy. CEO incentives-It’s not how much you pay, but how[J]. Harvard Business Review,1990b(68):138-153.
[98]Jensen, Michael C., and J. B. Warner. The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics ,1988,20 (12): 3-24.
[99]Jensen Michael C. , William H. Meckling. Theory of the firm : Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Ecomics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[100]Jensen M.C..The modern industrial revolution,exit,and failure of internal control system[J].Journal of Finance,1993,84(3):831-880.
[101]Jingjing Xu and Changjiang Lu. Accounting conservatism: A studyof market-level and firm-level explanatory factors [J]. China Journal of Accounting Research,2008(1):11-20.
[102]Joscow Paul,Nancy Rose,and Shepard Andrea. Regulatory Constraints on CEO compensation[J]. Brookings Papers:Microeconomics,1993.
[103]Korr J. and Kron L. Effect of relative decision monitoring on chief executive compensation[J]. Industry and Labor Relations Review,1990,43(3).
[104]Kren J.and Kerr J..THe effect of outside directors and board shareholdings on the relation between CEO and firm performance[J]. Accounting and Business Research,1997(27):297-309.
[105]Lala-Belkaoui and Pavlik. The impact of risk on executive compensation[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1993.
[106]Lewellen and Huntsman. Managerial pay and corporate performance[J]. The American Economic Review,1970(4):710-720.
[107]Lipton M.,Lorsch J.W. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance[J]. Journal of Business Lawyer,1992(48):59-77.
[108]Mcguire, Chiu and Elbeing. Executive income, sales, and profits[J]. American Economics Review,,1962(51):753-761.
[109]Murdoch J..Executive compensation:The use of incentive contracts to attenuate and agency problem[D].University of Calofornaia,Los Angeles unpublished Ph.D.Dissertation,1991.
[110]Murphy K.J. Corporate performance and Managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis[J]. Journal of financial economics,1995(7):11-42.
[111]Murphy K. R. S. and Salter M. S.Should CEO pay be linked to results? [J]. Harvard Business Review,1975(53):66-73.
[112]P.Zre Land. Company law and the myth of shareholder ownership[J].Modern Law Review,1999(62):32-57.
[113]Rechner Dalton. CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1999.
[114]Rexford E.Santerre, Stephen P.Neun. Stock dispersion and executive compention[J].Review of Economics and Statistics,1986(68):685-687.
[115]R.Lambert, D.F.Larcker. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1987(25):85-125.
[116]R.Sloan. Accounting earnings and top executive compensation[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993(16):55-100.
[117]Rosen. The Conflict between managers and Shareholders[J] NBER working paper,1992(10):320-323.
[118]Rosen, Sherwin. Authority, control and distribution of earnings[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1982(2):311-323.
[119]Taussings F.W.and Baker W.S. American corporations and their executives: a statistical inquiry[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1925(3):1-51.
[120]Tosi H.L.,Werner S.,Katz J.. How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of executive compensation studies[J]. Journal of Management,2000(2):301-339.
[121]Yermack, David. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics ,1996,40 (2): 185-211.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |