三峡库区及上游流域生态补偿机制与水污染管理研究
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摘要
流域生态补偿是保持流域内经济平衡、维持经济可持续发展、实现社会公平的重要手段。三峡库区作为长江流域中上游地区的重要生态屏障区，其环境的好坏直接影响当地的经济发展和下游地区的生产生活成本，如何协调好当地经济发展与生态保护的关系，做好上游地区的水污染防治工作，是本文研究的主旨。
对库区水污染现状的汇总和整理是本文研究的出发点。通过对水污染风险的梳理，本文将三峡库区目前比较严重的水污染问题归纳为三点。一是工业废水排放，二是农业面源污染，三是跨境水污染。
本文首先针对跨界水污染纠纷问题，通过建立跨界水污染生态补偿机制，对上游地区形成制约。然后在跨界水污染生态补偿的制约下，研究上游地区对本地的面源污染和点源污染进行管理的问题。针对库区污染比较严重的农业面源污染问题，本文设计针对农户的生态补偿机制。其目的是从遏制面源污染的源头，彻底改变土地等自然资源原有落后的利用方式，促进农业生产技术和农户生产生活水平的提高。针对工业污水排放也就是点源污染管理问题进行研究。同样是在跨界水污染生态补偿机制的约束下，上游地区政府如何平衡本地的经济发展与污染排放的问题。从政府和企业间的互动博弈，研究政府如何有效的对点源污染进行控制的问题。最后同样是在跨界水污染生态补偿机制的传导作用下，研究政府如何制定政策，引导企业做出技术升级的投资决策，改善本地区的环境。
本文得出的结论主要有以下几方面：
①针对跨流域污染问题，建议建立跨流域的生态补偿机制。通过分析，认为上下游可以采用最终开价仲裁法议定污染量的补偿系数，并且对于不同程度的污染应当采用阶梯系数。当污染量较小时，补偿系数可以比较低，当污染量较大时，单位污染量给予的赔偿系数应当较大。
②针对农业面源污染设计了结合直接补偿与小额贷款的生态补偿思路。建议通过政府担保和利息补贴等方式，确保农户生态补偿项目的顺利实施。首先对生态补偿机制的设计，并模拟参与生态补偿项目的双方主体的博弈过程。根据农户和地方政府的参与约束条件、激励相容约束条件计算出使得补偿主体双方都能在补偿项目中获利的参数取值。认为生态补偿项目设计中，适当的惩罚机制，可以降低农户违约的道德风险。合理的利息补贴可以缓解农户逆向选择的问题，降低农户的整体风险水平，保证补偿主体的收益。在此基础上，本文进一步说明向农户提供利息补贴并不但不会影响政府的收益，相反还十分有利于生态补偿活动的良性循环，提高生态补偿项目的覆盖面。建立结合小额贷款的生态补偿机制，是生态补偿实践的值得探索的一个新思路。
③针对工业点源污染问题，通过构造流域上游地方政府和企业间的随机微分对策模型，分别求解地方政府扮演监管方和企业合谋者两个角色时，不同均衡策略和流域总体的污染水平，得出了地方政府在缺乏中央政府监管时，更倾向于与企业进行合谋的结论。同时也说明了为什么出现政企合谋时，会给当地带来较高的经济产出和较高的污染水平。这从理论上解释了现实中地区经济发展伴随难以消除的高污染现象的内在原因。本文认为，政企合谋现象的存在使污染减排的效果大打折扣，而模型说明了政企合谋的存在是一种均衡，因此需要外力来破除这种均衡。
④政府可以降低本地污染的政策除了对企业征收污染税之外，地方政府还可以通过制定合理政策，来引导企业进行技术升级和设备改造达到降低污染排放的目标。由于微小的政策变动，都会给企业决策的很大的影响，政府需要在根据经济环境和行业信息，考虑到企业的潜在反应后，才能既兼顾到企业利益，又达成环境指标。
论文的主要创新点体现在以下三个方面：
本文的创新之一在于对生态补偿机制的创新设计。将农户小额贷款与直接经济补贴相结合，设计一种生态补偿思路，从激励机制方面对生态补偿机制设计进行探讨，并采用数理模型对生态补偿作用于流域跨界污染领域的过程和效果进行定量分析。一方面，这种补偿思路没有增加生态补偿的资金负担；另一方面，也有利于农户未来的发展。因此本文认为，建立结合小额贷款的生态补偿机制，是生态补偿实践的值得探索的一个新思路。
本文创新之二是应用方法上的创新，在污染治理这个问题应用微分对策工具并不多见。在考虑到环境决策背后的生态补偿背景，用微分对策对行政区内污染控制主体（政府和企业）进行连续时间下的决策分析，能够同时考虑到局中人面对环境政策的理性反应，较为真实地模拟局中人的行为，为给出合理的政策建议提供理论基础。
本文创新之三是在研究结论上的新发现。通过对污染治理博弈问题的研究，本文发现政企合谋现象的存在使污染减排的效率降低，而模型恰好说明了政企合谋的存在是一种博弈均衡，因此本文认为需要提出政策来破除污染治理中的这种均衡，使水污染治理工作更有效率。
River valley ecological compensation is an important to keep economic balance,maintain sustainable development，and to realize social fairness. Three gorges reservoirarea, as important ecological barrier area of Yangtze River valley, has a direct impacton local economy development and living standards and cost of production indownstream area with its environmental status. This study focuses on how to coordinatethe relationship between local economic development and ecology conservation, as wellas on how to promote water pollution management in Three Gorges Reservoir and itsupstream.
