基于风险规避的中国商业银行资本结构研究
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摘要
商业银行的资本结构对于实现商业银行的财务目标和稳健经营具有至关重要的作用,它不仅决定银行的价值和筹资成本,而且决定银行抵御和化解风险能力的大小。西方国家商业银行发展的历史证明,有效地资本结构管理不仅有助于商业银行主动适应监管要求,实施有效的资本充足率管理,而且可以有效地规避商业银行的金融风险,通过资本规划支持银行的总体发展战略目标,实现银行市场价值的最大化。
随着商业银行制度的不断完善,尤其是风险意识的不断增强,我国商业银行资本结构发生了一系列的变革和优化。但是,与国际大银行相比,我国商业银行的资本结构在许多方面还存在弊端,与建立现代商业银行制度,实现商业银行的价值最大化的优化目标相距较远。东南亚金融危机和由美国次贷风波引发的全球金融危机已经给我们敲响了警钟,使我们更加清楚地认识到银行业潜在的巨大风险,因而,从风险规避这一特殊视角来研究商业银行资本结构及其优化,从制度和技术两个层面完善商业银行的资本结构,以建立起基于市场驱动的资本结构管理机制,提高我国商业银行的核心竞争力和抗风险能力,保证我国商业银行在未来银行之间激烈的市场竞争中立足并求得发展。
本文以货币金融学、资本结构理论、现代企业理论及相关经济学理论为指导,以当前商业银行资本结构为参照系；坚持经济与金融、理论与实践、历史与发展、借鉴与创新相结合的原则；采用实证分析与理论分析、归纳与演绎、定性分析与定量分析、规范分析与比较分析相结合的研究方法；从理论性、历史性、实证性、借鉴性、前瞻性和政策可操作性的角度,对我国商业银行资本结构及其优化进行了深入的研究。
本文立足于商业银行“三性”原则,以大型商业银行和股份制商业银行为研究范围,从风险规避这一特殊视角,围绕我国商业银行的资本结构状况及其优化逐步展开研究。论文的第一章为导论。第二章在界定风险规避和商业银行资本结构的概念,梳理资本结构理论的发展演进的基础上,探究了商业银行资本结构的发展脉络,剖析了商业银行资本结构和风险规避的理论相关性。第三章通过对商业银行安全性分析、流动性分析和盈利性分析,考察了我国商业银行风险现状和分布；通过核心资本结构、附属资本结构现状与风险规避分析,总结出现阶段我国商业银行资本结构的特征事实,提出了商业银行资本结构与风险规避存在内在联系的观点。论文的第四、五、六章分别从商业银行的安全性、流动性和盈利性原则出发,采用计量经济学模型,对风险规避和我国商业银行资本结构的关系进行定量分析,在肯定风险规避和我国商业银行资本结构之间的重要关系的同时,研究并发现了我国商业银行资本结构中可能引发风险的主要因素,强调了优化商业银行资本结构的重要性和迫切性。第七章在商业银行“三性”原则的统一框架下,充分考虑了安全性、流动性及盈利性的相互影响,并对商业银行的风险规避行为产生交叉反馈效应,建立了商业银行资本结构与风险规避的联立模型,在证实了第四、五、六章的分析结果的同时,指出了商业银行的风险规避与资本结构间的响应系数随时间变迁的特性。论文的第八章在考察美国、日本、韩国等成熟市场经济国家商业银行的现行资本结构的基础上,利用经济学原理构建了最优资本结构的经济学模型,指出了我国商业银行资本结构优化目标的现实选择,并据此提出我国商业银行资本结构优化的策略和路径。第九章重点对我国商业银行资本结构优化的现实难点——融资结构优化、股权结构优化和外部环境优化提出了相应的对策措施。
Commercial banks'capital structure plays an important role in realizing their financial objectives and stable management.Not only does it determine commercial banks'value and cost of floatation, but also the ability to resist and puncture risks. The commercial banks' developing history in Western countries proves that effective structural management of capital not only helps them to adapt to regulatory requirements in an active manner and implement effectively capital adequacy management, but can avoid financial risks, so as to give support to the overall strategic development targets through capital planning, and to maximize their market value.
With an increasingly flawless regulation of commercial banks, especially the deepening awareness of risks, there have been a series of transformation and optimization in the capital structure of commercial banks in China. However, compared with the large international banks, many defects still exist in the capital structure of Chinese commercials. There is still a relatively long way to go before we establish a modern regulation system of commercial banks so as to realize the optimizing targets of achieving the largest value of commercial banks. The Southeast Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis caused by the Subprime mortgage disputes in the US have already rung the alarm bell, making us more aware of the great potential risks of commercial banks. Therefore, we should study the capital structure of commercial banks and its optimization from the special aspect of risk evading, better improve the capital structure of commercial banks from institutional and technological aspects, so as to establish a managerial system of capital structure based on market-oriented, enhance the core competency and the ability to resist risk of our commercial banks, ensuring China's commercial banks would stay still and achieve a good development in the fierce competition between banks in the future,
under the guidance of monetary and financial theory, capital structure theory, theory of modern enterprises and relevant economic theories, and with the current capital structure of commercial banks as the reference frame, this paper, sticking to the principal of combining economy and finance, theory and practice, history and development, learning and innovation, and adopting research methods of combining empirical analysis and theoretical analysis, inductive and deductive, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, and normative analysis and comparative analysis, gives an in-dept study on the capital structure and its optimization of Chinese commercial banks, from the theoretical, historical, empirical, drawing, perspective and policy operability points of view.
Based on the "three characters" of commercial banks and with the large commercial banks and share-holding commercial banks as research objective, this paper researches the capital structure and its optimization of commercial banks from the special angle of risk evading. Chapter1is an introduction. In Chapter2, we discuss the capital structure development history of commercial banks and analyze the theoretic relativity of capital structure and risk evading in commercial banks on the basis of defining risk evading and capital concept of commercial banks, and reviewing theoretic development of capital theory. In Chapter3we sum up the present situation and distribution of commercial bank's risks through an analysis of security, liquidity and profitability of commercial banks; we also, through analyzing the present situation and risk evading of core capital structure and subsidiary capital structure, sum up the capital structure features of Chinese commercial banks at the present stage, and put forward the viewpoint that there is an internal link between commercial banks'capital structure and risk evading. In Chapters Fourth, Five and Six, we, based on the principals of security, liquidity and profitability of commercial banks, give a quantitative analysis of the link between capital structure and risk evading by adopting calculating statistics. In affirming the important links between risk evading and capital analysis of commercial banks, we detect the key factors that might lead to risks in the capital structure of Chinese commercial banks, and emphasize the importance and urgency to better the capital structure of commercial banks. In Chapter Seventh, we, under the framework of "three characters" principal of commercial banks and giving full consideration to the interrelation between security, liquidity and profitability and there interfeeding effects on risk evading behavior of commercial banks, establish the linking models of capital structure and risk evading for commercial banks, which is a proof of the analysis results in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Meanwhile, we point out the feature that the responding coefficient between capital structure and risk evading changes with the time. In Chapter Eight, on the basis of consideration of the present capital structures of commercial banks in countries with mature market economy including the US, Japan and ROK, we establish a Optimal economic model of capital structure by adopting the economic theory, and point out the practical choice to realize the target of optimizing capital structure. And on that basis, we propose the strategy and realizing method for the optimization of capital structures in Chinese commercial banks. In Chapter Nine, we focus on the countermeasures for the difficulties realizing in realizing optimized capital structure, including optimized financing structure, stockholders'right structure and external environment.
随着商业银行制度的不断完善,尤其是风险意识的不断增强,我国商业银行资本结构发生了一系列的变革和优化。但是,与国际大银行相比,我国商业银行的资本结构在许多方面还存在弊端,与建立现代商业银行制度,实现商业银行的价值最大化的优化目标相距较远。东南亚金融危机和由美国次贷风波引发的全球金融危机已经给我们敲响了警钟,使我们更加清楚地认识到银行业潜在的巨大风险,因而,从风险规避这一特殊视角来研究商业银行资本结构及其优化,从制度和技术两个层面完善商业银行的资本结构,以建立起基于市场驱动的资本结构管理机制,提高我国商业银行的核心竞争力和抗风险能力,保证我国商业银行在未来银行之间激烈的市场竞争中立足并求得发展。
本文以货币金融学、资本结构理论、现代企业理论及相关经济学理论为指导,以当前商业银行资本结构为参照系；坚持经济与金融、理论与实践、历史与发展、借鉴与创新相结合的原则；采用实证分析与理论分析、归纳与演绎、定性分析与定量分析、规范分析与比较分析相结合的研究方法；从理论性、历史性、实证性、借鉴性、前瞻性和政策可操作性的角度,对我国商业银行资本结构及其优化进行了深入的研究。
本文立足于商业银行“三性”原则,以大型商业银行和股份制商业银行为研究范围,从风险规避这一特殊视角,围绕我国商业银行的资本结构状况及其优化逐步展开研究。论文的第一章为导论。第二章在界定风险规避和商业银行资本结构的概念,梳理资本结构理论的发展演进的基础上,探究了商业银行资本结构的发展脉络,剖析了商业银行资本结构和风险规避的理论相关性。第三章通过对商业银行安全性分析、流动性分析和盈利性分析,考察了我国商业银行风险现状和分布；通过核心资本结构、附属资本结构现状与风险规避分析,总结出现阶段我国商业银行资本结构的特征事实,提出了商业银行资本结构与风险规避存在内在联系的观点。论文的第四、五、六章分别从商业银行的安全性、流动性和盈利性原则出发,采用计量经济学模型,对风险规避和我国商业银行资本结构的关系进行定量分析,在肯定风险规避和我国商业银行资本结构之间的重要关系的同时,研究并发现了我国商业银行资本结构中可能引发风险的主要因素,强调了优化商业银行资本结构的重要性和迫切性。第七章在商业银行“三性”原则的统一框架下,充分考虑了安全性、流动性及盈利性的相互影响,并对商业银行的风险规避行为产生交叉反馈效应,建立了商业银行资本结构与风险规避的联立模型,在证实了第四、五、六章的分析结果的同时,指出了商业银行的风险规避与资本结构间的响应系数随时间变迁的特性。论文的第八章在考察美国、日本、韩国等成熟市场经济国家商业银行的现行资本结构的基础上,利用经济学原理构建了最优资本结构的经济学模型,指出了我国商业银行资本结构优化目标的现实选择,并据此提出我国商业银行资本结构优化的策略和路径。第九章重点对我国商业银行资本结构优化的现实难点——融资结构优化、股权结构优化和外部环境优化提出了相应的对策措施。
Commercial banks'capital structure plays an important role in realizing their financial objectives and stable management.Not only does it determine commercial banks'value and cost of floatation, but also the ability to resist and puncture risks. The commercial banks' developing history in Western countries proves that effective structural management of capital not only helps them to adapt to regulatory requirements in an active manner and implement effectively capital adequacy management, but can avoid financial risks, so as to give support to the overall strategic development targets through capital planning, and to maximize their market value.
