中国公司债券市场制度瓶颈与制度创新研究
|
摘要
在成熟的市场经济体系中,就企业外源融资而形成的金融市场来看,公司债券、银行信贷和股票之间呈现出一种三足鼎立的关系。作为资本市场的重要组成部分,公司债券市场发展的意义重大:宏观方面,发展公司债券市场既有利于化解国家金融风险,维护国家金融安全,又可以优化资源配置,促进经济快速发展。微观方面,企业增加债券融资既可以促使企业资本结构优化,从而实现价值最大化,又可以满足投资者不同的风险及收益偏好,从而实现资产的最优配置。
由于投资者的集体监督与还本付息的刚性约束,使得公司债券有着其他金融产品不可替代的优势。包括美国在内的大部分市场经济国家,不论是企业这一微观层面,还是国家金融市场格局这个宏观层面上,公司债券都占据了相当重要的地位,其在资本结构中的相对比重甚至高于股权融资。然而在中国,公司债券市场在金融体系中所扮演的角色却无足轻重。本文选择中国公司债券市场作为研究对象,运用制度经济学的原理对其发展问题进行研究。具体地说,本文从公司债券的供给、需求及市场流通三个环节入手,沿着金融体制、监管模式、信用体制和文化等方面全面诠释公司债券领域的制度约束,并提出相应的制度创新设想。
资本结构理论表明,在解决现代企业的委托代理和降低综合资金成本方面,公司债券的信息揭示等机制具有显著优势,它理应比银行信贷和股票发挥更突出的作用。另外,它对于推进国有企业改革、消除较为严重的金融风险隐患等,都具有非常重要的意义。这也是中国需要大力发展公司债券的基本原因所在。然而,本文研究发现,公司债券与GDP、CPI、银行信贷增加额、国债发行额、股票筹集额、居民储蓄额等经济变量并无统计上的规律性。因此,本文初步推断,中国公司债券市场发展滞后的现状主要源于制度瓶颈方面。
进一步地,本文从企业内部到企业外部,从正式制度到非正式制度,从制度环境、制度安排到制度装置,从供给、需求到债券市场等多方位展开,探讨中国公司债券发展的制度瓶颈。本文认为,对中国公司债券影响最深刻的是制度环境和制度安排上对供给的约束。相比之下,政府推行渐进式的市场化改革,银行领域和股票市场在经历了金融管制和金融约束阶段后,金融自由化取得了实质性突破。但是,公司债券仍然处于过度管制时期。本文分析表明,为支持信贷、国债和股票市场的发展,政府对公司债券从发行规模、利率、期限、用途和发债主体等方面都进行了严厉管制。这种管制是造成公司债券市场供给规模过小的重要原因。影响供给的因素也同样作用于需求环境,并有自身的一些特征。政府有意识地通过制度设计使居民金融剩余流向它所偏好的国有银行和较能体现政府意图的股票市场。可以看到,对商业银行等机构投资者的准入限制、双重征税、严格的利率限制、较低的流动性和债券持有人保护制度缺陷等因素既导致了较大的信用风险,也不同程度地降低了公司债券的预期收益,而低预期收益直接从需求方面制约了公司债券市场的发展。
显然,影响供给和需求的因素都会对流通市场产生作用,而政府对交易和流通领域制度设计的缺陷加剧了公司债券市场体系发育不足,从而体现出较低的流动性。发行额度过小、承销和发行方式单一等一级市场的问题也制约着二级市场的发展。在二级市场上,制度约束情形相对宽松,许多制度瓶颈正在加速打破。然而,制度影响了票息、上市与否、持有年限、收益波动性、收益离散程度、市场参与者数量、价格迷失等经济变量,进而影响了市场的流动性。本文分析表明,做市商制度等提高市场流动性相关制度的缺乏、结算与托管体系的分割、对机构投资者的限制、交易方式和债券品种的单一等,都不同程度地降低了公司债券市场的流动性,阻碍了市场发育。
金融基础设施作为具有较大正外部性的制度环境,对公司债券的发展来说是基础性的条件。竞争性的金融体制、基于效率和投资者利益导向的监管体制、对债权人利益严格的司法保护、正式制度发挥正常作用所依赖的信用文化、严格限制政府权利的政商关系、充分发挥社会力量的契约传统,等等,都是公司债券发展所依赖的制度。中国公司债券市场发展滞后的现状与金融基础设施建设落后之事实相关。
本文在供给、需求、流动性与金融基础设施四方面分析了制度方面的问题同时,提出了相应的制度创新建议。
From perspective of financial markets shaped by enterprise external financing channels, there is a triangle relationship of equal importance among corporate bond, stock market and bank loan in those mature market economies. As the key component of the capital markets, the development of corporate bond market will enable enterprises to achieve their optimal capital structures in the course of development so as to realize the goal of value maximization; such development will further satisfy different needs of investment from investors of various types of risk-taking and preferences, so that assets can be efficiently allocated. Corporate bond has its comparative advantage over other sort of financial assets in consideration of its collective investor supervision mechanism as well as constraint of rigid rules of repayment of capital and interest. Therefore, in most market economies such as USA, the weight of corporate bond would be even greater than equity-financing in views of both the national financial market system and the corporate level. However, corporate bond is currently playing quite an unimportant role in the financial system in China. This dissertation will study on the corporate bond markets by employing theories of Institutional Economics to explore its development issues. Specifically, this dissertation will start from perspectives of supply, demand and market circulation of corporate bonds, then provide an explanation to the institutional constraints of corporate bonds field through approaches of financial systems, supervision patterns, credit systems and cultures. The author will finally suggest the relevant measures of improvement.
It is illustrated by the theory of Capital Structure that corporate bond enjoys prominent advantages in reducing comprehensive capital costs and in dealing with Principal-Agent problems in modern enterprises through mechanism such as disclosure of information. Moreover, corporate bond markets will be useful in declining macro-finance risks then facilitating economic growth. Therefore, its status shall be much more superior to bank loans and stocks in mature market economic systems. This is one of the reasons why China is in need of great efforts in pushing forward the development of corporate bonds. Of course, corporate bond can also be very helpful in promoting the reform of state-owned enterprise as well as eliminating potentiality of financial risks. However, the research outcomes of this dissertation illustrates that there is no statistical regulations between the corporate bond markets and other economic variables such as GDP, CPI、interest rate, credits , the scale of stock market. Accordingly, the author concludes that the backward situation of the corporate bond market in China is mainly a result of the institutional bottleneck in this regard.
Furthermore, the author explores thus institutional bottle-neck by mechanism of supply and demand from perspectives of external and internal situation of the enterprise, formal and informal institutions, institutional environments, institutional arrangement and devices. It is found out that the most serious impacts imposed on the corporate bond market would be the constraints on the supply by the institutional environment. Though the government has gained great successes in the reforms of the banking system and stock markets even a period of regulation and control was experienced, the corporate bond is still under over-regulation. It is argued in this dissertation that in order to facilitate the development of credit, bonds and stock markets, the government has imposed strict regulations upon corporate bond regarding the issuing scale, interest rate, maturity, utility and issuers which has become main reasons of a small supply of the corporate bonds. Factors impacting supply also impact the demand situation with unique features per se. Intentionally, the government has designed relevant institutions to attract surplus household capitals to flow to the state-owned banks which it preferred and stock markets which may well demonstrate the government intentions. It is obvious that credit risks have been initiated by entry barriers for institutional investors such as commercial banks, dual taxation, low interest rate, low liquidity, and defect protection system to bond holders. This has also declined the expected revenue of the corporate bonds which has constrained the development of corporate bond market from demand side point of view.
Obviously, factors which impact supply and demand will influence the circulation market. However, the defects of institutional designs of the government in the fields of exchange and circulation have worsened the corporate bond markets and its liquidity. Issues in the primary market such as small issuing scale, single ways of issue and underwrite have aversely constrained the development of the secondary markets. However, the situation is a bit better in the secondary markets where many bottle-necks are broken through. Nevertheless, institutions have great impacts on economic variables such as coupons, listing decisions, maturities, earning fluctuation, earning disperse, number of market participants, lost of prices etc.. The market liquidity will hence be influenced. It is found out that the liquidity is decreased because of the absence of market-maker, the separation between settlements and entrust system, the regulations on institutional investors, the monotony of mode of exchange and the variety bonds.
With positive externalities, finance infrastructures are quite fundamental for the development of corporate bonds. Institutions such as competitive finance systems, efficiency-oriented and investor-benefit-oriented supervision systems, legal protection to creditors, credit cultures which foster healthy implementation of formal institutions, restrictions on relationship between politicians and merchants, covenants and traditions to foster social forces etc. are all indispensable for development of the corporate binds. The deficiency of finance infrastructure has resulted in the laggard development of the Chinese corporate bond market..
While carrying out a thorough analysis on the institutional issues of supply, demand, liquidity and finance infrastructure, the author finally puts forth relevant suggestions on the innovation of institutions.