This study starts from summarizing and classificating the present situation of waterpollution in the Three Gorges Reservoir. Based on analyzing the water pollution risk,the most serious water pollution issues are concludedinto three aspects, which areindustrial wastewater discharge, agricultural non-point source pollution andcross-border water pollution.
First, Ecological compensation mechanism, as a restriction to upstream area, isestablished to overcome the dilemma of transboundary water pollution dispute. Underthe restriction of ecological compensation, the special issues about how the upstreamgovernment manages non-point source pollution and point source pollution arediscussed.
The paper suggests the design of the ecological compensation mechanism forfarmers, in order to overcome the serious agricultural non-point source pollution.Mechanism that integrates small-loans with the Eco-compensation is designed not onlyused to alleviate agricultural non-point source pollution, but also to overcome farmerhouseholds’ difficulty in financing. Resources behind the original ways of using,promoting agricultural production technology and farmers to raise the level ofproduction and life.
Third, this study reveals the way of how Eco-compensation Mechanism influencespollution abatement decision of upstream area government by stochastic differentialgame. This paper applies a Stackelberg stochastic differential game and a cooperationstochastic differential game involving local government and industrial sector.
Finally, also under the transboundary ecological compensation mechanism, thisresearch shows how the government policy guides the enterprise to make the technology upgrading investment strategy and improve the environment of the area.
The conclusion of this paper involves several aspects as bellowed:
①According to the transboundary pollution problem, this paper suggestsestablishing a transboundary ecological compensation mechanism. By analyzing, thispaper sticks to the point that AFOA can be used to decide the Ecological compensation.
②The paper suggests the design of the ecological compensation mechanism forfarmers, in order to overcome the serious agricultural non-point source pollution. Themain source of pollution in Three Gorges reservoir is agricultural non-point sourcepollution. Mechanism that integrates small-loans with the Eco-compensation is not onlyused to alleviate agricultural non-point source pollution, but also to overcome farmerhouseholds’ difficulty in financing. Based on a qualitative analysis, this studyestablishes a game model, and proves that a proper punishment mechanism for breachof contract and interest subsidization can reduce the farmer households’ moral hazardand adverse selection. Without changing the other conditions, the introduction ofinterest subsidization can increase the coverage of the ecological compensationmechanism, as well as improve social welfare and ecological protection efficiency.
③This study reveals the way of how Eco-compensation Mechanism influencespollution abatement decision of upstream area government by stochastic differentialgame. This paper applies a Stackelberg stochastic differential game and a cooperationstochastic differential game involving local government and industrial sector. Byanalyzing and comparing the Nash Equilibrium, this study offers the underlying reasonfor the phenomenon why local government tends to collude with enterprises, and thenmake some suggestions to overcome this problem.
④Except for collecting pollution tax, local governments can also guideenterprise technology upgrade and equipment modification to achieve pollutionemission cut target by formulating reasonable policies. Ecological objective promoteslocal government who is in a reservoir area adopting new environmental policies,which also encourage firms to save energy and reduce emissions. Based on realoption theory, this study characterizes the arrival of new environmental policy as aPoisson jump process. Under the situation that neither the policy arrival time norcontents can be determined, with the real option theory, this study focuses on offeringsuggestions for firms to decide best investment timing and scale, providing thecumulative probability distribution function of investment timing, and giving anumerical analysis. By analyzing the relationship between policy and investment decision, a perverse result that the high subsidy does not always encourageinvestment all the time is found, which can be a valuable reference for government tocontrol industry pollution and make reasonable policies.
The innovation spots of this paper are listed as bellow:
The first is suggesting a creative design for ecological compensation mechanism.Mechanism that integrates small-loans with the Eco-compensation is a new conceptionof ecological compensation. A new attempt in mechanism designing is quantity analyseto the influence of ecological compensation on transboundary pollution usingmathematical model.
Second, stochastic differential game is established in Continuous time to analyzethe decision making of players under the background of ecological compensation. Theseplayers include local government and enterprise. The paper is not limited toenvironmental policy itself, but also considers the rational reaction of players facingenvironmental policy. This paper tries to simulate the actual reactions of humanbehavior, and provides theoretical basis of reasonable policy suggestions.