With an increasingly flawless regulation of commercial banks, especially the deepening awareness of risks, there have been a series of transformation and optimization in the capital structure of commercial banks in China. However, compared with the large international banks, many defects still exist in the capital structure of Chinese commercials. There is still a relatively long way to go before we establish a modern regulation system of commercial banks so as to realize the optimizing targets of achieving the largest value of commercial banks. The Southeast Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis caused by the Subprime mortgage disputes in the US have already rung the alarm bell, making us more aware of the great potential risks of commercial banks. Therefore, we should study the capital structure of commercial banks and its optimization from the special aspect of risk evading, better improve the capital structure of commercial banks from institutional and technological aspects, so as to establish a managerial system of capital structure based on market-oriented, enhance the core competency and the ability to resist risk of our commercial banks, ensuring China's commercial banks would stay still and achieve a good development in the fierce competition between banks in the future,
under the guidance of monetary and financial theory, capital structure theory, theory of modern enterprises and relevant economic theories, and with the current capital structure of commercial banks as the reference frame, this paper, sticking to the principal of combining economy and finance, theory and practice, history and development, learning and innovation, and adopting research methods of combining empirical analysis and theoretical analysis, inductive and deductive, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, and normative analysis and comparative analysis, gives an in-dept study on the capital structure and its optimization of Chinese commercial banks, from the theoretical, historical, empirical, drawing, perspective and policy operability points of view.
Based on the "three characters" of commercial banks and with the large commercial banks and share-holding commercial banks as research objective, this paper researches the capital structure and its optimization of commercial banks from the special angle of risk evading. Chapter1is an introduction. In Chapter2, we discuss the capital structure development history of commercial banks and analyze the theoretic relativity of capital structure and risk evading in commercial banks on the basis of defining risk evading and capital concept of commercial banks, and reviewing theoretic development of capital theory. In Chapter3we sum up the present situation and distribution of commercial bank's risks through an analysis of security, liquidity and profitability of commercial banks; we also, through analyzing the present situation and risk evading of core capital structure and subsidiary capital structure, sum up the capital structure features of Chinese commercial banks at the present stage, and put forward the viewpoint that there is an internal link between commercial banks'capital structure and risk evading. In Chapters Fourth, Five and Six, we, based on the principals of security, liquidity and profitability of commercial banks, give a quantitative analysis of the link between capital structure and risk evading by adopting calculating statistics. In affirming the important links between risk evading and capital analysis of commercial banks, we detect the key factors that might lead to risks in the capital structure of Chinese commercial banks, and emphasize the importance and urgency to better the capital structure of commercial banks. In Chapter Seventh, we, under the framework of "three characters" principal of commercial banks and giving full consideration to the interrelation between security, liquidity and profitability and there interfeeding effects on risk evading behavior of commercial banks, establish the linking models of capital structure and risk evading for commercial banks, which is a proof of the analysis results in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Meanwhile, we point out the feature that the responding coefficient between capital structure and risk evading changes with the time. In Chapter Eight, on the basis of consideration of the present capital structures of commercial banks in countries with mature market economy including the US, Japan and ROK, we establish a Optimal economic model of capital structure by adopting the economic theory, and point out the practical choice to realize the target of optimizing capital structure. And on that basis, we propose the strategy and realizing method for the optimization of capital structures in Chinese commercial banks. In Chapter Nine, we focus on the countermeasures for the difficulties realizing in realizing optimized capital structure, including optimized financing structure, stockholders'right structure and external environment.
引文
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