由于投资者的集体监督与还本付息的刚性约束,使得公司债券有着其他金融产品不可替代的优势。包括美国在内的大部分市场经济国家,不论是企业这一微观层面,还是国家金融市场格局这个宏观层面上,公司债券都占据了相当重要的地位,其在资本结构中的相对比重甚至高于股权融资。然而在中国,公司债券市场在金融体系中所扮演的角色却无足轻重。本文选择中国公司债券市场作为研究对象,运用制度经济学的原理对其发展问题进行研究。具体地说,本文从公司债券的供给、需求及市场流通三个环节入手,沿着金融体制、监管模式、信用体制和文化等方面全面诠释公司债券领域的制度约束,并提出相应的制度创新设想。
资本结构理论表明,在解决现代企业的委托代理和降低综合资金成本方面,公司债券的信息揭示等机制具有显著优势,它理应比银行信贷和股票发挥更突出的作用。另外,它对于推进国有企业改革、消除较为严重的金融风险隐患等,都具有非常重要的意义。这也是中国需要大力发展公司债券的基本原因所在。然而,本文研究发现,公司债券与GDP、CPI、银行信贷增加额、国债发行额、股票筹集额、居民储蓄额等经济变量并无统计上的规律性。因此,本文初步推断,中国公司债券市场发展滞后的现状主要源于制度瓶颈方面。
进一步地,本文从企业内部到企业外部,从正式制度到非正式制度,从制度环境、制度安排到制度装置,从供给、需求到债券市场等多方位展开,探讨中国公司债券发展的制度瓶颈。本文认为,对中国公司债券影响最深刻的是制度环境和制度安排上对供给的约束。相比之下,政府推行渐进式的市场化改革,银行领域和股票市场在经历了金融管制和金融约束阶段后,金融自由化取得了实质性突破。但是,公司债券仍然处于过度管制时期。本文分析表明,为支持信贷、国债和股票市场的发展,政府对公司债券从发行规模、利率、期限、用途和发债主体等方面都进行了严厉管制。这种管制是造成公司债券市场供给规模过小的重要原因。影响供给的因素也同样作用于需求环境,并有自身的一些特征。政府有意识地通过制度设计使居民金融剩余流向它所偏好的国有银行和较能体现政府意图的股票市场。可以看到,对商业银行等机构投资者的准入限制、双重征税、严格的利率限制、较低的流动性和债券持有人保护制度缺陷等因素既导致了较大的信用风险,也不同程度地降低了公司债券的预期收益,而低预期收益直接从需求方面制约了公司债券市场的发展。
显然,影响供给和需求的因素都会对流通市场产生作用,而政府对交易和流通领域制度设计的缺陷加剧了公司债券市场体系发育不足,从而体现出较低的流动性。发行额度过小、承销和发行方式单一等一级市场的问题也制约着二级市场的发展。在二级市场上,制度约束情形相对宽松,许多制度瓶颈正在加速打破。然而,制度影响了票息、上市与否、持有年限、收益波动性、收益离散程度、市场参与者数量、价格迷失等经济变量,进而影响了市场的流动性。本文分析表明,做市商制度等提高市场流动性相关制度的缺乏、结算与托管体系的分割、对机构投资者的限制、交易方式和债券品种的单一等,都不同程度地降低了公司债券市场的流动性,阻碍了市场发育。
金融基础设施作为具有较大正外部性的制度环境,对公司债券的发展来说是基础性的条件。竞争性的金融体制、基于效率和投资者利益导向的监管体制、对债权人利益严格的司法保护、正式制度发挥正常作用所依赖的信用文化、严格限制政府权利的政商关系、充分发挥社会力量的契约传统,等等,都是公司债券发展所依赖的制度。中国公司债券市场发展滞后的现状与金融基础设施建设落后之事实相关。
本文在供给、需求、流动性与金融基础设施四方面分析了制度方面的问题同时,提出了相应的制度创新建议。
From perspective of financial markets shaped by enterprise external financing channels, there is a triangle relationship of equal importance among corporate bond, stock market and bank loan in those mature market economies. As the key component of the capital markets, the development of corporate bond market will enable enterprises to achieve their optimal capital structures in the course of development so as to realize the goal of value maximization; such development will further satisfy different needs of investment from investors of various types of risk-taking and preferences, so that assets can be efficiently allocated. Corporate bond has its comparative advantage over other sort of financial assets in consideration of its collective investor supervision mechanism as well as constraint of rigid rules of repayment of capital and interest. Therefore, in most market economies such as USA, the weight of corporate bond would be even greater than equity-financing in views of both the national financial market system and the corporate level. However, corporate bond is currently playing quite an unimportant role in the financial system in China. This dissertation will study on the corporate bond markets by employing theories of Institutional Economics to explore its development issues. Specifically, this dissertation will start from perspectives of supply, demand and market circulation of corporate bonds, then provide an explanation to the institutional constraints of corporate bonds field through approaches of financial systems, supervision patterns, credit systems and cultures. The author will finally suggest the relevant measures of improvement.
It is illustrated by the theory of Capital Structure that corporate bond enjoys prominent advantages in reducing comprehensive capital costs and in dealing with Principal-Agent problems in modern enterprises through mechanism such as disclosure of information. Moreover, corporate bond markets will be useful in declining macro-finance risks then facilitating economic growth. Therefore, its status shall be much more superior to bank loans and stocks in mature market economic systems. This is one of the reasons why China is in need of great efforts in pushing forward the development of corporate bonds. Of course, corporate bond can also be very helpful in promoting the reform of state-owned enterprise as well as eliminating potentiality of financial risks. However, the research outcomes of this dissertation illustrates that there is no statistical regulations between the corporate bond markets and other economic variables such as GDP, CPI、interest rate, credits , the scale of stock market. Accordingly, the author concludes that the backward situation of the corporate bond market in China is mainly a result of the institutional bottleneck in this regard.
Furthermore, the author explores thus institutional bottle-neck by mechanism of supply and demand from perspectives of external and internal situation of the enterprise, formal and informal institutions, institutional environments, institutional arrangement and devices. It is found out that the most serious impacts imposed on the corporate bond market would be the constraints on the supply by the institutional environment. Though the government has gained great successes in the reforms of the banking system and stock markets even a period of regulation and control was experienced, the corporate bond is still under over-regulation. It is argued in this dissertation that in order to facilitate the development of credit, bonds and stock markets, the government has imposed strict regulations upon corporate bond regarding the issuing scale, interest rate, maturity, utility and issuers which has become main reasons of a small supply of the corporate bonds. Factors impacting supply also impact the demand situation with unique features per se. Intentionally, the government has designed relevant institutions to attract surplus household capitals to flow to the state-owned banks which it preferred and stock markets which may well demonstrate the government intentions. It is obvious that credit risks have been initiated by entry barriers for institutional investors such as commercial banks, dual taxation, low interest rate, low liquidity, and defect protection system to bond holders. This has also declined the expected revenue of the corporate bonds which has constrained the development of corporate bond market from demand side point of view.
Obviously, factors which impact supply and demand will influence the circulation market. However, the defects of institutional designs of the government in the fields of exchange and circulation have worsened the corporate bond markets and its liquidity. Issues in the primary market such as small issuing scale, single ways of issue and underwrite have aversely constrained the development of the secondary markets. However, the situation is a bit better in the secondary markets where many bottle-necks are broken through. Nevertheless, institutions have great impacts on economic variables such as coupons, listing decisions, maturities, earning fluctuation, earning disperse, number of market participants, lost of prices etc.. The market liquidity will hence be influenced. It is found out that the liquidity is decreased because of the absence of market-maker, the separation between settlements and entrust system, the regulations on institutional investors, the monotony of mode of exchange and the variety bonds.
With positive externalities, finance infrastructures are quite fundamental for the development of corporate bonds. Institutions such as competitive finance systems, efficiency-oriented and investor-benefit-oriented supervision systems, legal protection to creditors, credit cultures which foster healthy implementation of formal institutions, restrictions on relationship between politicians and merchants, covenants and traditions to foster social forces etc. are all indispensable for development of the corporate binds. The deficiency of finance infrastructure has resulted in the laggard development of the Chinese corporate bond market..
While carrying out a thorough analysis on the institutional issues of supply, demand, liquidity and finance infrastructure, the author finally puts forth relevant suggestions on the innovation of institutions.
引文
[1]转引自王一萱,银行体系失效与公司债券市场发展:理论、实践与政策建议,深圳证券交易所综合研究所报告,深2003.03.09证综合所研字第0075号。
[2]数据来源:同①。
[3]数据来源:根据http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/marketresearch/20070921/00013999427.shtml资料计算。
[4]虽然经过股权分置改革以后,股市行情有了较大的恢复,但是只要上市公司“圈钱”的意识和行为不改,只要监管工作还是不到位,那么,这种“政策牛市”的风险就不会有根本性缓解。
[5]关于公司债券的定义,本章1.2.1部分将详细说明。
[1]瓶颈(Bottleneck)的涵义详见1.2.3.1.
[2]数据来源:http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/16214788.html?fr=qrl.
[3]数据来源:孙景德,发达国家企业债券市场发展的特点与启示,《上海金融》,2007.4.
[4]数据来源:jpkc.nxu.edu.cn/hgjjx/news/view.asp?id=523-15k.
[5]数据来源:www.duyidu.com/Article/lsxs/txdg/200610/104721.asp-25k.
[1]数据来源:http://topic.csdn.net/u/20070723/09/7e7a7b3b-5424-4b4d-ae6b-fe0dae12fdbc.html
[2]数据来源:http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/hgjj/20080124/10564447608.shtml
[3]即国务院于2004年1月31日颁布的《国务院关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定发展的若干意见》。
[4]资料来源:http://www.cs.com.cn/jrbznew/html/2007-03/06/content_2185284.htm
[5]详见1987年3月27日由国务院颁布的《企业债券管理暂行条例》第五条。
[1]详见1993年8月2日国务院第121号文《企业债券管理条例》第五条。
[2]在八十年代中至九十年代初的一段时期里出现了一些企业自发进行的债券筹资行为,当时也称为“企业债券”,这其中只是因为新中国第一部《公司法》在1993年才出台的缘故,而在这部《公司法》里才有了“公司债券”的概念。
[3]详见《公司法》(1993)第一百六十条。
[4]详见《公司法》(2005)第一百五十四条。
[1]详见新华网广东频道2007.9.27
[1]参见中财网,2006年12月25日
[2]参见卢现祥,《新制度经济学》,武汉大学出版社,2004年1月,第158-159页。
[3]同②。
[1]见希克思,《价值与资本》,牛津出版社1946年版,第144页,转引自沈艺峰,《资本结构理论史》,经济科学出版社,1999年。
[1]信息来源:http://hk.news.yahoo.com/070915/12/2fplf.html.