The third one is the new discovery in the conclutions. The model gives aexplanation that rapid development of economy is always accompanied by highpollution.
对库区水污染现状的汇总和整理是本文研究的出发点。通过对水污染风险的梳理，本文将三峡库区目前比较严重的水污染问题归纳为三点。一是工业废水排放，二是农业面源污染，三是跨境水污染。
本文首先针对跨界水污染纠纷问题，通过建立跨界水污染生态补偿机制，对上游地区形成制约。然后在跨界水污染生态补偿的制约下，研究上游地区对本地的面源污染和点源污染进行管理的问题。针对库区污染比较严重的农业面源污染问题，本文设计针对农户的生态补偿机制。其目的是从遏制面源污染的源头，彻底改变土地等自然资源原有落后的利用方式，促进农业生产技术和农户生产生活水平的提高。针对工业污水排放也就是点源污染管理问题进行研究。同样是在跨界水污染生态补偿机制的约束下，上游地区政府如何平衡本地的经济发展与污染排放的问题。从政府和企业间的互动博弈，研究政府如何有效的对点源污染进行控制的问题。最后同样是在跨界水污染生态补偿机制的传导作用下，研究政府如何制定政策，引导企业做出技术升级的投资决策，改善本地区的环境。
本文得出的结论主要有以下几方面：
①针对跨流域污染问题，建议建立跨流域的生态补偿机制。通过分析，认为上下游可以采用最终开价仲裁法议定污染量的补偿系数，并且对于不同程度的污染应当采用阶梯系数。当污染量较小时，补偿系数可以比较低，当污染量较大时，单位污染量给予的赔偿系数应当较大。
②针对农业面源污染设计了结合直接补偿与小额贷款的生态补偿思路。建议通过政府担保和利息补贴等方式，确保农户生态补偿项目的顺利实施。首先对生态补偿机制的设计，并模拟参与生态补偿项目的双方主体的博弈过程。根据农户和地方政府的参与约束条件、激励相容约束条件计算出使得补偿主体双方都能在补偿项目中获利的参数取值。认为生态补偿项目设计中，适当的惩罚机制，可以降低农户违约的道德风险。合理的利息补贴可以缓解农户逆向选择的问题，降低农户的整体风险水平，保证补偿主体的收益。在此基础上，本文进一步说明向农户提供利息补贴并不但不会影响政府的收益，相反还十分有利于生态补偿活动的良性循环，提高生态补偿项目的覆盖面。建立结合小额贷款的生态补偿机制，是生态补偿实践的值得探索的一个新思路。
③针对工业点源污染问题，通过构造流域上游地方政府和企业间的随机微分对策模型，分别求解地方政府扮演监管方和企业合谋者两个角色时，不同均衡策略和流域总体的污染水平，得出了地方政府在缺乏中央政府监管时，更倾向于与企业进行合谋的结论。同时也说明了为什么出现政企合谋时，会给当地带来较高的经济产出和较高的污染水平。这从理论上解释了现实中地区经济发展伴随难以消除的高污染现象的内在原因。本文认为，政企合谋现象的存在使污染减排的效果大打折扣，而模型说明了政企合谋的存在是一种均衡，因此需要外力来破除这种均衡。
④政府可以降低本地污染的政策除了对企业征收污染税之外，地方政府还可以通过制定合理政策，来引导企业进行技术升级和设备改造达到降低污染排放的目标。由于微小的政策变动，都会给企业决策的很大的影响，政府需要在根据经济环境和行业信息，考虑到企业的潜在反应后，才能既兼顾到企业利益，又达成环境指标。
论文的主要创新点体现在以下三个方面：
本文的创新之一在于对生态补偿机制的创新设计。将农户小额贷款与直接经济补贴相结合，设计一种生态补偿思路，从激励机制方面对生态补偿机制设计进行探讨，并采用数理模型对生态补偿作用于流域跨界污染领域的过程和效果进行定量分析。一方面，这种补偿思路没有增加生态补偿的资金负担；另一方面，也有利于农户未来的发展。因此本文认为，建立结合小额贷款的生态补偿机制，是生态补偿实践的值得探索的一个新思路。
本文创新之二是应用方法上的创新，在污染治理这个问题应用微分对策工具并不多见。在考虑到环境决策背后的生态补偿背景，用微分对策对行政区内污染控制主体（政府和企业）进行连续时间下的决策分析，能够同时考虑到局中人面对环境政策的理性反应，较为真实地模拟局中人的行为，为给出合理的政策建议提供理论基础。
本文创新之三是在研究结论上的新发现。通过对污染治理博弈问题的研究，本文发现政企合谋现象的存在使污染减排的效率降低，而模型恰好说明了政企合谋的存在是一种博弈均衡，因此本文认为需要提出政策来破除污染治理中的这种均衡，使水污染治理工作更有效率。
River valley ecological compensation is an important to keep economic balance,maintain sustainable development，and to realize social fairness. Three gorges reservoirarea, as important ecological barrier area of Yangtze River valley, has a direct impacton local economy development and living standards and cost of production indownstream area with its environmental status. This study focuses on how to coordinatethe relationship between local economic development and ecology conservation, as wellas on how to promote water pollution management in Three Gorges Reservoir and itsupstream.