[2]一般来说,这种非线性机制源于下述情况。第一,信贷市场的较强关联效应。信贷市场的全球化、银行之间的同业支付清算系统,多边支付清算系统等,使得任何个别风险可以通过多米诺骨牌效应,在乘数效应下引发系统性风险。第二,金融市场的从众行为,即所谓羊群效应。储户的这种行为往往把个体行为为转化市场行为,从而引起系统性银行风险。第三,银行自身业务的存短贷长这一特性而具有极大的风险。
[3]资料来源:金融政策择优:全面开放债券市场。http://www.100paper.com/100paper/jingjixue/zhengquanjinrong/zhengquanxiangguan/2007070142064_2.html.
[1]以上内容转引自何旭强 娄静,证券市场脆弱性的内生机制与相机治理,《东部经济评论》,2004年第4期
[1]麦金农,王宇.东亚美元末位、浮动恐惧和原罪的主要观点,《经济社会体制比较》2003年第3期
[2]资料来源:金融政策择优:全面开放债券市场。http://www.100paper.com/100paper/jingjixue/zhengquanjinrong/zhengquanxiangguan/2007070142064_2.html
[1]详见1.1,第2页。
[2]以上内容转引自http://www.2008red.com/member_pic_395/files/qikanlunwen/html/article_2569_1.shtml
[1]参见 陈柳钦,制度、制度变迁与金融制度创新.来源:http://www.tianyabook.com/jingji/040.htm.
[1]见《国务院关于坚决制止乱集资和加强债券发行管理的通知》第二条。
[1]按照(社会)契约论,政府是选民利益的代表,它没有自身利益,政府是作为选民的代理者身份出现在市场上。对社会契约论的具体论述,可详见让-雅克·卢梭著,何兆武译《社会契约论》,红旗出版社,1997年。
[2]按照国家的掠夺理论,政府看成是一个纯粹的租金榨取者,无益于社会经济发展。这也是马克思主义的国家理论之主要观点。
[3]请参阅(美)道格拉斯·C·诺斯《经济史中的结构与变迁》,陈郁等译,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年,第20-35页。
[1]同年,美国的水平为59%,英国是104%,日本为114%,德国是70%,印尼为40%,韩国是44%,马来西亚是89%,泰国是79%。转引自“中国的货币化进程、金融控制及改革困境”,《经济研究》,1997.08。
[1]关于诱致性制度变迁和强制性制度变迁的定义及相关内容,请参阅 林毅夫,《关于制度变迁的经济学理论:诱致性变迁与强制性变迁》;v.w.拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载于《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学译文集》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年。
[1]资料来源:http://baike.baidu.com/view/1324635.htm
[1]资料来源,李婧“美国债券市场简介及与中国债券市场之比较”,www.chinabond.com.cn/chinabond/article/fj_content.jsp?sLmId
[1](意)维科(Giovanni B.Vico,1725).关于民族共同性的新科学原理[J].转引自 吴承明.经济史:历史观与方法论[J].中国经济史研究.2001(3):3-22.
[2]梅耶(Henry·Maine)(1861年).转引自 何兆武.从身份到契约—重评梅耶的公式[J].史学伦理研究.1992(1):117-127.
[3](德)马克斯·韦伯.新教伦理和资本主义精神[M].上海:三联书店,1987.
[4](英)斯科特·拉什.风险社会与风险文化[J].马克思主义与现实,2002(4):52-63.
[5](英)多米尼克·卡瑟利.挑战风险—金融机构如何生存和发展[M]北京:商务印书馆,1997.
[6]安平印.拓宽融资渠道 提高资金使用效率[N],中国信息报社,2005.08.01.
[7]中国人民银行货币政策分析小组,中国货币政策执行报告,2004年第四季度[R].上海证券报2005.02.25.
[8]杨阳.中国企业债券市场的发展研究[D],硕士论文.2004.
[9](美)凡勃伦.有闲阶级论——关于制度的经济研究[M].中译本,北京,商务印书馆,1964.
[10](美)康芒斯.制度经济学[M].中译本,北京:商务印书馆,1962.
[11](美)格鲁奇.比较经济制度[M].中译本,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1985.
[12]Bede and Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Proper[M].MacMillan,New York,1932.
[13](美)加尔布雷斯(1973).经济学和公共目标[M].北京:商务印书馆,1980.
[14](瑞典)冈纳·缪尔达尔(1944).美国的两难困境:黑人问题和现代民主[M].中译本,北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2001.
[15](美)富兰克·H·奈特著,王宇、王文玉译.风险、不确定性和利润[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[16](美)西蒙.现代决策理论的基石[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989.
[17](日)速水佑次郎,[美]弗农·拉坦著,郭熙保等译.农业发展的国际分析[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2000.
[18](美)诺斯.经济史中的结构与变迁[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1996.
[19](美)科斯等.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店,1994.
[20]盛洪.现代制度经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2003.
[21](美)埃瑞克·G·菲吕博顿、[德]鲁道夫·瑞切特.新制度经济学[M].上海:上海 财经大学出版社,1998.
[22](美)诺斯.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海:上海三联书店,1994.
[23]Modigliani F,Miller M H.The Cost of Capital,Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment[J].American Economic Review,June,1958(48):267-297.
[24]Jensen,Michael,and William Meckling.theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and ownership structure[J].journal of financial economics 1976(3):305-360.
[25]Harris,M.,& A Raviv.Capital structure and the information role of debt[J].Journal of Finance,1988(45):321-349.
[26]Harris,M.,& A.Raviv.Corporate control contests and capital structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(20):55-386.
[27]Stulz,Rene M..Managerial Control of Voting Rights:Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20).
[28]Myers,S.C.& N.S.Majluf.Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984(13):187-221.
[29]Ross.Stephen.the Determination of Financial Struture:The Incentive Signalling ApproachBell[J].Journal of Eonomics,1977(8):23-40.
[30]Douglas W.Diamond.Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring[J].Review of Economic Studies,1984(51):393-414.
[31]Fama,E.Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,88,1980:288-307.
[32]Rajan,R.G.,Zingales,L.Financial systems,industrial structure,and growth [J].Unpublishedworking paper.University of Chicago.1999.
[33]Miguel Cantillo and Julian Wright.How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical Investigation[R].Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-256-Rev,University of California at Berkeley,2000.
[34]Eom,Young Ho,Helwege,Jean and Huang,Jing-Zhi.Structural Models of Corporate Bond Pricing:An Empirical Analysis[J].(February 2002).
[35]Chen,Long,Lesmond,David A.and Wei,Jason Zhanshun.Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond Liquidity[R].(April 2005).14th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=495422.
[36]Edith S.Hotchkiss and Tavy Ronen.The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market:An Intraday Analysis[J].Rev.Finane.Stud.2002(15):1325-1354
[37]Roger Walder.Dynamic Allocation of Treasury and Corporate Bond Portfolios University of Lausanne(HEC),International Center FAME and Banque Cantonale Vaudoise,Switzerland February 7,2003,Working Paper Series.
[38]Lamdin,Douglas J.Corporate Bond Yield Spreads in Recent Decades:Trends,Changes,and Stock Market Linkages[R].(September 2003).Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=450140 or DOI:10.2139/ssrn.450140.
[39]Jagtiani,Julapa,George Kaufman,and Catharine Lemieux.The Effect of Credit Risk on and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields[J].Journal of Financial Research,Winter 2002:559-575.
[40]David.Durand.Cost of Debt and Equity Funds for Business:Tre-nds and Problems of Measurement.in National Bureau of Economic Research,Conference on Research on Business Finance,New Youk 1952:215-247.
[41]Modigliani F,Miller M H.Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital:A Correction[J].American Economic Review,1963(6)53:344-433.
[42]Miller.Debt and Taxes[J].Journal of Finance,1977(32):261-275.
[43]Aghion P and Bolton P.An Incomplete Contract Approach to Financial Contracting [J].Review of Economic Studies,1992(59):473-494.
[44]Diamond,Douglas W.Monitoring and Reputation:The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt[J].Journal of Political Economy,University of Chicago Press,vol.1991,(4):689-721.
[45]Herring,Richard J.and Nathporn Chatusripitak.The Case of the Missing Market:The Bond Market and Why it Matters for Financial Development[R].ADB Institute Working Paper 11,2000.
[46]Rajan,Raghuram and Luigi Zingales.Which Capitalism?[J].Lessons from the East Asian Crisis,Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1998,11(3):40-48.
[47]Boot,Arnound,and Anjan Thakor.Financial system architecture[J].The Review of Financial Studies 10,1997.
[48]Nils H.Hakansson.The Role of a Corporate Bond Market in an Economy--and in Avoiding Crises,University of California[J].Berkeley Accounting Group September 9,1999.Working Paper Series.
[49]王一萱.银行体系失效与公司债券市场发展:理论、实践与政策建议[R].深圳证券研究所报告.2003.07.09深证综研字第0075号.
[50]王国刚.发展公司债券市场应解决的几个问题[J].福建论坛(经济社会版),2003(7):18-23.
[51]Sanjeev Bhojraj and Partha Sengupta.Effect of Corporate Governance on Bond Ratings and Yields:The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors Journal of Business,Forthcoming Cornell University Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and George Mason University[J].Accounting Program March 26,2002 Accepted Paper Series.
[52]Paul H.Schultz.Corporate Bond Trading Costs and Practices:A Peek Behind the Curtain,University of Notre Dame-Department of Finance & Business Economics December 9,1998,Working Paper Series.
[53]Edith S.Hotchkiss and Tavy Ronen.The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market:An Intraday Analysis Boston College[J].Wallace E.Carroll School of Management and Rutgers,The State University of New Jersey-Finance &Economics January 3,2000,Working Paper Series.
[54]Joao A.C.Santos and Kostas Tsatsaronis.Cost of Barriers to Entry:Evidence from the Market for Corporate Euro Bond Underwriting Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Bank for International Settlements(BIS)[J].Monetary and Economic Department September 3,2003,Working Paper Series.
[55]Howard Qi,Sheen Liu and Chunchi Wu.Personal Taxes,Endogenous Default,and Corporate Bond Yield Spreads Michigan Tech,Youngstown State University Williamson College of Business Administration and Syracuse University,[J].Whitman School of Management,March 20,2005.
[56]Amy K.Edwards,Lawrence Harris and Michael S.Piwowar.Corporate Bond Market Transparency erie V.Vance Roley The Effect of Federal Debt Management Policy on Corporate Bond and Equity Yields[J].University of Washington School of Business Administration,July 7,2004,Working Paper Series.
[57]王国刚.发展企业债券市场[J].投资与证券,2003(10).
[58]安义宽.论发展中国企业债券市场的基本原则[J].投资与证券,2003(7).
[59]陈嘉明.发展企业债券市场的理论分析与实证研究[J].现代财经-天津财经学院学报,2003(4):27-29.
[60]何德旭.对我国企业债券市场的思考[J].金融理论与实践,2002(8):3-6.
[61]高小强.中美两国企业债券市场的比较与启示[J].新金融,2003(8):40-43.
[62]吴腾华.东亚新兴债券市场的发展及其启示[J].河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005(2):91-95.
[63]叶宗伟.从中美公司债券的比较看中国公司债券的滞后发展[J].亚太经济,2003(3).
[64]张捷、黄燕.债券市场与东亚金融体系[J].国际经济评论,2001(9).
[65]陈锐.企业债券市场的政府约束与市场约束选择[J].上海金融,2002(6):7-9
[66]胡少华.企业债券市场发展与产权制度创新[J].财经科学,2002(2):72-77
[67]陈莉、严中兴.我国企业债券市场供给与需求的均衡分析[J].华南金融研究,2001(1):34-36.
[68]黄燕君、丁华明.我国企业债券市场供求分析[J].生产力研究,2002(5):10-12.
[69]田柳.中国企业债券市场发展滞后的供求分析与对策[J].新疆财经,2002(4)
[70]王满四、和丕禅.融资结构失衡与企业债券融资发展[J].同济大学学报(社会科学版)2003(2):57-61.
[71]刘凯.企业债券市场管理弊端剖析及政策建议[J].上海经济研究,2002(4).43-47.
[72]陈柳钦.我国企业债券市场发展的深层次思考[J].上海商学院学报,2005(1):5-10.
[73]王一萱,徐良平,李信民.中国企业债券市场上市公司调查报告[J].证券市场导报,2003(4):17-.22
[74]侯杰.新制度经济学视角下的中国企业债券市场的发展[J].经济体制改革,2002(5).
[75]钱春海.我国企业债券市场问题的体制性分析及建议[J].财经理论与实践,2002(1):54-58.
[76]龚翔.公司债券融资障碍:基于公司治理结构的分析[J].商业经济与管理,2002(9).
[77]夏有华.企业债券市场发展的架构安排与主导创新[J].经济与金融,2002(2)
[78]耿志民.论中国债券市场的制度创新[J].河南金融干部管理学院学报,2003(2)
[79]吴腾华.新兴债券市场发展[J].社会科学文献出版社[M],2005,35-36
[80]E I.Altman.Financial ratios,discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy[J].Journal of Finance,1968,9(4):589-679.
[81]Robichek,A.A.,and Stewart C.Myers.Optimal Financing Decisions[M].Englewood Cliffs,N.J.Prentice-Hall,1965.
[82]Robichek,Alexander A.,and Myers,Stewart,.Problems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1,no.1(1966).
[83]Jensen,M.C..Agency Cost of Free Cash,corporate Finance & Taker[J].American Economic Review.1986(76):488-500.
[84]Fischer,E.O.Heinkel,R.and J.Zechner.DynamicCapital Structure Choice:Theory and Tests[J].Journal of Finance,1989(44):19-40.
[85]Grossman,S.J.& O.Hart.Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives [M].in J.McCall,ed:The Economics of Information and Uncertainty,University of Chicago Press,1982.
[86]Stulz,R.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(26):3-27.
[87]Titman,S.,& R.Wessels,1988,The determinants of capital structure choice[J].Journal of Finance,1988(43):1-19.
[88]郑培敏等.权益融资:中国上市公司并购融资创新路径探讨[J].经济导刊,2004(5).
[89]张丽英.中外企业资本结构现状的比较分析[J].生产力研究,2006(3).
[90]张玉明、赵强.资本结构优化与企业优序融资策略[J].复旦学报,2002(5).99-95.
[91]Rajan G.R.,& L.Zingales.What do we know about capital structure?Some evidence from international data[J].Journal of Finance 50,1995:1421-1460.
[92]Diamond,D.Reputation Acquisition in Debt Market IJ].Journal of Political Economy,1989,97(4):828-862.
[93]Berger,A.N.,Herring,R.J.and Szego,G.D.The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions [J].Journal of Banking and finance,1995,(23):393-430.
[94]A.Bhide.The hidden cost of stock market liquidity[J].Journal of Financial Economies,1993.34(2):31-51.
[95]Stiglitz,J,and Weiss,A.Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information [J].American Economic Review,June,1981:393-410.
[96]Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales,The Cost of Diversity:The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment[J].Journal of Finance,American Finance Association,vol.55(1),2000a:35-80,02.
[97]Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales,The tyranny of inequality[J].Journal of Public Economics,Elsevier,vol.76(3),2000b:521-558.
[98]Blackwell,D and Kidwell,D.,investigation of cost different between public sales and private placement of debt[J].Journal of Fi nancial Economics 22,1988:253-278.
[99]Sudha,Krishaswami,paul A.Spindt,venkat Subramaniam.information asymmetry,and the placement structure of corporate debt[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,(51):407-434.
[100]Carey,M1,Prowse,S 1,Rhea,and Udell,G The economics of the private placement markets:a newlook'Financial Markets,Institution,and Instrument,1993(2):1-661.
[101]马克思恩格斯全集第25卷,北京:人民出版社,1975.
[102]William F.Sharpe Capital Asset Prices:A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under. Conditions of Risk,Journal of Finance,Vol.19,1964:425-442.
[103]John Lintner.Security Prices,Risk,and Maximal Gains from Diversification [J].Finance,1965(4):587-615.
[104]Mossin,J.Equilibrium in a Capital AssetMarket[J].Econometrica,1965(35):768-783.
[105]Dalla,Ismail.The Emerging Asian Bond Market.Washington,D.C.:World Bank,1995.
[106]Bank of Thailand governor Chatu Mongol Sonakul,“When Will Thai Banks Wake Up ?”,Speeches at the Bangkok Club,1999,7.22.
[107]安辉.亚洲新兴市场国家公司债券市场发展研究[J].国际金融研究,2004(7):40-46.
[108]赵志君.金融资产总量,结构与经济增长[J].管理世界,2003(3).
[109]Varouj A.Aivazian,Laurence Booth and W.Sean Cleary Do Firms in Emerging Markets Follow Different Dividend Policies From U.S.Firms?,Journal of Financial Research,Forthcoming,University of Toronto-Joseph L.Rotman School of Management,University of Toronto-Joseph L.Rotman School of Management and Saint Mary's University-Finance & Management Science,Accepted Paper Series,August 6,2003.
[110].Gabrielle Wanzenried;Capital structure decisions and output market competition under demand uncertainty[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,(21):171-200.
[111](英)威廉·配弟.政治算术[M].北京:商务印书馆,1978.
[112](英)查尔斯·达维南特.论英国的公共收入与贸易[M].北京:商务印书馆,1995.
[113](美)保罗·A·萨缪尔森,经济学[M].北京:发展出版社,1992.
[114]安义宽 如何认识和理解中国企业债券市场[J].财贸经济,2002(4):15-19.
[115]牛新华、张高丽、余国新、杨红、戈歧明等.投资者利益保护机制研究[A].中国证券市场发展前言问题研究[C].北京:中国金融出版社,2001.
[116]LLSV.Investor Protection and Corporation Valuation,Havard Institution for Economic Research,Discussion Paper 1882,Havard University,1999.
[117]Johnson,Simon and Andrei Sheifer,“Privatization and Corporation Governance ”Manuscript Harvard Business School,2001.
[118]Rafael La Porta.Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes.Andrei Shleifer.Robert W.Vishny.llaw and finance Journal of Political Economy.Journal of Political Economy 1998,107(6);1113-1155.
[119]黄明.市场经济下银企关系模式的选择[J].当代经济科学,1997(2):13-17.