This study starts from summarizing and classificating the present situation of waterpollution in the Three Gorges Reservoir. Based on analyzing the water pollution risk,the most serious water pollution issues are concludedinto three aspects, which areindustrial wastewater discharge, agricultural non-point source pollution andcross-border water pollution.
First, Ecological compensation mechanism, as a restriction to upstream area, isestablished to overcome the dilemma of transboundary water pollution dispute. Underthe restriction of ecological compensation, the special issues about how the upstreamgovernment manages non-point source pollution and point source pollution arediscussed.
The paper suggests the design of the ecological compensation mechanism forfarmers, in order to overcome the serious agricultural non-point source pollution.Mechanism that integrates small-loans with the Eco-compensation is designed not onlyused to alleviate agricultural non-point source pollution, but also to overcome farmerhouseholds’ difficulty in financing. Resources behind the original ways of using,promoting agricultural production technology and farmers to raise the level ofproduction and life.
Third, this study reveals the way of how Eco-compensation Mechanism influencespollution abatement decision of upstream area government by stochastic differentialgame. This paper applies a Stackelberg stochastic differential game and a cooperationstochastic differential game involving local government and industrial sector.
Finally, also under the transboundary ecological compensation mechanism, thisresearch shows how the government policy guides the enterprise to make the technology upgrading investment strategy and improve the environment of the area.
The conclusion of this paper involves several aspects as bellowed:
①According to the transboundary pollution problem, this paper suggestsestablishing a transboundary ecological compensation mechanism. By analyzing, thispaper sticks to the point that AFOA can be used to decide the Ecological compensation.
②The paper suggests the design of the ecological compensation mechanism forfarmers, in order to overcome the serious agricultural non-point source pollution. Themain source of pollution in Three Gorges reservoir is agricultural non-point sourcepollution. Mechanism that integrates small-loans with the Eco-compensation is not onlyused to alleviate agricultural non-point source pollution, but also to overcome farmerhouseholds’ difficulty in financing. Based on a qualitative analysis, this studyestablishes a game model, and proves that a proper punishment mechanism for breachof contract and interest subsidization can reduce the farmer households’ moral hazardand adverse selection. Without changing the other conditions, the introduction ofinterest subsidization can increase the coverage of the ecological compensationmechanism, as well as improve social welfare and ecological protection efficiency.
③This study reveals the way of how Eco-compensation Mechanism influencespollution abatement decision of upstream area government by stochastic differentialgame. This paper applies a Stackelberg stochastic differential game and a cooperationstochastic differential game involving local government and industrial sector. Byanalyzing and comparing the Nash Equilibrium, this study offers the underlying reasonfor the phenomenon why local government tends to collude with enterprises, and thenmake some suggestions to overcome this problem.
④Except for collecting pollution tax, local governments can also guideenterprise technology upgrade and equipment modification to achieve pollutionemission cut target by formulating reasonable policies. Ecological objective promoteslocal government who is in a reservoir area adopting new environmental policies,which also encourage firms to save energy and reduce emissions. Based on realoption theory, this study characterizes the arrival of new environmental policy as aPoisson jump process. Under the situation that neither the policy arrival time norcontents can be determined, with the real option theory, this study focuses on offeringsuggestions for firms to decide best investment timing and scale, providing thecumulative probability distribution function of investment timing, and giving anumerical analysis. By analyzing the relationship between policy and investment decision, a perverse result that the high subsidy does not always encourageinvestment all the time is found, which can be a valuable reference for government tocontrol industry pollution and make reasonable policies.
The innovation spots of this paper are listed as bellow:
The first is suggesting a creative design for ecological compensation mechanism.Mechanism that integrates small-loans with the Eco-compensation is a new conceptionof ecological compensation. A new attempt in mechanism designing is quantity analyseto the influence of ecological compensation on transboundary pollution usingmathematical model.
Second, stochastic differential game is established in Continuous time to analyzethe decision making of players under the background of ecological compensation. Theseplayers include local government and enterprise. The paper is not limited toenvironmental policy itself, but also considers the rational reaction of players facingenvironmental policy. This paper tries to simulate the actual reactions of humanbehavior, and provides theoretical basis of reasonable policy suggestions.
The third one is the new discovery in the conclutions. The model gives aexplanation that rapid development of economy is always accompanied by highpollution.
引文
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