[120]何广文.德国金融制度研究择[M].中国劳动社会保障出版社,2000.
[121]夏斌.日本金融业开发资金的特点[N].经济日报,1985.10.05.
[122]Asian Development Bank:“Bond Market Development in East Asia:Issues and Challenges”,January,2003.
[123]汪红丽.中国企业债券市场发展的实证分析[J].证券市场导报2002(5):63-66.
[124]吴晓灵.中国金融体制改革跟踪研究(上)[J].改革,199703:64-76;中国金融体制改革跟踪研究(下)[J].改革,1997(4):83-98.
[125]吴晓灵.稳步发展企业债券市场全面优化金融资产结构[J].金融研究,2005(3):1-6.
[126]张杰.中国金融制度的结构与变迁[M].太原:山西经济出版社,1998.
[127]黄春蕾.对西方资本主义国家从国有化到私有化的再认识[J],当代财经,2001(4):22-27.
[128]黄少安,张岗.中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析[J].经济研究200111:12-21
[129]张育军.促进企业债发展的关键是建立偿债保障机制[J].金融信息参考2003(5);我国资本市场制度设计与制度建设研究[J].证券市场导报,2006(9):4-15.
[130]李海涛.我国企业债券市场的现状、问题及对策[J].内蒙古金融研究,2004(2):50-54.
[131]欧阳卫民.债券、基金和货币市场[M].北京:中国金融出版社,1997.
[132]吴正光、周东山.发展我国企业债券市场的研究[J].中南财经政法大学研究生学报,2003(5).
[133]Thomas,L.C,A Surveyof Credit and BehaviournalScornig:Forecasting financial risk of lending to consumers.International Journal of Forecasting,16,2000,149-172.
[134]米运生.投资秩序演变与国有银行信用风险[D].北京大学博士论文.2004.
[135]杨庆育.企业债券融资理论与实证研究[D].博士论文,2005.
[136]Hart,O.and Moore,J.Debt and Seniority:An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management[J].The American Economic Review,Vol.85,No.3.(Jun.,1995),pp.567-585.
[137]James Tobin.Liquidity preference as behavior towards risk[J].Review of Economic Studies,Febrary,1958:65-85.
[138]Harold Demsetz.The Cost of Transacating[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,82.1968:33-57.
[139]Bagehot,Walter(pseudonym for Jack Treynor).The Only Game in Town”[J].Financial Analysts Journal 27,1971:31-53.
[140]Black,F.Noise[J].Journal of Finance,July,1986:529-543.
[141]Kyle,Albert.Continuous auctions and insider trading[J].Econometrica,53,1985:1315-1336.
[142]Grossman,Sanford J & Miller,Merton H,.Liquidity and Market Structure,[J].Journal of Finance,American Finance Association,vol.43(3),1988:617-37.
[143]O'Hara,M.Market Microstructure Theory,BasilBlackwell,Cambridge Mass,1995;O'Hara,M.and G.Oldfield.The Microeconomicsof Market Making[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 21,1986:361-376.
[144]Admati,Anat R.,and Pfleiderer,Paul.Divideand Conquer:A Theory of Intraday and Day-of-the-Week MeanEffects[J].Review of Financial Studies 2,1989:189-224.
[145]Glen R.1994,Components of The Bid-ask Spread and The statistical properties of Transaction prices,[J].Journal of Finance 42,1994:1293-1308..
[146]Garbade K D,Silber W L.Structural organization of secondary markets:Clearing frequency,dealer activity and liquidity risk[J].Journal of Finance.34(June 1979:577-593.
[147]Glosten,L.R.,and L.E.Harris.Estimating the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread,[J].Journal of Financial Economics 21,1988:123-142.655.
[148]Muranaga J,Shimizu.Market Microstructure and Market Liquidity[M].Basel:Bank of International Settlements,1999.
[149]Diamond,D.and Dvbvig,P.Bank Runs,Deposit Insurance,and Liquidity,[J].Journal of Political Economy,Vol.91,No.3(June).No 91,1983:401-419.
[150]Greenwood,Jeremy & Smith,Bruce D.Financial markets in development,and the development of financial markets[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,21,1997:145-181.
[151]R.Levine.Stock markets,growth,and tax policy[J].Journal of Finance,46,1991(4):1445-1465.
[152]Sanford J.Grossman & Joseph E.Stiglitz..On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets[J].American Economic Review,1980,70(3):393-407.
[153]Laffont,J.J,and J.Tirole.A Theory of Incentives in Procurement an Regulation,[M].MIT Press,Combridge,1993.
[154]R.Levine.Financial development and economic growth:views and agenda[J].Journal of Economic Literature,1997(7):688-726.
[155]Goldstein and Kavajecz.A Specialist's Quoted Depth and Limit Order Book[J].Journal ofFinance1999(/54):747-771.
[156]HeeJoon Ahn,Kee Hong Bae,and Kalok Chan:Limit Orders,Depth,and Volatility: Evidence from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong[J]. Journal of Finance,2001:767-788.
[157] Demestz, Harold .Why Regulate Utilities[J]. Journal, of Law & Economics.1968(11): 55-65.
[158] Smidt, S :Which Road to an Efficient Stock Market :Free Competition or Regulated Monopoly ? [J]. Financal A nalysts Journal 27,1971: 64 - 69.
[159] Stoll, H. The Supply of Dealer Services in SecuritiesMarkets[J]. Journal of Finance 33,1978:1133-1151.
[160] Garman ,M :Market Microstructure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 3 ,1976:257 -275.
[161] Cohen, K ,Maier, S, Schwartz, R, Whitcomb, D.Transaction Costs ,Order Placement Strategy ,and Existence of the BidAsk Spread[J]. Journal of Political Economy ,1981:287-305.
[162] Ho ,T ,Stoll ,H. The Dynamics of Dealer Markets under Competition[J]. Journal of Finance 38,1983:1053-1074.
[163] Copeland, T. and D. Galai: Information Effects on theBid Ask Spreads[J]. Journal of Finance 38 ,1983:1457 -1469.
[164] Glosten ,L. R. ,Milgrom, P. Bid ,Ask ,and TransactionPrices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Agents[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 14,1985:71-100.
[165] Holden ,C . Subrahmanyam ,A. Long lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition[J]. Journal of Finance 47,1992:247 - 270.
[166] Admati, A. R, Pfleiderer, P. A Theory of Intraday Trading Patterns [J]. Review of Financial Studies 1 ,1988;3 -40.
[167] Easley ,D ,O'Hara ,M . Price, Trade Size ,and Information in Securities Markets[J].Journal of Financial Economics 19,1987: 69 -90.
[168] Easley ,D ,O'Hara ,M . Time and the Process of Security Price Adjustment [J].Journal of Finance 47 ,1992:577 - 606.
[169] Kraus, A. and H. Stoll.Price Impacts of Block Trading on the New York Stock Exchange [J]. Finance, Vol. 27,1972:569-588.
[170] La Porta,Rafael,Lopez-de-silanes,Florencio,Shleifer.Andrei and Vishny.Robert. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1998(106) :1113-1155.
[171] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Slianes, Andrei Sheilfer, Robert W. Vishny.Legal Determinants of External Finance [J] Journal of Finance 1997(52):1131 — 1150.
[172]Claessens,S.,and Jiankov,S.The Separation of Ownership and Controle in East Asian Corpations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):81-112.
[173]La Porta et al,Lapea-de-Silanes and Sheleifer,RobertW.Vishny.Investor Protection:Origins,Consequences Reform.The World Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper No.1.1999.
[174]Coffee,J.C.Privitization and Corporate Governance:the Lessons from Securities Market Failure[J].Journal of Corporation Law,vol.1999(25):1-39.
[175]胡汝银.投资者保护与证券监管架构[N].上海证券报,2000.11.12.
[176]Johnson Simon and Andrei·Shleifer.Coase v.the Coasians[J].NBER Working Paper No.w Issued in December,1999.
[177]Demirguc-Kunt,A.,& V.Maksimovic.Institutions,financial markets and firm debt maturity[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999(54):295-336.
[178]世界银行.世界发展报告1989[M].北京:中国财政出版社,1990.
[179]L·E·戴维斯、D·C.诺斯,制度变迁的理论:概念与原因,载于《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学译文集》,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994,274-291.
[180]Fry,M.J.Money,Interest,and Banking in Economic Development[M].(2nd Edn.)(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins) 1995.
[181]Arestis,P.and P.O.Demetriades(1996) “Finance and Growth Institutionial Considerrations and Causality,”Paper Presented at the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference,University of Wales Swansea,1-4.
[182]Sengupta,P.Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt[J].The Accounting Review 73(4),1998:459-474.
[2]数据来源:同①。
[3]数据来源:根据http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/marketresearch/20070921/00013999427.shtml资料计算。
[4]虽然经过股权分置改革以后,股市行情有了较大的恢复,但是只要上市公司“圈钱”的意识和行为不改,只要监管工作还是不到位,那么,这种“政策牛市”的风险就不会有根本性缓解。
[5]关于公司债券的定义,本章1.2.1部分将详细说明。
[1]瓶颈(Bottleneck)的涵义详见1.2.3.1.
[2]数据来源:http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/16214788.html?fr=qrl.
[3]数据来源:孙景德,发达国家企业债券市场发展的特点与启示,《上海金融》,2007.4.
[4]数据来源:jpkc.nxu.edu.cn/hgjjx/news/view.asp?id=523-15k.
[5]数据来源:www.duyidu.com/Article/lsxs/txdg/200610/104721.asp-25k.
[1]数据来源:http://topic.csdn.net/u/20070723/09/7e7a7b3b-5424-4b4d-ae6b-fe0dae12fdbc.html
[2]数据来源:http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/hgjj/20080124/10564447608.shtml
[3]即国务院于2004年1月31日颁布的《国务院关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定发展的若干意见》。
[4]资料来源:http://www.cs.com.cn/jrbznew/html/2007-03/06/content_2185284.htm
[5]详见1987年3月27日由国务院颁布的《企业债券管理暂行条例》第五条。
[1]详见1993年8月2日国务院第121号文《企业债券管理条例》第五条。
[2]在八十年代中至九十年代初的一段时期里出现了一些企业自发进行的债券筹资行为,当时也称为“企业债券”,这其中只是因为新中国第一部《公司法》在1993年才出台的缘故,而在这部《公司法》里才有了“公司债券”的概念。
[3]详见《公司法》(1993)第一百六十条。
[4]详见《公司法》(2005)第一百五十四条。
[1]详见新华网广东频道2007.9.27
[1]参见中财网,2006年12月25日
[2]参见卢现祥,《新制度经济学》,武汉大学出版社,2004年1月,第158-159页。
[3]同②。
[1]见希克思,《价值与资本》,牛津出版社1946年版,第144页,转引自沈艺峰,《资本结构理论史》,经济科学出版社,1999年。
[1]信息来源:http://hk.news.yahoo.com/070915/12/2fplf.html.
[2]一般来说,这种非线性机制源于下述情况。第一,信贷市场的较强关联效应。信贷市场的全球化、银行之间的同业支付清算系统,多边支付清算系统等,使得任何个别风险可以通过多米诺骨牌效应,在乘数效应下引发系统性风险。第二,金融市场的从众行为,即所谓羊群效应。储户的这种行为往往把个体行为为转化市场行为,从而引起系统性银行风险。第三,银行自身业务的存短贷长这一特性而具有极大的风险。
[3]资料来源:金融政策择优:全面开放债券市场。http://www.100paper.com/100paper/jingjixue/zhengquanjinrong/zhengquanxiangguan/2007070142064_2.html.
[1]以上内容转引自何旭强 娄静,证券市场脆弱性的内生机制与相机治理,《东部经济评论》,2004年第4期
[1]麦金农,王宇.东亚美元末位、浮动恐惧和原罪的主要观点,《经济社会体制比较》2003年第3期
[2]资料来源:金融政策择优:全面开放债券市场。http://www.100paper.com/100paper/jingjixue/zhengquanjinrong/zhengquanxiangguan/2007070142064_2.html
[1]详见1.1,第2页。
[2]以上内容转引自http://www.2008red.com/member_pic_395/files/qikanlunwen/html/article_2569_1.shtml
[1]参见 陈柳钦,制度、制度变迁与金融制度创新.来源:http://www.tianyabook.com/jingji/040.htm.
[1]见《国务院关于坚决制止乱集资和加强债券发行管理的通知》第二条。
[1]按照(社会)契约论,政府是选民利益的代表,它没有自身利益,政府是作为选民的代理者身份出现在市场上。对社会契约论的具体论述,可详见让-雅克·卢梭著,何兆武译《社会契约论》,红旗出版社,1997年。
[2]按照国家的掠夺理论,政府看成是一个纯粹的租金榨取者,无益于社会经济发展。这也是马克思主义的国家理论之主要观点。
[3]请参阅(美)道格拉斯·C·诺斯《经济史中的结构与变迁》,陈郁等译,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年,第20-35页。
[1]同年,美国的水平为59%,英国是104%,日本为114%,德国是70%,印尼为40%,韩国是44%,马来西亚是89%,泰国是79%。转引自“中国的货币化进程、金融控制及改革困境”,《经济研究》,1997.08。
[1]关于诱致性制度变迁和强制性制度变迁的定义及相关内容,请参阅 林毅夫,《关于制度变迁的经济学理论:诱致性变迁与强制性变迁》;v.w.拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载于《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学译文集》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年。
[1]资料来源:http://baike.baidu.com/view/1324635.htm
[1]资料来源,李婧“美国债券市场简介及与中国债券市场之比较”,www.chinabond.com.cn/chinabond/article/fj_content.jsp?sLmId
[1](意)维科(Giovanni B.Vico,1725).关于民族共同性的新科学原理[J].转引自 吴承明.经济史:历史观与方法论[J].中国经济史研究.2001(3):3-22.
[2]梅耶(Henry·Maine)(1861年).转引自 何兆武.从身份到契约—重评梅耶的公式[J].史学伦理研究.1992(1):117-127.
[3](德)马克斯·韦伯.新教伦理和资本主义精神[M].上海:三联书店,1987.
[4](英)斯科特·拉什.风险社会与风险文化[J].马克思主义与现实,2002(4):52-63.
[5](英)多米尼克·卡瑟利.挑战风险—金融机构如何生存和发展[M]北京:商务印书馆,1997.
[6]安平印.拓宽融资渠道 提高资金使用效率[N],中国信息报社,2005.08.01.
[7]中国人民银行货币政策分析小组,中国货币政策执行报告,2004年第四季度[R].上海证券报2005.02.25.
[8]杨阳.中国企业债券市场的发展研究[D],硕士论文.2004.
[9](美)凡勃伦.有闲阶级论——关于制度的经济研究[M].中译本,北京,商务印书馆,1964.
[10](美)康芒斯.制度经济学[M].中译本,北京:商务印书馆,1962.
[11](美)格鲁奇.比较经济制度[M].中译本,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1985.
[12]Bede and Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Proper[M].MacMillan,New York,1932.
[13](美)加尔布雷斯(1973).经济学和公共目标[M].北京:商务印书馆,1980.
[14](瑞典)冈纳·缪尔达尔(1944).美国的两难困境:黑人问题和现代民主[M].中译本,北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2001.
[15](美)富兰克·H·奈特著,王宇、王文玉译.风险、不确定性和利润[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[16](美)西蒙.现代决策理论的基石[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989.
[17](日)速水佑次郎,[美]弗农·拉坦著,郭熙保等译.农业发展的国际分析[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2000.
[18](美)诺斯.经济史中的结构与变迁[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1996.
[19](美)科斯等.财产权利与制度变迁[M].上海:上海三联书店,1994.
[20]盛洪.现代制度经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2003.
[21](美)埃瑞克·G·菲吕博顿、[德]鲁道夫·瑞切特.新制度经济学[M].上海:上海 财经大学出版社,1998.
[22](美)诺斯.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海:上海三联书店,1994.
[23]Modigliani F,Miller M H.The Cost of Capital,Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment[J].American Economic Review,June,1958(48):267-297.
[24]Jensen,Michael,and William Meckling.theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and ownership structure[J].journal of financial economics 1976(3):305-360.
[25]Harris,M.,& A Raviv.Capital structure and the information role of debt[J].Journal of Finance,1988(45):321-349.
[26]Harris,M.,& A.Raviv.Corporate control contests and capital structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(20):55-386.
[27]Stulz,Rene M..Managerial Control of Voting Rights:Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20).
[28]Myers,S.C.& N.S.Majluf.Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984(13):187-221.
[29]Ross.Stephen.the Determination of Financial Struture:The Incentive Signalling ApproachBell[J].Journal of Eonomics,1977(8):23-40.
[30]Douglas W.Diamond.Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring[J].Review of Economic Studies,1984(51):393-414.
[31]Fama,E.Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,88,1980:288-307.
[32]Rajan,R.G.,Zingales,L.Financial systems,industrial structure,and growth [J].Unpublishedworking paper.University of Chicago.1999.
[33]Miguel Cantillo and Julian Wright.How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical Investigation[R].Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-256-Rev,University of California at Berkeley,2000.
[34]Eom,Young Ho,Helwege,Jean and Huang,Jing-Zhi.Structural Models of Corporate Bond Pricing:An Empirical Analysis[J].(February 2002).
[35]Chen,Long,Lesmond,David A.and Wei,Jason Zhanshun.Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond Liquidity[R].(April 2005).14th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=495422.
[36]Edith S.Hotchkiss and Tavy Ronen.The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market:An Intraday Analysis[J].Rev.Finane.Stud.2002(15):1325-1354
[37]Roger Walder.Dynamic Allocation of Treasury and Corporate Bond Portfolios University of Lausanne(HEC),International Center FAME and Banque Cantonale Vaudoise,Switzerland February 7,2003,Working Paper Series.
[38]Lamdin,Douglas J.Corporate Bond Yield Spreads in Recent Decades:Trends,Changes,and Stock Market Linkages[R].(September 2003).Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=450140 or DOI:10.2139/ssrn.450140.
[39]Jagtiani,Julapa,George Kaufman,and Catharine Lemieux.The Effect of Credit Risk on and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields[J].Journal of Financial Research,Winter 2002:559-575.
[40]David.Durand.Cost of Debt and Equity Funds for Business:Tre-nds and Problems of Measurement.in National Bureau of Economic Research,Conference on Research on Business Finance,New Youk 1952:215-247.
[41]Modigliani F,Miller M H.Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital:A Correction[J].American Economic Review,1963(6)53:344-433.
[42]Miller.Debt and Taxes[J].Journal of Finance,1977(32):261-275.
[43]Aghion P and Bolton P.An Incomplete Contract Approach to Financial Contracting [J].Review of Economic Studies,1992(59):473-494.
[44]Diamond,Douglas W.Monitoring and Reputation:The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt[J].Journal of Political Economy,University of Chicago Press,vol.1991,(4):689-721.
[45]Herring,Richard J.and Nathporn Chatusripitak.The Case of the Missing Market:The Bond Market and Why it Matters for Financial Development[R].ADB Institute Working Paper 11,2000.
[46]Rajan,Raghuram and Luigi Zingales.Which Capitalism?[J].Lessons from the East Asian Crisis,Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1998,11(3):40-48.
[47]Boot,Arnound,and Anjan Thakor.Financial system architecture[J].The Review of Financial Studies 10,1997.
[48]Nils H.Hakansson.The Role of a Corporate Bond Market in an Economy--and in Avoiding Crises,University of California[J].Berkeley Accounting Group September 9,1999.Working Paper Series.
[49]王一萱.银行体系失效与公司债券市场发展:理论、实践与政策建议[R].深圳证券研究所报告.2003.07.09深证综研字第0075号.
[50]王国刚.发展公司债券市场应解决的几个问题[J].福建论坛(经济社会版),2003(7):18-23.
[51]Sanjeev Bhojraj and Partha Sengupta.Effect of Corporate Governance on Bond Ratings and Yields:The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors Journal of Business,Forthcoming Cornell University Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and George Mason University[J].Accounting Program March 26,2002 Accepted Paper Series.
[52]Paul H.Schultz.Corporate Bond Trading Costs and Practices:A Peek Behind the Curtain,University of Notre Dame-Department of Finance & Business Economics December 9,1998,Working Paper Series.
[53]Edith S.Hotchkiss and Tavy Ronen.The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market:An Intraday Analysis Boston College[J].Wallace E.Carroll School of Management and Rutgers,The State University of New Jersey-Finance &Economics January 3,2000,Working Paper Series.
[54]Joao A.C.Santos and Kostas Tsatsaronis.Cost of Barriers to Entry:Evidence from the Market for Corporate Euro Bond Underwriting Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Bank for International Settlements(BIS)[J].Monetary and Economic Department September 3,2003,Working Paper Series.
[55]Howard Qi,Sheen Liu and Chunchi Wu.Personal Taxes,Endogenous Default,and Corporate Bond Yield Spreads Michigan Tech,Youngstown State University Williamson College of Business Administration and Syracuse University,[J].Whitman School of Management,March 20,2005.
[56]Amy K.Edwards,Lawrence Harris and Michael S.Piwowar.Corporate Bond Market Transparency erie V.Vance Roley The Effect of Federal Debt Management Policy on Corporate Bond and Equity Yields[J].University of Washington School of Business Administration,July 7,2004,Working Paper Series.
[57]王国刚.发展企业债券市场[J].投资与证券,2003(10).
[58]安义宽.论发展中国企业债券市场的基本原则[J].投资与证券,2003(7).
[59]陈嘉明.发展企业债券市场的理论分析与实证研究[J].现代财经-天津财经学院学报,2003(4):27-29.
[60]何德旭.对我国企业债券市场的思考[J].金融理论与实践,2002(8):3-6.
[61]高小强.中美两国企业债券市场的比较与启示[J].新金融,2003(8):40-43.
[62]吴腾华.东亚新兴债券市场的发展及其启示[J].河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005(2):91-95.
[63]叶宗伟.从中美公司债券的比较看中国公司债券的滞后发展[J].亚太经济,2003(3).
[64]张捷、黄燕.债券市场与东亚金融体系[J].国际经济评论,2001(9).
[65]陈锐.企业债券市场的政府约束与市场约束选择[J].上海金融,2002(6):7-9
[66]胡少华.企业债券市场发展与产权制度创新[J].财经科学,2002(2):72-77
[67]陈莉、严中兴.我国企业债券市场供给与需求的均衡分析[J].华南金融研究,2001(1):34-36.
[68]黄燕君、丁华明.我国企业债券市场供求分析[J].生产力研究,2002(5):10-12.
[69]田柳.中国企业债券市场发展滞后的供求分析与对策[J].新疆财经,2002(4)
[70]王满四、和丕禅.融资结构失衡与企业债券融资发展[J].同济大学学报(社会科学版)2003(2):57-61.
[71]刘凯.企业债券市场管理弊端剖析及政策建议[J].上海经济研究,2002(4).43-47.
[72]陈柳钦.我国企业债券市场发展的深层次思考[J].上海商学院学报,2005(1):5-10.
[73]王一萱,徐良平,李信民.中国企业债券市场上市公司调查报告[J].证券市场导报,2003(4):17-.22
[74]侯杰.新制度经济学视角下的中国企业债券市场的发展[J].经济体制改革,2002(5).
[75]钱春海.我国企业债券市场问题的体制性分析及建议[J].财经理论与实践,2002(1):54-58.
[76]龚翔.公司债券融资障碍:基于公司治理结构的分析[J].商业经济与管理,2002(9).
[77]夏有华.企业债券市场发展的架构安排与主导创新[J].经济与金融,2002(2)
[78]耿志民.论中国债券市场的制度创新[J].河南金融干部管理学院学报,2003(2)
[79]吴腾华.新兴债券市场发展[J].社会科学文献出版社[M],2005,35-36
[80]E I.Altman.Financial ratios,discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy[J].Journal of Finance,1968,9(4):589-679.
[81]Robichek,A.A.,and Stewart C.Myers.Optimal Financing Decisions[M].Englewood Cliffs,N.J.Prentice-Hall,1965.
[82]Robichek,Alexander A.,and Myers,Stewart,.Problems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1,no.1(1966).
[83]Jensen,M.C..Agency Cost of Free Cash,corporate Finance & Taker[J].American Economic Review.1986(76):488-500.
[84]Fischer,E.O.Heinkel,R.and J.Zechner.DynamicCapital Structure Choice:Theory and Tests[J].Journal of Finance,1989(44):19-40.
[85]Grossman,S.J.& O.Hart.Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives [M].in J.McCall,ed:The Economics of Information and Uncertainty,University of Chicago Press,1982.
[86]Stulz,R.Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(26):3-27.
[87]Titman,S.,& R.Wessels,1988,The determinants of capital structure choice[J].Journal of Finance,1988(43):1-19.
[88]郑培敏等.权益融资:中国上市公司并购融资创新路径探讨[J].经济导刊,2004(5).
[89]张丽英.中外企业资本结构现状的比较分析[J].生产力研究,2006(3).
[90]张玉明、赵强.资本结构优化与企业优序融资策略[J].复旦学报,2002(5).99-95.
[91]Rajan G.R.,& L.Zingales.What do we know about capital structure?Some evidence from international data[J].Journal of Finance 50,1995:1421-1460.
[92]Diamond,D.Reputation Acquisition in Debt Market IJ].Journal of Political Economy,1989,97(4):828-862.
[93]Berger,A.N.,Herring,R.J.and Szego,G.D.The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions [J].Journal of Banking and finance,1995,(23):393-430.
[94]A.Bhide.The hidden cost of stock market liquidity[J].Journal of Financial Economies,1993.34(2):31-51.
[95]Stiglitz,J,and Weiss,A.Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information [J].American Economic Review,June,1981:393-410.
[96]Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales,The Cost of Diversity:The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment[J].Journal of Finance,American Finance Association,vol.55(1),2000a:35-80,02.
[97]Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales,The tyranny of inequality[J].Journal of Public Economics,Elsevier,vol.76(3),2000b:521-558.
[98]Blackwell,D and Kidwell,D.,investigation of cost different between public sales and private placement of debt[J].Journal of Fi nancial Economics 22,1988:253-278.
[99]Sudha,Krishaswami,paul A.Spindt,venkat Subramaniam.information asymmetry,and the placement structure of corporate debt[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,(51):407-434.
[100]Carey,M1,Prowse,S 1,Rhea,and Udell,G The economics of the private placement markets:a newlook'Financial Markets,Institution,and Instrument,1993(2):1-661.
[101]马克思恩格斯全集第25卷,北京:人民出版社,1975.
[102]William F.Sharpe Capital Asset Prices:A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under. Conditions of Risk,Journal of Finance,Vol.19,1964:425-442.
[103]John Lintner.Security Prices,Risk,and Maximal Gains from Diversification [J].Finance,1965(4):587-615.
[104]Mossin,J.Equilibrium in a Capital AssetMarket[J].Econometrica,1965(35):768-783.
[105]Dalla,Ismail.The Emerging Asian Bond Market.Washington,D.C.:World Bank,1995.
[106]Bank of Thailand governor Chatu Mongol Sonakul,“When Will Thai Banks Wake Up ?”,Speeches at the Bangkok Club,1999,7.22.
[107]安辉.亚洲新兴市场国家公司债券市场发展研究[J].国际金融研究,2004(7):40-46.
[108]赵志君.金融资产总量,结构与经济增长[J].管理世界,2003(3).
[109]Varouj A.Aivazian,Laurence Booth and W.Sean Cleary Do Firms in Emerging Markets Follow Different Dividend Policies From U.S.Firms?,Journal of Financial Research,Forthcoming,University of Toronto-Joseph L.Rotman School of Management,University of Toronto-Joseph L.Rotman School of Management and Saint Mary's University-Finance & Management Science,Accepted Paper Series,August 6,2003.
[110].Gabrielle Wanzenried;Capital structure decisions and output market competition under demand uncertainty[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,(21):171-200.
[111](英)威廉·配弟.政治算术[M].北京:商务印书馆,1978.
[112](英)查尔斯·达维南特.论英国的公共收入与贸易[M].北京:商务印书馆,1995.
[113](美)保罗·A·萨缪尔森,经济学[M].北京:发展出版社,1992.
[114]安义宽 如何认识和理解中国企业债券市场[J].财贸经济,2002(4):15-19.
[115]牛新华、张高丽、余国新、杨红、戈歧明等.投资者利益保护机制研究[A].中国证券市场发展前言问题研究[C].北京:中国金融出版社,2001.
[116]LLSV.Investor Protection and Corporation Valuation,Havard Institution for Economic Research,Discussion Paper 1882,Havard University,1999.
[117]Johnson,Simon and Andrei Sheifer,“Privatization and Corporation Governance ”Manuscript Harvard Business School,2001.
[118]Rafael La Porta.Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes.Andrei Shleifer.Robert W.Vishny.llaw and finance Journal of Political Economy.Journal of Political Economy 1998,107(6);1113-1155.
[119]黄明.市场经济下银企关系模式的选择[J].当代经济科学,1997(2):13-17.
[120]何广文.德国金融制度研究择[M].中国劳动社会保障出版社,2000.
[121]夏斌.日本金融业开发资金的特点[N].经济日报,1985.10.05.
[122]Asian Development Bank:“Bond Market Development in East Asia:Issues and Challenges”,January,2003.
[123]汪红丽.中国企业债券市场发展的实证分析[J].证券市场导报2002(5):63-66.
[124]吴晓灵.中国金融体制改革跟踪研究(上)[J].改革,199703:64-76;中国金融体制改革跟踪研究(下)[J].改革,1997(4):83-98.
[125]吴晓灵.稳步发展企业债券市场全面优化金融资产结构[J].金融研究,2005(3):1-6.
[126]张杰.中国金融制度的结构与变迁[M].太原:山西经济出版社,1998.
[127]黄春蕾.对西方资本主义国家从国有化到私有化的再认识[J],当代财经,2001(4):22-27.
[128]黄少安,张岗.中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析[J].经济研究200111:12-21
[129]张育军.促进企业债发展的关键是建立偿债保障机制[J].金融信息参考2003(5);我国资本市场制度设计与制度建设研究[J].证券市场导报,2006(9):4-15.
[130]李海涛.我国企业债券市场的现状、问题及对策[J].内蒙古金融研究,2004(2):50-54.
[131]欧阳卫民.债券、基金和货币市场[M].北京:中国金融出版社,1997.
[132]吴正光、周东山.发展我国企业债券市场的研究[J].中南财经政法大学研究生学报,2003(5).
[133]Thomas,L.C,A Surveyof Credit and BehaviournalScornig:Forecasting financial risk of lending to consumers.International Journal of Forecasting,16,2000,149-172.
[134]米运生.投资秩序演变与国有银行信用风险[D].北京大学博士论文.2004.
[135]杨庆育.企业债券融资理论与实证研究[D].博士论文,2005.
[136]Hart,O.and Moore,J.Debt and Seniority:An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management[J].The American Economic Review,Vol.85,No.3.(Jun.,1995),pp.567-585.
[137]James Tobin.Liquidity preference as behavior towards risk[J].Review of Economic Studies,Febrary,1958:65-85.
[138]Harold Demsetz.The Cost of Transacating[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,82.1968:33-57.
[139]Bagehot,Walter(pseudonym for Jack Treynor).The Only Game in Town”[J].Financial Analysts Journal 27,1971:31-53.
[140]Black,F.Noise[J].Journal of Finance,July,1986:529-543.
[141]Kyle,Albert.Continuous auctions and insider trading[J].Econometrica,53,1985:1315-1336.
[142]Grossman,Sanford J & Miller,Merton H,.Liquidity and Market Structure,[J].Journal of Finance,American Finance Association,vol.43(3),1988:617-37.
[143]O'Hara,M.Market Microstructure Theory,BasilBlackwell,Cambridge Mass,1995;O'Hara,M.and G.Oldfield.The Microeconomicsof Market Making[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 21,1986:361-376.
[144]Admati,Anat R.,and Pfleiderer,Paul.Divideand Conquer:A Theory of Intraday and Day-of-the-Week MeanEffects[J].Review of Financial Studies 2,1989:189-224.
[145]Glen R.1994,Components of The Bid-ask Spread and The statistical properties of Transaction prices,[J].Journal of Finance 42,1994:1293-1308..
[146]Garbade K D,Silber W L.Structural organization of secondary markets:Clearing frequency,dealer activity and liquidity risk[J].Journal of Finance.34(June 1979:577-593.
[147]Glosten,L.R.,and L.E.Harris.Estimating the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread,[J].Journal of Financial Economics 21,1988:123-142.655.
[148]Muranaga J,Shimizu.Market Microstructure and Market Liquidity[M].Basel:Bank of International Settlements,1999.
[149]Diamond,D.and Dvbvig,P.Bank Runs,Deposit Insurance,and Liquidity,[J].Journal of Political Economy,Vol.91,No.3(June).No 91,1983:401-419.
[150]Greenwood,Jeremy & Smith,Bruce D.Financial markets in development,and the development of financial markets[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,21,1997:145-181.
[151]R.Levine.Stock markets,growth,and tax policy[J].Journal of Finance,46,1991(4):1445-1465.
[152]Sanford J.Grossman & Joseph E.Stiglitz..On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets[J].American Economic Review,1980,70(3):393-407.
[153]Laffont,J.J,and J.Tirole.A Theory of Incentives in Procurement an Regulation,[M].MIT Press,Combridge,1993.
[154]R.Levine.Financial development and economic growth:views and agenda[J].Journal of Economic Literature,1997(7):688-726.
[155]Goldstein and Kavajecz.A Specialist's Quoted Depth and Limit Order Book[J].Journal ofFinance1999(/54):747-771.
[156]HeeJoon Ahn,Kee Hong Bae,and Kalok Chan:Limit Orders,Depth,and Volatility: Evidence from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong[J]. Journal of Finance,2001:767-788.
[157] Demestz, Harold .Why Regulate Utilities[J]. Journal, of Law & Economics.1968(11): 55-65.
[158] Smidt, S :Which Road to an Efficient Stock Market :Free Competition or Regulated Monopoly ? [J]. Financal A nalysts Journal 27,1971: 64 - 69.
[159] Stoll, H. The Supply of Dealer Services in SecuritiesMarkets[J]. Journal of Finance 33,1978:1133-1151.
[160] Garman ,M :Market Microstructure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 3 ,1976:257 -275.
[161] Cohen, K ,Maier, S, Schwartz, R, Whitcomb, D.Transaction Costs ,Order Placement Strategy ,and Existence of the BidAsk Spread[J]. Journal of Political Economy ,1981:287-305.
[162] Ho ,T ,Stoll ,H. The Dynamics of Dealer Markets under Competition[J]. Journal of Finance 38,1983:1053-1074.
[163] Copeland, T. and D. Galai: Information Effects on theBid Ask Spreads[J]. Journal of Finance 38 ,1983:1457 -1469.
[164] Glosten ,L. R. ,Milgrom, P. Bid ,Ask ,and TransactionPrices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Agents[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 14,1985:71-100.
[165] Holden ,C . Subrahmanyam ,A. Long lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition[J]. Journal of Finance 47,1992:247 - 270.
[166] Admati, A. R, Pfleiderer, P. A Theory of Intraday Trading Patterns [J]. Review of Financial Studies 1 ,1988;3 -40.
[167] Easley ,D ,O'Hara ,M . Price, Trade Size ,and Information in Securities Markets[J].Journal of Financial Economics 19,1987: 69 -90.
[168] Easley ,D ,O'Hara ,M . Time and the Process of Security Price Adjustment [J].Journal of Finance 47 ,1992:577 - 606.
[169] Kraus, A. and H. Stoll.Price Impacts of Block Trading on the New York Stock Exchange [J]. Finance, Vol. 27,1972:569-588.
[170] La Porta,Rafael,Lopez-de-silanes,Florencio,Shleifer.Andrei and Vishny.Robert. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1998(106) :1113-1155.
[171] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Slianes, Andrei Sheilfer, Robert W. Vishny.Legal Determinants of External Finance [J] Journal of Finance 1997(52):1131 — 1150.
[172]Claessens,S.,and Jiankov,S.The Separation of Ownership and Controle in East Asian Corpations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):81-112.
[173]La Porta et al,Lapea-de-Silanes and Sheleifer,RobertW.Vishny.Investor Protection:Origins,Consequences Reform.The World Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper No.1.1999.
[174]Coffee,J.C.Privitization and Corporate Governance:the Lessons from Securities Market Failure[J].Journal of Corporation Law,vol.1999(25):1-39.
[175]胡汝银.投资者保护与证券监管架构[N].上海证券报,2000.11.12.
[176]Johnson Simon and Andrei·Shleifer.Coase v.the Coasians[J].NBER Working Paper No.w Issued in December,1999.
[177]Demirguc-Kunt,A.,& V.Maksimovic.Institutions,financial markets and firm debt maturity[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999(54):295-336.
[178]世界银行.世界发展报告1989[M].北京:中国财政出版社,1990.
[179]L·E·戴维斯、D·C.诺斯,制度变迁的理论:概念与原因,载于《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学译文集》,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994,274-291.
[180]Fry,M.J.Money,Interest,and Banking in Economic Development[M].(2nd Edn.)(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins) 1995.
[181]Arestis,P.and P.O.Demetriades(1996) “Finance and Growth Institutionial Considerrations and Causality,”Paper Presented at the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference,University of Wales Swansea,1-4.
[182]Sengupta,P.Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt[J].The Accounting Review 73(4),1998:459-474.